A NEW

TREATISE

OF THE

ART of THINKING;

Or, A Compleat

System of Reflections,

Concerning the

CONDUCT and IMPROVEMENT of the MIND.

ILLUSTRATED

With Variety of CHARACTERS and EXAMPLES drawn from the *Ordinary Occurrences* of LIFE.

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Done into *ENGLISH.*

In TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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PREFACE.

MEN *have conceived two different Prejudices againſt* Logic. *Thoſe who confine this Name to what has hitherto been taught under it in the Schools, deſpiſe it as an Heap of Nonſenſe; and becauſe they never remember without Uneaſineſs the Pains they have taken, and the Time they have loſt in ſtudying it, they do not like to hear any body ſpeak of it, nor would they be much troubled if the Uſe thereof were for ever aboliſhed. Others there are, who do indeed agree, that* Logic *ought to contain ſomething more than what we meet with in* Ariſtotle *and* Ramus; *but they think it ought not to be extended much farther.*

To fill a Syſtem of Logic *with Maxims, which properly belong to a Treatiſe of Morality, is, in their Opinion, to lead the Reader from the Purpoſe, and to enrich one Science with the Spoils of another, is what they do not think allowable.*

I NEVER cou'd imagine the Sciences to be diſtinguiſh'd by Bounds or Limits ſo exact and inviolable, as thoſe that divide Kingdoms. I am ſenſible on the contrary, that the Difference of their Objects and Views, does not at all hinder their having a great many Parts in common, nor obſtruct their confirming or illuſtrating one another. I look upon Errors and Vices, as Diſtempers of the Mind: The End of Logic *is to prevent and weed out Errors; as the End of Morality is to oppoſe and eradicate Vices. But if there are Maxims and Reflections, which may with the ſame Succeſs be oppoſed both againſt Error and Vice, as certainly there are; if one and the ſame Remedy is equally uſeful againſt both of theſe Evils; why ſhould we be denied making uſe of them any where but in a Syſtem of* Ethics? *Has not a Syſtem of* Logic, *which teaches us to reaſon juſtly, an equal Right to whatever may promote the End it propoſes?*

I AFFIRM farther, That our Vices ariſe from our Errors; and that we ſhould commit no Faults, if we were not miſtaken, either about our Duty, or our true Intereſt: From whence I conclude, that our firſt Care ought to be to guard againſt Error. Whatever Rules, Maxims, and Reflections may ſerve to make us avoid this, we ought to make our own, and render very familiar to us; by theſe we ought to begin. Logic *therefore has the beſt Right to be before-hand with* Ethics; *and it is the Part of the latter to take up with the Leavings of the former.* There occurs to me ſome good Maxim, which will ſerve to advance me in Knowledge, and that may alſo help to improve me in Virtue: Muſt I therefore reſerve it to ſecure me againſt Vice, and not employ it at all againſt Error? Should I loſe the Benefit thereof, if I made a double Uſe of it.

SO far ſhould we be then from making any Scruple to advance in Logic *a Truth, which would alſo ſerve extremely well in* Ethics, *for fear of meeting with the ſame Argument twice in a Courſe of Philoſophy, that on the contrary, we ought in one ſingle Science to repeat conſtantly the very ſame Principles and Rules, as often as ever*

there is occaſion for them. A Syſtem of Phyſick would be very imperfect, if in treating of any particular Diſtemper, it ſhould decline mentioning the ſeveral Remedies proper for it, under the pretence of their being mentioned already under another Diſtemper, for which they are alſo proper.

WE are ſubject to a great Number of Illuſions: Error inſinuates it ſelf into us by a great many Ways, and Truth finds a thouſand Means to eſcape us. How then? Becauſe we have made good Advantage of a certain Rule in particular Circumſtances, muſt we reject it in others, where it would be of equal Service; and becauſe it offends our Delicacy to hear the ſame Thing twice, muſt we deprive our ſelves of the Benefit we are ſure to receive from it?

SOME will perhaps further Object, That granting there ought to be a Liberty of making uſe of ſuch Arguments in Logic, *as are proper to* Ethics, *yet that it ought to be ſtretched no farther than juſt to the bare mentioning and urging them by the Bye, without inſiſting and dwelling upon them. But I imagine thoſe who talk at this Rate, have ſcarce taken the Pains to reflect ſufficiently*

ently upon the Heart of Man, upon the Nature of Rules, and upon the Manner in which they ought to be uſed and applied, in order to reap the entire Fruits of them.

IT is neceſſary that Rules ſhould be made very familiar to us, that we may conſtantly obſerve them whenever we have Occaſion. It is neceſſary that our Minds ſhould be ſo formed upon, and contract ſo intimate and perfect an Habit of them, that to follow them, we need not ſo much as to be at the Trouble of thinking on them. It is neceſſary that what we call Artificial Logic *ſhould become in us* Natural Logic. *The bare Knowledge of Rules could never produce this Effect: It is by the Uſe we make of them, that we learn to manage them, and form our ſelves to an Habit of employing them to the beſt Advantage. Explain to young People the Maxims of* Logic *as clearly as you pleaſe; make them get them by Heart, and repeat them an hundred and an hundred Times over; yet if you go no farther than this, you will teach them no more to think Juſtly, than you would to ſpeak Eloquently, by explaining only to them the Rules of Grammar, and ranging them in their Memory, without taking any Pains to ſhew*

them, in Diſcourſes and Compoſitions, Examples of the good Effects of the Obſervation of them, and of the Ridiculouſneſs that attends the Violation of them. In order to make a young Lad a good Logician, *and to form him to Juſtneſs of Reaſoning, after having taught him the Rules, it is abſolutely neceſſary to exerciſe his Underſtanding upon a great Number of Examples: They ſhould be ſuch as are engaging, and drawn from various Subjects, that he may learn in all ſorts of Things, to make uſe of the Helps theſe Rules afford. The Attention which I thought my ſelf obliged to give to my Pupils, has taught me, by Experience, that my firſt Edition did not contain near ſo many Examples as were neceſſary.*

IT is not enough to know the Diſtempers, whether of the Mind, or Body, ſo well as to be able to diſtinguiſh them by their ſeveral Names; we muſt alſo underſtand the Cauſes of them, if we would be aſſured of the Means to prevent them, and be able to put them in practiſe with better Succeſs. The Remedies with which we oppoſe the Diſtempers of the Body, are for the moſt part diſagreeable, and oftentimes

times painful: The Precautions with which we guard againſt Error, are neither very pleaſant, but oftentimes difficult, and mortifying to Self-Love. To reſolve to make uſe of theſe Remedies, it is expedient to be acquainted with all the Ridiculouſneſs and Danger of thoſe Evils, which cannot without their Aſſiſtance be avoided. I have therefore thought it the indiſpenſable Duty of a Logician, *to trace out the Sources of our Errors, and to dwell upon their Effects. If we were made more ſenſible of all the Conſequences of our Errors, we ſhould be more afraid of them, and ſhould reaſon with more Circumſpection.*

THERE are Evils that reign ſo univerſally, and which we are ſo much accuſtom'd to, that we do not ſo much as regard them as Evils, nor does it even enter into our Minds that it is neceſſary to ſtand upon our Guard againſt them. So long as a Penſion, ſo long as the good Graces of a Great Man, will determine us much more powerfully, and influence our Belief a great deal more effectually, than a Train of Syllogiſms, we ſhall labour in vain to find Rules proper to be obſerved in Reaſoning, becauſe no Body will follow them,

them, except in indifferent Matters; and they will be neglected in thoſe, where it is moſt neceſſary to follow them. We ought to begin by gaining the Heart, and making the Obſervation of theſe Maxims more ſacred and amiable to it, than any Conſideration in the World beſide, that may contribute to its Satisfaction. This Obſervation diſcovers the Reaſon, why I have ſpent ſo many Pages in repreſenting Mankind as the deſpicable Sport of Error; becauſe one Part find in their high Station, and Revenue, a ſufficient Title to follow all their Fancies, and the other in their Dependance; a Reaſon ſtrong enough to adopt them, and to endeavour to juſtify them.

THE little Care that has been taken to apply the Rules of Reaſoning to Matters of Practice, and to the Conduct of Mankind, has not a little contributed to make Logic, *which contains theſe Rules, look'd upon as an uſeleſs Art, full of empty Promiſes. When we have ſeen nothing in the Behaviour of Men of Learning, that ſhews a greater Share of good Senſe, of Rectitude of Heart, and of Clearneſs of Underſtanding, than in the Conduct of thoſe who have never ſtudied: When we have even ſeen them fall into the greateſt Faults, we*

cannot

cannot be perſuaded that they think more prudently in Matters of bare Speculation; and we have ground to ſuſpect, either that their Hearts are very vicious, or their Rules very uſeleſs. He who knows and loves theſe Rules as he ought to do, ſhou'd conſult them upon all ſorts of Subjects, but upon the moſt important, more than upon the reſt: If once we accuſtom our ſelves to neglect them upon a great many Occaſions, we ſhall eaſily neglect them upon all. Theſe Rules ought to enlighten us, and ſerve for our Guide and Direction in Morality, as well as in Speculation. Logic *is an Art, whoſe End is to render Men worthy of their Name and Definition, Rational and Happy, upon that very Account becauſe they are Rational.*

AS ſoon as I conſider'd Logic *in this View, it ſeem'd to me to be of much greater Importance, to make it expoſe the Ridiculouſneſs of our Errors with reſpect to Morality, than the Abſurdity of Sophiſtry upon Subjects of bare Curioſity. The Reaſon that moſt People caſt their Eyes upon the Follies of others, is, that they may not have Time to perceive their own: I have endeavour'd to make them be taken in another Light, being perſuaded that there is*

no Study ſo uſeful as that of the Faults of others, when they are attended to only with a Deſign of avoiding the like our ſelves. A great Means to prevent our falling into Ridicule, is to ſee it in others, where Self-Love neither diſguiſes nor excuſes it; and to conſider with our ſelves, at the ſame time, that we cannot fail of falling into the ſame our ſelves, ſince we are under the Influence of the ſame Principles, unleſs we uſe our utmoſt Efforts to diſcover and prevent them.

TO the Additions I have made in this Edition, to the Body of the Work, I have thought it proper to ſubjoin a great many Quotations. I have tranſlated ſome of the Latin *ones; others I have paraphraſed; and of ſome I have been content to abridge the Senſe, and give the Subſtance of them. I have thought it very uſeful to preſent the ſame Truths in different Lights. Every Thing which may contribute to make them better reliſh'd, and render them more familiar, ſeem'd to me to be of Importance. I have made Choice of ſuch Authors where Logical Truths ſeem'd moſt diſpers'd; and I have taken a Pleaſure in ranging in ſome Order that which pleas'd me, in whatever*

Place

Place I found it, and which wou'd yet pleaſe more, if in reading there was no fear of forgetting.

WHEN I borrow from Authors Examples of the Errors Men commit by neglecting theſe Rules, I quote them if they be antient; but when I happen to find fault with any of the Thoughts of the Moderns, I neither mention their Names, nor their Books: It wou'd have been very difficult for me to have done it. Sometimes in reading, I put down upon a Piece of Paper the Subſtance of a Train of Reaſoning, which does not appear juſt, and I take ſo little Pleaſure in contradicting, let it be what it will, that in a little Time I forget from whence I took this Extract.

IT may be, ſome Readers will here and there find ſome Thoughts, which they have met with before in other Authors; but I muſt beg of them not to take it ill, if I have not done Juſtice to thoſe from whom they may think I have borrow'd them; I have done it as far as my Memory wou'd ſerve. It may have happen'd alſo, that ſome Things, which may be thought to belong to another, may yet be actually my own: The Roads

that

that lead to Truth are not ſo very numerous, but that we may meet with one another from Time to Time upon the Way, without ſetting out from the ſame Place. Beſides this, as I cannot be ſuppoſed always to read with Pen in Hand, the Impreſſion which ſome Truths in reading make upon me, may afterwards revive upon ſome certain Occaſions, without its being in my Power to diſcover whether I owe them entirely to theſe Occaſions only, or not. One Study from which I have received a great Part of my Reflexions, is that of the World; but it wou'd be equally impoſſible for me to refer to the reſpective Perſons the ſeveral Miſtakes and Errors I have taken Notice of: I remember the Faults, but forget the Authors. Some may imagine themſelves deſcribed, whom I never thought of; and others, on the contrary, may have furniſh'd me with Pictures, which they will not know again when they meet with them.

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THE

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A NEW TREATISE OF THE ART of *THINKING.*

PART I.

SECT. I.

Containing an Account of our Perceptions, *so far as they vary on the Score of the different Faculties that give Birth to them.*

CHAP. I.

Of Logic, *or the Art of* Thinking, *in general; and of the Method of Treating it.*

I. IT is frequent for Men to fall into *Error*; and sometimes indeed they happen to meet with *Truth*. But it will readily be granted that the compleat Use of our Faculties is to be able to think justly, without being liable to Mistakes. In order to this we must search out the *Principles* and Rules upon

What Logic is.

upon which our Thoughts ought to be form'd, and carried on, directly to the Diſcovery of Truth, without being any way diverted or miſled. LOGIC therefore, or the ART OF THINKING, is a *Syſtem* of ſuch Principles, Obſervations, and Maxims, as are able to furniſh the human Underſtanding with a greater Degree of Penetration, Force, Extent, Exactneſs, and Readineſs either to diſcover Truth of it ſelf, or to comprehend it when propoſed to it by others, or, laſtly, to communicate it to them in its Turn upon its own Diſcovery.

Its principal Parts.

II. To reduce theſe Obſervations and Rules into a *Syſtem*, that is, to range them in Order, ſo as to make the Knowledge and Practice of them more eaſy, it is neceſſary to divide them into diſtinct Claſſes, under reſpective Heads, according to the different Thoughts they are to conduct and direct. In the firſt Place are form'd our *Perceptions*, that are called *Simple*, becauſe they are only the Repreſentation of Objects, without determining any thing about them, either affirmatively or negatively. As, when I have the Perception or Repreſentation of a Tree, of the Sun, or of a Triangle, or when I recollect in my Memory how they uſed to appear to me, without troubling my ſelf whether the Objects themſelves are really ſuch as my Perceptions repreſent them, or not. Afterwatds we compare our Perceptions together, and obſerve their Connexion, or Oppoſition, which is call'd *Judging*; as when I ſay, That *Trees are nouriſh'd by their Roots*; or that *one ſide of a Triangle is leſs than the other two*. Thus I ſay, *Knowledge is valuable*; and that *Riches are not ſufficient to make Men happy*. When I compare the Signification of the Term *Knowledge*, with that of the Term *Valuable*, I find they agree; but when I compare what is ſignified by the Word *Riches*, with what is ſignified by *a Sufficiency to make Men happy*, I do not find any ſuch Agreement; and therefore *judge* negatively in this Caſe, as in the former I *judged* affirmatively.

IN the ſame manner, as we compare our Perceptions in order to form our JUDGMENTS, we alſo compare our Judgments together, and from thence draw a Concluſion, which is call'd *Reaſoning*. I know, for Example, that he is happy, who can ſatisfy his Deſires; and in order to ſatisfy one's Deſires, I perceive it neceſſary to moderate them. And from theſe two Propoſitions I conclude, that the Way to render our ſelves happy, is to learn the Maſtery of our ſelves.

Laſtly, BY rightly diſpoſing a great Number of Thoughts, Reflections, Reaſonings, Principles, and Concluſions, we form

form what is call'd a *Diſcourſe*; and to ſucceed the better in the right ordering of ſo many different Parts, a certain *Method* is neceſſary: And this is the fourth Operation of the Underſtanding, to which Rules muſt be preſcribed. And with reſpect to theſe four general Differences in our way of Thinking, we ſhould divide *Logic* (according to ſome celebrated Authors) into four principal Parts.

BUT becauſe from our Infancy we gain an Habit of ſpeaking as readily almoſt as we can think, there ariſes by that Means ſuch a Connexion betwixt our Thoughts and our Expreſſions, that the one are hardly ever without the other; and this Connexion will oblige us to avoid ſeparating theſe two Acts, and to give Rules for the one at the ſame time with the other. Theſe Rules come ſo much the more properly within our Deſign, becauſe the End of *Logic* is to aſſiſt the Underſtanding not only of it ſelf to diſcover Truth, but moreover to comprehend it more readily from the Inſtructions of others, and to demonſtrate it to them with more Clearneſs when diſcover'd.

IT is evident that all this requires a great Attention to the Language that is made uſe of: But however, it is not neceſſary to make a *fifth* Part of *Logic* to teach the Art of ſpeaking with more Propriety and Clearneſs, of entering more readily into the Thoughts of others, and of explaining more exactly their Diſcourſe; only as we ſhall examine, in their Order, our ſeveral Ways of Thinking, and lay down upon each of them their proper Rules, we ſhall at the ſame time make Remarks upon the Sufficiency or Inſufficiency of the Terms that are made uſe of to expreſs them. And as the Exactneſs of Language depends upon the Relation it bears to our Thoughts, the Conſequences will more immediately follow their Principles, when the Rules of our Language do immediately follow thoſe of our Thoughts; ſo that this Method will ſpare the Reader the Fatigue and Trouble of Repetitions.

III. IN truth, the four principal Operations, upon which the Diviſion of *Logic* is founded, have ſo great a Connexion together, that it is hardly poſſible to arrive to Perfection in one of them, without the Aſſiſtance of the others: They produce one another reciprocally. For to treat of *Simple Perception*, we muſt make uſe of *Method*; ſo that the fourth muſt precede the firſt, to which it ſelf at the ſame time altogether owes its Original. It would therefore be impoſſible ever to arrive to Perfection in any one of theſe four Acts, ſince in order to this we

The four firſt Operations ariſe reciprocally one from another.

must first be supposed perfect in all the rest: For as to discover the Rules of the first, we shall want to understand the Rules of the second; so to discover these, we should want to be inform'd of those. But infinite WISDOM and GOODNESS, that created us on purpose for the Knowledge and Love of Truth, has provided for this Difficulty: There are implanted within us *naturally*, without the Assistance of Art or Precepts, Faculties sufficient to *perceive*, to *judge*, to *reason*, and to carry on *methodically* our Views and Conclusions. And it is by the Use of these natural Faculties that we discover Art, which afterwards serves to perfect those Principles from which it self was derived.

WHAT we have said of the Art of *Logic*, *Cicero* has applied to Arts in general: *Omnes enim, tacito quodam sensu, sine ullâ Arte aut Ratione, quæ sint in Artibus ac Rationibus recta & prava dijudicant, neque earum quemquam funditus Natura voluit esse expertem.* De Orat. Lib. III.

THOSE who have taken Pains to bring Arts to Perfection, have only left to others Helps and Rules to guide them more easily to that very Point, to which they themselves have first arrived without any Guide or Precept at all, but with abundance more Pain and Labour, and, as it were, by mere good Fortune. *Tradamus ea quæ nos Usus docuit, ut nobis ducibus veniant eò, quò sine duce ipsi pervenimus.* Cic. de Orat. Lib. II.

Of Natural Logic.

IV. THESE Dispositions, with which we seem born, and which never fail of being display'd by Time, and improved by Experience; Dispositions which we follow without being sensible of, and without having occasion to reflect on; these, I say, form what we call *Natural Logic*. These supply the want of Art; they stand in the room of it, and produce the same Effects. The Reason we do not so easily discover and determine what they are, is our being used and habituated to follow those happy Inclinations without reflecting on them, and often without being sensible of them. However, I think they may be referr'd to these four Heads: 1. To adhere closely and solely to *Evidence*, and by that to form the Judgment. 2. To avoid *Precipitation* in all Inquiries and Determinations. 3. To preserve a constant *Attention*. And lastly, 4. To maintain a perpetual *Tranquility* of Mind, secure from the Ruffle of our Passions, which do nothing but darken our Ideas, disturb our Attention, divert us from what we ought to dwell upon, and fix us to what we should be sure to avoid.

THE

THE *Logic* which is to be met with in Books, and is call'd *Artificial*, ſhould be needleſs to any that ſhould happen to poſſeſs theſe four Diſpoſitions in a perfect Degree. This is what conſtitutes the Abilities of great Genius's. And to perfect and eſtabliſh them in us, ſhould be the ſole End of all our Searches and Remarks.

THEY all four improve in us according to the Inclination and Love we have for Truth; a Love which muſt be pure, ſincere, lively, and exalted above the Fear of Mens Diſpleaſure, the Deſire of their Praiſes, and the Eſteem of what is call'd *Fortune*. When nothing intimates, when nothing dazzles, when nothing affects it, in compariſon to Truth, then the Mind becomes more and more compoſed, attentive, circumſpect, and attached to Evidence only; nothing is neglected that leads to Truth, no Pains are ſpared that may help towards the Diſcovery of it, and there is no Stop made at any thing till it is found.

The Uſefulneſs of artificial Logic.

V. IT is an Art of which we may ſay, as of all others, That Nature contains the Seeds and Foundations: And the Knowledge and Obſervation of Precepts make theſe Seeds more fruitful, and teach us to build with more Succeſs upon theſe Foundations. There are People that have wonderful Talents; ſome for Singing, ſome for Building; others for inventing and contriving Machines, for Painting, for Engraving, *&c.* But for the very ſame Reaſon that they are found to make a great Progreſs in them without Art and without Rules, we muſt conclude that with thoſe Aſſiſtances they would have gone much further. Why ſhould we think otherwiſe of *Logic*? With whatever Penetration, Extent, and Clearneſs of Underſtanding we may be born, why ſhou'd it not be poſſible by *Logic* to improve theſe rich Talents of Nature? Much more will it be of Service to thoſe of lower Endowments (*a*).

I OWN, and Experience ſhews it, that a ſufficient Application to any certain Science, may at laſt make one a tolerable Maſter of it, without being prepared with any Lecture of *Logic*, or having any Knowledge at all of it worth ſpeaking of; but in ſuch Examples, wou'd not there be a greater Progreſs made with greater Aſſiſtances? Wou'd not they gain a great deal more Ground in leſs Time? Wou'd not

(*a*) Neque enim ignoro & quæ bona ſunt, fieri meliora poſſe doctrinâ, & quæ non optima, aliquo modo acui tamen & corrigi poſſe. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* I.

their Ideas be ranged in better Order? And wou'd not there be a greater Clearneſs in their Works? If we take theſe Learned Men, that owe their Succeſs to an happy Genius, or to their great Induſtry, into Things that are new to them, and which they have not had time to examine on all ſides, and make themſelves Maſters of, it is eaſy to impoſe upon them, becauſe they are not furniſhed and guarded with thoſe general Rules which ſecure from Error in all Subjects. It takes a great deal of time to get to our Journey's End without Guides; and it is not without a great many Tryals, and being often out of the Road, and obliged to go back again, that we find our ſelves right at laſt: Whereas we advance a great Pace, when the right Way is once laid out to us.

ALL Arts have been cavil'd upon; and ſome great Orators have thought Eloquence for the moſt part Natural, without owing any thing conſiderable to Art (*b*). Nature, ſay they, teaches us to ſooth and inſinuate, to declare and gain our Point; and Uſe perfects theſe natural Diſpoſitions (*c*). I own all this; and yet at the ſame time maintain, that attending to Rules makes the Exerciſe of the natural Faculties more juſt and ſure. For ſince we meet with falſe Reaſoning, as well as juſt; and that among thoſe who reaſon, ſome ſhall think finely, and others groſly, one ſhall confound the moſt ſimple and eaſy Subjects, and another ſhall clear and enlighten the moſt obſcure and intricate; it muſt be granted, that if we do but obſerve carefully what it is that makes the one ſucceed ſo well, and the other ſo ill, we ſhall be able from theſe Remarks to diſcover an Art not to be deſpiſed (*a*). The Knowledge and Uſe of Precepts nouriſhes

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(*b*) Res mihi videtur eſſe facultate præclara, arte mediocri. *Anton. apud Cic. de Orat. Lib.* II.

(*c*) Ita nati, ut & blandiri & ſuppliciter inſinuare ab iis à quibus eſſet petendum, & adverſarios minaciter terrere poſſemus, & rem geſtam exponere, & id quod intenderemus confirmare, & id quod contra diceretur refellere, & ad extremum deprecari aliquid & conqueri, quibus in rebus omnis Oratorum verſaretur facultas, & quod conſuetudo exercitatioque, & intelligendi prudentiam acueret, & eloquendi celeritatem incitaret. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* I.

(*d*) Cum plerique temerè aut nullâ ratione cauſas in foro dicant, nonnulli autem propter exercitationem aut conſuetudinem aliquam callidiùs id faciant, non eſt dubium quin ſi quis animadverterit, quid ſit, quare alii meliùs quàm alii dicant, id poſſit notare. Ergo id qui toto in genere fecerint, is ſi non planè artem, ac quaſi artem quandam invenerit. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* II.

riſhes and improves the Force of the Underſtanding, corrects its Faults, and brightens its Beauties (*e*).

THERE are ſome happy Genius's who are born to (if I may ſo ſay) what others arrive to with Study and Application: But we ſee alſo ſome that have very great natural Parts, that ſuffer themſelves to be out-done by thoſe of meaner Capacities, by the Advantage of greater Induſtry and Application. So that every Day's Experience will ſufficiently refute whatever is alledged againſt the Uſefulneſs of Arts. The *Mexicans* have built Towns and Palaces, without the Uſe of any more than thoſe poor few Machines which they were acquainted with: But the Study of Mechanicks will be never the leſs eſteemed or purſued upon that Account. We ſhould always take care to diſtinguiſh between the Inconveniences that properly and truely belong to an Art, and thoſe that only bear its Name, and are at the ſame time often directly contrary to what that Name promiſes. Thus *Montaign* combats only a Phantom of *Logic*, when he asks, **Who has obtained any Knowledge from* Logic? *To what End ſerve all its fine Promiſes?* **Book* III. *Chap.* 8.

NEC AD MELIUS VIVENDUM, NEC AD COMMODIUS DISSERENDUM: That is, *It neither makes us better, nor wiſer; our Lives are not mended, nor our Thoughts improved by it.* This piece of Criticiſm is beſt replied to out of *Cicero*. " (*f*) The Precepts of *Logic* do not teach us ſo " much to diſcover Truth, as to weigh the Proofs by which " thoſe who pretend to have found it, endeavour to preſs it " upon others. At laſt, *adds he*, the *Logicians* wound them- " ſelves with their own Weapons: Upon the Strength and " Subtilty of their Art, they aſpire to Queſtions out of its " Reach, and which are not only impoſſible to be reſolved " by it, but do alſo in their Conſequences deſtroy and over- " turn its very Principles and Foundations before laid down; " ſo that by going too far, they find themſelves obliged to " return to the very Place from whence they firſt ſet out."

(*e*) Ingenii vis preceptis alitur & creſcit, novaſque perſuaſiones adjicit innatis, & depravata corrigit. *Sen. Epiſt.* 94. Imbecilliores adjuvabit & in bonum pronos educet ad ſumma. *Id. Epiſt.* 95.

(*f*) In hâc Arte, ſi modo eſt hæc Ars, nullum eſt præceptum, quomodo verum inveniatur, ſed tantùm eſt, quomodo judicetur. ------- Ad extremum ipſi ſe compungunt ſuis acuminibus, & multâ quærendo, reperiunt, non modò ea, quæ jam non poſſint ipſi diſſolvere, ſed etiam quibus ante exorſa & potius detexta propè retexantur. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* II.

THIS Cenſure falls upon the Defects of a bad *Logic*, and not at all upon the Rules of a good one. Theſe teach, without doubt, to diſcover and purſue with more Eaſe and Succeſs the Road that leads to Truth: But if they ſerv'd only the better to diſtinguiſh thoſe Errors into which we are liable to fall and fix, whether it be by the Heavineſs of the Underſtanding, or by the Conceitedneſs of the Temper, or by the Courſe of a bad Education; wou'd not this Uſe alone be ſufficient to evince the Neceſſity of them? For when two Men have reaſon'd differently, and by purſuing different Paths are come to Concluſions directly oppoſite, in order to diſcover which of them has thought the moſt juſtly, and to bring the other into the ſame Sentiment, is it not abſolutely neceſſary to make them agree upon the Principles and Rules which ought to be follow'd in reaſoning?

IN a word, the Knowledge of our ſelves being without Contradiction moſt worthy of our Attention, the Part which *Logic* contributes towards it, by giving us a Detail of what we have within us moſt excellent, will make it deſerve all our Application. It teaches us in what Order our Thoughts ſucceed one another; and how they receive their Birth, their Enlargement, and their Perfection: It inſtructs us in the Relation between our Thoughts, and the Terms by which we expreſs them: It diſtinguiſhes their different Kinds, and points out their Properties: It diſcovers the Sources of all our Miſtakes, and ſhews how we may correct, and, what is more, prevent them: It diſplays thoſe Principles and Rules which we conſtantly follow (though blindly, and without taking notice of them) whenever we think conformably to Truth, and that we ſucceed in our Enquiries. But our Buſineſs is to treat of *Logic* ſo as it may be underſtood, and not to declaim upon it, and ſet forth its Praiſes. Thoſe who ſhall read it with Attention, will beſt judge of its Value, and be ſenſible whether, or no, it deſerves the Applauſes that are beſtow'd upon it by thoſe that eſteem and recommend it.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Perception in general; and of its principal Kinds.

I. IT belongs not to *Logic* to examine to the bottom the Nature of *Thinking*, any more than that of *Judging*, or of *Reaſoning*, or, in a word, of thoſe *Faculties* by which we think. If it was neceſſary to know all this in order to diſcover and comprehend the Maxims of *Logic*, we muſt of Neceſſity be perfect Philoſophers, before we could be Maſters of the very Rules that are introductory to Philoſophy. It is for this Reaſon that, in my preſent Deſign of treating upon the Maxims that help towards the Knowledge and Advancement of other Sciences, I take care not to borrow from thoſe Sciences any Principles or Concluſions to demonſtrate that very Thing which, in my Judgment, ought to precede them; and I reaſon only upon ſuch Principles as are ſelf-evident, without ſuppoſing any previous Study. The Muſicians and Painters practiſe exactly the Rules of their Art, and make every Day Improvements in them, without, perhaps, ever ſo much as thinking of the Nature of Sounds and Colours. In trying to Sing and to Paint, certain Sounds have pleas'd, and certain Strokes have ſucceeded; by ſeparating what diſpleas'd from what was agreeable, and reflecting on the various Compoſitions of Sounds, and Mixtures of Colours, they form their Rules. We need only attend to our own proper Experience, and that will ſufficiently teach us to underſtand our Precepts, and even to diſcover them (*a*).

What Knowledge Logic *ſuppoſes.*

THIS

(*a*) Omnia ferè, quæ ſunt concluſa nunc in Artibus, diſperſa & diſſipata quondam fuerunt, ut in Muſicis Numeri, Voces & Modi; in ratione dicendi excogitare, ornare, diſponere, meminiſſe, agere; adhibita igitur eſt ars quædam quæ rem diſſolutam divulſamque conglutinaret, & ratione quâdam conſtringeret. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* I.

THIS will inform us, that *Thought* is *an Act conſcious of its own Exiſtence*. The Motion, for Inſtance, of an Arrow perceives not any thing of it ſelf: But Thought, for the ſame Reaſon that it exiſts at all, does perceive its own Exiſtence, and cannot be without being conſcious of it ſelf: He who does not perceive himſelf to think, does not think at all. We may grant that the Original of our Thoughts is unknown to us; that the internal Principles which form them are not what we perceive; yet will it be nevertheleſs true, that Thought is an Act conſcious of it ſelf; and we muſt confeſs, that this Act upon this account is very different from its Principles: For, once more, Thought perceives it ſelf, for the ſame Reaſon that it is Thought; it perceives its own Exiſtence, and ſo perceives it as the Exiſtence of Thought, and nothing elſe: Join to Thought, or ſuppoſe join'd with it, any thing elſe which perceives not it ſelf; this will be ſomething united to Thought, without being Thought it ſelf. But without puſhing this Diſpute any farther, I ſhall content my ſelf with affirming, That a *Logician* will look upon Thought in no other Light, than with regard to this Property it has of knowing and perceiving it ſelf; for it is by this only that it can teach and diſcover to us, what we are deſirous of knowing. In order to perceive what any Thought repreſents to us, it is abſolutely neceſſary to perceive that we have ſuch a Thought: And how can we perceive this, but by its perceiving it ſelf?

WHEN this Act, which perceives it ſelf, is not accompanied with any Determination either affirmitive or negative, it is called *Simple Perception*; it contains nothing but what is to be found in the Judgment, but the Judgment adds ſomething to it.

There are Ideas and Senſations.

II. THERE are ſome Perceptions which perceive themſelves Simply as they are; and there are other which at the ſame time that they perceive them, do alſo ſerve to make us perceive ſomething elſe beſides themſelves. The Perceptions of Thirſt, Pain, Sorrow, Deſire, are of the firſt ſort; thoſe of a Tree, a Circle, an Houſe, are of the ſecond. The one have nothing but themſelves for their Object; the others have an Object different from themſelves: The firſt are called *Senſations*, and to the ſecond I give the Name of *Ideas*. When we would repreſent to our ſelves ſomething which is without us, and which reſembles a Senſation, it is evident our Pains are to no purpoſe, and we purſue nothing but a Chimera, except we can repreſent in a Subject capable

capable of Senſation, ſome Senſation like to that about which we are employ'd our ſelves. A Senſation repreſents nothing but a Senſation: And Senſation being a Species of Thought, it cannot be conceived or repreſented but in Subjects capable of Senſation, and conſequently of Thought. It is not ſo with our Ideas: I think ſometimes after a certain manner, which repreſents to me a Tree, a Triangle, *&c.* which makes me know the Objects to which I give thoſe Names: It repreſents them to me, it makes me know thoſe Objects how different ſoever they are from my Thoughts: This is wonderful; but it is at the ſame time inconteſtable. If my Ideas were the ſame with their Objects, that which thinks in me would become ſucceſſively like Iron, Darkneſs, a Bowl, a Bell, *&c.* which is impoſſible to ſuppoſe.

OUR Senſations do immediately occaſion our Happineſs or Miſery; and as it depends not abſolutely and immediately upon our ſelves to be either happy or miſerable, it is not in our Power to excite or ſtay theſe Senſations the Moment we are enclined to do ſo, according as our Will would direct; but our Ideas are drawn as it were out of our own Fund, and as we will, we paſs from one to another; 'tis true, ſometimes more eaſily, and at other times more difficultly; but they are always excited by our ſelves, by a Power which is given us to diſplay for that purpoſe. It was fit it ſhould be ſo; becauſe the Wiſdom and Perfection of the Man depending upon his Ideas, and being his Duty, he ought to have it in his Power to make the proper Advances in Knowledge and Virtue. Hence will be underſtood the Reaſon why Words may produce Ideas in us, but not Senſations; for upon meeting with a certain Word, we immediately excite the Idea, of which we are before agreed to have that Word a Sign. This is neceſſary to enable us to communicate our Thoughts one to another. But though a Word may ſerve alſo as a Sign of a certain Senſation, that is to ſay, may be the Name of it; pronounce it never ſo ſoft, the Sound of it will never be able to produce the Senſation it ſelf, that depending entirely upon its proper Object, to the Impreſſion of which the Author of Nature has ordered it to be inſeparably joined. A Word may occaſion the calling to Mind a paſt Senſation, but the Remembrance or Idea of a Senſation is a different thing from the Senſation it ſelf.

IN order therefore to underſtand the Things which exiſt without us, we muſt conſult our Ideas, rather than our Senſations.

ſations. By our Senſations we come acquainted with *our ſelves*, and our own Condition; but our Ideas lead us to the Diſcovery of *Nature*, and of the Condition of *Things*, quite different from our ſelves. When any one can *expreſs* his Thoughts *clearly*, it is a Proof of his having made good uſe of his *Ideas*; but if he expreſſes them cloudily, and has much ado to explain his Meaning, it is plain, that inſtead of forming Ideas, he has contented himſelf with *Senſations* only. When I call *Motion* an Effort, an Impetuoſity, theſe Expreſſions are not clear, becauſe they ſignify Senſations, and cannot be repreſented clearly in a Bowl, whatever there be in that which anſwers to it; but when I ſay that a Bowl in Motion changes its Situation, and applies it ſelf ſucceſſively to different Places, my Thought or Meaning will be very diſtinctly underſtood. Senſations are only underſtood by themſelves: Whenever we would look upon them as Repreſentations of certain Objects different from themſelves, and which exiſt without us, we know no more what to ſay, or what to think; we ſuppoſe that which is not, and labour in vain to produce Chimera's. The Courſe of this Work will furniſh us with divers Occaſions to diſtinguiſh theſe two Methods of Thinking, and ſufficiently evince the Neceſſity of this Diſtinction.

Perceptions are ſimple or compounded.

III. OUR Senſations and Ideas are either *Simple* or *Compounded*; and an Idea which is ſimple in one reſpect, is compounded in another. The Idea of a *Right-Line* is *ſimple* with reſpect to a *Triangle*, but it is *compounded* with reſpect to a *Point*.

SUCH Compoſitions as preſent themſelves all at once, and whoſe Parts we have not yet reflected on, paſs for ſimple, though they are at the ſame time very much compounded. So the Idea of a Circle appears to a great many People a ſimple Idea; but whoever enquires into the Nature of it, will find it a Figure very much compounded, and in which a great many Things are included. For Inſtance, a Circumference, a Space encloſed within this Circumference, the ſeveral Parts which compoſe this Circumference, a Diſtance always equal betwixt every Point in this Circumference, and a certain Point or Center encloſed within it.

IT often requires a great deal of Attention, Addreſs, and Readineſs to prevent confounding the Simple with the Compounded. A Painter will diſtinguiſh in the Strokes of the Pencil, a Muſician in Sounds, and a Phyſician in the Pulſe, a great many Varieties; whilſt an infinite Number of other

People

People shall find nothing in all these but what is very simple. It is the same in Tastes and Odours, &c. (*b*)

FOR want of being attentive enough to the Composition of Things, Disputes often arise without any real Opposition of Sentiments: One affirms what another denies, and yet their Opposition is only in Appearance; for under one and the same Name they comprehend quite different Things, about which they must consequently reason very differently. For Example, Man is mortal, and immortal: He has great Perfections, and great Imperfections: Religion has done a great deal of Good of it self, and a great deal of Mischief by the ill Use Men have made of it: We shall treat yet more particularly of simple and compounded Ideas.

Whether there be any Error in simple Perceptions.

IV. THE *Logicians* have, almost to a Man, laid it down as an important Maxim, or a Paradox, that there is no Error in simple wonderful Perceptions. But this Remark to me seems founded upon an Equivocation; and when rightly explain'd, falls to nothing. It is an Error when we conceive Things to be other than what they really are. If then by Means of an erroneous Idea, we imagine an Object existing which that Idea ought regularly to represent, whereas in Truth no such Object is really existing, I cannot see why we must not be said to have form'd a false Idea. I own, indeed, what they affirm, That he who forms an Idea is not deceived by it, but from the the Moment that he supposes this Idea to represent an Object which it really does not represent. In this Sense it is that his Error consists; not in forming the Idea, but in misapplying it, and taking it for what it is not. So the Idea of a Mountain of Gold, is in it self neither true nor false; but he that shall look upon it as a Representation of such a Mountain as might possible be, will think justly; whereas he that shall suppose that this Idea answers to a Mountain of Gold actually existing, will be deceiv'd by such Supposition.

General Division of Ideas.

V. 1. IN forming an Idea, we make use of a Power implanted within us for that purpose, which is call'd the *Thinking Faculty*. 2. In thinking of any thing, that which our Idea represents to us bears the Name of *Object*. 3. We think of this Object after a certain *manner*. For Instance, I represent

(*b*) Quàm multa vident Pictores in Umbris & Eminentiis, quæ nos non videmus? Quàm multa quæ nos fugiunt in Cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati? *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*

preſent to my ſelf an Horſe, either diminiſh'd, and at a Diſtance, or near me, and in its natural Magnitude. Theſe three Things, *Faculty*, *Object*, and *Manner of perceiving*, are the Sources of the Varieties of our Ideas; and we ſhall lay down juſt ſo many general Heads, to which we ſhall in courſe refer our Remarks and Rules.

Diviſion of Faculties.

VI. WHEN external Objects act upon the Organs of our Bodies, the Perceptions which ariſe, or ſeem to ariſe, immediately from their Impreſſions, belong to the Faculty of *Senſe*. So I perceive an Horſe, a Tower, *&c.* when the Rays which proceed from thence make an Impreſſion upon my Eye: But when we repreſent to our ſelves thoſe very Objects which have formerly affected us in that manner, or ſomething which reſemble them; when, I ſay, we repreſent them to our ſelves as though they were actually preſent, at the ſame time that they really are not ſo, the Faculty which thinks in this manner is called the *Imagination*: So I repreſent to my ſelf a Tree as though I actually ſaw it, though my Eye is ſhut at the ſame time. Laſtly, when we think of any Thing without repreſenting it under any Image, without conceiving it under any corporeal Form, we make uſe of the *pure Underſtanding*. We ſhall ſpeak particularly of this in the following Chapter.

BESIDES theſe three Faculties, we experience in our ſelves a *Will*, *Inclinations*, and *Paſſions*; Faculties more active, and which determine us to think of certain Objects rather than of others, and contribute a thouſand Ways to vary our Ideas: For we conceive Things very differently, according as our Inclinations prepoſſeſs us in their Favour, or to their Prejudice. We have moreover a *Memory*, that is to ſay, a Power to retain in ſome ſort ſuch Ideas as have once been preſented to us, and to recollect them again when we have occaſion. All theſe Faculties have their Defects and their Uſes; and it is of Importance to find out the Means to correct the one, and to perfect the others.

CHAP. III.

Of the Underſtanding.

I. WHEN I ſpeak of *Deſire*, *Contentment*, *Trouble*, *Apprehenſion*, *Doubt*, *Certainty*, of *Affirming*, *Denying*, *Eſteeming*, *Approving*, *Blaming*, *Excuſing*, *Condemning*, I underſtand what I ſay, and I pronounce Words not at all deſtitute of Senſe; and yet I do not repreſent the Things ſpoken of under any Image or corporeal Form. The Power which we have to think in this Manner is called the *Underſtanding*, or the *Intellectual Faculty*.

Example of Ideas purely intellectual.

II. IN truth, at the ſame time that the pure Underſtanding is engaged and buſy upon its Ideas, the Imagination is alſo at work, and preſents its Images and Phantoms; but ſo far from aſſiſting us by the Pains it takes, that we are only retarded and diſturbed thereby. Would you know what Thought is? Enter into your ſelves, and be but attentive to what you find there; your Thought, which is an Act that knows it ſelf, will it ſelf diſcover to you what it is. It is preciſely that which you perceive paſſes within you when you think; for all that which you are inſenſible of, and perceive not, certainly is not Thought, nor ought to bear that Name: Stop but here, and you are ſufficiently informed. But the Imagination ſtops not here; but to gratify our Deſire to know what Thought is, it preſents to us I know not what Fire, I know not what Vapour, and I know what active and airy Bodies. And to what can all this tend, except it be to divert our Attention from what Thought is, to fix it upon what it is not? We perſuade our ſelves ordinarily, that whatever we are not accuſtomed to do, muſt for that Reaſon be a great deal the more difficult; and as we paſs our Minority, and often times a great Part of our Life beſides, without making any Reflection upon, or Enquiry into the Nature of Thought, we fear it will be extreamly difficult

Phantoms of the Imagination diſturb the Underſtanding.

cult to discover it. In this Prepossession we undertake the Work by raising up our selves to such Efforts, as do but in vain distract and fatigue us.

WE must then make a great Difference between the Ideas of the Understanding, and the Phantoms of the Imagination which may happen to accompany them. The Understanding conceives with Clearness; but in that which the Imagination presents, there is rarely any thing but Confusion. I comprehend very perfectly what is to be understood by a Figure which is formed by 120 or 124 equal Sides: I can demonstrate its Generation and Properties; but the Image which the Imagination makes of it is not at all distinct, nor to be discern'd from that of a Figure of 118 or 122 Sides. The Understanding determines all its Sides, and counts them clearly; the Imagination dares not undertake it, not having the Power to perform it. When I read in an History of 50 Battalions, and 53 Squadrons, of a Ditch of 49 Feet, of a Plain of 4700 Paces, of an Hill 90 Fathom high; all these Numbers, and a much longer Detail, are conceiv'd very determinately by my Understanding; but the Imagination is confounded with them, and what it conceives, is not at all different from what would be represented to it by a Detail of quite different Numbers.

THE Understanding does not only form exact Ideas of that which the Imagination presents but very confusedly, but even rectifies its Contradictions. The Imagination always represents the Antipodes as standing upon their Heads; but the Understanding demonstrates, that a Man can never be truly in this Position, when his Feet are nearer to the Centre of the Earth than his Head.

Proofs of the Understanding.

III. ARISTOTLE was pleas'd to say, That *nothing could enter the Understanding, without first passing through the Sense.* NIHIL *est Intellectu quod non priùs fuerit in sensu*, was a Maxim of the antient Schools. After a great deal of Pains taken to defend and support it, at last it was found necessary to be abandon'd. But as antient Sentiments are revived sometimes, as well as old Fashions, so has this been; and to give it a Grace of Novelty, they have improv'd upon *Aristotle*, and gone so far, as to deny that Man has any Understanding at all. We know nothing but by *Sense* and *Experience*, say some, who think themselves of the first Rank for Learning, and who, in bringing all Knowledge down to the Body, think to raise themselves to as great a Superiority above our ordinary Philosophers, as these have above the Vulgar

Vulgar. To thoſe that think at this rate, I ſhall neither oppoſe the Ideas of Morality, nor thoſe of Religion; but ſhall content my ſelf to draw ſome Demonſtrations from the firſt Elements of *Arithmetic* and *Geometry*. I demand then, Whether we are ſure a Calculation is juſt, becauſe a certain Method of trying it has ſucceeded ſeveral Times, and from thence may be made a Rule? or, whether it does not therefore deſerve this Name, becauſe it is a Series of general Ideas of Numbers, and their Combinations? Do we believe that *any two Sides of a Triangle, taken together, are greater than the third*; or that *the Sum of the three Angles of any Triangle is equal to the Sum of two Right ones*, only becauſe we have found it ſo whenever we have been pleas'd to meaſure them? Or are we not rather convinced of the Truth of theſe Propoſitions, ſo as to look upon them as abſolutely univerſal, becauſe we have diſcover'd their Truth in the univerſal Ideas of a Right Line, an Angle, and a Triangle? If any one affirms the firſt, he muſt own that Experiment is more convincing than Demonſtration; that we may indeed be ſure, that ſo many Triangles as we ſhall take the Pains to meaſure have this Property; but we cannot be perfectly ſure that it will be found in others that may be drawn. But he that ſhall declare on the ſide of Demonſtration, muſt acknowledge an Underſtanding; for the Ideas of Senſe are all at an end: The Eye is an utter Stranger to an univerſal Triangle; it is far from being able to form an Idea of one equally applicable to all the Triangles that ever we ſhall or can ſee. The general Formules, or Rules in *Algebra*, are alſo the Effect of Reaſoning, founded not upon the particular Ideas of *Senſe*, but upon the univerſal Ideas of the Underſtanding. Nor muſt it be ſaid, that *Algebra* is entirely founded upon Signs or Characters; that it is a Science purely *Symbolical*, and only combines together certain Characters in the room of the Things whoſe Places they ſupply; for whoever knows any thing of Algebraical Calculations at all, knows that the Characters there uſed ſignify in effect what they ought to ſignify; and by conſequence we have univerſal Ideas, of which they are the Expreſſions; and we have moreover an Idea of the juſt Relation theſe Characters bear to the Objects whoſe Places they ſupply. Without this we could never be certain whether they might not be deceitful and equivocal Characters; and as they do ſometimes happen to be ſuch, we are ſometimes deceiv'd by confining our ſelves to Characters, without attending ſufficiently to the Things themſelves. So that to calculate with

Certainty, we must always join the Intellectual with the Symbolical Knowledge.

THE Geometers have invented a great Number of Curves, and have exactly demonstrated their Nature and Properties, even before they have discover'd the Manner how to describe them: They knew them before ever they appear'd before their Eyes, and consequently the Imagination added nothing to the Clearness and Exactness of their Ideas. Let any one study these Demonstrations, and they will find whether they consist only of Words, and whether their Clearness and Force depends only upon the Exactness with which the Figure is drawn. We may be soon convinc'd, when we have before our Eyes a very exact Figure, with which we compare the Demonstration, if we do but reflect, that in order to extend this Demonstration to all other Figures of the same Species, it must be demonstrated, that all this, which agrees with the determinate Idea of this particular Figure, does equally agree with the general Idea of this whole Species.

NUMBERS in themselves are very distinctly understood; all Mankind have the same Idea of them invariably: But the Images, with which the Imagination accompanies these Ideas, are not at all uniform. The *Latin*, the *Greek*, the *Hebrew*, the *Arabian*, when they think of an Hundred, think of the same Number. They have the same Idea, but their Images are quite different: Each has his Objects, each has his Characters; and the Idea of the Number would be all confounded with the Idea of the Character: 100 and C, as well as 50 and L, present to the Mind two very different Images; but each of those Characters does however express the same Number. There is then a great deal of Difference betwixt the Image of the Sign, and the Idea of the Thing signified. But it happens unfortunately that we are more affected with what is corporeal, than we are with what is not so; we are full of the one, and make no Reflection at all upon the other. It is wrong therefore to look upon the Idea of Numbers as an Idea of the Imagination, for it belongs to the Understanding: The Character belongs to the Imagination, but the Number to the Understanding. This has no Image, but is quite different from its Sign.

THE general Term of *Body*, is it only a bare Sound, to which there is no general Idea that answers? How then shall I know that this Term is equally applicable both to all the Bodies I have seen, and also to those which I never shall see, and which I have never once imagined, if I have no other

other Idea of it beſides thoſe with which Senſe has furniſh'd my Imagination? The very Idea of that wherein all the Bodies which I have ſeen do reſemble one another ſufficiently to bear that ſame Name, this Idea is univerſal and different from the Ideas of Senſe, which are all particular and determinate. I have in my Hand a Ball of Wax; I flat it, then put it over the Fire; which, after having melted it, converts it into Flame, and diſſipates it into Smoke: When I ſay that the ſame Body, which I ſaw ſolid and round, ſubſiſts yet, tho' vaniſh'd from my Eyes, and changed into Vapours, and that after having undergone all theſe Alterations, to which I have been Witneſs, it yet continues in one Senſe always one and the ſame Body; do I not underſtand what I ſay? And yet in ſaying this, I pronounce only Words without any Signification, if I have no other Ideas beſides thoſe of the Senſes and of the Imagination; for each of theſe Ideas preſents the Wax to me under a determinate Circumſtance, and each of them under a different Circumſtance: It is the Underſtanding alone that conceives the Identity.

Do we not underſtand what we ſay, when we ſpeak of the *Time paſt* and *to come*? That which we have ſeen, and that which we may ſee, when it is conſider'd of by the Imagination, is always figured as tho' it were preſent: We underſtand what is meant by the Relation between the *Paſt* and the *Preſent*, but we do not ſee it, we do not imagine it. The *Conjunctions* which illuſtrate and adorn our Diſcourſe, are they nothing elſe but Sounds intended to affect the Ears, or only Characters deſign'd to make an Impreſſion upon the Eyes? Muſt we not have an Idea of theſe Conjunctions, of their Force and Uſe? And, in a word, muſt we not underſtand what theſe Characters ſignify, before we can know how to place them, or be ſure that they are in their proper Places? But certainly their Idea concerns it ſelf not either about their Dimenſion, their Figure, or their Colour, but entirely eſcapes the Notice of the Senſes, and of the Imagination.

THE Reflections which we make upon the Perceptions of the Senſes and of the Imagination, the Acts by which we combine them, compare them, ſtudy their Nature, their Origine, their End, and their Return, are theſe the Acts of the Senſes and of the Imagination?

BODIES make their Impreſſions upon our Senſes, and the Imagination repreſents to us theſe paſt Impreſſions; but, to be ſure that theſe Impreſſions are ſomething more than Illuſions, and that we are actually placed in a corporeal

World, whoſe different Parts act upon our Senſes in their turn, we muſt make uſe of Reaſonings. In theſe Reaſonings, as we ſhall ſee in the following Chapter, it belongs to the Intellectual Ideas, and to the Underſtanding, and not at all to the Senſes, to judge of the Juſtneſs of theſe Reaſonings, and of the Connection of the Parts which compoſe them.

WHEN I ſay, *There is ſomething exiſting which never had Beginning:* For whatſoever has had a Beginning, and is become what it was not before, muſt neceſſarily derive its Exiſtence and Condition from ſome Cauſe which did exiſt already. That which might or might not be, neceſſarily ſuppoſes ſome Cauſe which determines it rather to be, than not to be: Therefore it is neceſſary to acknowledge either a Chain of Cauſes which has no Beginning; or elſe in this Chain ſome firſt Cauſe, which has no Beginning. When I ſpeak in this manner, I underſtand what I ſay; but it is not from the Senſes and the Imagination that I derive this Knowledge: Each of theſe Faculties may very readily repreſent to us a Beginning; but neither the Senſes, nor the Imagination, can reach or conceive that which never had Beginning. And theſe Terms would ſignify nothing to a Man, who had no other Faculty beſides thoſe of the Senſes and the Imagination.

I FIND my ſelf alſo under a Neceſſity of acknowledging, either a corporeal Extenſion, or a Space void of Matter, infinite and without any Bounds. The Eyes have never perceiv'd any thing but what is finite; and whatever Efforts the Imagination makes, it can never reach or repreſent to us any thing but what is limited: To be convinced that beyond that which the Imagination repreſents to us, there is farther an Extenſion abſolutely infinite, is not a Concluſion within the Power of the Imagination.

Method of facilitating the Exerciſe of the Underſtanding:

IV. THE Habit, which grows upon us from our Infancy, of thinking only of ſuch Things as are corporeal, is perhaps the only Cauſe of the Difficulty we find in thinking intellectually; and if it be not the only Cauſe, it is at leaſt one of the moſt principal. But in order to weaken this Habit, and reſtore by Exerciſe to the Underſtanding the Force which it has loſt, we muſt abſtract with all our Power the Idea of Body, and think in ſuch a manner as tho' there were no ſuch Thing in Being, and give no more Attention to it, than if we had never known any ſuch Thing. In this Suppoſition, in this Ignorance and Uncertainty of the Exiſtence of the corporeal Univerſe, what would there remain of Cer-

Certainty? I ſhould always be ſure that I think, and exiſt my ſelf; I ſhould then have an Idea of a Being, which thinks, and by conſequence knows ſomething, namely, its own Exiſtence and Thought, at leaſt imperfectly, which knows a little, and is deſirous of knowing more: And upon this Occaſion I ſhould advance to the Idea of a Being which has greater Knowledge, and at laſt to the Idea of a Being whoſe Knowledge equals its Deſires, and which knows whatſoever it pleaſes. In this Ignorance and Weakneſs, I find in my ſelf, I am not at all happy; and this Reflection leads me to the Idea of a Being more powerful, and more ſatisfied, who is able to do all Things, and need only to will it to put this Power in Execution, who is ſupremely happy, ſelf-ſufficient, knows and perceives his own Exiſtence with perpetual Extaſy. Hitherto I have had no concern with any thing corporeal; and thus far the Ideas of my Underſtanding have advanced without being at all diſturbed with thoſe of the Imagination. In purſuing this Method, I ſhall not only acquire a Readineſs in the Exerciſe of the pure Underſtanding, but alſo advance extremely in the Knowledge of God, and of my ſelf, of eternal Thought, and of created Thought.

In what reſpect the Underſtanding depends upon the Senſes.

V. THEY who pleaſe themſelves ſo much in ſpoiling Man of his intellectual Faculty, and in rendring him as much corporeal as poſſibly they can, appeal to Experience for their Vindication. A Man, ſay they, brought up in a Wood by a Bear, or in the Deſart by a Goat, of which there have been Inſtances, (*b*) would have no other Ideas than ſuch as belong to thoſe Animals. In what Stu-

(*b*) *Dr.* Conner, *an* Engliſh *Phyſician, aſſures us, that he was at the Court of the King of* Poland, *when they brought thither a Man that was taken amongſt a Company of Bears, who in Imitation of them, went upon all Fours, and made uſe of Arms inſtead of two Fore-Legs. He was perfectly as Savage as a Bear; and could by no Means bear being looking at, but would riſe right up in a great Fright. By reſting his Hands againſt a Wall, he was gradually tamed; and at laſt taught to ſpeak. The ſame Author adds, that the Bears oftentimes carry off the Children of Labourers, which are laid under Cover of Trees, while their Parents are at Work; and it is their Opinion, that ſome Bear, whoſe young ones have been taken away, through the Uneaſineſs of her Milk, becomes a wet Nurſe to the Child which ſhe carries off.*

Procopius *relates, that during a certain War in* Italy, *all the Inhabitants of a particular Village having fled at the Approach of their Enemies, an Infant that was forgot and left behind was brought up by the Goats, which it learn'd to follow through the Woods, and amongſt the Rocks,*

pidity do they paſs their Lives, who are born deaf, unleſs ſome extraordinary Education ſhould be contrived to ſupply the Defect of thoſe Inſtructions that are convey'd by the Ear? It is neceſſary then to inſtruct the Man, if you would have him know any Thing; and it is by his Eyes and Ears, that all Knowledge enters, and by Conſequence there are no other Ideas than thoſe of the Senſes.

THIS Reaſoning ſeems very well ſuited to ſuch as make light of the Underſtanding, and are not willing to make any uſe of it. But they that ſet up to reform the Reaſon of almoſt all our Philoſophers, and to perſuade them out of their Prepoſſeſſions in favour of the Underſtanding, ſhould, in my Opinion, reaſon a little more juſtly. If we have no other Knowledge but what enters by the Eyes and the Ears, whence comes it that we invent Things perfectly different from all that ever we have ſeen, and that we extend our Knowledge a great Way beyond what our Maſters have taught us? The Objection might have ſome Force, if all our Knowledge conſiſted only in retaining the Memory of what we have ſeen and heard.

WE go a great Way farther than our Eyes and our Ears: And conſequently we have in us a Power of drawing Ideas out of our own Bottom. That which we ſee and hear gives us Occaſions to reflect, to exerciſe this Power, to perfect our ſelves, and enrich our ſelves out of our own Stock. Language it ſelf would be uſeleſs without this Power: The Force of a Word pronounc'd, extends no farther than to produce the Senſation of a Sound; but it is the Soul which, upon occaſion of this Sound, ſets it ſelf to work about forming Ideas. In truth, there are ſome Occaſions where, at the ſame time that the Ear is affected with a Sound, we have the Object preſented before the Eye, whoſe Idea this Sound would in the end recall to our Mind: But there are innumerable Occaſions, where, without any Aſſiſtance of this Nature, by the Strength of an Attention more or leſs diligent, we can make our ſelves Maſters of the Ideas of the Man who converſes with us, and can think in the ſame Manner as he does. The greateſt Part of our Diſcourſes are Kinds of *Problems*, which the Mind buſies it ſelf in reſolving. Some of them it reſolves at firſt Sight; and theſe are to it very *clear* and *ſimple* Diſcourſes: Others of them are much more difficult, and not to be found out without a great deal of Enquiry and Search; ſometimes the Obſcurity of the Expreſſions is the Cauſe of this; ſometimes the Complication of the Subjects, or the want of Exerciſe on

Subjects

Subjects of a certain Kind. It is certain a Man may be all his Life-time ſhut up within himſelf, and may actually poſſeſs Faculties without ever exerciſing, or even knowing them. The Soul of the young Maid, mention'd by Mr. *Boyle*, who was born with two Cataracts, which were couch'd when ſhe came to 18 Years of Age, paſſed all that Time, and, without this couragious Operation, would have paſs'd the reſt of its Days in an entire Ignorance of the Faculty of Seeing, which it certainly was poſſeſs'd of at the ſame time.

IN the ſame Manner a Man born deaf, and by that means, for want of Inſtruction, abandon'd to ſuch a Degree of Stupidity, as to be wholly given up to the Influence of the moſt groſs Senſations, might very well paſs his whole Life without making any uſe of the *Faculty of chuſing freely*, being perpetually determin'd by the Impreſſions of external Objects, by which Impreſſions he paſſively and entirely gives himſelf up; but yet it does not at all follow, that in this Condition his Soul is deſtitute of the Faculty of chuſing for and determining it ſelf, altho' it makes no uſe of it: For if by ſome lucky Accident this Man ſhould recover his Hearing, as there happen'd an Inſtance at *Chartres*, mention'd in the *Hiſtory of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris* for the Year 1703, the Soul of this Man would receive no new Faculties, only new Occaſions would be preſented to it to exerciſe thoſe it had before.

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THE Occaſions which are preſented are external; but the Acts and the Ideas, which the Mind forms in conſequence of theſe Occaſions, are not furniſh'd by them, but are derived by it ſelf out of its own Stock. It could produce them in it ſelf, without theſe Occaſions, tho' perhaps without theſe Occaſions it would never once think of doing ſo.

FOR Example: Perhaps a Man might never form a Reſolution of applying himſelf to meditate upon the Nature of *Liberty*, if it were not for the controverted Diſputes of Divines upon this Subject; yet is he ſo far from receiving all his Lights from theſe Controverſies, that, on the contrary, he takes care to forget every thing his Ears have been ſtunn'd withal upon this Point, and refers himſelf to his inward Helps, and deſcends into himſelf to obſerve attentively what paſſes there, when he chuſes for and determines himſelf: He derives then his Knowledge from his own Bottom, and could have derived it without this Occaſion, tho' perhaps without it he would have neglected ſo to do.

WE may learn from hence, that it is poſſible for a Soul to be united to a Body, whoſe Organs may be ſo far diſorder'd, as to put a continual Obſtacle to the *Faculty* it has to *reflect*; a Faculty which is eſſential to it, tho' the Uſe of it be not ſo. When a Man, for Example, is weigh'd down by Sleep, or by ſome Exceſs in Eating and Drinking, the preſent Condition of his Body is averſe to Meditation; but after ſome Hours Repoſe, he then finds himſelf in a Condition to meditate, not from the Objects which affect him, but from a Fund which he contains within, and whoſe Light is no longer clouded. It may very eaſily be ſuppoſed, that ſuch a Soul as, by the Laws of Union with an unhappy Body, is become ſubject to a ſtupid Ignorance, would ſoon have been clear'd up, if in the Beginning of its Exiſtence it had begun to exiſt ſeparately without ſuch Union.

The Ideas of the Underſtanding depend not upon the Body.

VI. WHETHER I make uſe of my *Eyes*, or deliver my ſelf up to my Imagination, it is always my Mind, that is to ſay, *my ſelf* thinking, and *my ſelf thought of*, or, if you pleaſe, that which is in me the *Principle of Thought*, is the ſame Principle which perceives inwardly, and alſo ſees, and imagines. By conſequence, the Imperfections of the Mind muſt needs affect the Senſes, and the Imagination; but becauſe, with reſpect to theſe two laſt, their manner of thinking has a greater Dependance on the Body, the Defect of the Body ought to have a greater Influence over the Imagination and Senſes. The *pure Underſtanding*, which certainly depends not on the Body, or depends on it much leſs, will then be more juſt in its Operations, than the the Imagination and the Senſes in theirs. If it departs from its Ideas, the Body has nothing to anſwer for, or contributes not near ſo much to it, as it does to the Errors of the Senſes, and thoſe of the Imagination.

And are on this account preferrable to thoſe of the Senſes, and of the Imagination.

VII. WE ought then to regulate and correct thoſe that are leaſt perfect, and moſt expoſed to the Impreſſions of a greater Number of Cauſes of Error, by the moſt perfect; that is to ſay, we ſhould regulate and correct the Ideas of the Senſes, and of the Imagination, by thoſe of the Underſtanding.

They are leſs mixed with Senſations.

VIII. BESIDES, the Perceptions of the Underſtanding are all of the Number of thoſe which we call *Ideas*, and which are given us on purpoſe to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator, and his Creatures: Whereas amongſt the Perceptions

tions of the Senſes, and of the Imagination, there are a great many *Senſations*; and it is not by our Senſations that we ought to judge of external Objects, by repreſenting them like to what we feel.

They extend a great way farther.

IX. MOREOVER, the Senſes and the Imagination are a great deal more limited than the Underſtanding, and conſequently are very much inferior to it. There are a great many Things which we neither know how to ſee, nor to imagine, and yet can underſtand them very well. For, beſides what we have inſtanced in before, the Underſtanding, for Example, conceives very perfectly that there is no Part of Matter ſo ſmall, but it has ſtill ſome Extenſion, and is conſequently diviſible: It conceives farther, that the Portions and Parcels of this firſt Diviſion may be again divided, ſince they are ſtill Matter, and have ſome Extenſion; it comprehends, that the ſmalleſt Parts of all have their determinate Figure, as well as the largeſt. This being laid down, it conceives that one Grain of Seed may include in little an entire Plant, that is to ſay, in the full Proportion of its Parts. It follows from hence, that this little Plant has alſo its Seeds, which likewiſe contain their entire Plants; and theſe again their Seeds, and ſo on ſucceſſively; and yet theſe Parts, how much ſoever they may be more and more diminiſhed, ceaſe not to be yet farther diviſible to have their determinate Figures, or to preſerve in theſe little Figures all the Proportions of the great ones. The Underſtanding perceives all theſe Things; it is convinced of their Poſſibility, and makes no Myſtery at all of them. But theſe are Things which the Eyes can never diſcover, and to which the Imagination can never attain. The Ideas which we derive from our Senſes, contradict themſelves ſometimes. When I move my Hand along a Stick which is half emerged in Water, my Feeling tells me it is ſtrait; but if I look upon it with all the Attention I am able, my Eye makes me conceive it crooked. In this Contradiction the Underſtanding decides, becauſe its Ideas never deſtroy themſelves; what one teaches, is never contradicted by another: For when a Man perceives and retracts an Error, he does not correct one of the Ideas of his Underſtanding by another more juſt; but whereas he was deceived by pronouncing upon what he had not ſeen at all, or had but ſeen in part, he at laſt comes to the Truth by judging according to his Idea, and according to Knowledge.

IT is the Understanding then, which ought principally to be consulted, and in its Ideas above all to be followed; and it is from this Reason, that, as we have said before, they should give Rules to the Senses, and to the Imagination.

Errors of Men who do not follow them.

X. INTO what Errors do Men fall, purely by taking the contrary Course to that which has now been laid down, and by giving the Preference to the Ideas of their Senses, and of their Imaginations, above those of the Understanding! Science, Wisdom, Disinterestedness, Equity, Virtue, and, in a word, true Glory, which consists in doing Justice to true Merit, with these People are made to yield to Pleasure, Pride, and Pageantry, and to a crowd of Flatterers; all these are apt to engage the Senses, and the Imagination, which are not at all affected by Objects of the first Kind, or but very little.

WHAT a Difference is there to a Man who is almost ignorant of his having an Understanding, so far has he always been from making any Use of, or Reflection upon it, between conceiving himself attentive to some Ideas, which clear up the Duties of Man, and their Excellencies; and between imagining himself Master of a stately Palace, or General of an Army, which carries into all Places Terror or Desolation? It is yet however true, that in these last Circumstances, how shining soever they appear, the Man only appears happy; whereas in the former he actually is so.

PYRRHUS, when he was thinking to make War against the *Romans*, and from their Defeat to proceed to that of other Nations, and from Victory to Victory, to make himself a Way to return into his Country, and to enjoy there in Peace the rest of his Days, in this Project deliver'd himself up to Phantoms of a dazzled Imagination; but the Courtesan, who advised him to enjoy from the present Moment a Repose which was in his Possession, and not to quit a Tranquility with which the King himself confess'd it was reasonable he should be contented, she consulted Reason, and followed the Ideas of the Understanding. And in general, when a Prince, obey'd by his Subjects, esteem'd by some of his Neighbours, and fear'd by others, who wants nothing to make his own Life easy and agreeable, and his Subjects happy, pours out that Blood which ought to be dear to him, and exposes himself to several Dangers in the pursuit of what is called Glory, that is to say, to fill the *Gazettes*, and to find

find Employment for Poets and Orators; does he take for his Rule the pure Ideas of the Underſtanding, or ſuffer himſelf to be led by confuſed Impreſſions of the Imagination?

THE *Enthuſiaſts*, who diſhonour Religion with their Extravagancies, and give occaſion to *Libertines*, who do not care for the Trouble of examining Things nearly, to confound the true Revelations with Viſions, would avoid the Errors into which they fall, if inſtead of abandoning themſelves to confuſed Imaginations, they would give themſelves up only to the clear Ideas of the Underſtanding. Again, by conſulting thoſe, we ſhould avoid *Superſtition*, and prevent loading Religion with a thouſand Externals, which take up the Minds of Men too much, eſpecially the Vulgar, and make them forget the Eſſentials of Religion.

WE ſhould live happy, indeed, if we could prevail on ourſelves to be determined always by the Ideas only of the Underſtanding. All our Slips, and all our Miſchiefs come only from our limiting our Attention to the Impreſſions that are made upon the Senſes, and upon the Imagination. It is agreed, for Example, that we ought to do a Thing; but the Queſtion is, whether we ſhould apply our ſelves inceſſantly to the doing it. The Idea of Labour remitted, always pleaſes the Senſes and the Imagination; but the Underſtanding decides, that the more Pains we take, the better: When any one has ſpoken ill of you, if you follow the Bent of your Imagination, gall'd with an offenſive Diſcourſe, you will find your ſelf ready to reply upon the Spot, and with Warmth; but if you conſult the Lights of your Underſtanding, they will convince you that it is more for your Intereſt to eſtabliſh your Right quietly. Ought we to prefer the Pleaſure of good Cheer to the Preſervation of the Health? Upon this Queſtion the Senſes will ſeduce us, but the Underſtanding will ſhew us the beſt Side. We ought then to accuſtom our ſelves always to conſult it; this will be the Means never to abandon the Solid, or be dazzled with Appearances.

NOTHING but the Ideas of the Underſtanding give a true Firmneſs: He that abandons himſelf to thoſe of the Senſes, and of the Imagination, is the Sport of Paſſions and of Times: By forming his Deſigns upon Appearances which deceive him, he paſſes from Error to Error; preſently he is diſguſted at that which but now gain'd his Admiration, and ſoon after he returns to that which juſt before diſguſted him: He approves

and

and condems by Turns, and hardly knows himſelf what it is he would have. (*c*)

It is of great Importance to attend to the Limits of the Underſtanding.

XI. It is not that the Underſtanding has not its Imperfections; it is even dangerous not to attend to them, above all to forget its *Bounds*, and ſuppoſe it to have a greater Extent than it really has. There are ſome People ridiculous enough to look upon themſelves as the Meaſure and Rule of all Things. Whatſoever is above their Ideas, paſſes with them for an Impoſſibility and a Chimera. It is upon this blind Vanity, as well as upon the Corruption of their Heart, that the *Atheiſm* and Irreligion of our pretended great Wits are founded. Thoſe that are ſhort-ſighted themſelves, are apt to look upon others as Deceivers, who pretend to ſee Objects at a much greater Diſtance, for the ſame Reaſon as Men of mean Underſtandings are uſed to eſteem ſuch Enthuſiaſts, as pretend and really have a much ſtronger Knowledge and Penetration. To cure or prevent this dangerous Conceitedneſs, it is altogether of Importance to reflect ſeriouſly upon a great many Things which cannot be denied, and yet do lead to ſuch Conſequences and Difficulties as cannot entirely be clear'd up. There is, for Example, over my Head an Extenſion; and yet to this Extenſion, whether it be throughout corporeal, as ſome pretend, or beyond certain Limits only a perfect void Space, it is impoſſible for me to aſſign any Bounds. Whereſoever I terminate it, whatſoever Bounds I endeavour to aſſign it, I find my ſelf forced to conceive beyond theſe Bounds a Space which encloſes and encompaſſes them. From my Head upwards is an infinite Extenſion, and from my Feet upwards there is alſo an infinite Extenſion; and yet of theſe two Infinites the ſecond is greater than the firſt. I find the ſame Inequality downwards, and to the Right, and to the Left, and on all Sides; all Infinites, and yet ſome greater than others. Who can extricate himſelf out of this Difficulty? And yet the Principle is inconteſtable, that there is ſuch an Extenſion below and above me, and ſurrounding me on all Sides. Let us then fairly confeſs, that our Underſtanding cannot comprehend the

(*c*) Non poteſt cuiquam ſemper idem placere, niſi rectum. Quid eſt ſapientia? Semper idem velle atque idem nolle. Nemo proponit ſibi quid velit, nec ſi propoſuit, perſeverat in eo, ſed tranſilit: Nec tantùm mutat, ſed redit, & in ea, quæ deſeruit ac damnavit revolvitur. *Sen. Epiſt.* 20.

the Whole; and yet it would be extravagant to deny it, becauſe we do not perfectly underſtand it. I am certain that I think and exiſt; but it is impoſſible for me to comprehend that I have always exiſted, and always thought; nor can I conceive any better, that I ſhould come my ſelf out of nothing; nor, laſtly, am I able to repreſent to my ſelf in what manner a ſuperior Power ſhould give me an Exiſtence which I had not before. It is neceſſary that one of theſe three Caſes ſhould be true. I can demonſtrate the two firſt to be falſe, and the laſt to be true. But in proving that a ſuperior Power has created me, I do not comprehend any better the manner of my Creation. There are a great Number of Queſtions of this Nature, whoſe Foundations are inconteſtable: Such may be propos'd upon the Diviſibility of Matter, upon Motion, upon Time; which all border upon Infinity, and raiſe ſuch a Perplexity in our Underſtandings, that they are loſt in it. It is good to reflect upon theſe, and purſue them, in order to learn to be modeſt, and to confeſs that we cannot comprehend all Things, nor muſt upon that account reject all Things. I am ſenſible that I can move my Arm whenever I will; but in what manner I perform this Motion, I am entirely ignorant: Muſt I for this Reaſon call in queſtion a Fact which is ſo familiar to me? And becauſe I cannot comprehend it ſufficiently, muſt I imagine my ſelf to have no Will or Action at all?

HE muſt have reflected very little upon the Bounds of his Underſtanding, who can believe it right to reject every thing which he cannot perfectly comprehend, altho' otherwiſe eſtabliſh'd upon very good Grounds. There are in Religion Things which paſs our Underſtanding; and ſo do alſo Queſtions that may be propoſed concerning the Diviſibility of Matter: But do not they, who take occaſion from ſome Difficulties to reject Religion and the Idea of God, ſubſtitute Suppoſitions more obſcure in their Place?

I HAVE as ſtrict a Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of God, as I have of the Exiſtence of a Circle; nor is this laſt without its Difficulties: It is form'd by the Motion of a Ray about one of its Extremities; but how can a Line move about a Point? And muſt I, for this Difficulty, doubt whether there can be ſuch a Thing as a Circle? It is equally unjuſt to call in queſtion the Arguments which eſtabliſh the Exiſtence of God, becauſe I have not ſo great an Extent of Knowledge as to reſolve all Queſtions that may be propoſed concerning his Nature.

See my Geom. Book iv. Sect. of Tangents.

XII.

Means of extending our Knowledge.

XII. THERE are Things then, which, according to Appearances, will in this Life, and perhaps always, be above our Understanding; but there are others which for a time do puzzle us, and afterwards become very clear to us. When we become Men, for Example, we comprehend very clearly those Things which were a Myſtery to us whilſt Infants; and a Man of Letters diſtinguiſhes in a Moment what an Idiot has not the leaſt Notion of. In a word, it is beyond doubt, that ſome have a much greater Extent of Underſtanding than others, and that our Capacities may increaſe and grow ſtronger. It is of great Importance to know the Means of it; and upon this Point I am about to make ſome Reflections. One Sign of a more extended Underſtanding, is, when it can think of a greater Number of Subjects at one time, and when it paſſes more readily from one Thought to another, for the ſame Reaſon that an Arm is ſtronger that acts with greater Readineſs, and ſuſtains a greater Weight or Quantity of Matter at once. And I am of Opinion, that the Strength of the Mind, like that of the Body, is improv'd by Exerciſe; but it muſt be an Exerciſe that is moderate, and regulated, and whoſe Efforts advance by very inſenſible Degrees. A Mind that always remains in a State of Inactivity will always continue little; and one that ſhall undertake at once too great a Number of Things, and at firſt aſpire to the moſt difficult, will but diſorder and confound it ſelf, and ſo far from redoubling its natural Forces, will only weaken them, and run the Hazard of loſing them entirely. It is neceſſary then to proceed in order, that is to ſay, to begin firſt with the moſt eaſy, and from the moſt ſimple Subjects; not to paſs immediately to the moſt difficult, but to advance by Degrees to thoſe that are but very little compounded, and from theſe to riſe to others that are a little more difficult to manage, and ſo on ſucceſſively. We muſt never quit one Subject, without having firſt diſtinctly comprehended it, and made our ſelves Maſters of it; we muſt reviſe, at one View, firſt two Things which we have clearly underſtood; then three; after that four, *&c.* By Means of theſe Precautions, we ſhall come to take in a great Number of Things, with the ſame Eaſe and Clearneſs as we did at firſt two or three of the moſt eaſy. Experience demonſtrates, that by collecting by little and little, and in a proper Order, ſeveral Ideas, and by making ſuch Collections familiar, by repeating them often, and with great Attention, we come at laſt to comprehend, at one View,

that

that which at firſt we could only perceive Part after Part. He that ſtudies the Mathematicks with this Precaution, and aims not at the difficult Parts before he has made himſelf Maſter of thoſe that are leaſt ſo, will at laſt conquer the moſt complicated Demonſtrations, with as little Trouble as he did at firſt the moſt ſimple ones. He that was puzzled at firſt with the ſimple Rule of *Addition*, by a continued Exerciſe will at laſt, without any Difficulty, go thro' Calculations of great Extent: He who was forced to exert his whole Strength, in order to comprehend a Demonſtration of two or three Lines, will at laſt play with one that fills a whole Sheet.

THE general Formules in Algebra, or the univerſal Propoſitions of Geometry, Mechanicks, and Phyſicks, expreſs'd in Algebraic Characters, will extremely contribute to augment the Extent of our Minds, provided we do but take care to form to our ſelves ſuch Ideas of them as are perfectly clear, and to make them very familiar to us: To deſcend from their Univerſality to the particular Caſes which they include; and to return again from theſe particular Caſes to the Univerſality which includes them, together with an infinite Number of others. There is nothing of this kind, that I know of, which comes up to what Mr. *Varignon* has publiſh'd. If any one would ſee an Example of his, eaſy to be underſtood, he need only read the Article of the Motion of Fluids in the *Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences* for the Year 1703. *Pag.* 285, *&c. of the* Amſt. Ed.

WE muſt take care to diſtinguiſh from the true Extent of Mind, which is always accompanied with Juſtneſs, a Fruitfulneſs that is without Taſte, and without Diſtinction. One who, by frequenting the Bar, is accuſtomed to hear the Arguments *pro* and *con* upon the ſame Subject, and to ſee different Turns, more dazzling than juſt, given to one and the ſame Thought, will by this Means learn to cavil and contradict; his Underſtanding will become fruitful in trifling Niceties and Shifts, and become ſo far extended, as to raiſe immediately a great many plauſible Arguments upon any Subject that offers: But theſe plauſible Arguments will form, as it were, a Cloud, and entirely hide the Face of Truth. A Mind accuſtom'd to be amus'd with Appearances, knows not how to apply to any thing that is ſolid or certain. The Study of the Mathematicks, when purſued in its proper Order, at the ſame time that it convinces the Underſtanding by the Clearneſs of its Demonſtrations, does alſo the moſt

of

of any thing contribute to give it the greateſt Extent imaginable. By this we learn to ſee at once the Conſequences in their Principles; and the more we draw of them, the more we ſee ſtill riſing, which we can very readily demonſtrate, and range in order: But we muſt not give up all our Time to this Study. When we abandon our ſelves entirely to it, we loſe the Reliſh of all other Things, and become incapable of managing or well underſtanding them, and perfectly depriv'd of all Benefit ariſing from the Converſation of the World.

VARIETY of Studies and Applications contribute extremely to enlarge the Underſtanding. Next to Inactivity and Idleneſs, nothing cramps it more than an Application to one only Science, and a Confinement to a narrow Converſation. By fixing the Eye only upon a ſmall Circle, we become at laſt unable to ſee any thing farther. It is much the ſame with our *Thoughts*, as with our *Words:* A Man, who is grown old without ever knowing any other Language than that of his native Country, knows not how to learn any other, becauſe it is too late. It is the ſame with a Man who gives himſelf up entirely to one Science, and converſes only with a ſmall Number of Men of the ſame Humour with himſelf: If ever he ſhould meet with ſome others, who ſhould entertain him with Subjects quite different from thoſe which he confined himſelf to, and talk to him in a Way quite different from his former narrow Converſations, he would be apt to think himſelf amongſt Intelligences of a different Rank, and could by no means enter into their Ideas; you would ſay he had nothing in common with them.

BUT we muſt make a great Difference betwixt varying our Applications, and permitting them to haſte from Object to Object, for no other Purpoſe than juſt to glance on them: A Narrowneſs of Genius loves ſuperficial Conceptions, and ſuperficial Conceptions entertain in their Turn a narrow Genius in what Bounds they pleaſe. The People of Faſhion, who live in a perpetual Wandering, for want of Reflection, contract a Levity, which certainly does not at all enlarge the Underſtanding: But thoſe who paſs thro' different States, who negotiate different Affairs, who are oblig'd to accommodate themſelves to different Characters, and ſometimes to Characters directly oppoſite, to avoid divers Inconveniences, to foreſee and prevent divers Obſtacles, and to play a great many After-games, do as much enlarge their Capacities as their Complaiſance.

OUR

OUR School-Maſters, who have the Charge of the Education of Youth, are ſo far from enlarging the Genius of their Scholars, as they ought to do, that they commonly contribute to cramp them by the Authority which they aſſume over them. A School-Boy, who dares neither ſpeak, nor even think, nor ſo much as dreſs himſelf, nor wear his Hair, nor almoſt ſneeze, otherwiſe than juſt as his Maſter does, for fear of being reprimanded upon making the leaſt Elopement, by little and little accuſtoms himſelf not to think at all. The Memory is the only Faculty he makes uſe of; and this he gives up into his Maſter's Hand, and muſt purſue no farther than as he pleaſes to direct.

NOTHING is a greater Obſtacle to the Enlargement of our Underſtanding, than the conceited Opinion we are apt to have of it; we do not put our ſelves to the Trouble of acquiring what we already imagine we have no need of: But nothing is more vain than this Prepoſſeſſion; our Underſtanding may be always improv'd, and not only acquire every Day new Knowledge, but alſo new Capacities. Studies that are well manag'd, do not only enrich our Minds with new Acquirements, but do alſo enlarge and ſtrengthen them. This is one of the Wonders of our Nature, which great Genius's are much the moſt ſenſible of. Thoſe of a narrow Genius ſeeing nothing beyond themſelves, remain in Poverty and Inaction, ridiculouſly contented with their imaginary Abilities; while thoſe of real Abilities, the farther they advance, ſtill find they may and muſt go a great Way farther; and bending all their Thoughts upon the Way that lies before them, they have no Notion of being proud of having got ſo far.

It is above all neceſſary in Practice.

XIII. IN Matters of Simple Theory, where we have all the Leiſure we pleaſe, Time and Application may ſupply the Place of an enlarg'd Underſtanding; but in Affairs of Practice, which muſt be undertaken and executed preſently, as all falſe Steps are of Conſequence, and Miſtakes coſt dear, and even ſometimes are not to be repair'd, and laſtly, where Time often preſſes, and Opportunities are loſt, it is of the laſt Importance to have an extended Genius, to diſcover, at firſt Sight, all the Ways we have to take, and all the Inconveniences we have to avoid, and which, by weighing exactly, and combining the Strength, Readineſs, Expedition, and Certainty of the Means, always determines upon the beſt Method. We fall ſhort of this Method, either by the Barrenneſs of the Underſtanding, which diſ-

covers too few of the Circumſtances requir'd, and forgets entirely what it wants to find; or for want of a Capacity to chuſe when it even preſents it ſelf, which almoſt always happens, when by a Narrowneſs of Genius we are overwhelm'd with a Multitude of Views. We ought then in the Hiſtories we read, and in the Events our ſelves are Witneſs to, or which we hear of from others, to accuſtom our ſelves to conſider the Collection of Cauſes which contribute to produce a certain Effect; we ſhould reflect upon ſuch Deſigns as have miſcarried; and upon the Circumſtances which occaſion'd ſuch Miſcarriages, we ſhould ask our ſelves what we would have done in the like Caſe, and compare our own Views with thoſe of others; we ſhould ſearch into the Heart of Man, and learn all the Springs that put it in Motion; we ſhould practiſe the World, and perpetually join Experience with Reflections, and Reflections with Experience. There are ſeveral who abandon themſelves to their Ideas, without conſidering of Events: Theſe will never bring forth any thing but Chimeras, and Projects that can never ſucceed. There are others, who can only imitate what they have ſeen; a Caſe never ſo little out of the way entirely deſtroys all their Meaſures.

Bad Effects of a narrow Mind.

XIV. THE Narrowneſs of our Underſtandings are follow'd with an infinite Number of Miſchiefs: Men ruin themſelves, damn themſelves, and even in this Life draw upon themſelves, by their Vices, innumerable Misfortunes; becauſe being entirely taken up with the preſent, they have no time to think of what is to come; their ſhort Sights reach not ſo far, and they conſider no more the Conſequences of what they do, than if they were abſolutely ſure they had nothing to fear.

A GENTLEMAN ruins his Tenants; neglects no Occaſions of ſcrewing and ſqueezing all he can out of them, and makes them pay dearly for whatever Favours he does them: If he ſees they have any thing he likes, he muſt have it: This Game pleaſes him, he applauds himſelf; but is all this time running on to his own Ruin, and his over-impatient Avarice will make his Children miſerable. His Tenants will be impoveriſh'd; they will loſe the Spirit to work, when they find they muſt not have the Advantage of their Labour; their Idleneſs will ruin them by Degrees, and their Miſery at laſt entirely incapacitate them; and their Lord will not only be ill paid, but alſo ill ſerved: He will be robb'd, his Villages depopulated, his Rents will fall with the Crops of his

his Lands, ill cultivated; he will loſe the Benefit of his Fines when no body ſhall be in a Condition to purchaſe, and his Poſterity, at leaſt, will feel the Effects of his too ſhort and too narrow Views. (*d*)

NOTHING

(*d*) *The Archbiſhop of* Cambray, *in more than one Place, gives us a Draught of a Sovereign, whoſe Underſtanding has its proper Extent. In the* 3*d Book of* Telemachus (pag. 54. *of the firſt* Paris *Edit. conformable to the Original* Manuſcript, 1717.) *he makes a Citizen of that great City, which appear'd the common Receptacle of all Nations, to ſpeak, after the following Manner:* "Give a welcome and eaſy Reception to "all Strangers; let them within your Gates find Security, Conve- "niency, and perfect Liberty; ſuffer not your ſelves to be made "Slaves to Avarice or Pride. The true Way to gain a great deal, is "never to be deſirous of gaining too much, and to know how to loſe "in a proper Place. Make your ſelves beloved by all Strangers; ſuffer "even ſomething from them; raiſe not their Jealouſy by your Haugh- "tineſs. Adhere conſtantly to the Rules of Commerce, which ſhould "be ſimple and eaſy; accuſtom your ſelves to follow them inviolably. "Puniſh ſeverely the Fraud, and even the Negligence or the Pride of "your Merchants, who ruin Commerce by ruining thoſe who are "engaged in it. Above all, attempt not to cramp Trading, in order "to bring it to ſerve ſome Ends of your own: It is not proper the "Prince ſhould meddle with it, but ſhould entirely leave the Profit "of it to his Subjects, who have the Trouble of it; otherwiſe he "will diſcourage them: He will reap ſufficient Advantages by the "Wealth it will bring into his Dominions. Commerce is like cer- "tain Springs; if you offer to divert their Courſe, you dry them up. "There is nothing but Profit and Conveniency that brings Strangers "amongſt you: If you make Commerce leſs commodious and bene- "ficial to them, they withdraw inſenſibly, and return no more, be- "cauſe other People, taking the Advantage of your Imprudence, are glad to receive them, and invite them from you. Princes that are covetous, and have no Foreſight, think only of laying Taxes upon ſuch of their Subjects as are moſt vigilant and induſtrious in improving their Talents, becauſe they expect theſe will be moſt likely and ready to pay them, and at the ſame time favour ſuch as by Idleneſs are reduc'd to a meaner Condition. Reverſe this unjuſt Order, which over-whelms the Good, and recompences the Vicious, and which introduces a Negligence equally fatal to the King himſelf, as well as to all his Dominions: Impoſe Taxes, Fines, and, if there be occaſion, other rigorous Puniſhments, upon thoſe that neglect their Fields, as you would puniſh Soldiers who abandon their Poſt in Time of War: On the contrary, beſtow Favours and Exemp- tions upon ſuch Families as increaſe; augment in proportion the Tillage of their Lands; preſently their Families will multiply; all People will be encourag'd to work; it will even become honourable. *Book* xii. *p.* 262.

NOTHING is of greater Importance to the Good of Society, than a great Extent of Knowledge in thoſe that govern. Magiſtrates ſhould look upon themſelves as immortal, becauſe their Offices never die; and therefore ſhould profit by the Knowledge of the paſt, in order to provide wiſely for the future, which they ſhould have full as much at heart as the preſent, unleſs they chuſe rather to make the following Declaration: " Since a happy Fortune has placed me in my " preſent Station, I ſhall make my preſent Intereſts my only " Rule, without troubling my ſelf with a Thought of thoſe " who are to come after me: This is the Centre all my " Actions

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" But when the People ſhall thus enjoy Peace
Page 264. " and Plenty, Luxury will corrupt them, and they
" will turn againſt me thoſe Forces which I have
" given them. Fear not at all, ſays *Mentor*, this Inconvenience:
" This is a Pretext always alledg'd to flatter prodigal Princes, who
" would oppreſs their Subjects with Taxes. The Remedy is eaſy:
" The Laws which we come to eſtabliſh for Agriculture, will make
" their Lives laborious; and in their Plenty, they will have nothing
" more than neceſſary, becauſe we ſhall retrench all Arts which fur-
" niſh Superfluities. This Plenty will alſo be divided by the Fre-
" quency of Marriages, and by the great Multiplication of Families:
" Every Family being numerous, and having little Land, will be
" oblig'd to cultivate it without ceaſing. It is Softneſs and Idleneſs
" that makes the People inſolent and rebellious.

" Remember, that in thoſe Countries where the
Page 266. " Prince reigns moſt abſolute, he is leaſt powerful:
" He ſeizes; he ruins all; himſelf alone poſſeſſes his
" whole Country: But the whole Country alſo languiſhes; the Fields
" are uncultivated, and almoſt deſart; the Towns every Day depo-
" pulated, and Commerce deſtroy'd. The King, who cannot be a
" King alone, and is only ſo by means of his People, annihilates him-
" ſelf by little and little, by annihilating inſenſibly the People from
" whom he derives his Riches and Power: His Country is exhauſted
" of its Wealth and People. This laſt Loſs is the greateſt and moſt
" irretrievable; his abſolute Power makes as many Slaves as he has
" Subjects. They flatter, they ſeem to adore him, and to tremble at
" the very Look of him: But behold the leaſt Revolution, this mon-
" ſtrous Power, carried to ſo violent an Extreme, cannot ſubſiſt; it has
" no Refuge in the Hearts of the People; it has wearied and tired out
" all the Body of the State; it forces every Member of it to ſigh after
" a Change. At the firſt Stroke that is given it, the Idol is thrown
" down, and trampled under Foot. Contempt, Hatred, Fear, Re-
" venge, Defiance, in a word, all the Paſſions unite againſt an Autho-
" rity ſo odious. The King, who in his vain Proſperity did not find
" one Man couragious enough to tell him Truth, in his Misfortune
" will not find one to excuſe him, or defend him againſt his Enemies.

"Actions ſhall point to". He who has imbibed the Principles of *Epicurus*, and reaſons in this Manner, thinks accordingly.

FOR want of an enlarg'd Underſtanding, by pitying the Guilty, we deprive the Innocent of that Protection which we owe them.

FOR want of an enlarg'd Underſtanding we perceive not, that in Controverſies we are ſo far from concluding upon any thing, that we only ſtart new Difficulties, by ſuch Anſwers as a falſe Shame and Unwillingneſs to yield uſually dictate. Beſides, a narrow Mind oftentimes ſees not that the Blow which is aimed at the Adverſary, will fall back upon it ſelf; and that the Arguments which are produced to ſupport one Part of its Syſtem, will but ſerve in the end to overthrow the other Parts.

OUR good Intentions are all in vain, if by reaſon of Idleneſs, or for want of Exerciſe, or of a good Method, our Genius be too much contracted: For whatever Project is propoſed, if our Self-love be but flatter'd in it, we readily give into it with all our Heart, and are charmed to ſee it ſucceed: We applaud our ſelves for having contributed to it; and perceive not that we are all the time taking Pains to ſap the Liberties of our Country, and giving fatal Blows to it, which our Poſterity, and perhaps our ſelves, ſhall in a little time feel.

IN vain we inſtruct our ſelves in the Foundations of Right; in vain we learn, for Example, that the good of the Society ſhould be the Rule of our Conduct, if we do not love this Principle, and make it familiar to us; if we have not our Underſtanding enlarged enough to apply it upon all Occaſions, we ſhall ſacrifice the eſſential Intereſts of the Society we belong to to little particular Intereſts, and to mean Conveniences, which are the ſole Aim of narrow Minds. The Reaſon of our trampling under Foot the Rules of our Duty, is becauſe we are ignorant or forgetful of thoſe of Reaſoning; and for want of a perfect *Logic*, we are confined to an imperfect Morality.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Perception of the Senses.

Three Things to be diſtinguiſh'd in our Senſations.

I. WHEN we ſay, *we ſee*, for inſtance, *a Tree*, or that *we feel the Heat of a Stove*, we confound three different Things in one, and include them all under one Name: For, 1. The Organs of our Body are *affected* by ſome external Object, which makes its Impreſſion upon them. 2. This corporeal Impreſſion is uſually follow'd by a *Perception*, I ſay, *uſually*, and not at all *neceſſarily*, becauſe ſometimes this Effect is interrupted, and this uſual Conſequence does not follow at all: As, when People paſs by us without our perceiving them, altho' our Eyes are open, and in good Order, and turn'd that Way; we do not perceive them, I ſay, nor have any Idea of them, becauſe we are taken up with other Thoughts, and yet the Eye is acted upon by the Object preſented before it in the ſame manner as it always is; for external Objects do not wait to make their Impreſſions juſt when we are in the Humour to receive them. All this proves, without Contradiction, that to perceive, and to receive upon the Organs of Sight a very clear and very lively Impreſſion, are two different Things, and that we ought not to confound Perception, with the Affection of the Organ. (*a*)

AFTER

(*a*.) Cicero *has made this Remark, and concludes from it, that it is the Mind which ſees and hears, and not the Organs, which it is obliged to make uſe of to ſee and hear.* Nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quæ videmus. Neque enim eſt ullus ſenſus in corpore, ſed ut non ſolùm Phyſici docent, verùm, etiam Medici, qui iſta aperta & patefacta viderunt, viæ quaſi quædam ſunt ad oculos, ad nares, ad aures à ſede animi perforatæ. Itabue ſæpe aut cogitatione, aut aliquâ vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris oculis, & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: Ut facilè intelligi poſſit, animum & videre, & audire, non eas partes, quæ quaſi ſunt feneſtræ animi: Quibus tamen nihil ſentire queat mens, niſi id agat, & adſit. Quid quod eâdem mente res diſſi-

AFTER the Impreſſion upon the Organ, and the Perception which follows, we *judge*, 3. That there is without us an Object which anſwers to this Perception, which is the Cauſe of it, and reſembles it. Tho' this third Act generally follows the others, and follows them alſo ſo readily, as to be confounded with them; for which Reaſon we are uſed to take them all Three for One, yet ſometimes we are able to ſeparate it. When at a Diſtance, and in a dusky Light, the Eye is affected, and the Impreſſion immediately follow'd with the Idea of a Wolf, I can however prevent my judging this diſtant Object to be actually a Wolf, and really to reſemble my Idea.

Wherein conſiſt the Errors of our Senſation.

II. IT is always certain that the Ideas which we have and perceive are real; but it is not always certain that they are juſt Repreſentations of the Objects which excite them: Our Perception is always a true Perception; but the Judgment which follows is ſometimes deceitful. It is always true, that the Idea of a Wolf is actually the Idea of a Wolf, and there is no Error but in the too haſty Application which I make of it to an Object which it does not belong to.

WE muſt not confound our Senſations, with the Memory which remains of them; for we often remember with Pleaſure, a Pain we have formerly ſuſtain'd, and are no longer expoſed to: Sometimes this Memory is only an Idea, which repreſents a paſt Senſation under a mix'd Notion of Pleaſure and Pain; ſometimes, indeed, this Idea has Power enough to make ſome Impreſſion upon the Organs, and by this means to raiſe ſome feeble Senſation.

Our Senſations are not in us the juſt Repreſentations of Objects.

III. ALL the World agrees, that there are certains Objects which have nothing in them reſembling the Senſation which they excite. It would be extravagant, for Example, to imagine that a Pin ſhould contain in its ſelf any Thing reſembling the Pain which we feel when prick'd with it; no Body has ever dream'd of ſuch a Thing. But we often times imagine in Objects I don't know what Reſemblance to the Senſations which they raiſe

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diſſimillimas comprehendimus, ut colorem, ſaporem, caloremo, dorem, ſonum? quæ nunquam quinque nuntiis animus cognoſceret, niſi ad eam omnia referrentur, ut idem omnium judex ſolus eſſet. *Cic. Tuſc. Quæſt. Lib.* I.

Father Lamy *has taken a great deal of Pains to ſet this ſame Reaſoning in the cleareſt Light.*

in us; and ſometimes we have not the Patience to be convinced that we have been too haſty in ſuppoſing this Reſemblance. If I put my Hand, for Example, when it is very cold into warm Water, I ſhould ſay that I feel this Water to be warm; but if after this I ſhould plunge into it my other Hand extremely heated, I ſhould feel this very ſame Water to be very cold. It is however impoſſible that it ſhould have any Reſembance to theſe two contrary Senſations at the ſame time; and conſequently I ſay I feel, when I do moreover judge, and I confound in my Judgment the Appearance with the Reality. It is the ſame, when by means of a Priſm I diſplay upon white Paper all the Colours of the Rainbow: I ſay I ſee them, becauſe I judge them to be there, inſtead of judging ſimply that they appear there. We ſhould therefore be *cautious in judging of Objects by the Perception of the Senſes:* And till we have Philoſophy enough to diſtinguiſh perfectly what belongs to the Soul, from that which belongs to the Body, it is beſt to *ſuſpend* our Judgment *concerning the Nature of theſe* external Appearances.

Our Senſations acquaint us with the Relations which external Bodies have to ours.

IV. BUT if our Hand, ſome will ſay, makes us perceive in Fire an Heat which it has not, and our Eyes in Objects Colours which they have not, our Creator has put us under a Neceſſity of being miſtaken every Moment. Not at all. The Fire appears to have Heat, and the Objects appear to have Colours: This is true; and we are not miſtaken when we judge that they appear there. But we then begin to be deceiv'd, when we judge this Heat, and theſe Colours, to be actually and really in the Objects which carry the Appearance of them; and this is what the Senſes do not teach us. They give us no Inſtruction concerning their Reality; they inform us only with regard to their Appearance; it belongs to the Underſtanding to decide the reſt.

BUT here we may be aſſured of one Truth: 1. That our Senſations give us to know the Relation which the Objects which occaſion them have to our Body. The more diſtant Objects are, the leſs they appear to us, becauſe they have leſs Influence on us: Thoſe which cauſe uſeful Vibrations, or ſuch as agree with the Well-being of our Fabrick, produce agreeable Senſations: Thoſe which cauſe ſuch as injure the ſolid Parts, or diſſipate and exhauſt the Spirits, produce Effects which are follow'd by painful Senſations. Thus robuſt Bodies love violent Exerciſes; and thoſe whoſe Fibres are hardened with uſe, are pleas'd with ſuch active and penetrating

ting Liquors, as are insupportable to those whose Organs are of a more dilicate Texture. To this it may be objected, that we eat with Pleasure unwholsome Aliment, and have an Aversion to healthful Remedies. But I answer, 1. That our Sensations do not acquaint us with the Relation which a Body, applied to ours, will have in the Event to our Health, but singly the Effect which it produces immediately upon the Part to which it is applied. I answer, 2. That the Frame of our Body has been put out of Order by the Consequences of Sin, and our ill Habits. An useful Remedy acts disagreeably upon a Body disorder'd, and in effect we were not originally made for Remedies, whose first Impressions are even hurtful as well as disagreeable. Man was at first design'd to live in Happiness and Health; and since the Fall, our Luxury and our Mixtures have corrupted our Taste, which without this, as acutely and justly as that of other Animals, which have not been corrupted by the Commerce of Men, would have distinguish'd by its Sensations of Pleasure or Pain that which it should seek, from that which it should shun.

I OBSERVE, 3. That our Sensations being establish'd to warn us of the Disorders to which our Body is liable, the usual Motions, and such as are continual, ought not to excite any Sensations; otherwise the Mind would be continually taken up with a thousand Sensations, and would never have any Leisure to form Ideas, reflect, or meditate. Such Motions as cause no stronger Vibrations in the Parts of the Body, than those which are occasioned every Moment by the continual Circulation of the Blood and Spirits, ought not to excite in us any Sensations; for if some of these Motions may have in the long-run troublesome Consequences, they are however quickly spent without any present Effect. It is not then proper they should give us every Moment useless Alarms. We may add to this, that these light and insensible Motions are perform'd in such Parts as are beyond the reach of Remedies; and that, lastly, since the Fall Man being born to die, it was but merciful in our Creator to appoint that our slow Steps to an inevitable Death, should not be attended with painful and grievous Sensations.

They assure us of the Existence of Objects.

V. 2. THE Perceptions of the Senses do moreover furnish us with certain Proofs of the Existence of Objects which encompass us. Sometimes, I confess, we think we see what we do not see, as it happens in Dreams, and in the Case of a Delirium; may not therefore our whole Lives be a continued Sensation of such like Illusions? This Difficulty taken

ken in the Groſs may perhaps diſturb a weak Mind, which is aſleep almoſt whilſt waking; but a ſmall Attention to what our Senſes make us perceive, will ſoon clear it up: What! can I continually dream that I have for my Parents ſuch Perſons as never were in Being? After I had dream'd, in the Time of what I call waking, that any Body is dead; if it were only a Dream, why ſhould I never in this time of waking dream that he is living again? If I only dream that I am going a Journey; why ſhould my wandring Imagination continually bring forth new Roads, new Towns, new Hoſts, new Houſes, and new Appartments? why ſhould I never fancy my ſelf in the very ſame Place again, from whence I but juſt now ſet out? Can I dream of Studying, and in this Illuſion inſtruct my ſelf in exact Order, and make actual Advances in all Parts of Learning? It is eaſy to purſue this Argument; and the longer we dwell upon it, the more entirely will our firſt Doubts vaniſh, if it be poſſible for us to have any ſo extravagant: For I can ſcarce be perſwaded that there ever was any Body ſo mad as maintain it in good earneſt. There are ſome over-thwart and cavilling Wits, which take a Pleaſure in perplexing thoſe of meaner Abilities with ſuch like Objections; perhaps alſo by frequent Contradiction, and oppoſing themſelves againſt Truth, they have loſt the Reliſh of it, and at laſt embraced thoſe Opinions in earneſt, which they did at firſt ſtart only in jeſt; as it happen ſometimes with common Lyers, to deceive themſelves, and believe their own Lye at laſt by often repeating it, which they invented only at firſt to deceive others. We may act the Madman ſo long, till at laſt we actually become ſo.

A MODERN Author has undertaken to overthrow Scepticiſm, by denying the Exiſtence of Bodies, and admitting only that of Spirits. If he has any Deſign of impoſing by this upon the reſt of Mankind, and hopes to ſucceed in it, he has a very bad Opinion of them; and if he thinks as he ſpeaks, he does not give us any great Idea of his own good Senſe, and muſt neceſſarily ſuppoſe other Mens Brains to be as much diſordered as his own really are. If we believe him, we are all pure Spirits, and do but deceive our ſelves when we think we communicate our Thoughts by the Intercourſe of our Bodies, for we have no Bodies. This very Author has not really printed a Book; but has only had an Idea of one; and it is this Idea which we read: The Book-ſeller, of whom we imagine we buy this Book, exiſts only in Idea, no more than the Money which we give for it. The

Treaties

Treaties of Peace, the Wars which are concluded, the Fire, the Ramparts, the Arms, the Wounds, the Whigs, the Tories, have nothing of Reality beſides their Idea; and all the Pains we take to make a Progreſs in the Knowledge of Metals, Plants, and of the human Body, advance us only in the *Ideal World*. There are neither Fibres, nor Juices, nor Fermentation, nor Seeds, nor Knives to diſſect, nor Microſcopes to view them; but by means of the Idea of a Microſcope, there ariſe in me Ideas of the wonderful Texture of the little Ideal Parts.

By the Senſes we diſcern corporeal Objects.

VI. IF we do but attend to the Structure of the Organs of our Senſes, the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Author of them, will be ſufficiently obvious: This Author, whoſe Wiſdom and Goodneſs are inexpreſſible, and who creates nothing without Deſign, has viſibly propoſed to put us by means of our Senſes in Poſſeſſion of corporeal Objects, and in a Condition to enjoy and benefit by their Commerce. But this Commerce would be a perpetual Error, if by our Senſes we could not certainly diſtinguiſh one Body from another. Indeed their Penetration does not extend ſo far as to diſcover to us the Nature, inward Conſtitution, and firſt Principles of them; but the Neceſſities of Life require that we ſhould be able certainly, and without the Danger of being deceiv'd, to diſtinguiſh Objects, and to know that what we touch is, for Example, as it appears, an Horſe, a Tree, a Man, a Stone, Bread, *&c.*

A MAN believes himſelf to have the ſame Wife to Day which he had yeſterday; believes himſelf to dine with the ſame Children who ſupped with him the Night before; believes himſelf to confer with the ſame Magiſtrates with whom he was aſſembled ſome few Days before: Will any one ſay that this may be true, but that it is not certain? that the Information of the Senſes is at beſt but founded on Probabilities? that it is poſſible all this may conſiſt but in Appearances? and that theſe Appearances may be deceitful? What Pleaſure could there be in a Life always floating in Uncertainties? would it be a Preſent worth receiving? There are ſome Men who have ſo weakened their Underſtandings by conſtant abſtracted Speculations, and, if I may ſo ſay, have ſo beat their Brains about Metaphyſical Poſſibilities, that to be aſſured of the Exiſtence of Bodies upon the ſame Foot on which the Groſs of Mankind are convinced of it, they are forced to call in Faith to their Aſſiſtance. If they who talk thus, mean honeſtly, as nothing obliges me to think the contrary,

trary, they certainly have not ſufficiently conſidered what they ſay, but are plainly fallen into a Contradiction, unleſs by *Faith* they underſtand *Inſpiration*, or an inward Revelation, and a ſecret and all-powerful Action, by which God engraves in their Souls an irreſiſtable Perſwaſion of whatever he pleaſes: But if by Faith, according to the uſual Senſe of the Word, be underſtood a Perſwaſion of the Truth and Divinity of that Book which we call the *Old* and *New Teſtament*, it is evident this Perſwaſion is altogether founded upon the Teſtimony of the Senſes. We muſt be aſſured that it is really a Book, and not an Appearance only or Phantom of a Book; that this Book is compoſed of ſuch and ſuch Characters; that theſe Characters form ſuch and ſuch Words; and that theſe Words have ſuch and ſuch a Signification. Further, this very Book would be found full of Sophiſms, if the Report of the Senſes were not a Foundation of Certainty: The Authors of it do every Moment appeal to the Teſtimony of the Senſes; they confirm their Relations; they eſtabliſh the Proof of the Divinity of their Miſſion upon *what the Eyes have ſeen, upon what the Ears* *1 John ii. 1. *have heard, and upon what the Hands have felt.* *

It is from theſe Principles, ſuppoſed by them to be inconteſtable, that they draw their Proofs to bring Men to their Faith; whereas our pretended Philoſophers have occaſion for the Aſſiſtance of Faith to ſupport the Teſtimony of the Senſes.

Precautions for avoiding Miſtakes.

VII. We are deceived ſometimes, it is true, in judging of Things by the Report of our Senſes, and we miſtake one Object for another: But it is when we judge raſhly upon the firſt Appearances, and without uſing ſufficient Precautions. But if after uſing all poſſible Precautions, we ſhould yet be deceiv'd, we ſhould be plunged in perpetual Uncertainty, without any Poſſibility of extricating our ſelves. Theſe Precautions conſiſt *in conſulting more Senſes than one*; *in dwelling upon an Object*; *in conſidering it oftentimes over, at different Times, and in different Situations*; *and in enquiring how it appears to others.* (*b*) If after all this we ſhould ſtill be deceiv'd, we have no Principle of Certainty left, and all our Conduct turns always but at beſt upon Probabilities; and even Religion it ſelf, which is eſtabliſhed

(*b*) Et lumen mutari ſæpe volumus, & ſitus earum rerum quas intuemur, & intervalla aut contrahimus aut diducimus, uſque eò ut aſpectus ipſe fidem faciat ſui judicii. *Cicero.*

ed upon Miracles, of which the Senſes are the Witneſſes, will be found to ſtand upon an uncertain Foundation.

THE Schools give three Rules, by which we may be certain of the Teſtimony of the Senſes. The *Organs*, ſay they, ought to be *in perfect Order*; the *Medium* ſhould be *rightly diſpos'd*; and the *Object* in a *convenient Poſition*. I agree the Senſes do not impoſe upon us when theſe three Conditions are fulfill'd; but as it is difficult to be aſſured of this, theſe Rules are inſufficient. Our *Organs* are alter'd without our perceiving it; the Variations which happen in the *Medium*, how imperceptible ſoever in themſelves, do not fail to produce very ſenſible Effects; and laſtly, we are eaſily miſtaken in our Judgments of the Situation and Diſtance of *Objects*: But, if we attend to the Rules which we before laid down, all this will be clear'd up to us. The *Medium* cannot be ſuſpected when an Object appears the ſame, tho' *examin'd at different Times*; neither the Diſtance nor Situation can deceive us, when by *varying* them, we find no Difference in the Effect; and it is impoſſible that the Organs of all the Senſes in one and the ſame Man, and much leſs in a great Number of Men, ſhould be all equally diſorder'd, there being never any ſuch Uniformity in Diſorder.

Means of aſſiſting the Senſes.

VII. IF our Eyes had ſuch a Penetration as nothing could eſcape, we ſhould have nothing to do but to direct them to an Object, and preſently we ſhould make a perfect Diſcovery of it, and of all it contains; not one of its Principles would eſcape us: And to become a complete Philoſopher, we ſhould have nothing to do but to fix our Eyes upon the Univerſe, and regiſter in good Order all that we there obſerve. We ſupply the Weakneſs of the Senſes by Inſtruments; Art comes into their Aſſiſtance, and ſeparates that which they could not diſtinguiſh or perceive, but very confuſedly. Thus with *Semicircles* we meaſure Angles with great Exactneſs; and with *Clocks* and *Quadrants* we divide the Time and the Courſe of the Sun into as many Parts as we pleaſe, with much Preciſeneſs. Thus, by the Aſſiſtance of *Microſcopes*, ſmall Objects ceaſe to be imperceptible; and the moſt diſtant ſeem to approach the Eye, when arm'd with a *Teleſcope*.

IT muſt be agreed, that the Imagination does ſometimes aſſiſt the Eyes, and we believe we ſee, what we only imagine. When two Men, one of whom we are well acquainted with, the other a perfect Stranger, preſent themſelves, each at the Diſtance of an hundred Yards, we ſhall diſtinguiſh the Lines of the firſt as tho' he were but four

Yards

Yards off. This particular Clearneſs muſt be imputed to the Imagination, for the Sight perceives them both with equal Diſtinction. I conclude from hence, that in the Uſe of Microſcopes, we ought to be extremely cautious, leſt the Imagination ſhould ſupply ſomething in the Objects beyond what we ſee there.

Our Conjectures commence where our Senſes ceaſe.

IX. When the Effects only are found within the Reach of the Senſes, and all the Cauſes eſcape them, then we have Recourſe to *Conjectures:* We ſuppoſe ſome imperceptible Principles, but capable nevertheleſs of producing the Effects which fall under our Obſervation: And to be ſure of the Juſtneſs of our *Conjectures*, we draw Conſequences from them, which we take Pains to confirm by Experiments; thoſe which Experience contradicts we reject; thoſe which it verifies we adhere to.

When Reaſon fails us, we have Recourſe to Experience, which is a Method much more feeble and inferior, ſays *Montague*. It is quite the contrary when we cannot find out any thing by Experience, then we have Recourſe to Conjectures.

IF this Method had been always follow'd, it would have prevented the ridiculous Diſputes concerning the Cauſes of Facts, which Facts themſelves are but ſuppoſed. Experiments require Pains and Time, and ſometimes Expence: Conjectures coſt nothing to a forward Imagination. Experiments are ſeldom ſufficiently examin'd; we ſuppoſe them right, and haſten from them to our Conjectures. Mont. B. III. Ch. 11. *When Facts are propoſed, Men amuſe themſelves more readily to enquire out the Cauſes of them, than to queſtion the Truth of them. They are ſatisfied at firſt ſetting out with Suppoſitions; but examine the Conſequences with great Curioſity: They leave the Things, and run after the Cauſes. ---- How comes all this to be ſo? But muſt we ſay it is ſo? Our Diſcourſe is capable of furniſhing out an hundred other Worlds, and of finding out their Principle and Contexture: There neither wants Materials nor Foundation. Let it but alone, and it will build upon a* void Space *as well as upon a plain, upon a Vacuum as well as upon Matter.*

Dare Pondus idonea Fumo. *Perſ. Sat.* V.

I find almoſt every where, that one ought to ſay, there is nothing at all of it. And I ſhould very often make uſe of this Reply, but I dare not; for they cry it is a Demonſtration of Ignorance,

norance, and of a weak Underſtanding. And ſo I am forced to juggle for Company, and treat of idle Tales and fabulous Subjects, which I believe nothing of. Beſides, that it is indeed *a little rude and affronting to deny point-blank a Propoſition of Fact; and few People fail in Matters not eaſy of Belief, to affirm that they themſelves have ſeen them; or to vouch the Teſtimony of ſuch, whoſe Authority will admit of no Contradiction. According to this Method, we know the Foundations and the Means of a thouſand Things which never had Being: And the World is engaged in Arguments* pro *and* con, *where both Sides are falſe.* ITA eſt; finitima ſunt falſa veris, ut in præcipitem locum non debeat ſe ſapiens committere. Cic. Acad. Quæſt. 4.

IN order to procure from Experiments all the Aſſiſtance they are able to afford, 1. We ought to make them without being firſt determin'd to any Hypotheſis; or at leaſt, we ought to be always ready to abandon an Hypotheſis, or correct it by Experiments. 2. We ought to repeat them; for it is very eaſy to attribute an Effect to Cauſes, which it does not at all depend on, for want of being attentive enough to all the Circumſtances, which it is hardly poſſible to be at the firſt Tryal. 3. We ought to make them at different Times, and in different Places, to diſcover how much external Circumſtances may contribute towards producing the Effect, whoſe Cauſe we are enquiring after. 4. We ought to vary the Materials upon which we make them, that we may obſerve how much Aſſiſtance the Cauſe may receive from the Subjects upon which it operates. And to meaſure more juſtly the Extent of Cauſes, we ſhould vary the Quantities, both of what they act with, and what they act upon. *(c)*

THE

(c) Hiſt. of the Royal Acad. of Sciences, 1704. "It is certain that "an infinite Number of Things would not remain obſcure, but "for Want of a ſufficient Number of Facts, which "might preſent them before us in ſeveral different *Page* 17. *Edit. Amſt.* "Views, or which might teach us all their eſſen- "tial Circumſtances.

"By ſubſtituting in the room of the acid Salt of *Page* 47. "Sulphur Oil of Vitriol, and in the room of the "greaſy and inflamable Part of the Sulphur Oil of Turpentine, we "ſucceed in making a true Sulphur.

"A Pendulum of three Feet eight Inches and a half vibrates Se- "conds at *Paris*, *Uranisburgh*, and *Bayonne*. In the Iſle of *Gorée*, "in

THE Air produces very powerful Effects: We cannot ſee the Figure of its Parts; but we conjecture that they are elaſtic, and wound up round about themſelves, like ſo many ſmall Springs; that they unfold and extend themſelves as ſoon as they have their Liberty. From this Suppoſition we conclude the Air capable of ſuſtaining a great Weight; and to ſee if Experience will prove it to have this Force, we take ſome Tubes open only at one Extremity, and fill one of them with ſome Liquor; then ſtopping this open Extremity with one Finger, we turn it downwards, and immerge it in a Veſſel full of the ſame Liquor, but freely expos'd to the Influence of the Air. This Influence ſuſtains the Liquor in the Tube, whoſe open Extremity is immerged, and its cloſed Extremity, uppermoſt. We make the Experiment with Tubes of different Diameters, and the Height of the Liquor ſuſtained is always the ſame, becauſe there is in proportion a greater Column of Air to counterpoiſe it. To diſcover whether the Weight or Elaſticity of the Air is the immediate Cauſe of this Suſpenſion of Liquors, we try if the Experiment will ſucceed in Places perfectly encloſed. And to find whether it is not the Weight of the Air which cauſes its Elaſticity, we repeat the Experiment in Places of different Heights. Laſtly, we try Tubes of different Figures, and uſe Liquors of different ſpecifick Gravities. From Liquors we paſs to Solids; and by applying two Plates of Marble or Steel perfectly poliſh'd, one upon another, and hanging to the undermoſt a conſiderable Weight, we find both the Plate and the Weight added to it, ſupported by the Air. Behold with what Precautions, with what Exactneſs, with what Scruples and Doubts we ought to ſtudy Nature; and from thence to find our Conjectures verified, by which we endeavour to come at the Knowledge of what we can never ſee, let us take what Pains we will. *Examples.*

IT is not only in Matters of Philoſophy, that we ought to take the Pains to juſtify our Reaſonings by Experience; this Precaution extends a great way farther, and ought to be us'd in all Subjects that are capable of it. I ſhall inſtance in a very plauſible

" in fourteen Degrees Lat. the Pendulum for Seconds muſt be two " Inches ſhorter; and in the Iſle of *Cayenne* only one Inch and a " quarter ſhorter. So many different Experiments prevent our being " miſtaken in conjecturing too haſtily, that the Nearneſs to the " Æquator is the true Cauſe of theſe unequal Lengths of a ſe- " cond Pendulum.

plauſible Argument, urged by ſome againſt *Operas*, which has taken with a great many People, and even with thoſe who have not had the leaſt Prejudice againſt publick Shews; *Nothing*, ſay they, *appears ſo contrary to the Action of Tragedy as Singing; and nothing can be more ridiculous than the continuing a Converſation in Muſick.* This Argument has been long ſince made uſe of, and I remember it appeared demonſtrative to me the firſt Time I read it; and in this Prepoſſeſſion, that an Opera was a very unreaſonable Entertainment, I had not even the Curioſity to go to one; and if it had not been out of Complaiſance, I believe I never had ſeen one. But from the Moment of my having been there, I plainly perceived the Difference betwixt diſcovering Truth by Experience, and imagining it to be demonſtrated by ſome uncertain Reaſonings: That which ſuch kind of Reaſonings had made me treat with Ridicule, became the Object of my Admiration; and the Singing to me ſeem'd wonderfully to enliven the Sentiments it expreſs'd, as well as all the Repreſentations I ſaw, or rather all the Actions to which I imagin'd my ſelf to be Witneſs. I then re-examined the Reaſoning which had dazzled me; and in obſerving it with more Circumſpection, to diſcover the Defect of it, I ſoon took notice, that my Miſtake had been, in extending to all Sorts of Converſations, what would be very true of ordinary Converſations: Thoſe which turn upon Subjects that are tedious and difficult, require a very great Exactneſs in the Terms, and a perfect Tranquility of the Mind. So unuſual an Entertainment as Singing, would as little agree with common Subjects, and thoſe of little Moment; but ſomething extraordinary in the Tone and Pronuntiation, as well as in the Expreſſions made uſe of, does perfectly well ſuit with grand and extraordinary Events and Sentiments. There is a very wide Difference betwixt a Diſcourſe compoſed of a long Chain of Ideas, and one that conſiſts but of a few Words, which are to expreſs, with an extreme Vigour, ſome very lively Sentiments. Proſe is proper for the firſt; but Poetry and Muſick agree altogether with the ſecond. In a Chamber, as well as upon a Theatre, Verſe and Singing engage the Heart very differently from ordinary Diſcourſe.

IT is good to lead the Imagination thro' a great Variety of Examples: This Variety will ſhew the Neceſſity of our Rules, and at the ſame Time teach their Uſe. If it be demanded, whether it is of Importance to have a Church in every Pariſh, Devotion and Zeal, complicated, as they frequently are, with different Paſſion, raiſe upon this Subject

a great Number of uncertain Reaſonings; to the Examination of which the Religion of narrow Minds is always averſe: But if we conſult Experience, to which all Ranks of Underſtanding ſhou'd be ſubject, do we ſee thoſe Men who need not go out of their Pariſh to find a Church, any Thing better edified, or leading better Lives, than thoſe that are forced to go to the next Pariſh for a Church? We are deceiv'd then in expecting from a certain Conveniency of Nearneſs to a Church, an Effect which ariſes only from the Ability of the Preacher in the choice of his Subjects, and in his manner of enforcing them upon his Audience.

CHAP. V.

Of the Imagination.

In what conſiſt the Ideas of the Imagination. The Extent of this Faculty.

I. IT is a Truth univerſally acknowledged, that the Impreſſions of Objects upon the Senſes paſs to the Brain, and produce there what we call the Perceptions of the Imagination. The Cuſtom which we have of connecting continually Ideas with Signs, is moreover the Cauſe that the Underſtanding hardly ever forms any Thought, but that the Imagination furniſhes at the ſame time Names and Signs. Even in meditating we are ſpeaking already, and expreſſing our ſelves inwardly. By this Connection it happens, that the Operations of the Underſtanding are quicker or ſlower, according as the Imagination ſupplies its Operations with more or leſs Activity. Moreover, our Reaſonings and inward Sentiments are compoſed of the Ideas of each of theſe Faculties; for at the bottom, that which is call'd the Underſtanding and the Imagination, is the ſame Soul which thinks in different Ways, and diſtinguiſhes under different Names. This Faculty then has a very great Influence upon our Knowledge, and it is of great Importance to take advantage of its Helps, and to know and be able to correct its Defects.

WE ſhould be very groſly deceiv'd, if we ſhould take occaſion from theſe Names, *Underſtanding*, *Senſes*, and *Imagination*, to ſuppoſe in the Soul three diſtinct Faculties one from another, as the Feet are from the Hands and Belly: It is the ſame Soul, the ſame Thought, which perceives in three different Manners: Theſe three different Manners are diſtinguiſh'd by the different Names of *Underſtanding*, *Senſes*, and *Imagination*, which are each ſubdivided into ſeveral different Species.

ONE Error is always follow'd by a great many others. There are ſome, who ſuppoſing a much greater Difference betwixt the Underſtanding and the Imagination than there really is, take occaſion from thence to condemn the Uſe of Eloquence. *It advances not our Reaſon*, ſay they; *it reaches not the Underſtanding; for it affects and moves the Imagination, and whatever moves that ſtops there.* When the Terms we make uſe of excite Ideas; and by comparing theſe Ideas among themſelves, we connect or disjoin them as we ought, we cannot be deceiv'd; we think reaſonably in whatſoever Terms they are expreſs'd: The Pleaſure we take in hearing, is not a neceſſary Hindrance to our Underſtanding, but on the contrary often promotes it.

What is underſtood by Temperament.

II. SEVERAL Laws contribute to vary the Imagination, and conſequently to perfect or to weaken it; we ſhall run over them in their Order: The firſt which offers it ſelf is the *Temperament*. We ſhall not undertake to explain the Nature and Effects of it philoſophically, nor borrow from other Sciences Foundations for this, which is intended only as an Introduction to them. It was neceſſary there ſhould be in Man Activity and Sluggiſhneſs, Fire and Phlegm; and the Mixture of theſe two different Qualities, according to their particular Proportions in one and the ſame Man, is call'd the *Temperament*. Without Fire we could not have liv'd at all; and if we had had nothing but Fire, it would have ſoon conſumed it ſelf, and we could have lived but a few Moments. The moſt happy Temperament is that which conſiſts of ſuch a Combination of theſe Qualities, as are moſt ſerviceable to our Health and Vigour: This is call'd *Sanguine*; becauſe then the Blood is moſt pure, and leſs charged with ſuch Mixtures as corrupt it. (*a*)

III. THE

(*a*) " Quod humidiſſimum eſt in Igne, & Siccisſimum in Aquâ, ſi " in Corpore Temperamentum acceperint ſapientiſſima ſunt. ——

Advantages of a ſanguine Temperament with reſpect to the Imagination.

III. THE ſtrong Union which the Author of Nature has thought proper to eſtabliſh between the Body and the Soul, requires that the Operations of the Mind ſhould be performed with ſo much more Freedom as the Body is in a more happy Condition; and ſuch is the Condition of it, when our Thoughts are neither produced and diſſipated with Precipitation by too much Fire, nor yet retarded by too much Phlegm. This is the Advantage of Sanguine Temperaments: They conceive with Readineſs, becauſe the cold Part does not over-balance; and they can fix upon a Subject long enough to conſider it thoroughly, becauſe they are not hurried away by too much Heat. To theſe ready and juſt Conceptions anſwers an eaſy Stile, full of Clearneſs and Force, in which true Eloquence conſiſts; ſo that (*b*) they ſeem born to diſcover Truth, and to communicate it to others.

Its Diſadvantages.

IV. THE Misfortune is, that this Conſtitution is too much expoſed to Pleaſures (for Health puts us in a Condition of procuring them more eaſily, and of reliſhing them more agreeably,) which appear ſo charming, that they are courted and careſſed with Eagerneſs: They are perpetually purſued and ever deſired; and yet as ſoon as enjoyed, they are found wanting. This puts the Mind into a conſtant Wandering, and Unſettledneſs; and makes it ſucceed the worſt, in what it is really capable of ſucceeding the beſt. Its happy Foundation is buried under ill Habits.

Means to repair them.

V. THESE Habits will be prevented, by demonſtrating that the Mind reliſhes Pleaſures in the Knowledge of Truth, far beyond corporeal Pleaſures; and that an Application to Virtue, is attended

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" Ex his autem Anima Temperata, ſapientiſſima eſt, memoriâ va-
" lentiſſimâ prædita. ---- Si autem Ignis ſinceriſſimi, itemque Aquæ
" temperamentum Anima ſortiatur, ſit autem Ignis paulò inferior ac
" defectuoſior quàm Aqua, ſapientes quidem ſunt etiam hi, verùm
" defectuoſiores quàm in priore Temperamento ----- Si verò am-
" pliùs adhuc ſuperetur Ignis à preſenti Aquâ, hos jam alii deſipientes,
" alii attonitos ſive ſtupidos appellant. ----- Hi plorant nemine mo-
" leſtante aut Verberante, formidantque non formidanda, & triſtantur
" in rebus nihil ad ſe pertinentibus. ---- Ex his verò ſapientiores &
" deſipientiores animæ fiunt." *Hippocrat. de Diatâ. Lib.* I. Ed. Vand Linden.

(*b*) Inſtitutam noſtram ſententiam ſequitur Orationis genus, *Cic. de Orat.*

tended with a Tranquility far above the Price of the Sweets of a voluptuous Life. A Life which is taken up with the Shadow, inſtead of the Subſtance; and being engaged with Trifles, paſſes from Amuſement to Amuſement, without ever arriving at, or taſting true Happineſs. Theſe are Truths which may be demonſtrated; but they ſhould be urged in a proper Seaſon, and when a convenient Opportunity offers for their Reception. If you preſs them upon voluptuous Men in the height of their Prepoſſeſſions, you only confirm them in an Habit of rejecting them. (*c*) There are Moments when, being diſcontented with themſelves, weary with Trifles, out of Humour with their falſe Friends, ſeized with ſome Diſtemper, or galled with ſome Diſgrace, their Attention will be at liberty to liſten to a Propoſal of a new Kind of Life, whoſe Pleaſures may be more ſolid, and its Expectations more certain. (*d*) They become Converts the Moment you can engage them to make a Tryal of it, and to ſurmount couragiouſly the Obſtacles and Difficulties which attend only the Beginning of it.

WHEN I would propoſe to gain ſomething upon a Man who is too much under the Influences of his Senſes, and too much addicted to their Objects, I would deſire of him to be pleaſed to make tryal of my Pleaſures. He is ſometimes diſſatisfied with his own; he has occaſion for a great Variety of Objects and Amuſements to prevent or remove his Diſguſts: I would beg of him not to be diſcouraged, if he does not immediately find the Pleaſures I invite him to, come up to what I promiſed. Even our Games of Diverſion themſelves do not at firſt appear pleaſant, before we come to reliſh them, the Pains we take in learning them far exceeds the Pleaſure of them. To engage him the more to believe me, I make him ſenſible, that there can be no doubt but that the Pleaſures moſt worthy of us, thoſe which reſpect the moſt noble and excellent Part of us muſt needs be the greateſt of all. The Satisfactions of a Man under the Dominion of his Senſes, are not proportionable to his Inquietudes: He is the Sport of Illuſions, and always hopes to find what he never meets with, his Diſguſts increaſe with his Deſires. The Moment the Senſes have leave to ramble, and their Deſires are once excited, he gives himſelf up to them without Reſerve, and himſelf deſtroys his own Happineſs by a miſtaken eager Purſuit

(*c*) In morbis quoque nihil perniciosius quàm immatura Medicina.

(*d*) Nullum tempus emendandi melius quàm dum interquieſcit, dum emendato ſimilis eſt. *Sen. Ep.* XXV.

of it: He ſhortens his Days, ſpends his Vigour, and dulls his Appetite.

ON the other ſide, if to prevent theſe Inconveniences, we refuſe the Senſes ſome part of their Demands, and endeavour to moderate their Deſires, then theſe Pleaſures will be very much diſturb'd and inconſiderable. So that in this caſe then, we muſt either be content with theſe half Satisfactions, or elſe ſeek out an Happineſs of a different Nature. The Author of our Being, by impowering our Senſes to procure us none but very imperfect Pleaſures, ſufficiently ſhews that he has created us for ſome much better Purpoſe. Let us then conſider the great Ends of our Creation, that we may be able to anſwer them. We are made for *Contemplation* and *Method*, for *Science* and *Wiſdom*: Let us then purſue theſe infinite Prizes, and our Senſes will ſoon put themſelves in Order, without giving us the Trouble to regulate them. (e) *True and ſolid Pleaſures conſiſt not in filling and pampering the Body, or raiſing its Deſires: Our Security lies in keeping them quiet, and being free from their Importunities. To live Happy, is to live in perfect Tranquility, exempt from the Diſturbances which are occaſioned by Envy and Ambition, and above the inſupportable Terrors which are adminiſtred by Superſtition and a Falſe Religion. To enjoy our ſelves and the Preſent, not to repent the Paſt, nor fear the Future, is true Pleaſure; a Pleaſure always uniform, a Pleaſure never to be exhauſted, and far from being burdenſome to it ſelf, becomes always more delightful, the more it is enjoy'd. The Man who lives in this Condition, cannot be ſaid to be Content with a little, for he Enjoys every Thing.*

VI. AN

(e) Dicat ipſe ſibi: Voluptas fragilis eſt & brevis, faſtidio objecta: quo avidiùs hauſta eſt, citiùs in contrarium recidens, cujus ſubinde neceſſe eſt aut pæniteat, aut pudeat. In quâ nihil eſt aut magnificum, aut quod naturam hominis, Diis proximi, deceat: res humilis, membrorum ac vilium miniſterio veniens, exitu fœda. Iſta eſt Voluptas & homine & viro digna, non implere Corpus, nec Saginare, nec Cupiditates irritare, quarum tutiſſima eſt quies: Sed perturbatione carere, & eâ quam hominum inter ſe rixantium ambitus concutit, & eâ quæ intolerabilis ex alto venit, ubi de Diis famæ creditum eſt, vitiiſque illos noſtris æſtimavimus. Hanc voluptatem æqualem, intrepidam, nunquam ſenſuram ſui tædium, percipit hic quem deformamus cum maximè; qui, ut ita dicam, divini juris atque humani peritus, præſentibus gaudet, ex futuro non peudet. Nihil enim firmi habet, qui in incerta propenſus eſt. Magnis itaque curis exemptus, & diſtorquentibus mentem, nihil ſperat, aut cupit, nec ſe mittit indubium, ſuo contentus. Nec illum exiſtimes parvo eſſe contentum, omnia illius ſunt. *Sen. de Benef. Lib.* VII. *Cap.* 2.

VI. AN infinite Number of young People, who by their good Senſe and happy Inclinations to Virtue, are born for Knowledge and the Good of Mankind, prepoſſeſs themſelves againſt Learning, and oftentimes even againſt Prudence, by ſeeing the odious Gloomineſs, and ſupercilious Affectations of a thouſand Pedants, whoſe only Aim is to make themſelves look'd upon as the Sources of Science, and reverenced as the Rules of Duty. Theſe *Dons* would think themſelves diſhonour'd, if they did the leaſt thing like other People: They dreſs themſelves differently; and if they walk, or ſpeak, or cough, or even ſpit, it muſt be done learnedly and gravely. You wou'd ſay their Study is to keep Men at a diſtance, not to invite them nearer; that they find more Pleaſure in contradicting, than in reforming; and that their firſt Principle is always to be the very Reverſe of other Men. A young Man who obſerves this Pedantic Farce, is apt to look upon Men of Letters, as ſuch whoſe Vanity and Extravagance make them more to be laugh'd at than imitated. Men have in all Times given into this ridiculous Humour. *Seneca* ſets them off admirably well in his fifth Letter. (*f*).

The pernicious Effects of Pedantry.

VII. IT is a Truth of Experience, That the Diſpoſitions of the Mind anſwer to thoſe of the Body. Let us but reflect upon the Difference there is in our manner of Thinking in the heighth of a Fever, and in the Exit of the Diſtemper; in the Morning faſting, and immediately after a full Stomach; and by theſe Relations betwixt the Condition of the Body and that of the Mind, we may eaſily judge what Influence the *Temperaments* will have upon the *Imagination*. Thoſe which have an extreme Proportion of *Fire*, have a very

The Qualities of the Cholerie.

(*f*) Illud autem te admoneo, ne eorum more qui non proficere, ſed conſpici cupiunt, facias aliqua, quæ in habitu tuo, aut genere vitæ notabilia ſint. Aſperum cultum, & intonſum caput, & negligentiorem barbam, & indictum argento odium, & cubile humi poſitum, & quicquid aliud ambitionem perverſâ viâ ſequitur, devita. ------ Id agamus, ut meliorem vitam ſequamur quàm vulgus, non ut contrariam: alioqui quos emendari volumus, fugamns, & à nobis avertimus. Illud quoque efficimus, ut nihil imitari velint noſtri, dum timent ne imitanda ſint omnia. Hoc primùm Philoſophia promittit, ſenſum communem, humanitatem & congregationem: à quâ profeſſione diſſimilitudo ſeparabit. Videamus ne iſta, per quæ admirationem parare volumus, ridicula & odioſa ſint.

very ready and penetrating Apprehenſion: Their Imagination is more fruitful of Ideas than that of others; they riſe in Crowds; and as abundantly as they are deſired, their Inquiries take in a great many more Particulars than others can extend to. But the Fire which tranſports them, ſeldom gives them time to fix upon a Subject long enough to form Ideas ſufficiently exact; and a great many things eſcape them, which a longer Attention wou'd have diſcover'd. It is with the Mind, as it is with the Eyes; if we roll them about haſtily, we ſee things only in the groſs, and at moſt can perceive but ſome particular ones with any thing of Exactneſs. Beſides this, the Greatneſs of their Fire hurries them on to Extremes of all kinds: If you believe them, whatever they diſlike muſt be extremely mean, and of no Value in the leaſt: They make Prodigies of every thing they commend, and Monſters of every thing they condemn: They either magnify or annihilate. Whence the common Obſervation of theſe *Choleric* Conſtitutions is, That they are either a very great deal better, or a very great deal worſe than others: When they ſucceed, nothing can do ſo well; when they miſcarry, nothing can do ſo ill. Moreover, this exceſſive Fire being ſoon ſpent, they are very unequal in their Compoſitions; ſome Parts are perfectly finiſhed, and others very indifferent: In ſome Places they are extremely clear; and in others ſo much the contrary, that you muſt gueſs at their Meaning, and it is a great chance whether you find out any thing by gueſſing. They are not however ſenſible of this Inequality; but on the contrary, becauſe their exhauſted Attention can ſee nothing more in the Subject, they imagine that in effect there is nothing more to be diſcover'd, that the Whole is already known to them, and that to go further is only to purſue Chimeras.

THERE are ſome Occaſions where their Fire animates them, and prevents their being diſcouraged with the difficulties of an Enterprize. At other times this ſame Fire throws them into Impatience, ſo that not giving themſelves time to conſider Things to the bottom, they accuſtom themſelves to know them only by halves; and ſo their Mind becomes every Day narrower and narrower.

THOSE who perceive in themſelves a great deal of Activity, do ſometimes undertake a greater Task than they are able to go thro' with: What they do, they do in an hurry, becauſe they have and wou'd always have a great deal more upon their Hands; ſo that by aiming to ſucceed in too many Things, they really ſucceed in none of them. By thinking

their

their Faculties, which ſeem ſo lively, to be more powerful than they are, they aim at Things beyond their ſtrength, and ſo either ſink under their Work, or diſcharge it but very imperfectly. *Ante omnia neceſſe eſt ſeipſum æſtimare, quia ferè plus nobis videmur poſſe quàm poſſumus.* Sen.

Advice againſt Choler and Impatience.

VIII. THE Choleric eaſily grow impatient and tranſported. A Man then of this Diſpoſition ought to take all Opportunities of obſerving the Extravagancies committed by thoſe, who, like himſelf, are under the Dominion of *Choler*. Nothing can bring Men nearer to Madneſs and Lunacy (*g*); And, *when you ſee a Man in a Paſſion, do not enquire for the Cauſe of his Tranſport in the Subjects which he pretends to have for it, it is entirely within himſelf* (*h*). One of this Conſtitution will be put in a Rage for nothing; and a broken Glaſs, or a Friend ill treated, will equally raiſe their Choler (*i*.)

Againſt an Application to Subtilties.

IX. WHEN Men have too much Fire, they generally like to make uſe of it all. Whatever is difficult, far from diſcouraging them on that Account, becomes more agreeable to them for being ſo. They love ſuch Subtilties as other People cannot eaſily apprehend; and ſometimes their Taſte runs ſo much this Way, that whatever is plain and eaſy ſeems unſavoury, and they cannot ſubmit to expreſs themſelves in the Way that Nature has dictated. They are ſo far from ſeeking the moſt ſimple Methods, that if they offer themſelves, they will not make uſe of them. They ought however to conſider, that by this Shew of Subtilty, they make all their Reaſonings ſuſpected, tho' otherwiſe they may be very ſolid. By the ſame Means alſo they oftentimes deceive themſelves: For by liking every Thing that is ſubtil, they make it, as it were, a Character of Truth; whereas they ought to conſider, that 'tis for the moſt part with

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(*g*) Immediata Ira gignit Inſaniam, & Ira Furor brevis eſt.

(*h*) Non intereſt ex quàm magnâ cauſâ naſcatur, ſed in qualem perveniat animum.

(*i*) Ferè enim juſtum quiſque affectum judicat, quem agnoſcit. Iraſcuntur boni viri pro ſuorum injuriis; ſed idem faciunt, ſi calida non benè præbeatur, ſi vitrum fractum eſt, ſi calceus luto ſparſus eſt. Non pietas illam iram, ſed infirmitas movet: ſicut pueri qui tam parentibus amiſſis flebunt, quàm nucibus. *Sen. de Irâ, Lib.* I. *Cap.* 12.

with *Subtilties*, as with *Spiders Webs*, the finer they are ſpun, the weaker they are (*k*).

Remedies. X. THE Diſtempers of the Mind are in one Senſe eaſier to cure than thoſe of the Body. To be throughly ſenſible of them, and ſeriouſly deſirous to get rid of them, might be Remedies ſufficient. When a Choleric Man is conſcious of his Fire, and keeps upon his guard, he will prevent Precipitation, and all its ill Conſequences. Not that it is amiſs to endeavour to correct his Conſtitution by Medicines and a Courſe of Phyſic: But I am perſuaded that as the Body has a great influence over the Inclinations of the Mind, and the Habits which by repeated Acts it contracts, do in their Turn alſo as much influence the Body; and conſequently he that endeavours to moderate his Fire, will by the ſame Application mend his Conſtitution. Whoever will make the Experiment upon himſelf, will find what I ſay to be true. I adviſe every one therefore to conſult himſelf ſincerely; and if he finds his Caſe to bear any Reſemblance to what I have been mentioning, inſtead of entirely purſuing his Heat and his Inclinations, let him break off his Speculations and Studies, before the Vigour of his Attention abates. He may, by frequent renewing his Purſuits, very well recompence the Loſs of Time which ſuch Interruptions occaſion; and in all Caſes it is much better to diſcover the pure Truth, tho' never ſo little, than to run the Hazard of ſuffering a Mixture of Error to ſpoil the whole. Theſe Interruptions which I here recommend, are not to be attempted without a good deal of Pains and Trouble in the beginning: But let not this diſcourage; for by a couragious Perſeverance, Uſe will make that eaſy, which at firſt appear'd very difficult. And if the Difficulty be extreme indeed, it muſt be conſider'd, that the true Strength of the Mind conſiſts in its gaining the abſolute Dominion of it ſelf (*l*). By reſuming thus at different Times the

(*k*) Nihil eſt acutius ariſtâ, quædam inutilia & inefficacia, ipſa Subtilitas reddit. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXII.

Supereſt ex heſterno mihi cogitatio, quid ſibi voluerint prudentiſſimi viri, qui rerum maximarum probationes, leviſſimas, & perplexas fecerunt: QUÆ UT SINT VERÆ, MENDACIO TAMEN SIMILES SUNT. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXIII.

(*l*) Ea demùm velocitas placet, quæ ubi juſſa eſt veſtigium ſiſtit, nec ultra deſtinata procurrit, & quæ flecti, & à curſu ad gradum reduci poteſt. Ægros ſcimus nervos eſſe, ubi invitis nobis moventur; Senex

the ſame Subject, and conſidering it coolly every Time, he will at laſt entirely exhauſt it, and prevent being hurried away with only a Notion of being Maſter of it.

Advice to Teachers.

XI. THOSE that Teach are under a particular Obligation of managing their Fire with great Addreſs. There is a great Occaſion for it, to rouſe and keep up the Attention of their Scholars; to diſcover perfectly their Genius, with all their different Habits and Humours; to know when they have entirely entred into the Thought which is expreſs'd to them; to find out what hinders and confounds them; to contrive the proper Remedies to remove theſe Difficulties; and to ſet what they are to be taught in ſuch a Light, that they ſhall abſolutely comprehend it. But as ſoon as ever the Fire of the Maſter degenerates into Impatience, it is more prejudicial to his Scholars than an Heavineſs would be: They learn no longer, when once they are ſtunned; and the Ideas of young People, which have been but a ſhort time exerciſed, muſt not be expected to ariſe with the Quickneſs of a Whirlwind; their Ideas muſt be form'd by little and little, and ſtrengthen'd gradually: They ſeek not to learn, when they can't be permitted to ask a Queſtion without running the Hazard of being mortified with a Reprimand. When a Maſter comes to be impatient that his Scholars do not go on as faſt as himſelf, they will appear to follow him, but leave him in reality to go by himſelf.

I do not at all doubt but this is one of the chief Reaſons, that it is ſo rare and difficult to meet with thoſe that know perfectly how to Teach. Fire and Temper, two eſſential Qualities of a good Maſter, ſeldom or never meet. It is hardly poſſible to procure Fire, where it is not naturally; and where it is, 'tis as difficult to govern it. To gain this Point, requires a great deal of Pains, and a great deal of Reaſon; and he muſt well underſtand, and as well love his Duty, and count nothing a Trouble, who diſcharges it perfectly.

Of the Phlegmatic.

XII. WHERE *Phlegm* and Heavineſs prevail, we call ſuch *Phlegmatic*. Theſe being not over haſty, advance ſlowly; but then the Time they take in conſidering of a Subject, gives them an Opportunity of comprehending it better; and as

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Senex aut infirmi corporis eſt, qui ambulare vult currit: Animi motus eos putemus ſaniſſimos validiſſimoſque, qui noſtro arbitrio ibunt, non ſuo ferentur. *Sen. de Irâ, Lib.* II. *Cap.* 35.

as they are not distracted with a Multiplicity of Employments, they often succeed better in what they undertake. It is true, if the Subject they attempt be very much compounded, they often content themselves with one of its Parts, and upon that determine and direct all their Views and Inquiries: After which they do not fail to perswade themselves, that nothing has escaped their Application, because they judge of the Extent of their Knowledge, by the Time they have spent in acquiring it. It has cost them so much Pains, that their chief Consolation is in thinking it absolutely perfect. The bare Suspicion of its not being compleat, puts them into too an ill Humour to think of taking it into farther Consideration; and they conceive a strange Antipathy against any one that dares advise them to renew their Inquiries, which have already so extremely fatigued them.

MEN of a Phlegmatic Constitution are usually *timorous*: Their Timorousness makes them diffident; this diffident Humour is a Disposition to Hatred, whence they easily become Cruel. When they are out of Humour, every Thing displeases; and they are very willing to get rid of every Thing that displeases. Mr. *Spon* observes, That the Christian *Greeks*, who keep a great many Fasts, become very gloomy with this bad Nourishment; we may add also, by the Superstition which accompanies them, that the Darkness of their Constitution disposes them to a thousand criminal Habits, as Avarice, Envy, and Perfidy.

Means to correct it.

XIII. IT is seldom found that a Constitution can be changed at once: But it is certain that it may be regulated, and the bad Effects of it prevented. It is to this End that Logic directs its Precepts.

I confess that the Phlegmatic may, by the Assistance of Medicine, supply their want of Fire and Activity; Logic will prescribe sprightly Conversation and Lectures full of Vivacity. It will teach them that Knowledge may be exquisite in its Kind, and yet be of too narrow an Extent; and consequently, that it is of great Importance to join to one's own Discoveries,

(*m*) Nulla enim sapientia, naturalia Corporis aut animi vitia ponuntur; quicquid infixum, & ingenitum est lenitur arte, non vincitur. — Nam ut quidam boni sanguinis sunt, ita quidam incitati & mobilis, & citò in os prodeuntis. Hæc, ut dixi, nulla sapientia abigit: alioquin haberet rerum naturam sub imperio, si omnia eraderet vitia. Quæcunque attribuit conditio nascendi, & corporis temperatura, cum multum se diuque animos composuerit, hærebunt. *Sen. Ep.* XI.

Diſcoveries, thoſe of others, to make the Whole more compleat. It is alſo abſolutely neceſſary, never to embrace any Opinion, till it has been ſubmitted to Examination, and to ſuſpend one's Judgment of one's own Diſcoveries, till others have view'd them on all Sides, and ſounded the Depth of them. This is the way to avoid the ridiculous Character of being opiniated and conceited of Syſtems too contracted, and, what is worſe, oftentimes erroneous.

XIV. TEMPERAMENTS are combined in a thouſand different Ways: Activity and Heavineſs are capable of being mixed in a thouſand different Degrees and Proportions. It is impoſſible to enter into ſo large a Detail, nor would it be of any Uſe, ſince it could neither ſerve to diſcover new Defects, nor to eſtabliſh new Rules. The greater Aſcendant any one of the Temperaments before ſpecified ſhall be obſerv'd to have in theſe various Mixtures, the more good or bad Qualities, which are the Conſequences of that Temperament, will be taken notice of. Perhaps, if we conſider it throughly, we ſhall find in this Variety of Temperaments the true Sources of that great Diverſity of the Opinions, Manners, and Maxims of Mankind. The Inclination follows the Temperament, and our Ideas ariſe, are formed, and changed conformably to our Inclinations. This is the Principle from whence the ſeveral Illuſions of Men have been derived. *Epicurus* being of *a gentle Diſpoſition*, and deſirous only of enjoying an eaſy Life, eſtabliſh'd his *Summum Bonum* in Pleaſure, and made it the Principle of his Morality. (*n*) *Zeno* being ſevere, and of a Conſtitution apt to carry all Things to Extremity, allow'd of nothing but ſtrict *Virtue* to bear the Name of Good, and entirely excluded every thing elſe which Men are uſed to purſue and eſteem as ſuch. *Ariſtotle*, who was of a *ſociable Temper*, gave into Ideas conformable to his Humour, and join'd to *Virtue*, Glory, and Riches, and the *Advantages of the Body*. This Sentiment is of uſe in Society, and very well ſuited to the Ideas of a Multitude. The Principle of *Zeno* will not at all agree; and that of *Epicurus* is too dangerous: Theſe are neither of them fit for any but

The Variety of Temperaments is the Cauſe of the different Opinions, and the different Maxims of Men.

(*n*) *Might not this be one of the Reaſons which moved the Epicureans to diſcharge God of all Care and Sollicitude concerning human Affairs; becauſe even the Effects of his Bounty towards us cannot be exerciſed without diſturbing his Repoſe?* Mont. B. II. Ch. 12.

but ſuch as are deſirous of living by themſelves, in a Separation and Retirement from the reſt of Mankind. Not only in Philoſophy, but alſo in Religion, every one eſpouſes Maxims agreeable to his Conſtitution: One attributes to God a Diſpoſition to take no care of any thing, and conceives his Clemency under an Idea of Eaſineſs. Another, moroſe and auſtere in his Temper, cries out upon every little Fault as a moſt enormous Crime: He condemns every Inclination to Pleaſure and Eaſe; and laſtly imagines, that God has made the greateſt Part of Mankind for nothing but to be damned.

Maxims to form the Imagination of Youth.

XV. THE Imagination varies according to the Difference of *Sexes*; but becauſe the Temperament may be the Cauſe of this, and Education may yet further contribute to it, we ſhall not allow it a ſeparate Article, but paſs on to conſider the *Difference of Ages*, which we ſhall divide into *Three*. The firſt begins from our Infancy, and concludes at full Age, and may take in twenty Years, or ſome little more, according as the Mind comes quicker or ſlower to its full Strength. In this firſt Age the Imagination is extremely *flexible*, and eaſily takes all Sorts of Impreſſions: It is *weak*, and for that Reaſon ought to be manag'd with a great deal of Care. As in this Age the Attention cannot be kept up long enough to follow Reaſonings of any Length, ſo no body thinks fit to reaſon with Children at all: This requires too much Patience and Trouble, and for that Reaſon it is thought ſufficient only to exerciſe their Memories. This ſeems to me to be a great Fault; for by this Management they are only taught, like Parrots, to deal in Words, and have no Concern with Ideas; to give themſelves up entirely to their Teachers; to forbear examining into themſelves, and endeavouring to underſtand; and to be prepoſſeſs'd by the firſt that ſpeaks. I would therefore have them get nothing by heart, but what has been firſt explain'd to them, and is very clearly underſtood by them; that is to ſay, they ſhould be taught nothing but what is within their Reach, as the Rules of Language, Hiſtory, Geography, the Elements of Religion, the Facts and Experiments of Natural Philoſophy, Anatomy, and the Mathematicks; and laſtly, all ſuch Parts of Learning as are not ſubject to Error: Which are for that Reaſon well ſuited to this Age, that is ſo liable to be led into Miſtakes, and would be found to be much more within the reach of young People than they are imagined to be, if we did but take Pains to

teach

teach them with more Clearneſs, and advance them by eaſy Steps, and by ſhort Leſſons. But it muſt be confeſs'd, that the gloomy Humour of moſt of our *Mathematicians*, who are ſo enamour'd with their own Studies, that they deſpiſe all others, and ſeparate from Society, and wholly neglect all ſprightly Lectures which poliſh and enliven the Mind; I ſay, their gloomy Humour clouds theſe Sciences with too much Obſcurity. Beſides, the Haſte they are in to heap Knowledge upon Knowledge, makes them content to build upon what their Predeceſſors have already laid down, and never trouble themſelves to re-examine it ſufficiently, or make it more clear: Their Underſtandings are caſt in the Mould that is in faſhion, and finds no Difficulty any where. This is in general the common Fault of Maſters, to keep themſelves up too ſervilely to what is eſtabliſh'd, and which Cuſtom has made eaſy to them, tho' it is capable of being made ſtill much eaſier to their Scholars: And it is upon this wrong Principle, and to have the ſooner done, that, in teaching Children, they borrow the Aſſiſtance of the Paſſions, rather than of Reaſon; and inſtead of explaining and ſhewing the Uſefulneſs of the Task they ſet them, they chuſe rather to conduct them by their Fears, or by their Emulation. By this means they are accuſtom'd from their Infancy to take their Paſſions for their Guide, rather than their Reaſon, which is hardly ever to be conſulted, becauſe they have not been taught to conſult it. (*o*) But this Article very well deſerves a ſeparate Diſcourſe.

At full Age Advice continues to be very neceſſary.

XVI. As ſoon as the firſt Heats and Levities of Youth are over, even till *old Age* approaches, the Imagination enjoys its full Vigour as well as the Body; for the Faculties of the one uſually anſwer to the Faculties of the other. In this Age the Attention not only, by being enliven'd, renders the Imagination more fruitful in Ideas, but does alſo, by keeping it ſelf up, perfect thoſe Ideas which it gives Birth to. This Age does oftner conſult Experience, to which it is more accuſtom'd; and having reflected

(*o*) Uter autem præceptor liberalibus ſtudiis dignior, qui excarnificabit diſcipulos, ſi memoria illis non conſtiterit, aut ſi parùm agilis in legendo oculus hæſerit, an qui monitionibus, & verecundiâ, emendare ac docere malit? *Sen. de Clementiâ.* Lib. I. Cap. 16.

Si cui eſt mens tam illiberalis, ut objurgatione non corrigatur, is etiam ad plagas, ut paſſima quæque mancipia, durabitur. *Fabius.*

reflected (*p*) more upon its Faults, conducts it self with more Circumspection. What is most to be fear'd is, its building upon the Prejudices of Childhood. It is of great Importance to have been well instructed in the first Age; and before we rest sure of this, we ought to suspect every thing we then learn'd, and examine all over again anew, and not to engage in any Employments that may interrupt so necessary an Examination.

IDLENESS is not a more pōwerful Obstacle to this Examination, than the Eagerness of Learning, and appearing to know every thing; an Eagerness which makes us heap with Precipitation Lectures upon Lectures. It is an Ambition which must be cured, unless we would make a Chaos of our Understanding, and a monstrous Mixture of Truths and Errors, confounded beyond a Possibility of being distinguish'd.

BUT in putting off the Prejudices of Childhood, we must take care not to be prepossess'd in favour of our selves, and of our own proper Views: This is a common Fault of the Age we are speaking of. The Pleasure of being reckon'd amongst the Number of Masters, after being so long fatigued in the Rank of Scholars, is a Pleasure very dazzling: We perswade our selves easily that we are in effect what we wish to be, and what we are so much delighted to believe our selves to be. We first speak with an Assurance; then with an Air of Authority; and lastly, we expect to have our Sentences look'd upon as Oracles. We love to have others listen, and ask Questions, but cannot bear they should contradict us. In an Age less advanc'd, we think it an Honour to learn; but in this we are asham'd to be instructed. To get rid of this Infatuation, let us often reflect upon the Errors and Imperfections that accompany us even to the End of our Lives; let us consider that the Mistakes of *Childhood* attend us even to old Age. Thro' the whole Course of our Lives, from time to time, we have our Moments of appearing little, flexible, credulous, and precipitate, conquer'd by Flattery, or transported with Passion, and pursuing Chimeras with as much Readiness as Children do.

WHAT *Seneca* said of perfect Probity, is yet more true of Science. He who flatters himself with the Hopes of knowing every thing that can be known, or, at least, that deserves to be known, plainly demonstrates, that he does not even

(*p*) Multis experimentis longa, & frequenti rerum patientia sese domuit, & ad salutaria mitigatis affectibus venit. *Sen.*

even know what it is to know any thing; if he did, he would find himſelf infinitely ſhort of ſuch Expectations, and plainly perceive, that they can never be otherwiſe than very imperfectly fulfill'd, and that there will always remain a great many more Things to learn than what he already knows. (*q*)

How little do we know, in compariſon to what we do not know! How many Obſtacles are there to oppoſe our Progreſs in Knowledge! (*r*) The Care of our Health; the Neceſſities of Life; the Time we are obliged to ſpend in ſerving our Friends; the Interruptions we have from our Enemies; the Engagements of our Profeſſion; an Attention which is very ſoon wearied; Paſſions that move us, and ſometimes diſorder us; a Self-Love, which never leaves us, and ſeduces us but too often: Dare we then, whilſt under Subjection to ſo many Infirmities, and encompaſs'd by ſo many Obſtacles, value our ſelves ſo much, as to reject the Lights and Aſſiſtance of others? We are charm'd to receive the Praiſes of others, and we always take Money with Pleaſure from what Hand ſoever it comes; whether thoſe we receive it from be Friends or Enemies, does not at all trouble us. But it is quite otherwiſe with Inſtruction and Advice: Theſe are hated Preſents, which muſt be accompanied with a thouſand Inſinuations to make them receiv'd. Is it then that we ſet too ſmall a Value upon Truth? (*s*) I am entirely of Opinion, that this ſtrange Repugnance which Men have to Advice at a full Age, proceeds from the Manner in which it uſed to be given to them when Children. Almoſt

(*q*) Si ſciret quid eſſet vir bonus, nondum ſe eſſe crederet, fortaſſe etiam fieri poſſe deſperaret. *Sen. Ep.* XLII.

(*r*) Non vis cogitare, quantum temporis tibi auferat mala valetudo, quantum occupatio publica, quantum occupatio privata, quantum occupatio quotidiana, quantum ſomnus; metire ætatem tuam: tam multa non capit. De liberalibus ſtudiis loquor: Philoſophi quantum habent ſupervacui, quantum ab uſu recedentis! *Sen. Ep.* LXXXVIII.

(*s*) " We fly Correction, which, to produce any notable Effects, " muſt be introduced by way of Conference, and not of Authority. " Upon any Oppoſition, we regard not whether it is juſt or not, " but right or wrong, how we ſhall get rid of it: Inſtead of Arms to " embrace it, we make uſe of Claws to keep it off. If any one con- " tradicts me, he raiſes my Attention, but not my Paſſion: I receive " him that contradicts me as one who is to inſtruct me. The Cauſe " of Truth ought to be the common Cauſe of one as well as the " other. *Montagne*, B. III. Ch. 8.

moſt all the Advice that is given to young People, tends to make them renounce that which they love, and to apply themſelves not only to what they love leſs, but moreover to what they hate and avoid. They oppoſe themſelves ſo much the more againſt receiving Advice, as it makes part of the Mortifications they are puniſh'd with: It is uſually accompanied with Reproof; and theſe tireſome, mortifying, odious Circumſtances do at laſt make odious in themſelves the Counſels and Corrections they attend. Our Imagination has the Weakneſs always to confound in one, ſuch different Objects as are often preſented to it at one and the ſame time.

In an Age more advanced we often find it difficult to hearken to good Advice, for the ſame Reaſons which have made us hate it when we were Children. The Haughtineſs which they ſhew that give it, and the Pleaſure they take in diſcovering the Superiority of their Underſtanding, turn our Love of it into Averſion. We do not like to receive any Thing from thoſe who appear to deſpiſe us, becauſe we care not to have any Obligation to them; but if we conſider it well, we ſhall find, that the greater the Diſcouragements are under which Truth is propoſed to us, the greater is the Merit in embracing it: And I am clearly of Opinion, that there is more Honour in ſubmitting modeſtly to one ſingle Truth, than in having diſcover'd a great Number of them, and afterwards propoſing them with Pride and Haughtineſs. The unpoliſh'd *Literati* are always in ſome Fault, and ſerve to heighten the Glory of thoſe who have the Luck to be civiliz'd, and of a contrary Diſpoſition. It is by this Character that, in the Republick of Letters, we ought to diſtinguiſh the illuſtrious and truly Learned from the groſs Multitude. Let us then become rational; let us diſtinguiſh Things that are different, and ſeparate the Facts from the Circumſtances; let us throw off the Habits of Childhood, that the Love of Truth may ſet its true Value upon every Thing which may contribute to its Diſcovery: We love to know, and ſhould therefore love to be undeceiv'd, for one Error extends its Influence a great Way; and aſſuredly this is not knowing, but heaping Error upon Error. Nothing binds us faſter to our Friends than our Forwardneſs to conſult them, and the Deference we pay to what they propoſe to us. Good Counſels are the beſt Offices that can be mutually done: In admoniſhing a Friend of a Fault, we take away from his Enemy the malicious Joy of expoſing him. Nothing gives our Enemies a greater Advantage over us, than our adhering obſtinately to our Miſtakes. But if they ſhame us out of them, if it is a Glory to them

them, it is alſo an Advantage to us; whereas our continuing obſtinate in them delivers us up intirely to their Mercy, and gives them an ample Field for Triumph. (*t*) *Diogenes* uſed to ſay, *That we ſtood in need either of* ſincere Friends, *who would not fail to adviſe us*; *or of* better Enemies, *who would force us to mend our Faults.*

XVII. PRECAUTIONS againſt Conceitedneſs may be very uſefully obſerved, whilſt we are young; but it is a Miſchief paſt Remedy, when once confirmed with Age. One of the moſt effectual Precautions againſt Conceitedneſs, is to let ſlip no Occaſion of attending to the ridiculous Behaviour of thoſe that are conceited. If they have but determined any Thing, whether it be without Knowledge, or by Prepoſſeſſion, or Paſſion, or Chance, muſt not be conſider'd. They have determined it; and this with them is Demonſtration: To confeſs that they are miſtaken, is a Reproach, a Diſgrace, and a Mark of Infamy. Conceited Men are the moſt provoked with Reaſons that are the moſt convincing: They love rather to ſhut their Eyes than to ſee: Their Paſſion is their laſt Refuge againſt Conviction. A Mind ſo overthwart as to look upon the Glory of retracting an Error as a Diſgrace, will be always an inexhauſtible Spring of falſe Reaſonings, by the Pains it will take to ſupport the firſt Error by a ſecond. (*u*) *Againſt Conceitedneſs.*

To what Purpoſe ſerves Conceitedneſs? It confirms the Conceited in their Error, without engaging others in it, at leaſt not always: Truth will prevail over it at laſt, and the Conceited have the double Shame of neither being able to diſcover it themſelves, nor of acknowleding it when it was preſented to them by others. The ſupreme Merit, is never to

(*t*) Ratio id judicari vult, quod æquum eſt: ira id æquum videri vult, quod judicavit. Ratio nihil præter ipſum, de quo agitur, ſpectat: ira vanis & extra cauſam obſervantibus commovetur. Vultus illam ſeeurior, vox clarior, ſermo liberior, cultus delicatior, advocatio ambitioſior favor, popularis exaſperat. Sæpe infeſta patrono reum damnat: etiam ſi ingeritur oculis veritas, amat & tuetur errorem: coargui non vult: & in malè cæptis, honeſtior illi pertinacia videtur, quàm pœnitentia. *Sen. de Irâ.* L. I. Nunc autem primum impetum ſequimur; deinde quamvis vana nos concitaverint, perſeveramus, ne videamur cæpiſſe ſine cauſâ. *L.* III.

(*u*) "Obſtinacy and Heat of Opinion are the moſt certain Marks of "Folly. Is there any thing ſo immovable, reſolute, regardleſs, con"templative, ſerious, and grave, as an Aſs?" *Montagne*, B. III. Ch. 8.

to be mistaken; but where can this be found? The next, which is the only one that Men can lay claim to, is to return from our Errors. We pay a greater Homage to Truth, and set an higher Value upon it, when we receive with Acknowledgement the Correction of others, than when we correct our selves: When I see a *conceited* Man, I think I see the *Destiny* of the *Stoicks*: It is in the Fancy only that you must look for the Reasons of their Decrees; and their great Law is never to change.

But if nothing but Error makes up the Character of a *conceited* Man, this Title will be perpetually shifted off from one to another; because each will pretend to be on the side of Truth, for which they will plead an unshaken Steadiness absolutely necessary: But he that is conceited in Error will be the same in Truth; and he that is conceited in Truth will be so in Error: He is conceited whose Steadiness is founded in *Humour* rather than in *Reason*, and who is not only *ashamed* to return from an Error, but also *impatient* to listen to an Objection. We must have a large Fund of *Docility*, Modesty, and Sweetness, to make us always attentive to the Reasons of others, and first to be sensible of their *Strength*, before we seek out their *Defect*. By yielding to others all that we can possibly yield to them, we convince them it is not out of Prejudice that we do not yield to them in every Thing; we are very ready to do so, if *Evidence*, which is the *first Law* we submit to, did not determine us otherwise.

Of the Imagination in Old Age.

XVIII. Obstinacy is yet stronger, and almost invincible in *Old Men*. Novelty is insupportable to them: The new Ways which conduct to important Discoveries, seem to tarnish their Glory, by reproaching them with not knowing enough; and to charge their Knowledge with being of too short an Extent, is robbing them of the Fruits of their long Fatigues. New Truths present to old Men, even by their Novelty, something too ungrateful and odious to engage their Attention: They reject them immediately, without inclining to examine them. New Examinations are too troublesome for their heavy *Imagination*: You provoke them to ask it of them.

In Truth, the Defects of this Age, Heaviness, Confusion, and Conceitedness, are too difficult to correct, and never are conquer'd after they are once well rooted: But to prevent them, we should in time accustom our selves constantly to lodge nothing in the Memory, without having first very exactly understood it; to advance our Studies by just Degrees, from the

the moſt ſimple to the moſt compounded, and not to apply to different Things at one Time; to conſult others, and not to acquieſce in our own Ideas, before having compared them with theirs; to place our Happineſs in the Progreſs we make in Knowledge, as well as in Goodneſs; and to advance from *Knowledge* to Knowledge, as well as from *Virtue* to Virtue. To grow old in theſe Diſpoſitions, is the way not to grow old at all; whereas a Life ill managed, will have a miſerable End. Father *Sirmond*, at the Age of ſeventy three Years, compoſed with as much Vigour as in his Youth. At eighty Mr. *de Limborch* has given us a *Commentary upon the Epiſtle to the Romans*. The Genius of the Abbot *Regnier*, continued thro' the whoſe Courſe of a very long Life. The Poem of Mr. *de St. Evremond*, upon *the paſſing the Boyne*, is not inferior to any he has written. The illuſtrious *Biſhop of Avranches* is alſo old, but is ſtill always compoſing, and always making himſelf admired. I am not at all of the Sentiment of *Montagne*, B. I. Ch. 57. *It is poſſible, to thoſe that make good uſe of their Time, Science and Experience may encreaſe with their Years; but Vivacity, Readineſs, Steadineſs, and other Qualities much more our own, and important, and eſſential, will languiſh and dye.* *Courage* and *Steadineſs* are the Effects of Reaſon, which in an advanced Age is yet more ſtrengthened by accuſtoming our ſelves to be above Events, and to retire within our own Treaſures, which increaſe with our Years, if we make a right Uſe of our Time. Our Ideas preſent themſelves to us ſo much the eaſier, as they are more familiar to us: And an old Man has run them over oftner than a young Man; but it is neceſſary in running them over, to range them in good Order, according as they multiply.

Means to make old Age happy.

XIX. HE that has purſued nothing but *Amuſements*, will find himſelf without Support in an Age that is not made for Amuſements: But he that has made his *Duty* the Foundation of his Felicity, will never find himſelf happier than in an Age where he will have no farther Occaſion to put himſelf to any trouble in the Diſcharge of it, and where he will enjoy all the Sweets of thoſe good Habits which he has taken the Pains to contract. He is never more uſeful than now, if he be but diſpoſed to be ſo; and the young People who love Wiſdom, are never more eager to benefit by the Inſtructions of a great Man, than when they perceive they cannot enjoy them long. In an advanced Age we enjoy our ſelves, and all the Good we have done. *Plena eſt voluptatis ſi illâ ſcias uti.* Old Age is charming when we know

know how to enjoy it; but this Science muſt be acquired whilſt we are young.

AN old Man that has paſs'd his Time in Amuſements, or in Affairs of Ambition, finding himſelf no longer in a Condition of reliſhing Pleaſures; and ſeeing his Credit diminiſhing every Day, and giving Place to new *Riſing Suns*, ſuffers continual Diſgraces. Every thing he ſees, he ſees through his Chagrin, as thro' a Glaſs which darkens every Object; every thing diſpleaſes him: He condemns the *preſent*, in which he has no ſufficent Part; and values nothing but the *paſt*, which he would fain, with all his Heart, call back again. (*x*) The more he criticiſes, the more trifling he appears. By this Means he grows more and more out of Humour, and commits Errors which multiply every Day. On the contrary, an old Man, who is above the Follies of Youth, confirmed in Virtue, and enrich'd with Knowledge; who can remember the paſt with Pleaſure, and can look towards the future with glorious Expectations, is in the moſt happy Condition of Life: He has nothing to fear, nothing to lament: He enjoys himſelf. Nothing is ſo melancholly as the Condition of an old Man who is deſpiſed, and ſees even his Obſequies before his Death: But if we ſpend our Life well, the Miſeries of it will not be able to purſue us thus far. (*y*)

Different Ages are mutually aſſiſtant to each other.

XX. THE Wiſdom of Providence, which has made Man for Society, obliges them in ſome Meaſure to Union amongſt themſelves, by mutual good Offices which they do one another. Young People, if left to themſelves, would produce nothing but Whims and Fooleries: The Imagination of old Men, if they lived in Retirement and Solitude, would fall by Degrees into Stupidity. But as the Difference of Ages hinders not the young Men from converſing with the old, the too great Fire of the one, will be morderated by the Phlegm of the others; and reciprocally

(*x*) Jamque Caput quaſſans grandis ſuſpirat Arator,
Et cum Tempora Temporibus præſentia confert
Præteritis, laudat fortunas ſæpe parentis,
Et crepat antiquum genus ut pietate repletum.

(*y*) Si te ad ſtudia revocaveris, omne vitæ faſtidium effugeris; nec noctem fieri optabis tædio lucis, nec tibi gravis eris, nec aliis ſupervacuus: multos in amicitiam attrahes, affluetque ad te optimus quiſque. Quarè nihil turpius eſt quàm grandis natu Senex, qui nullum aliud habet argumentum, quo ſe probet diu vixiſſe, præter ætatem. *Sen. de Tranquill. Animi.*

ly what remains of the Vigour of the laſt will not only be kept alive, but alſo rekindled by the Communication of the former: Young Men, without falling into the Heavineſs of old Men, will benefit by their Circumſpection; and the old, without imitating the Levity of the young, will reap ſome Advantages from their Vicacity. The one will continue a ſhorter Time in the Weakneſſes of the firſt Age, and the others will arrive later to the Infirmities of the laſt.

THIS Counſel, if follow'd, will not only ſtrengthen the Underſtanding, and put it in a Condition both of diſcovering Truth more eaſily, and of acknowledging it more readily when propoſed by others, but will alſo lead to Wiſdom, and what may be call'd the Art of Living. And as it will render the Lives of young Men more regular, ſo it will make thoſe of old Men more confortable.

WHENEVER young People give themſelves up to their Fire and Fancy, they preſently fall into Meanneſſes, and ſuch Exceſſes as are very ſhocking to remember in a more advanced Age, and which they are already aſhamed of, in theſe few Moments, when their Reaſon is at liberty. The Converſation of their Superiors is therefore very uſeful to them, becauſe it forms them to Reſerve and Circumſpection.

ON the other ſide, every Thing changes, tho' by little and little, and by inſenſible Degrees; our Habits, Furniture, the Modes of Architecture and Faſhions of Building, the Ceremonies of Entertainments and Salutations, the Stile and Turns of Converſation, the Forms of Civility and Politeneſs: Every Thing, I ſay, changes; ſo that whoever ſhall keep up to the firſt Faſhion he is acquainted with, without any Variation, for want of going out of the narrow Circle of his Acquaintance of the like Age and Humour, will before he arrives to old Age aleady paſs for a Man of another World. There are ſome that perceive this too late: They would willingly return back, and begin the World again, to model themſelves according to the innocent Faſhions in preſent uſe; but they are not receiv'd: They cringe, and importune; they become the Averſion of all Companies, or at beſt are look'd upon with Pity, as Objects worthy of ſome Compaſſion, and Subjects to exerciſe our Complaiſance upon. We ſee ſome, who after having ſhone ſome Time by their Wit and Politeneſs, appear after a dozen or twenty Years, perfectly dull and clowniſh, of a vitiated Taſte, and ſurprizingly ridiculous. What a Change! cries one: But he miſtakes, they are ſtill the ſame: But they that judge of them

are changed without perceiving it. They judge not any longer upon the same Maxims as formerly; and the Principles upon which they build Politeness and a good Taste are often changing, without their being sensible of it, because it comes on by little and little.

Of the Authority of old Age.

XXI. It was necessary there should be *Subordination* in Society; that some should direct, and others execute; some *govern*, and others *obey*. Employments that give an Authority, are not to be enter'd upon before a certain Age; for which Reason young People are usually placed in the lowest Ranks. This engages them to pay Respect to those that go before them, which they pay with less Reluctance, by how much the Person who is to receive it is older than themselves. This Deference for Persons in Years, makes in the World one part of Politeness: We are accustomed to it from our Infancy; because in an Age where we cannot govern our selves, we are more readily used to depend upon others, and are charmed to find in them Protectors against the little Injuries of our Equals. Thus old Men find themselves in Possession of the Government of their *Juniors*, which ought not to be contested with them so long as they do not abuse it: But they are apt, for the most part, to look upon this as an Effect of their Merit, which is only a Consequence of their Age. Under this Mistake they treat as *Idiots* all those who dare think otherwise than they do; and look upon the Liberty any one shall take of making Objections which may puzzle them, as an Insolence which deserves Punishment. But they ought to remember, methinks, that the greatest Part of their Sentiments, which are now become sacred to them, were adopted by them when they were young themselves; and they ought to agree, that the frequent Repetitions of them change not their Nature, and that all the Service their Years are of, is only to make the Examination of them a great deal more difficult, by the long Habit they have contracted of taking them for granted, without any Examination. On the other hand, Ease and Idleness are the two great Motives which engage young People to submit to the Decisions of their *Seniors*. To these two Motives they join a third, more reasonable in Appearance, That old Men must needs be more *Circumspect*, because they are believ'd to be *Wiser*. It were to be wished, that this favourable Opinion of old Age were establish'd upon a better Foundation: If old Men do not any longer give into the Passions of Youth, it is because they have already taken their *Fill* of them, and

Nature

Nature does not ſupply them with Faculties to continue all their Follies. As for the reſt, it but too often happens that one Vice ſucceeds in the Place of another; and as young People love their Pleaſures too much, ſo the old love alſo too much to croſs and oppoſe them, and in the Diſcontents of of the former, they found their own Satisfactions. Thoſe who are ſeduced by Pleaſures are to be pitied; but theſe that give themſelves up to Envy, deſerve to be deteſted. (*b*)

(*b*) "We call Wiſdom the Peeviſhneſs of our Humours, a Diſ-
"guſt to the preſent Age: But in Truth, we do not ſo properly part
"with our Vices, as change them, and, in my Opinion, for the worſe
"too. Beſides a ſtupid and decaying Pride, a tireſome Babbling, theſe
"crabbed and unſociable Humours, and Superſtition, and a ridiculous
"Thirſt of Riches after the Uſe of them is gone, I find there alſo a
"great deal more Envy, Injuſtice, and Malice." *Montagne, B.* III. *Ch.* 2.

CHAP. VI.

Being a Continuation of Remarks upon the Varieties of the Imagination.

I. THE different Kinds of Life have alſo a very great Influence over the Imagination. A Man that is employ'd in a great many Affairs, and is always converſing with others, has an Imagination quite different from that of one who paſſes his Days in Retirement. Each of theſe Kinds of Life has its Advantages and Diſadvantages; for which Reaſon they ought to be mixed, that we may borrow from the one Means to guard againſt the Inconveniences of the other. *Of Solitude.*

As we are not born purely for our ſelves, and for Solitude; ſo neither are we born to diſtract our ſelves continually in an Hurry of Buſineſs, or in the Amuſements of Society: We ſhould therefore firſt of all learn to live alone. He who does not know how to entertain himſelf by himſelf, and to be eaſy and ſatisfied alone, will be always the Slave of others,

others, and by his Easiness become the Sport of their Humours.

To learn them to live easy, we must learn to live by our selves: A ranging Life casts us infallibly into Disquiet. It is a sad Sign that our Wants are great, our Disorders many, and even grown to a terrible Excess, when we dare not look into our selves to examine them, to be sensible of them, and to apply Remedies to them. (*a*) *Conceal your self*, is a Maxim which such a Life as this must be begun with. In Retirement we learn to live for our selves: It is the first of Sciences; when it is once acquired, then it is time to learn to live for others.

We learn in Solitude to entertain our selves more easily with whatever we please, to fix or lead on our Thoughts at Pleasure, to keep up our Attention, to suspend our Judgment; because we are not pres'd to an hasty Decision, and by that Means we are accustomed to avoid Precipitation: We have moreover all the Leizure that is necessary, to go Step by Step, from Principle to Principle, and from Consequence to Consequence, and never to advance to a second Subject before having been confirmed in the first with all the Clearness and Perfectness it is capable of.

But if we would benefit by Retirement, we must make use of it to know and to correct our selves; whereas it is too frequently made to serve quite different Ends, to make us fly and avoid our selves as effectually as in the World, to employ our selves with Amusements, and to make a perfect Hurry of a solitary and religious Exercise. Moreover, a Man that is sunk in Solitude, with only one Friend of the same Humour with himself, will become by little and little incapable of being commonly civil to any body else: He cannot conform or accommodate himself to the Manners of others; the least Departure from his own provokes and disturbs him; the Objections and Advice, the Necessity of which we have already more than once treated of, to him will appear

(*a*) Ægri animi jactatio est. Primum augumentum compositæ mentis existimo, posse consistere & secum morari. *Sen.*

" Whatever it be, whether Art or Nature, which directs this Con-
" dition of Living with respect to others, it does us more Mischief than
" Good: We neglect our true Excellencies, to put on such as shall ap-
" pear so in the Opinion of the Publick: We do not so much re-
" gard what our real State is, as what it seems to be to others. Even
" the Blessings of Understanding and Wisdom appear to us without
" Fruit, if enjoy'd by our selves only, if they be not also produced
" to publick View and Approbation." *Mont. B.* III. *Ch.* 9.

appear a ſtrange Hardſhip. Pride thrives in Retirement as well as in the World; and the former has its Vanity and Affectation as well as the latter. Some retire from the World to avoid being Witneſſes to the Glory of others, and think themſelves humble becauſe they live in a ſort of Pride, that is leſs diſturbing. Some even retire to be talk'd of; which is the moſt ridiculous of all Contradictions. To benefit by Solitude, we muſt put on happy Diſpoſitions before we enter into it; we muſt be able to ſay, that when we are by our ſelves, we are not in bad Company. In Solitude we give up our ſelves more eaſily to our Prejudices and Humours than in the World. *Omnia nobis mala ſtolidè perſuadet.* Sen. Ep. XXV. Laſtly, in Solitude we fall into Inaction; from Inaction we ſink into Slothfulneſs; we become incapable of doing any Good; we are an uſeleſs Weight upon the Earth, and might as well be already covered with it.

Otium ſine Literis mors eſt, & hominis vivi Sepultura.

Of Society.

II. An Imagination accuſtomed to ſuch a Succeſſion of Objects, as follow one another in the Converſation of the World, eaſily contracts an Habit of Unſteadineſs. The Ideas, which the Objects that have moſt ſenſibly affected us, have engraven deep in the Imagination, will follow and poſſeſs it in ſpite of Oppoſition. Oftentimes when it would apply it ſelf to one particular Thing, the Memory of another interrupts and entirely diverts it. In the Converſation of the World alſo, the Circumſtances which paſs, and upon which it is neceſſary to come to a ſpeedy Determination, do not afford Time enough to reflect ſufficiently in order to bring its Ideas to Perfection, and to examine the whole with Accuracy. (*b*)

BUT oftentimes alſo in Affairs which concern us, we are obliged to form very exact Ideas, and to think with great Accuracy: The leaſt Miſtake is preſently diſcover'd and aggravated by ill Succeſs, and our Errors are always puniſh'd by Events. Whereas in Solitude, we may build upon falſe Principles, truſt to Illuſions, and go upon Matters of Theory, from Error to Error without being ſenſible of them. We ſtave off Objections ſometimes by poſitive Denials, ſometimes by frivolous Diſtinctions; and the ſame ſecret Motives that lead us into Error, make us find an Appearance of Strength

(*b*) Occupatorum animi velut ſub jugo ſunt, flectere ſe ac reſpicere non poſſunt. *Sen.*

Strength in the Reaſons which we endeavour to oppoſe to ſolid Arguments.

MOREOVER, in the room of Heavineſs and Dulneſs, which we are apt to fall into in Retirement, we acquire in Converſation a Vivacity and Strength of Imagination, which makes us capable of diſtinguiſhing in a few Moments, that which a Man in Solitude muſt take a great deal of Time to make out: We learn alſo to bear Contradictions, without being offended, and, what is a Conſequence of this, even to benefit by Objections. *Diſcere verum, dicere & audire.*

Both of them neceſſary.

III. We muſt know therefore how to paſs from Solitude to Society, and from Society to be able to retire into Solitude. By this we ſhall learn to be ready for Buſineſs, without being entirely given up to it. The want of obſerving this Rule, has occaſioned in moſt Men ſuch an Hurry and Unſettledneſs, as makes them incapable of any Thing that is a little difficult, and conſequently prevents their making any great Progreſs in the Sciences. We ſee a great many People in the World very ready and knowing in their own Affairs, who reaſon very wretchedly upon the Sciences and upon Religion, in reſpect to which they ſtagnate quietly in the moſt profound Ignorance: And for want alſo of obſerving the ſame Rule, moſt of our Men of Letters ſink into Heavineſs, Confuſion, Unpoliteneſs, Obſtinacy, and Clowniſhneſs, and by this Means deter from Learning many happy Genius's, who might otherwiſe have admirably well ſucceeded in it. We ſhall find upon Examination, that the Lives of our greateſt Men have a Mixture of both theſe different Qualifications. Retirement alone has made a great many conceited and whimſical People; and yet without Retirement we can never come to any Solidity or Coherence in our Knowledge (*c*).

WE

(*c*) Iſta inter ſe miſcenda ſunt, & quieſcenti agendum, & agenti quieſcendum eſt. *Sen.*

Miſcenda tamen iſta, & alternanda ſunt, ſolitudo & frequentia. Illa nobis faciet hominum deſiderium, hæc noſtri: & erit altera alterius remedium; odium turbæ ſanabit Solitudo, tædium ſolitudinis Turba. Nec in eâdem intentione retinenda mens eſt, ſed ad Jocos revocanda. *Sen. de Tranq. An.*

So many Humours, Sects, Judgments, Opinions, Laws, and Cuſtoms, teach us to judge ſoundly of our own, and diſcover to our Judgment its own Imperfection and natural Weakneſs, which is no ſmall Advantage. Mont. B. I. Ch. 25.

"I am

WE ought to be alone to work upon our ſelves with any Succeſs; but we muſt go into the Company of others, to find how well we have actually ſucceeded in the Pains we have taken to form our Hearts and Underſtandings. Action and Exerciſe make us know our ſelves, and diſcover both our Strength and our Weakneſſes. (*d*) In the Society of the World we ſee beſt what we are: In Solitude we find it eaſieſt to form our ſelves as we ought to be. We ſeldom find our ſelves in any Company, without ſeeing there ſomething either good or bad; but we muſt be alone to make a juſt Diſtinction of them. It is ſo true, that we ought to join theſe two different Kinds of Life, that we can never ſucceed in either of them, if we abſolutely neglect the other: A Man that is inſupportable to himſelf, eaſily becomes ſo to others; and the ſame Merit which makes us eaſy and contented with our ſelves without Flattery, will infallibly draw to us the Eſteem and Affection of others. *Qui ſibi amicus eſt, ſcito hunc amicum omnibus eſſe.*

IF we do not, from time to time, retire and reflect upon what we have heard, upon what we have ſeen, and upon what we have done our ſelves; if we do not inſtruct our ſelves in ſecret, and withdraw from Tumult, and every Thing which may diſturb us; it will be almoſt impoſſible to prevent having our Hearts and our Underſtandings depraved by the continual Converſation of the World: By being accuſtomed gradually to a Taſte of falſe Principles, we leave our ſelves expos'd to dangerous Impreſſions. The Commendations and Accuſations; Entertainments ſerious and comical; Friends and Enemies; thoſe we depend on, and thoſe who depend on us; are all dangerous, all deceitful, and do all very much require us to be upon our Guard (*e*).

THE

"I am pleas'd to ſee a General of an Army at the foot of a Breach "which he is preparing to attack, ſit down to Dinner and talk with "his Friends cheerfully and compoſed. And *Brutus* having Heaven and "Earth conſpired againſt him, and againſt the Liberty of *Rome*, ſteal-"ing from the Affairs of the Camp, ſome Hours of the Night, to "read and abridge *Polybius* in private. *Mont. B.* III. *Ch.* 11.

(*d*) Imperfectum ac languidum bonum eſt, in otium ſine actu projecta virtus, nunquam id quod didicit oſtendens. Quis negat illum debere profectus ſuos in opere tentare? nec tantùm quid faciendum ſit cogitare, ſed etiam aliquando manum exerere, & ea quæ meditata ſunt, ad verum perducere? *Sen. de Otho. Sap.*

(*e*) Nulla ad Aures noſtras vox impunè perfertur: nocent qui optant, nocent qui execrantur, nam & horum imprecatio falsò nobis mètus

THE Count de *Buſſi* takes notice, in one of his *Letters*, *Tom.* IV. *Lett.* 69. *That the* MONKS *are too much in Solitude, and the* COURTIERS *too much in Employment: There wants a Medium. A conſtant Hurry of Action leaves no Time for Thinking.* He might have added, That in Retirement we think either too careleſly, or too conformably to our own Humour; and the Pleaſure we have of going our own Pace, without finding our ſelves under any Neceſſity of conforming to the Temper of others, as we muſt do every Moment in the Society of the World, makes us amends for the Loſs of the ſocial Pleaſures we renounce. *Thoſe who ſhun publick Offices, and the infinite Difficulties, and great Variety of Faces, which a Man muſt have to deal with, who wou'd obſerve an exact Behaviour in civil Life, do, in my Opinion, ſave themſelves a great deal of Trouble, even tho' they ſhou'd chuſe a Life of ſome Severity. The flying a publick Life is far from Dying. It may have ſome other Conſideration, but I think it has not that of Difficulty: For it is a much harder Task to keep right amidſt the Waves and Throngs of the World, and diſcharge one's Duty to the Satisfaction of all its Members.* Mont. B. II. Ch. 33.

NOTHING is more common with Men than to make a Virtue of their Humour: The more extraordinary it is, the more apt they are to admire and conſecrate it. This happens above all to melancholy People, who, when they once take a Fancy for Solitude, look upon it as a State of the moſt exalted Perfection. Nothing is more unreaſonable than this Thought: Can the Perfection of Human Nature conſiſt in ſuch a kind of Life as tends directly to extinguiſh it? If Men had not learned at the ſame Time to Think and Reflect, as well as to Speak, they would have lived a Life not ſuperior to the Brutes. We have given Proofs of this already. The Converſation of the World is, as it were, the Fund from whence the Soul derives all its Ideas and Reflections; in vain does

Chap. III.

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metus & inſerit, & illorum amor malè docet benè optando. Mittit enim nos ad longinqua bona, & incerta & errantia, cùm poſſimus felicitatem domo promere. Non licet, inquam, ire rectâ viâ; trahunt in pravum parentes, trahunt ſervi: nemo errat uni ſibi, ſed dementiam ſpargit in proximos, accipitque invicem. Et ideò in ſingulis Vitia Populorum ſunt, quia illa Populus dedit: dum facit quiſque pejorem, factus eſt. Didicit deteriora, deinde docuit: effectaque eſt ingens illa nequitia, congeſto in unum, quod cuique peſſimum ſcitur. *Sen. Ep.* XCIV.

does it contain within it ſelf this Fund, which, without ſuch Help, would lie uſeleſs and unfruitful. If from our Birth we had been given up to Solitude, we ſhould never have known what Truth and Virtue are. How then can we be made to believe, that what compleats our Perfection is directly contrary to what begins and promotes it?

We muſt be Maſters of our ſelves.

IV. YOUNG People liſten with Pleaſure to every Thing that is ſaid of the Inconveniencies of Solitude; but they almoſt always make a wrong Uſe of it, and under the Pretence of avoiding Gloomineſs and Unpoliteneſs, which reign but too much in the Schools, they contract in the World an early Habit of Unſettledneſs, which follows them thro' the whole Courſe of their Lives: Their Underſtanding does not at all ſerve to make them Wiſe, becauſe they know not how to be long enough by themſelves to make a right Application of it.

THERE is a certain Rule to diſcover immediately when the Society of the World becomes dangerous, and begins to exert too great an Empire in our Heart. If, when we retire from Company, the Ideas of what we have ſeen and heard there do ſtill purſue us, if it is not in our Power to get rid of them, or if we find it very difficult to remove them, in order to think of other Subjects, it is a Demonſtration that we have engaged too far with the World; our Liberty loſes Ground, and thoſe Amuſements, which ought only to ſerve for our Diverſion, are made our Buſineſs and Employment. What we ſee and hear only by the by, in Companies where the Underſtanding is more concern'd than the Heart, can never do any Hurt: It is by the Pleaſure of reflecting upon what it has been once delighted with, that the Heart ſurrenders it ſelf, and becomes dependent, and that at laſt it comes to make a ſerious Entertainment of what would otherwiſe have been but a light Amuſement.

Society may have the Faults of Solitude.

V. WE may as well, and ſometimes better, ſpend our Lives in Solitude, than in the Company only of ſuch as are extremely below our ſelves in Birth, Fortune, Genius, or Learning: To gather about us a little Court of ſuch as know how to do nothing but Applaud, whom we can hear, reprimand, and make ſilent when we will, with whom we are under no manner of Reſtraint, we live, we ſpeak without exerting our Faculties, without Attention, without Order, without Exactneſs; is a ſure Method to confirm our ſelves, beyond Remedy, in all the Miſchiefs which

we

we are liable to in Solitude, without any of its Advantages. A Mind that is narrow, ſuperficial, and impatient, full of Admiration of it ſelf, and of Averſion to every Thing which does not bear ſome Reſemblance to it, is the true and conſtant Character of one who by Idleneſs, join'd with a Pride of being foremoſt, confines himſelf within a Circle of his Inferiors.

THOSE who take upon them to teach, very often fall into the ſame Errors; which they might eaſily prevent if they loved Truth, if they were pleas'd to conſider and ſtudy the the different Diſpoſitions of the Underſtandings they have to deal with, if they loved their Scholars, if they had an Ambition to educate and form great Genius's: To improve their Studies with greater Eaſe and Plainneſs, to promote them with more Succeſs, they would continually apply themſelves to find out the moſt eaſy, ſimple, natural, as well as the moſt copious Methods. The Underſtanding of the Maſter becomes enlarged, by his having at Heart the Advancement of his Scholars.

The Imagination of the Vulgar.

VI. WE never find any Fire or Fruitfulneſs in the Imagination of thoſe, who, for want of the Advantages of Fortune, and having neither Birth nor Dignity to ſet them off and give them credit, are obliged to live in continual Dependence upon others: They uſually receive all their Ideas from thoſe to whom they owe their Subſiſtance: They are reſtrain'd by Fear from forming any of their own; and oftentimes an excellent Genius is ſuppreſs'd, becauſe it dares not diſcover it ſelf (*f*). Idleneſs is natural; and theſe have no Courage to break thro' it, and to ſearch and examine for themſelves, for fear they ſhould meet with ſomething which might diſpleaſe their Superiors, and ruin their Expectations. They content themſelves therefore to become Parrots, or at beſt intelligent Echo's of what they hear and learn from their Benefactors. A Man thus intimidated, and thus dependent, has his Superiors perpetually before him; and when he undertakes any Subject, he thinks more of them than of it. The Pains he takes, are not to diſcover what he ought to think, but to know whether his Thoughts will pleaſe thoſe on whom he depends. It is a great Biaſs to the Thoughts of a Man in Neceſſity, to find it his Intereſt to maintain a particular Opinion: To pleaſe thoſe

(*f*) Contunde animos, & qucquid eſt indolis comminuetur trepidatione degeneri. *Sen. de Clem. Lib.* I. *Cap.* 16.

those in high Stations, you must be inferiour to them in every Thing, and appear in Understanding and Merit very much below them. They can never bear to find you upon the Level with them in any respect. A Grandee of *Spain* retiring from Court, told one of his Friends he was obliged to do so, because he had more Understanding than his Master. He who has no other Merit than the Greatness of his Quality, will admit of no other to imagine his Power to be absolute over his Inferiors. He can scarce perswade himself to reckon them in the Number of Men; if he should regard them in this View, he would often be ashamed; and it is without doubt for this Reason that great Men usually hate those that have more Merit than themselves, and are not far from hating all Mankind, so uneasy is it for them to esteem those they rule over to be Men like themselves.

IT is certain that Poverty gives terrible Shocks to Virtue: Many grovel in Ignorance, and from Ignorance pass into Vice, who might have made great Men, if they had been possess'd of the Means. He that is overwhelm'd with Wants, has neither the Time nor the Ease that is necessary to enlarge his Knowledge: Not having the Ability of examining Things himself, he becomes credulous; his Credulity makes him superstitious; and if he is a Man of Letters, to secure himself from Contempt, so insupportable to the Heart of Man, he conceals his Weaknesses and his Ignorance under an austere Gravity. How low therefore are the greatest Part of those Men reduced, from whom the Race of Mankind ought to receive their Instructions, and to derive their Learning! We have often the Blind for our Guides. It is the Part of the Magistrates to provide a Remedy for this Mischief: They must answer for it, and the Misfortunes of other Men will make up their Charge and their Condemnation.

AT the Sight of a rich Man, and all the Pomp which surrounds him, the common People are as it were stunn'd: They submit to him even their Liberty of Reasoning, and their Imagination is so affected, that it can do nothing but admire: Let but a rich Man speak, and presently he is applauded; and those who hear him will esteem it an Happiness to be able to come into his Sentiment, or to have their Understandings tuned in Consort with his.

VII. THE Ridiculousness of these Principles will be plainly perceived, if they be reduced into a proper Form of Argument, with their respective Consequences. *He keeps a good House, there-* *The Remedies.*

fore he thinks Judiciously: He has a great Number of Domesticks, therefore he is Learned: His Horse is richly furnish'd, therefore his Studies have been pursued with great Industry and Exactness. How little soever we are interested in Truth, it is impossible for us to be impos'd upon by such monstrous Absurdities. Who would not laugh at the Folly of a Jockey, who should rate the Price of an Horse according to the fineness of the Stable where he is kept? And yet we regulate our Esteem of Men by the Costliness of their Habit, and such other Circumstances as are not in the least any better Proofs of Merit. (*g*)

SOME expose themselves very much by citing great Men upon improper Occasions: If any one is speaking of Encampments, Defences and Attacks, and quotes a General of Reputation; if he is upon Maxims and Interests of State, and cites a Minister of noted Abilities, I submit to the Force of these Authorities: But in an Affair within every Body's Sphere, if any one brings up the Name of a great Man to enforce his Argument, it is a piece of great Impertinence. One of these grave Fools told me one Day, *He had heard a certain Lord say, That playing at Tables discover'd the Character and Genius of the Gamesters.* If this Lord had said so, it was only by Hear-say, for he neither play'd the Game himself, nor was inclined to be a Spectator of it, but spent his Time in Employments much more worthy of him and of his Rank. The Proposition is at the bottom partly false, as well as the Citation childish. A Man that is uneasy, or unsettled, or covetous, or dull, or stupid, will discover himself on a thousand Occasions, as much as by playing at Tables: And as to that part of the Conclusion that relates to its shewing the Penetration, Solidity, and Turn of Genius, nothing is more false; it is a Touch-Stone merely imaginary. A little Mind will take a Pride in succeeding and excelling in it, whilst a solid and superior Understanding will despise it, as not worth his Time and Application. The Gamesters usually follow the Method of their Teachers, more than the particular Turn of their own Genius: Experience is more with these than Reasoning, and we see every Day those that arrive to a good Proficiency, who cannot, without a very great Hyperbole, be said to have a tolerable Understanding.

To

(*g*) Quemadmodum stultus est, qui equum empturus, non ipsum inspicit, sed stratum ejus ac frænos: sic stultissimus est, qui hominem aut ex veste, aut ex conditione, quæ vestis modo nobis circumdata est, æstimat. *Sen. Ep.* XLVII.

TO quote the Authority of Great Men is ſometimes an effect of a narrow Genius, as well as of Affectation. Thoſe who take all Occaſions to mention great Names, do it not ſo much for the ſake of ſhewing they are honour'd with ſuch Acquaintance, as to give a Flight to their narrow Genius, which is ſwell'd up with the Ideas of thoſe whom they adore, and in whoſe Places they would be tranſported to ſee themſelves.

VANITY is an inexhauſtible Source of Illuſions; and we believe that we advance our ſelves by intereſting our ſelves in the Fortunes of Great Men, and by the Zeal with which we embrace their Sentiments: The Reflections we ſhall make upon this Weakneſs, may contribute to ſecure us from it. A Gentleman at his Country-Seat, and a Merchant in his Counting-Houſe, computes his Happineſs from the Victories of a Prince whom perhaps he never did nor will ſee: This Prince takes the Loſs of a Battel without any Concern; the Forces that ſerve him are diſturb'd at it; but the Tradeſman, who has but an imaginary Intereſt in it, is overwhelm'd with it, and loſes both his Stomach and his Reſt. He need not read you his Advices, to let you know whether he has received good or bad News of his Hero; his Air either depreſs'd or inſulting, his Walk either haſty or melancholy, diſcover all that at a Diſtance: He has dedicated his Ideas to thoſe of the Conqueror; he is elevated with his Conqueſts, and caſt down with his Defeats. You would ſay, that his very Being depended upon his Wiſhes, ſo much Delight does he take in forming them; and he wants nothing but a Turn of Devotion to believe that Providence determines Events by the Rule of his Wiſhes.

IT has for a long time been look'd upon as a Diſtemper of the Underſtanding, and a Diſorder of the rational Faculty, to ſubmit one's Thoughts to the Authority of another, and to ſacrifice one's Liberty, without daring even to conſider, whether thoſe to whom we make ſuch a Sacrifice do deſerve it. Mr. *de la Motte* perhaps deſcribes a much greater Number than he thought for, when, in his Diſcourſe upon *Homer*, he ſays, That *in their Opinions concerning Works of Learning, Men commonly form two ſorts of Judgments; one Publick, the other Private; one for Shew and Ceremony, the other for Reſerve, and their own particular Uſe. We think without Conſtraint upon an Author whom we examine in our Studies; and far from concerning our ſelves with what others think of* Page 40. Ed. Amſt.

him, we ſometimes pleaſe our ſelves the more with the Idea we form of him, by how much the more ſingular it is, and, if I may ſay ſo, the more it is our own. But when once it is neceſſary to make a publick Judgment of him, we take care to conform to the Ideas receiv'd, how falſe ſoever we know them to be, and we become not at all nice. For I confeſs if the Reſpect we owe to the Publick went no farther than to make us examine our Thoughts with greater Severity, that we may be confirm'd in them if they are reaſonable, or quit them if they appear to be otherwiſe; this Circumſpection would be prudent, and conſequently to be commended. But it extends for the moſt part a great way farther: It makes us betray our Judgment, for fear of offending the Majority; and we chuſe rather to appear judicious, than to be ſo in fact; and to avoid ſtriving againſt the Stream, we ſuffer our ſelves to be carried away with it.

So *the Party of Error grows every Day ſtronger and ſtronger, even by thoſe who have diſcover'd it; for undeceiv'd as they are, they nevertheleſs conform to the ſame Language with thoſe that are ſtill deceiv'd, and they become themſelves a new Authority of deceiving others.* After theſe Reflexions ſo reaſonable and true, he adds, *Ought this falſe Shame to extend to Things of ſo ſmall Importance as the Reputation of a Poet?* But there is a great deal more reaſon to add, Ought this falſe Shame to extend to Things of ſo great Importance as Morality and the Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures? *There are, however, a great many People of this Character, and I cou'd my ſelf mention ſeveral of the ſame Sentiments with my ſelf upon theſe Matters, who for want of Courage, will perhaps become Cenſurers of them.* Theſe are again the Words of Mr. *de la Motte.*

THERE may be Duties which perhaps we do not purſue far enough, nor ſufficiently know their Extent; perhaps alſo, there may be ſome which we ſtretch too far. Perhaps on the one ſide, we reckon trifling Ceremonies among the Eſſentials of Religion; whilſt on the other, we cry out upon Errors that are not material, as upon the greateſt Enormities. We may ſuſpect that Religion has ſuffer'd a great deal of Difficulty and Darkneſs from the Perplexity and Obſcurity of our Metaphyſicks; and that a falſe Philoſophy, loaden with laborious Subtilties, has ſpread its Confuſion over the Face of Divinity, and has robb'd it of that Simplicity which makes one of the Divine Characters of the Goſpel. There are ſome who perceive, or believe they perceive this Confuſion. They find it both in Practice and in Spe-

Speculation: In Precepts and in Doctrines they meet with Difficulties and obſtructions; They undertake to clear them up, and after ſome earneſt Endeavours have the Pleaſure of ſucceeding. But whenever they think of publiſhing their Diſcoveries, their Courage fails them, and the Fear of appearing to quit the Road that is authorized by Cuſtom, ſets them quite back again. They ceaſe to open their Eyes to a Light which is dangerous to look at; and after having got a Glimpſe of it, for fear of being ſuſpected, they talk as if they were ſtill in Darkneſs. One that wants to be inform'd, dares not complain of his Ignorance, but confuſedly; and another who could inſtruct him, dares not do it otherwiſe than ænigmatically. When once we begin to ſee, we ſhut our Eyes for fear of ſeeing too much; and for want of the Courage to remove a Difficulty that is reverenced, we touch upon it but ſoftly and imperfectly; ſo that it is only made to give a little Way for a Moment, and after that ſuffered to revive in its full Strength.

LASTLY, that we may prevent putting our Reaſon in Irons, and making a Condeſcention ſo ſervile and unworthy human Nature, I know nothing more effectual, than to conceive a ſtrong Paſſion for the Knowledge of Truth, and to think frequently with all poſſible Attention, that nothing is more ſhameful, or diſgraces us more than Miſtakes, whether they be in Opinion or Behaviour; that nothing debaſes a Man ſo much as Error and Vice; that Underſtanding and Virtue make up his true Glory and Grandeur; that *Riches* and *Titles* are far inferior to *Wiſdom* and *Knowledge*. By theſe laſt Advantages we bear ſome Reſemblance to the Deity; but the firſt are oft enjoy'd in common with the moſt wicked. He that ſeeks for ſolid Felicity, will never find it in Eſtate or Dignity: When they come to be poſſeſſed, he will find them very different from what he before imagined them to be. We are made for Truth and Rectitude: Theſe are what give abſolute Content, and are ſuch Advantages as do not dazzle with a deceitful Brightneſs, and whoſe Value is every Day increaſed and better known. In whatever Condition we are born, to make theſe the Objects of our Application, and to prefer them above all Things elſe, is the Way to raiſe us above the Dependances upon Men, and upon the Viciſſitude of Events. To know by Experience the true and greateſt of Goods, is the ſure Means of never being like to be dazzled with ſuch as are of a lower Value. He who attends frequently to the Greatneſs of his Soul, and the End of his

Creation, ſees nothing but Meanneſs in the Vanities which other Men are deceiv'd with, and ſeek their Grandeur from. (*h*) True Nobility conſiſts in Merit, not in Blood; and our Station is then the moſt elevated, when our Virtue will not ſuffer us to cringe amongſt the reſt of Mankind. *

* *This laſt is an Expreſſion of* Confucius.

VICE has made Subordination neceſſary amongſt Men, otherwiſe born equal; but in whatever Condition of Life we are placed, if we do but live wiſely, we ſhall always procure what is greateſt and moſt eſteemed among Men.

LET us but reflect that we are Men, and we ſhall be aſhamed to ſell our ſelves to other Men: Let us but remember that we have Souls made for Eternity and infinite Excellencies, and we ſhall be above purchaſing trifling Preſents at the Price of our Liberty, and ſacrificing our Knowledge and Honeſty for light Favours, which are very injuriouſly eſteemed gratuitous, becauſe not bought with Money. (*i*)

WE muſt only take care that Vanity does not come in for a Share, and that we do not confound with the Love of Truth the dangerous Pleaſures of contradicting, and the ambitious Deſire of being diſtinguiſh'd and raiſed above thoſe whom we find our ſelves inferior to in Birth and Fortune. We ſee ſome, who big with the Knowledge and Virtue which they pretend to have acquired, heighten the Pleaſure they take in valuing themſelves upon theſe internal Advantages, by that of contemning others who ſeem to want them. Not content with admiring themſelves, they would engroſs all the Attention and Admiration of others; they cannot ſuffer any to come in for Shares with them. To allow of any Eſteem or Conſideration for Birth, Riches, and Dignities, beſpeaks

(*h*) Cogita in te præter animum nihil eſſe mirabile, cui magno nihil magnum eſt. *Sen.*

(*i*) Gratuita nobis videntur, quæ cariſſimè conſtant. Ex eo licet ſtupor noſter appareat, quod ea ſolùm putamus emi, pro quibus pecuniam ſolvimus: & gratuita vocamus, pro quibus nos ipſos impendimus. Quæ emere nollemus, ſi domus noſtra pro illis eſſet danda, ſi amænum aliquod fructuoſumve prædium: ad ea paratiſſimi ſumus pervenire cum ſolicitudine, cum periculo, cum jacturâ pudoris & libertatis, & temporis. Adeo nihil eſt cuique ſe vilius. Idem itaque in omnibus conſiliis rebuſque faciamus, hoc quod concupiſcimus, quanti deferatur. Sæpè maximum pretium eſt, pro quo nullum datur. Multa poſſum tibi oſtendere, quæ acquiſita acceptaque, libertatem nobis extorſerunt; noſtri eſſemus, ſi iſta noſtra non eſſent. *Sen. Ep.* XLII.

beſpeaks a Diſorder of the Heart and Underſtanding, and is ſuch a piece of Injuſtice as quite diſmounts them: It is refuſing them that Homage which they believe themſelves alone to be worthy of, and paying it to Idols and Phantoms that no way deſerve it.

WHEN we concern our ſelves ſo much about the Actions of others, we are uſually wanting in attending to our ſelves; and it is a Sign we do not know the Value of true Excellencies, when we are not content with enjoying them, unleſs they are accompanied with the Admiration of other Men. We may ſay that they who take Pains with this View, make a Virtue of Neceſſity: If they would arrive at Eſteem and Diſtinction by any other Road, they would never think of chuſing this. He that ſingles it out becauſe he finds it amiable in it ſelf, contents himſelf with purſuing and advancing in it, and leaves other People to themſelves. But it happens too often that we wiſh to be in the Places of thoſe whom we are ſo hot in criticiſing upon; and that in our ill Treatment of great Men, by our Envy in not being ſuch our ſelves, we have all their Vanities, and all their Weakneſſes, without any of their Advantages. (*k*)

A LITIGIOUS Humour, a ſatirical Spirit, Rudeneſs, and Unpoliteneſs, fall but too often to the Share of Men of Letters, that are born in an obſcure Condition. They are uſed from their Infancy to obſerve with Concern the Diſtinction that is made betwixt them and their School-Fellows, who are born to Titles of greater Reſpect. The Thought of others being ready to deſpiſe, and deny them the leaſt Part of that Juſtice which they deſerve, ſets them at Defiance and Enmity with all the World. Having no other Refuge but in their Qualifications to make themſelves conſider'd, and well receiv'd in the World, they take Pains to diſplay them; and by their Affectation it often happens that they loſe the Fruits of them. They do all that is in their Power to be look'd on as ſtill more learned and virtuous than they really are: They decide with an Air of Authority what they know very little or nothing of, as tho' they underſtood it compleatly: And that they may be reſpected as Men of ſo ſtrict an Adherence to Virtue, that they cannot allow of the leaſt Deviation from it, they are always ready to reprimand and cenſure, and to find nothing of Merit in any thing but what they do themſelves.

(*k*) Aſſueſcendum itaque Conditioni ſuæ, & quàm minimùm de illâ querendum: & quicquid habet circa ſe commodi, apprehendendum eſt. *Sen. de Tranq. Cap.* 10.

ſelves. The Meanneſs of their Education hinders them from perceiving the Unpoliteneſs and Ruſticity of their Manners. There are ſome Countries which are ſo far from having any Taſte for Delicacy, that they have not ſo much as an Idea of it; and in ſome Nations their Minds are as ill form'd as their Bodies. Country Clowns entertain one another with handy Cuffs; and a Blow that is juſt great enough for them to feel, wou'd be enough to lame one of a leſs robuſt Conſtitution. A delicate Thought or fine Piece of Raillery is loſt upon Men of this Make; nothing affects them but down right Injuries and violent Paſſions.

Rules for thoſe of a ſuperior Rank.

VIII. THE Complaiſance we have for Perſons diſtinguiſh'd by their Birth, their Fortunes, and their Employments; the Intereſt we have in flattering and ſubmitting to their Authority, makes their Sentiments to be uſually follow'd with Approbation, or at leaſt with a reſpectful Silence; ſo that being under no Reſerve by the Apprehenſion of the Cenſure and Criticiſm of others, they give a full Swing to their Genius, and very freely deliver their Thoughts. Their Imagination by this Means becomes courageous and fruitful; but the worſt is, that it is apt to fall in with Preſumption, and by conceiving preſently the ſame good Opinion of themſelves which others appear to have, (*l*) they determine of Subjects conceitedly, and therefore very imperfectly, the uſual Effects of having too good an Opinion of our ſelves. They leave to the Vulgar Circumſpection and the Fear of Miſtakes, as well as the Obligation of anſwering particularly and ſeriouſly to what others may object. As to them, they are too much uſed to Applauſe, to look upon the Objections of others for any Thing more than Inſults: (*m*) To dare to believe that they are miſtaken, is to forget what they are. So that Dependance renders theſe too ſervile, and an high Station thoſe too preſumptuous. Great Men find by Experience that the Height of their Station authorizes every Thing they ſay, and makes every Faſhion follow'd which they are pleaſed to invent. The Senſes are the Receivers of Faſhions; and the Mind being prepoſſeſſed in favour of thoſe who eſtabliſh them, enjoin the Senſes to find that handſome, which is not ſo. Great Men

(*l*) Quales ſunt aliis credunt.

(*m*) Citò nobis placemus, & ſi inveniamus qui nos bonos viros dicat, qui prudentes, qui ſanctos, agnoſcimus. *Sen.*

Mala conſuetudo nihil contra voluntatem audiendi. *Sen.*

Men eſtabliſh any Thing, upon the Aſſurance of their Power to give a Currency to it; and as they would not like to ſay a mean Thing, ſo they believe themſelves incapable of it, and for that Reaſon are never at any Pains to avoid it.

WE have ſo great an Intereſt in flattering great Men, that to ſucceed in it the better, we wink at all their Faults, and magnify all their good Qualities; and we do not ſo much regard our deceiving both them, and our ſelves, as that we find a great many more of the ſame Sentiments with us. We do not know how, becauſe we would not know, and ſometimes becauſe we are become by our Habits incapable of knowing how to ſtrip a great Man of his Externals, in order to view him by himſelf, and to judge of his Merit without Prepoſſeſſion. Yet Titles and Riches are not the ſure Signs of Truth: Evidence alone is its Characteriſtick; and it is by Attention and Circumſpection that we muſt diſtinguiſh its true from its falſe Luſtre.

LET us ſet what Value we pleaſe upon *Riches*, they will be at beſt, in thoſe that poſſeſs them, only a Conſequence of their good Fortune, not at all of their Merit. Do we value our ſelves upon our *Nobility*? If we look back from Generation to Generation, till we come to the Deluge, we ſhall find all of us deſcended from an Husbandman. And if we would go ſtill farther, it is plain that God was the Father of the firſt Man. This is indeed the moſt grand Conception we could poſſibly have of our Original; but then this Glory is common to all Mankind, and for that Reaſon how infinite ſoever the Value of it be, it is loſt in the Sight of the Great, who judge only of their own Eminency by the Debaſement of others.

BIRTH and Riches furniſh without Contradiction happy Occaſions of acquiring Merit, but are not Merit of themſelves; and yet they are eſteemed as the moſt ſolid Merit; and Birth is with a great many made the only Title to Employments that require great Integrity and Abilities.

THE Great have at their firſt ſetting out, the Pleaſure of giving way to their Fancies, and by that Means of ſinning often without Uneaſineſs, becauſe they ſin without Fear, being ſecure of the Impunity of this World. But Age brings with it Reflections of another Nature; and the Apprehenſion of a future State affects them the more ſenſibly, by its being new to them. To eaſe them of their Fears, two Methods offer; one of which they make Choice of according to their ſeveral Humours; and as they are daring or timorous, they give into either Atheiſm or Superſtition.

IX. THE

Illuſions, and Remedies.

IX. THE Misfortune is, that we cannot live in Grandeur without living in Illuſion: We firſt impoſe upon our Inferiors, and then deceive our ſelves with their Prepoſſeſſions: We give our ſelves up to their Compliments and Flattery, and by that Means become the Sport of thoſe we look down upon as ſo much below us, and whom we heartily deſpiſe; and for the ſake of an apparent Grandeur, we ſink into real Meanneſſes. A trifling and imaginary Happineſs, deprives the Great of the lively and ſolid Felicity. By viewing themſeves with other People's Eyes, and by deriving their Satisfactions from the Applauſes of others, they become at laſt incapable of perceiving and taſting the infinite Satisfaction of a clear and eaſy Conſcience. There is nothing real or ſolid in the higheſt Stations, more than juſt ſo much as they have of Truth; and the Diſtruſt of our ſelves is the moſt ſure way to Truth.

WHEN we ſee the Great not content to be ſerv'd with more Readineſs, and obey'd more reſpectfully than others; not content to live more luxuriouſly, and to inhabit more ſpacious and magnificent Houſes; to have more commodious and ſplendid Equipages, and a greater Variety of Pleaſures; when, I ſay, not content with all theſe Advantages, they ſeem farther deſirous of engroſſing the Endowments of the Mind, and of claiming them alſo as their Due and Prerogative, as much as their Titles, their Pride, their Riches, and their Senſuality; when they diſdain liſtening to others, and determine upon all ſorts of Subjects as perfect Maſters of them, and judge of Merit only by Externals, which uſually conceal it; it is impoſſible to avoid being moved with Reſentment and Indignation. But after having thought better of it, inſtead of condemning we pity them, and turn our Reſentment and Indignation upon thoſe that ſurround them. How can they hold out againſt continual Flattery? How can they diſtinguiſh it from Sincerity, of which they have no Idea? They underſtood it but imperfectly in their earlier Age, and have not now any Remembrance of it left. If a very great Number of People ſhould agree to impoſe upon a Man, and ſhould all aſſure him that he does not look well, that he is fallen away, that his Eyes are ſunk, and his Voice alter'd; in ſpite of his Health and his Reaſon he would at laſt be perſwaded he is not right, and would ſend and conſult his Phyſician.

WHETHER the Great owe their high Station to their Birth, or to the Suffrages of others, at the ſame time that

we addreſs them with an Air of Reſpect, we treat them like Children and Idiots. When we cry up every Word a great Man ſpeaks agreeably to common Senſe for a Miracle, do we not laugh at him, in admiring to hear ſuch Expreſſions from one of the moſt conſummate Education, which might at beſt but deſerve that Applauſe if they came out of the Mouth of a Child, or a Porter? *(n)* But after having compliment-ed every Thing a great Man has ſaid or done, and ſet it off in all the glittering Circumſtances we can invent, we only pity him, when we find him charm'd with himſelf, ſome-times for having ſaid a very common Thing, ſometimes for paſſing for having ſaid what he never once thought of, or done what he never had the leaſt Share in.

FOR my own Part, I ſhould make a Conſcience of infa-tuating a Man, purely for the Pleaſure of hearing him ſay fooliſh Things, or to make him believe whatever I pleas'd, and to benefit by his Confuſion and the Loſs of his Liberty, even tho' this Alienation of Mind, which I ſhould caſt him into, were not to laſt above a few Hours.

BUT upon this Occaſion, as well as upon a great many more, Men fall into the Pits which they dig for others, and have their ill Deſigns return'd upon their own Heads. A Philoſopher ſees this juſt Return with Pleaſure, and his Plea-ſure would be compleat, if the Innocent did not ſuffer to-gether with the Guilty; for the Courtiers very well deſerve their uſual miſerable Fate. If you except a very few of them who

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(n) I have often thought, that under the Notion of Reſpect we treat Princes injuriouſly and contemptuouſly. This is what has offended me hei-nouſly in my earlier Age, to obſerve thoſe with whom I have been enga-ged ſcorn to exert themſelves in good Earneſt, as thinking me not a Match worthy enough for them to draw out their whole Force againſt: Yet this is what happens to them every Day; every Body giving them their Way, as they would do to Children, and ſuch as are not worth ſetting their Wit againſt. If it be but once perceiv'd that they have ever ſo little De-ſire for Victory, we are all ready to give it to them, and rather to belye our Faculties than to offend theirs: We employ juſt ſo much of our Strength as will ſerve to make their Conqueſt more honourable.------ When Briſ-ſon *ran with* Alexander, *and purpoſely faulter'd in the Race;* Alexander *rebuked him for it, but he ought to have given him the Strappado. Upon this Conſideration it was that* Carnades *ſaid, That the Children of Princes are taught nothing perfectly but the Management of their Horſes; for in all other Exerciſes every one concern'd ſubmits, and gives them the Ad-vantage; but a Horſe being no Flatterer, or Courtier, lays a King's Son in the Dirt as readily as a Porter's.* Mont. B. III. Ch. 7.

who are ſo fortunate as to eſcape their juſt Deſtiny, they do all ſoon or late meet with Back-Reckonings, and more or leſs become the Object of Caprices; which themſelves are the Authors of by extinguiſhing as much as poſſible their Reaſon which would prevent them, and ſubſtituting in its room an Infatuation which gives Birth to them.

If this Work ſhall happen to fall into the Hands of the Great, and they have Patience to read this Page, I hope they will approve the Zeal I ſhew on their Behalf againſt thoſe petty Tyrants, who beſiege and enſlave them under the Pretence of admiring them. Nothing is more haughty than their Deſign; they aim at nothing leſs than ruling their Maſters; and yet nothing is more ſervile than the Submiſſions they make to gain their Point. But thoſe whom Providence has advanced into the higheſt Ranks, will ſecure themſelves from theſe Snares that are laid for them; if, 1. They forbear giving into the Pleaſure of being admired by others, till they are aſſured that what is admired in them is really Matter of Commendation, and convinced by a ſerious Examination that they are really poſſeſs'd of thoſe Qualifications which are ſo much commended. The Emperor *Julian* ſaid, That no *Panegyricks* are of any Value, except ſuch as come from Perſons that are in a Condition of blaming with Impunity.(o) But there is another way of being ſure of the Sincerity of

(o) "What Teſtimony of Affection and Good-will can I draw from "him, who owes me, whether he will or not, all he is able? How "can I value my ſelf upon his humble Speeches and profound Re"verence, which he dares not refuſe me? The Honour we receive "from thoſe that fear us, is not Honour; it is due to my Office, not "to me,

——— Maximum hoc regni bonum eſt,
Quod pacta domini cogitur populus ſui
Quàm Ferre, tam Laudare. Sen. Thyeſt. Act 2.

"Do I not ſee that the wicked as well as the good King, he that is "hated, as well as he that is beloved, receives it equally and indiffe"rently? My Predeceſſor was ſerved with the ſame Appearances, "the ſame Ceremonies, and ſo will my Succeſſor. If my Subjects "do not offend me, 'tis not any Teſtimony of their good Affection: "Why ſhould I take it in good Part, when they could not, if they "would? None of them follows me for the Friendſhip that is be"twixt us; for there can be no Friendſhip where there is ſo little Re"lation and Correſpondence: My Station puts me out of their Reach; "there is too much Diſparity and Diſproportion. They follow me "for Form and Faſhion ſake, or rather my Fortune than me, in order

"to

of People's Praiſes, and that is to deſerve them. Merit will make it ſelf known; and when accompanied with Greatneſs will always be admired with Pleaſure, and receive the Homage that is due to it. If, 2. they look upon Flatterers as Men who make it their Buſineſs to poiſon the Mind; and if they caſt them off the Moment they diſcover them guilty of theſe Enormities.

Si vis exercere tibi utile, nulli autem grave imperium, ſubmove vitia. Sen. Ep. XCIV. This is what their Honour and their Intereſt viſibly requires. Why ſhould they confide in People that make it their Study to deceive them? and who, to ſucceed the better in it, confound Virtue with Vice, and call black white, and pretend to admire what they really deſpiſe? What a Blot is it upon the Memory of *Alexander*, that he could be ſo weak, to be pleaſed with his Courtiers imitating his wry Neck! And was it not Madneſs in *Dionyſius* the younger, to ſuffer Men to make their Court to him, by imitating his Short-ſightedneſs, and awkwardly ſtumbling againſt every Thing that lay in the Way, as tho' they had no better Eyes than their Maſter?

LASTLY, Men in high Stations ſhould be content to acknowledge by ſome Marks of Favour the moſt delicate and moſt rational Commendations; but ſhould preſerve all their Eſteem for the Counſels that are given them, and ſhould encourage the Liberty their Friends take in giving them, by their Eagerneſs in benefiting by them; and ſhould judge of their Value according to the Juſtice of the Cauſe they engage in, and the Advantages their Subjects will receive from it. He who does this is Great indeed, and deſerves to be ſo: He has but few Equals; and he would become little in his own Eyes, if he could once think himſelf the leaſt aggrandized by theſe Externals.

A great Man, in the Idea rational Men have of him, is one whom Providence has created and educated for the Good of Society, by the Wiſdom of his Laws, and the Goodneſs

Intereſt inter MAGNA *&* TUMIDA. *Sen.*

of

" to make their own Fortunes. All they ſay to me and do is but Diſ-
" guiſe, their Liberty being every Way reſtrained by the great Power I
" have over them: I ſee nothing around me but Masks and Covers.
" When *Julian* the Emperor was commended by his Courtiers for his
" juſt Adminiſtration; I ſhould indeed be proud, ſays he, of theſe
" Praiſes, provided they came out of the Mouths of ſuch Perſons as
" dared to miſlike or accuſe my Actions, if they were otherwiſe."
Montagne, B. I. *Chap.* 13.

of his Example; who loves Knowledge and Virtue, is the Support of Liberty and Wiſdom, the Scourge of Ignorance, Unpoliteneſs, and Vice, an Image of the Divinity in Prudence, Underſtanding, and Uprightneſs. But according to the Notion of thoſe that look no farther than the Body, he is one born to keep a good Table; to ſupport Maſquerades and Dancings, to carry in his magnificent Coaches thoſe who pleaſe him; and laſtly, to take the Liberty of doing openly, in the Face of the World, thoſe Things which the common ſort of Villains are almoſt aſhamed of doing in private. The firſt of theſe Ideas furniſhes us without Doubt with the *Right* Definition; but I leave it to thoſe who are better Judges of the World than my ſelf, to determine whether the laſt does not better ſupply us with the *Fact*.

IF the Great would open their Eyes to their true Intereſt, they would preſently find that nothing is able to advance them to, or to maintain them in that Situation but Virtue. *Senſuality* confounds them with the Crowd, as it confounds theſe with the Brutes: The Magnificence of their Table is owing to the Skill of their Cooks and Caterers: They are beholding for the Pleaſure of their Races to the Vigour of their Horſes; and to the Huntſman and Hounds for their Sport. The Architects build them Palaces; and the Painters and Upholſterers furniſh them: The Labour and Frugality of their Subjects is the Source of all their Riches; their Generals and Soldiers gain their Battles, and purchaſe at the Price of their Blood the Titles and Triumphs of the Conquerors. All the Glory therefore which they draw from theſe external Advantages is foreign to them, and the mere Contribution of others: But the Glory of being wiſe, learned, judicious, generous, temperate, chaſte, and juſt, belongs to them entirely as their Property, and diſtinguiſhes them from their Equals, as well as from their Inferiors. The more Temptations they have of being miſlead from Virtue, the greater is their Glory in adhering to it, and their Goodneſs receives no ſmall Luſtre from the Impunity with which they might be wicked.

I WOULD fain ask a great Man, whether he would have me eſteem his Perſon, or rather that I would value his Equipage, his Horſes, his Houſes, and his Lands. Would he like I ſhould change my Idea of him, as oft as he changes his Habit? Would he be looked upon as an Heroe in his embroider'd Coat, and a common Perſon in his Night-Gown? Would he like, in caſe his Revenue ſhould by ſome bad Fortune be reduced, that we ſhould ceaſe to honour and eſteem him?

him? 'Tis obvious therefore, that he would be eſteem'd *Himſelf*, that he would be loved *Himſelf*: And with good Reaſon; for whatever is not himſelf, nor any part of himſelf, however valuable it may be, renders him no more valuable, than the Wealth of his Neighbour does, or the Treaſures of the Grand Seignor. Suppreſs therefore your Deſires of being deceiv'd, and deceive not your ſelves firſt of all (*p*).

WHAT a melancholy Spectacle is a rich Man that has ſpent his Eſtate! Even they who have got moſt by him, are the moſt aſham'd to appear his Friends, and the firſt that fly him: Whether it be that their Conſcience will not let them look on him without being moved to make him Reſtitution, or only that they wou'd avoid the Confuſion of remembring how very much they have honour'd one that no way deſerv'd it. Theſe Examples, which are not very rare, ſufficiently ſhew that we flatter our ſelves we make uſe of our Reaſon and our Diſcretion, when we only make uſe of our Senſes, and judge of the Value of Things only by their Information.

MOST Men neglect examining and ſtudying themſelves with Application; for they are afraid of nothing ſo much as of ſeeing themſelves: And indeed can they ſee any thing there but what they ought to be aſham'd of? Notwithſtanding this, they love to form a great Idea of themſelves; and as to the Truth of this Idea, for that, as well as well as for almoſt every thing elſe, they appeal to the Teſtimony of others. But what are theſe Teſtimonies they give ſuch Credit to? Teſtimonies which they have bribed and corrupted by their Threats and their Promiſes, and which are entirely governed by Hopes and Fears. Amongſt the Crowd which ſurrounds a Great Man, there are ſome who know for what they are to praiſe and admire him; they would be undone if they did not: But there are alſo a great Number of others who are but Ecchos; they repeat what they hear ſaid, and do what they ſee done; they

(*p*) "If we do but ſee a Man advanced to ſome Dignity, tho' we "have known him juſt before a Man of little Conſideration, an Image "of Grandeur, and Sufficiency inſenſibly ſteals in upon us, and by en-"creaſing in Retinue and Credit, he is encreas'd in Merit. We judge "of him not according to his Worth, but in the faſhionable Way, "according to the Privileges of his Rank. If Fortune turns the "Tables, and throws him down again among the Crowd; then every "one wonders what it ſhould be that cou'd raiſe him ſo High. Is "this he? ſays one: Was not his Knowledge then more extenſive "than now? *Mont. B.* III. *Ch.* 8.

they have no Pretence to Diſcernment, but are downright living Machines. The Antichamber of an honeſt Citizen is ſet out with Prints; That of one of better Faſhion is adorn'd with Paintings; thoſe of a yet higher Rank add Buſts and Statues; but then theſe are all mute and immoveable: Whereas the Antichambers of the Great are crowded with Statues that can do Reverence, and ſometimes ſpeak. There will be no Aggravation found in all this, if we remember two Things; one is, that I do not ſpeak of all great Men; the other, that to deſerve to be called Men, we ought to deſerve to be called rational Creatures. If then ſuch Homage as is rational, and proceeds from the Heart, be alone to be valued, we can be ſaid to receive no more true Homage, than in proportion as we are Juſt and Good. Theſe are Qualifications whoſe Scarceneſs enhances their Price: There is often ſo little Equity, and Greatneſs of Soul, where there ſhould be moſt, that very frequently thoſe who ought always to remember that they are deſign'd by their Birth for the Happineſs of thoſe below them, do on the contrary oppreſs them with ſo much leſs Regard, by how much more they reckon upon their Affection and Patience.

WHEN, in order to commend any one, we are forced to ſupply Virtues which he has not, or to take up with the Externals that ſurround him, and which do truly make no part of his Merit, is it not confeſſing that we can find none in him? And are ſuch kind of Panegyricks any thing better than Satires?

I MOREOVER aſſure the Great of one Truth, which is known to all the World but themſelves, and the Vulgar who never reflect at all; and that is, That they who make their Court with greateſt Submiſſion, are certainly ſuch as love them leaſt, and in whom they ought leaſt of all to confide; for they who court the Favours of the Great at the Expence of their Honour and Honeſty, eſteem Grandeur too great a Bleſſing not to envy them it. To ſee it in the Poſſeſſion of another, is to them Torment enough; and they have no other way of making themſelves amends, for what they ſuffer in flattering thoſe who give them ſo much Pain, than by the liberty they take in decrying them as ſoon as ever they can do it with Impunity. Pride is the only Principle of all their Condeſcentions; and they ſhew ſuch an abſolute Dependance upon their Superiors, only the better to gain their Confidence, and in reality to bring them under Dependance, and to reign in their Name, and make them do whatever they think proper. It is a Truth of Experience, That ſuch as ſeem to be Maſters,

Maſters, do very often live in a Dependance upon thoſe over whom they imagine themſelves to rule: So that we have frequently two Maſters; one who appears; and the other conceal'd, who governs the firſt. This a great Misfortune upon the People; for each of theſe Maſters are for making the ſame Advantages as tho' he was ſingle. A Magiſtrate who knowingly lets himſelf be govern'd, wants Spirit; but he who lets himſelf be govern'd without knowing it, wants Underſtanding. Whoever undertakes the Government of others, ſhou'd himſelf be govern'd by nothing but Reaſon.

PERMIT me to add, That in the midſt of ſo many Advantages as ſeem to raiſe the Great infinitely above the Multitude, in the midſt of their Pride, their Pleaſures, their Power, by which they live as they pleaſe, they want in my Opinion one infinite Advantage, the moſt precious Thing in the World, a ſincere Friend, who is ready and able to bring them back to a Reliſh of Truth, which their Mind, intoxicated by continual Flattery, ſeems entirely to have loſt; which would teach them that they are Men; that their Proſperity may forſake them; that there is a Difference betwixt obeying and being convinced, betwixt yielding to Reaſon and being conquer'd by an Enemy (*q*).

The Uſefulneſs of converſing with the Great.

X. WHEN Great Men love Truth, and Virtue is dear to them, when they value Merit wherever it appears, and eſteem a rational and honeſt Man above all other Conſiderations, I take their Converſation to be of infinite Service, and I do not think there is any Study from which we can reap ſo much Advantage. The Eſteem and Admiration which we have for them, makes us regard their Approbation, without conſidering its Conſequences, as one of the greateſt Bleſſings of Life: In order to pleaſe them, we exert all our Abilities and Faculties: Their Preſence excites and ſupports our Attention: We are perfectly circumſpect

(*q*) Monſtrabo cujus rei inopiâ laborent magna faſtigia, quid omnia poſſidentibus deſit. Scilicet ille qui verum dicat & hominem inter mentientes ſtupentem, ipſaque conſuetudine pro rectis blanda audiendi, ad ignorantiam veri perductum, vindicet à conſenſu conſentuque falſorum, ---- & ab illis quorum unum certamen eſt, una contentio, blandiſſimè fallat; unde ſecuti iram, quam nemo revocabat, multorum ſanguinem hauſerunt, fuſuri noviſſimè ſuum, dum flecti non minùs turpe exiſtimant quàm vinci, & perpetua credunt quæ in ſummum perducta maximè nutant. *Sen. de Benef. B.* VI. *Ch.* 30.

ſpect before them, becauſe we reckon all Faults capital of which they are Witneſſes. As they are from their Infancy accuſtomed to all poſſible Politeneſs and Delicacy in Language and Manners, the leaſt Deviation will be perceived by them: They are not to be impoſed upon by Complements and Turns of Wit; they are too much uſed to them to be deceived by them. To their great Experience and Diſcernment, nothing will have any Reliſh but good Senſe and a Juſtneſs of Thought. With our Equals, and much more with our Inferiors, we ſupply the Defects of our Reaſonings with an Obſtinacy in maintaining them: But theſe are Weapons we ſhould be aſham'd of uſing, and they would be of no Service againſt a learned Superior. The Great, who are endued with Penetration, have ſuch frequent Occaſions to make uſe of it, and have by that means ſo well learn'd to diſtinguiſh thoſe that make it their Endeavour to deceive them, from thoſe that ingenuouſly ſpeak what they think, that it is dangerous to uſe any Diſguiſe before them, and it is much the ſafeſt in their Preſence really to be what it is our Intereſt to appear to be. By this means Sincerity will become natural, and we ſhall become like them; for they have no occaſion for Diſguiſe, but are by an happy Education from their Infancy brought into an abſolute Familiarity with whatever is elegant both in Language and Behaviour. It is from them we muſt copy the Rules we ought to obſerve; but for them to be perfect, they need only follow their own happy Diſpoſitions. In my Opinion, the good Fortune of thoſe that have the Opportunities of ſuch Converſation is not enough to be valued; they are ſuch as few can be bleſs'd with; they that are, may be truly ſaid to want nothing, provided they are not wanting to themſelves: For with reſpect to the Great, of whom I am ſpeaking, to be an honeſt Man, is the greateſt and almoſt the only Recommendation they require: They naturally love thoſe in whom they ſee ſuch Qualifications, as they eſteem and love in themſelves.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Cuſtom, of the Air, of Diet, and of Humour, in general.

I. THERE is nothing has ſo much Force in varying our Imagination as Cuſtom; and it is to this, for the moſt part, that thoſe Cauſes mention'd in the preceding Chapter are principally owing. But in theſe Effects of Cuſtom, there is ſomething ſo whimſical as is hardly to be reconciled. *The Effects of Cuſtom. Sometimes it abates our Attention.*

SOMETIMES our Attention is leſſened by our being accuſtomed to any Thing; whereas every Thing that is uncommon engages us by its being ſuch. The Reaſon is, that Novelty rouzes us, and Cuſtom lulls us aſleep; becauſe thoſe Things we are uſed to excite in us but very feeble Senſations, not ſufficient to keep our Faculties awake. By this means it often happens that we leave the Subſtance to run after the Shadow; that we uſually eſteem what we have not, far above what we have; and ſo we make our Lives miſerable by neglecting to enjoy theſe, for the ſake of purſuing thoſe: We wear our ſelves out with Deſires, when we want nothing but to take the Satisfaction of what we poſſeſs already (*a*).

THE little Value we ſet upon what is near at hand, is one of the Reaſons that in Medicines, as well as in Things of common Uſe, we are apt to prefer what is far fetch'd, to what we have at home. *Simples* are leſs valued in the Countries where they grow than in diſtant Places, tho' it is probable Nature may have enrich'd every Soil with what is moſt

(*a*) Quicquid exſpectantibus fortuna projecit, id ſine ullâ voluptate demittimus, ſtatim ad rapinam alterius erecti & attenti. Hoc ſapienti non evenit, plenus eſt: etiam ſi quid obvenit, ſecurè excipit ac reponit. Lætitiâ fruitur maximâ, continuâ, ſuâ. *Sen. Ep.* LXXII.

Præcipitat quiſque vitam ſuam, & futuri deſiderio laborat, præſentium tædio. *Id. de Brev. Vit. Cap.* 7.

proper for its own Inhabitants. The *Europeans* drink the *Tea* of the *Chineſe*, and the *Chineſe* drink the *Sage* of the *Europeans*. This little Attention we are uſed to give to Things we have been accuſtomed to from our Infancy, is alſo the Reaſon that Authors, that write the Hiſtory of their Country, omit an infinite Number of Things, for want of which, tho' they perceive it not, their Narration becomes very obſcure. We ſhould have loſt a great many *Roman* Cuſtoms, if the *Grecian* Writers had not preſerv'd the Memory of them.

WE may juſtly refer theſe Omiſſions to the want of Attention, as to their true Original. It is certain that our Sentiments are lively, and our Ideas clear; that they are more affecting and penetrating in proportion as we are more or leſs Attentive. The ſole Impreſſion of Objects is ſometimes ſufficient to excite our Attention: This is the Effect of ſuch as are new to us. In this caſe we are barely paſſive, and our Attention is raiſed without any Pains on our part: This is what pleaſes idle Minds, and moſt Men are of this Diſpoſition. They are Attentive as long as the Senſation of Novelty laſts, and ceaſe to be ſo in proportion as the Object becomes familiar. But if we would make good Uſe of our Faculties, and excite them our ſelves to conſider attentively the Objects that are moſt familiar to us, they will continue to appear exactly as they appear'd to us when they were new; nor can it be otherwiſe, ſince they are the ſame, and we obſerve them with the ſame Application. It will be a ſure means of guarding againſt the Emptineſs and Inſufficiency of Objects, if we attend to them ſufficiently; if we be not raſh in determining their Value; if we take time to conſider and know them perfectly; if we ſupply nothing to them, but prize them according to their juſt Worth. When we have done all this, let us but preſerve the ſame Degree of Attention, and we ſhall find that they are always the ſame, and we ſhall like them as well to the laſt, as ever we did at the firſt.

At other Times it prepoſſeſſes in in its Favour.

II. BUT it happens alſo very often, that Men are prepoſſeſs'd in favour of what they are accuſtomed to. They are uſed to ſome particular Ideas and Cuſtoms, and approve or diſapprove of every Thing as it is agreeable or diſagreeable to theſe.

THERE are ſome Inſtitutions ſo unreaſonable, that if they had been to be propoſed at this time of Day, all the World would have roſe up againſt them; and yet having been

been a long time eſtabliſh'd, the going about to alter the leaſt Part of them would be attended with the very ſame Clamour; ſuch is the Prevalence of Cuſtom: I am almoſt afraid to alledge any Inſtances, for fear of being thought too partial in a Work, which is to lay down Rules for univerſal Uſe: There is wanting a ſevere Law in *Ireland*, to prevent the Country Men from faſtning their Horſes to their Carriages by their Tails. The Uſe of *Coffee*, ſo univerſal at preſent, has met with great Contradiction in *Arabia* it ſelf, where it firſt began, and which is, as it were, its native Country, nay, it has been even abſolutely prohibited.

KHAIR BEG, *Governor of* Mecca, *by the Appointment of the Sultan of* Egypt, *had never heard of* Coffee, *or of the manner of taking it. As he was going out of a Moſque one Day, after Evening Prayer, he obſerv'd in a Corner of it a Company of People drinking* Coffee, *who were to ſpend the Night there in Prayer, and was much offended at it. He thought at firſt they had been drinking Wine: Nor was his Surprize much diminiſh'd after they had explain'd to him the Uſe and Virtues of this Liquor. On the contrary, after they had inform'd him how much it was in uſe at* Mecca, *and what Merriment paſs'd at the publick Places where it was ſold, he was of Opinion, that* Coffee *was intoxicating, at leaſt, that it conduced to Things forbidden by the Law.* *Voyage into* Arabia Felix, *p.* 282. *Ed.* Amſt. 1716.

FOR *this Reaſon, after having ordered theſe People to go out of the Moſque, with an Order never to meet again for the future upon the like Occaſion, he convened the next Day a great Aſſembly of Officers of Juſtice, and Doctors of the Law, together with the Prieſts, and moſt eminent Men of* Mecca, *to whom he communicated what he had obſerved the Night before in the Moſque, and what he was inform'd happen'd frequently in the publick Coffee-Houſes; adding, that he was reſolved to remedy this Abuſe, upon which he was deſirous firſt to know their Opinions.*

THE *Doctors agreed that the publick Coffee-Houſes wanted Regulation, as being contrary to the Law of pure* Mahometaniſm; *and declared, that with reſpect to* Coffee, *it was neceſſary at leaſt to examine whether it was not hurtful either to the Body or the Mind; whether it did not by its bad Qualities occaſion thoſe Diſorders in queſtion. For if it did not, it would be ſufficient to put by the Publick Houſes where it was ſold. The Concluſion was to take the Advice of the Phyſicians.*

THE *Governor call'd in two, who were Brothers, Natives of* Perſia, *and eſteem'd the moſt celebrated Phyſicians in* Mecca, *tho'*

tho' of very mean Abilities, and better skill'd in Quibbling than in Phyſick. One of them had even writ againſt the Uſe of Coffee, *jealous perhaps* (ſays our Author) *leaſt the Uſe of it ſhould ſpoil their Practice; ſo they did not fail to declare, That the Berries, of which Coffee was made, were cold and dry, and by conſequence very prejudicial to Mens Health.*

A DOCTOR *of the Aſſembly replied, That* Bengiazlah, *an antient* Arabian *Phyſician of great Authority, had ſaid, in a Book of his, concerning Simple Medicines and Diet, That theſe Berries were attenuating and drying, and conſequently could not have the Qualities juſt now aſcribed to them. The Remark was judicious; for upon occaſion of this Diſpute, all the Phyſicians of the preſent Age do agree, according to the Doctrine of* Bengiazlah, *That* Coffee *is hot and dry, and not cold and dry.*

THE *two* Perſian *Phyſicians, to maintain what they had advanced, replied, That* Bengiazlah *was a perfect ſtranger to the Berries in queſtion; that thoſe he treated of were indeed called by the ſame Name, but were of a quite different Nature; and ſo without taking any more Pains to prove this, they addreſs'd themſelves to the Caſuiſts, and declared, That if* Coffee *was reckon'd amongſt Things that were indifferent, and free for every body to make uſe of, yet ſince it was apt to lead to Things not allowed of, the ſafeſt way for true* Muſſulmen *would be to hold it unlawful.*

THIS *Determination obtain'd all their Suffrages; and ſeveral, either out of Prejudice, or falſe Zeal, did not fail to affirm, That* Coffee *had actually diſturb'd their Brain. One of the Aſſiſtants even maintain'd, That it intoxicated like Wine. Which ſet all the Aſſembly a laughing; becauſe in order to make this Judgment of it, it was neceſſary to have drunk Wine, which is expreſly forbidden by the* Mahometan *Religion. He was ask'd, whether he had ever drunk any Wine; and he had the Imprudence to anſwer in the Affirmative; which Confeſſion condemn'd him to the Baſtinado, the Puniſhment appropriated by* Mahomet *to the Violators of his Law.*

THE Mufti *of* Mecca *only, a Divine and Lawyer by Profeſſion, undertook with Heat the Defence of Coffee againſt the Determination of the Aſſembly, and in ſpite of the Governor, who was ſet on by his Imam, a very ſcrupulous Man: But all the Courage of the* Mufti, *and his beſt Arguments, ſerv'd only to make the falſe Zealots load him with Calumnies.*

COFFEE *was condemn'd ſolemnly, as a Thing forbidden by the Law; and this Sentence of Condemnation was dreſs'd up in very pathetick Terms, to expreſs a kind of Triumph over the Abuſes which were pretended to be redreſs'd. Several*

Doctors ſigned it, together with the Governor, and ſent it away as an important Diſpatch to the Sultan *of* Egypt *his Maſter.*

AT *the ſame time he publiſh'd an Order, expreſly forbidding the Selling or Drinking of Coffee, whether in publick or in private, under the Penalty incurr'd by them that tranſgreſs the Law, a Prohibition, which was follow'd by an exact and rigorous Viſitation of the Officers of Juſtice, who ſhut up all the publick Coffee-Houſes, and burnt all the Coffee they could find there, as well as in the Merchants Warehouſes.*

THE *Lovers of Coffee, who were very numerous, could never ſubmit to this Prohibition: They continued to drink it in their Houſes, being otherwiſe perſwaded that the Aſſembly had determin'd wrong; and that the Condemnation was unjuſt, ſince it had paſs'd without the Conſent of the* Mufti. *However, one of them being ſurpriz'd in his Houſe in the Fact, was very ſeverely puniſh'd, and afterwards expos'd, and led thro' publick Places upon an Aſs.*

BUT *this Rigour was not of long Duration; for the* Sultan *of* Ægypt, *far from approving of the indiſcreet Zeal of his Governor of* Mecca, *was ſurpriz'd that he ſhould dare to condemn a Thing ſo much in favour at* Cairo, *the Capital of his Dominions, where there were Doctors of much greater Authority than thoſe at* Mecca, *and who had not found any thing in the Uſe of Coffee contrary to the Law.*

THE Sultan *ordered him therefore to revoke his Prohibition, and to employ his Authority againſt the Diſorders only, if there were any, committed in the Coffee-Houſes; adding, that becauſe it was poſſible to abuſe the very beſt Things, even the Water of the Fountain* Zeruzem **, ſo much eſteem'd by all Muſſulmen, it was not for that Reaſon neceſſary abſolutely to forbid them.*

THE *Governor was oblig'd againſt his Will to obey. Nor was this the only Satisfaction the* Sultan *procur'd for the People of* Mecca; *for this ſame Governor, ſo ſcrupulous in Appearance, this Mahometan Phariſee, was an Extortioner, and a publick Robber; whom his Succeſſor, having Orders to bring him to an Account for his Conduct, ſentenc'd to a painful Death the Year after. His Brother kill'd himſelf, to avoid the like Fate.*

THE Arabian *Author adds, That the two* Perſian *Phyſicians, who bore ſo great a Part in the Prohibition of Coffee, came alſo to an unfortunate End. Being deſpis'd at* Mecca

* *The Fountain or Pit* Zeruzem, *according to the Muſſulmen, is that which God diſcover'd in the Wilderneſs in favour of* Hagar *and* Iſhmael, *after* Abraham *was oblig'd to withdraw with his Son. It is in the Body of the Temple of* Mecca; *the* Mahometans *drink of it out of Devotion, and aſcribe great Virtues to it.* (This Note is the Author's of the Voyage.)

after the Re-eſtabliſhment of that Liquor, they retir'd to Cairo; *where being convicted of curſing the Perſon of* Selim, *the firſt Emperor of the* Turks *of that Name, who made a Conqueſt of* Ægypt, *they were executed by his Order.*

AFTER *the Re-eſtabliſhment of* Coffee *at* Mecca, *till the Year* 1524, *it met with no Contradiction; but in that Year the* Cadi, *or Chief Judge of the Place, ſhut up all the Coffee-Houſes, upon account of the Diſorders committed there, without hindring private Perſons from drinking it in their own Houſes. His Succeſſor, however, permitted the Coffee-Houſes to be opened again; and every body behaved themſelves with ſo much Modeſty and good Order, that the Magiſtrate was never after oblig'd to make uſe of his Authority.*

IT *is true, that in the Year of* Hegira, 950, *there arriv'd at* Mecca, *by the Caravan of* Damas; *an Order of* Soliman the Great *to drink no more Coffee. But this Order was hardly ever put in Execution; for it was ſoon known that it had been granted only unawares, at the Requeſt of a Lady of the Court, ſomething over-ſcrupulous with reſpect to this Liquor.*

For the reſt, the Sultan *of* Ægypt, *who had ordered his Governor of* Mecca *to revoke his indiſcreet Prohibition of Coffee, conſulted his Doctors of the Law upon this Point, who gave their Opinions in Writing, and prov'd, by ſubſtantial Reaſons, the Fallacy of that Condemnation, and the Ignorance of thoſe that had paſs'd it; which eſtabliſh'd the Uſe of Coffee at* Cairo *upon a much ſtronger Foot than ever. But in the End this great City alſo met with a great deal of Trouble upon this Subject.*

THIS *was in the Year* 1523 *of the Chriſtian Æra, in* 930 *of* Hegira. *At firſt a ſcrupulous Doctor was pleas'd to ſtate a Queſtion in theſe Words, and ſend it to the other Doctors:* What is your Opinion of the Liquor call'd Coffee, which is drank in Company under the Notion of its being lawful to be taken, notwithſtanding it gives occaſion to Diſorders of great Importance, intoxicates the Head, and is prejudicial to the Health? Is it lawful, or unlawful? *At the bottom of the Queſtion was his own Opinion ſign'd,* That the Uſe of Coffee is unlawful. *Not one of his Brethren were of his Opinion, becauſe it was obvious Coffee had not thoſe bad Qualities he aſcrib'd to it. So that this gave no Shock at all to a Cuſtom ſo univerſally receiv'd.*

BUT *about ten Years after, a Preacher held forth ſo powerfully againſt the Uſe of Coffee, as a Thing prohibited by the Law, maintaining that thoſe who drank it could not be true Muſſulmen, that a great Mob of his Auditors at their*

going

going out of the Moſque, fell upon the Coffee-Houſes, broke the Pots and Diſhes, and abus'd the Company they found there.

UPON *this there were two Parties form'd in the City; one of which maintained that Coffee was prohibited by the Law, the other that it was not. But the Judge in Chief having conven'd an Aſſembly of all the Doctors, to have their Opinions, they all unanimouſly declared that the Queſtion had been already determined by their Predeceſſors in favour of Coffee; that they were all of the ſame Sentiment; and that there was nothing farther neceſſary than only to reſtrain the extravagant Heat of the Zealots, and the Indiſcretion of ignorant Preachers. The Judge who preſided, and was of the ſame Opinion, immediately order'd all the Aſſembly to be ſerved with Coffee, and took ſome himſelf; an Example which preſently compos'd all Controverſies, and made Coffee more faſhionable than before.*

HOWEVER, *the Officer of the Policy having found four Years after a great Company at a publick Coffee-Houſe in the Night, during the Seaſon of* Ramadam, or *Mahometan* Lent, *committed them to Priſon, and ordered them to be baſtinadoed the next Day, not upon the Account of the Unlawfulneſs of Coffee, but for drinking it publickly in a Time of Devotion, and at an unſeaſonable Hour.*

After all that paſs'd with reſpect to Coffee, the moſt Scrupulous had but a poor Reaſon to alledge, That it ought to be prohibited, becauſe it is drank in publick Companies in the ſame Manner as Wine. But their Mouth is eaſily ſtopp'd with the Example of Mahomet *himſelf, who drank Milk in the Company of Friends, in the ſame Manner as Coffee is drunk.* -----

AT *the Time when this Cuſtom was moſt prevalent in* Conſtantinople, *the Imams and* Page 296. *Officers of the Moſques made a great Clamour that they were deſerted, whilſt all the Coffee-Houſes were continually crowded. The Dervizes and Prieſts murmured at it extremely; and at laſt the Preachers fell foul upon Coffee, not only affirming that it was unlawful, but that it was a much greater Sin to go to a Coffee-Houſe than to a Tavern.*

AFTER *a great deal of Noiſe and uſeleſs Declamation, all the Prieſts united to obtain a ſolemn Condemnation of this Liquor. In order to it they were pleas'd to maintain, That Coffee roaſted is a ſort of a Coal; and that every Thing which had the leaſt Relation to a Coal, was forbidden by the Law. Upon this they drew up a Queſtion in Form, and preſented it to the Mufti, with a Requeſt that he would determine it, according to the Duty of his Office.*

THE

THE *Mufti, without giving himſelf the Trouble of examining any Difficulties, gave a Determination conformable to the Mind of the Prieſts, and pronounced that Coffee was prohibited by the Law of* Mahomet.

THE *Authority of the Mufti is held in ſuch Eſteem, that it is not permitted to call in doubt his Determinations. So all the Coffee-Houſes were immediately ſhut up, and the Officers of the Policy ordered to prevent the drinking of Coffee in what Manner ſoever.*

YET *notwithſtanding the Rigour that was us'd in the Execution of this Order, they could never entirely prevent the Uſe of it in private.* Amurath III. *again indulged a Liberty with regard to a Thing ſo agreeable, and which was believed otherwiſe not contrary to Religion; ſo that it was allow'd to be drank in Men's own Houſes, and grew more and more in Eſteem. At laſt the Officers of the Policy ſeeing there was no Remedy, were content for a certain Sum to permit it to be ſold, provided it was not in publick; ſo that it was allow'd to drink it in private Houſes, ſhutting up the Doors, or in Back-Shops.*

THERE *wanted but little to eſtabliſh by Degrees the publick Coffee-Houſes. It happened that a new Mufti, leſs ſcrupulous, or more wiſe than his Predeceſſor, declared ſolemnly that Coffee ought not to be look'd upon as a Coal; and that the Liquor made of it was not prohibited by the Law. After this Declaration the Zealots, Preachers, Mufti himſelf, and Lawyers, far from exclaiming againſt Coffee, took it themſelves, and their Example was univerſally follow'd by the whole Court and City.*

WE ſee by this, that in all Times, and in all Places, Men have been Men; that they have made Cuſtom their Rule, and their Prejudices their Principles; that in all Ages, and in all Nations, they have made Religion a Cover to their Ignorance, their Humours, and their Vanity. It is infinitely more ſcandalous to find that not only Turks, but even Chriſtians alſo are guilty of theſe Enormities.

Cuſtom conſecrates Fathions, and binds us even in Things moſt indifferent. The Uſe of Forks has formerly been forbidden in a certain celebrated Congregation.

Self-Love and Idleneſs are the Cauſe of theſe Illuſions. We love our ſelves, and by that Means are in love with our Ideas, our Opinions, and our Manners. It is extremely difficult to put off our Prejudices, in order to examine impartially the Sentiments of others. It is difficult to correct our Ideas, or change our Manners; we give a very unwilling

willing Attention to what tends to condemn and reform us. Objections are almoſt always troubleſome: We deny them our Attention; and by that means form very imperfect Ideas of them. Few People have the Juſtice and Reſolution to conceive clearly the Opinions of their Adverſaries: They run them over ſuperficially, and add or diminiſh as they think proper. (*b*)

A GREAT Part of Men of Letters propoſe nothing more to themſelves, than juſt to paſs their Lives in quiet, and with as much of the Enjoyments of Fortune as they can poſſibly compaſs. Upon every Queſtion, they begin with enquiring whether the Affirmative or Negative is more conformable to the Cuſtom of the Place they live in; that they may, according to ſo prudent and convenient a Partiality, regulate the Attention they are to give to Proofs, and the Contempt they are to ſhew to Objections.

THERE are others, who being led by a Spirit of Contradiction, and an Ambition of obtaining a Name, do at firſt ſetting out in their Studies, make it their Buſineſs to diſtinguiſh themſelves from the common Forms; and inſtead of beginning by learning what is already known, or at leaſt thought to be known, and examining it impartially, do not ſo much as vouchſafe to give Ear to it, or at beſt, if they do, it is only for the ſake of the Pleaſure of oppoſing it. Prepoſſeſſion and Humour are commonly very bad Guides, and always to be ſuſpected.

WHEN our Idleneſs has the Aſcendant over our Vanity, then we follow in the common Train, and are gently led by the Sentiments and Example of others, and entirely obedient to the Force of Cuſtom. When our Vanity is uppermoſt, then we ſeek to diſtinguiſh our ſelves, and love to purſue unbeaten Paths: But when our Reaſon is ſuperior, then we are without Prepoſſeſſion for what is old, and without Fondneſs for what is new; without having any View of making our ſelves beloved for our Complaiſance, or admired for our Diſcoveries, we apply our ſelves ſolely to think juſtly, and to ſee clearly.

THERE are an infinite many People, who, if you ask them why they do this, or that, will make no other Anſwer than that it is the Cuſtom: If you ask them why they follow the Cuſtom, they will reply, our Fathers taught us ſo to do. But is it always neceſſary to follow the Road our Fathers have pointed out to

(*b*) Inter ſtudia verſandum eſt & inter Autores ſapientiæ, ut quæ, ſita diſcamus, nondum inventa acquiramus. *Sen. Ep.* CIV.

to us? Upon this Queſtion ſome will determine point blank, that we ought to follow it without Contradiction; but others, who would appear more refined, diſtinguiſh upon it, and affirm, That there is a great Difference betwixt what their Fathers have preſcribed and practiſed, and what the Anceſtors of other People have appointed. If you preſs them yet farther, and demand the Reaſons of this Diſtinction and Preference, they will either fall into a Fit of Laughter, or Anger, according as they believe you their Friend, or their Adverſary. Theſe are at leaſt in ſome certain Countries Truths of every Day's Experience.

A GREAT many Things are done without knowing why; and yet they are done: And the oftener they are repeated, and the oftener they are ſeen done, with ſo much the more Obſtinacy are they continued. Every one encourages himſelf by the great Number of thoſe that accompany him in his Errors, and they all rely upon the Example one of another.

The Uſefulneſs of Prepoſſeſſions.

III. THE Prepoſſeſſions of Men for the Objects they are accuſtomed to, have ſometimes ſuch excellent Conſequences, that it would induce one to believe them to be an Impreſſion of the Divine Architect, who has by this Means contriv'd a Supply to the Weakneſs of our Reaſon. The common Sort of People know ſo little of the Uſe of Reaſon, that if their Prepoſſeſſions, and the Force of Cuſtom, did not bind them to their Families, their Laws, and their Country, we ſhould ſee ſuch a Degree of Indolence and Uncertainty amongſt them, as would be attended with conſtant Diſorders throughout the whole Race of Mankind. But becauſe this Inſtinct is very apt to run out to an Exceſs, it is neceſſary to be very careful in regulating it by Reaſon, our Actions being no farther commendable than juſt in proportion as they are govern'd by this.

The Remedies.

IV. TRAVELS, and the Hiſtories of them, by acquainting us with the different Opinions and Manners of ſo many Countries and particular People, who have lived, and do now live upon the Surface of our Earth, will remedy theſe bad Effects of Cuſtom, provided we do but ſufficiently attend to them, and conſider that there is hardly a Man, or an Opinion, or a Cuſtom ſo ridiculous, but you may find ſome Mixture of Good in them together with the Bad; as, on the contrary, there is nothing ſo excellent, but is yet capable of a farther Degree of Perfection. The Imagination, by being brought

into

into the Acquaintance of different Objects, in order to heighten its Excellencies, and excuſe its Defects, will at laſt be accuſtom'd to Variety, and will ceaſe to be ſtartled with any Thing new and extraordinary; (*c*) and, in the room of the Blindneſs of its Prejudices, will ſucceed a true Satisfaction and Complaiſance.

WE ſhould very early accuſtom our ſelves to diſtinguiſh upon every Subject the Good from the Bad. Cuſtom, by being oppos'd againſt Cuſtom, will no longer impoſe upon us; nor ſhall we reject what is contrary to our own Uſage, without a very fair and ſtrict Examination.

THOSE that have never travell'd themſelves, nor read the Hiſtory of the Travels of others, look upon the Cuſtoms of their own Nation as a perfect Model for all the World to follow. They go farther, and believe themſelves to be the favourite Objects of Heaven: Each People think themſelves only worthy of its Conſideration and Favours. If it were not for the fatal Conſequences of theſe Prepoſſeſſions, it would make one laugh to ſee Men prefer themſelves one to another, and mutually deſpiſe one another, without any manner of Reaſon. It ſometimes happens, that an Auditory is confirm'd in ſuch like Prejudices by the Pains the Preacher takes to awaken them to Gratitude to their Maſter, from the Conſideration that they have been the particular Objects of his Mercy and Goodneſs.

HE that would perfectly enlighten himſelf, and benefit by every Thing, and compleat his Taſte upon a true Foundation of what he can find good in the World, muſt hearken to every Thing, read every Thing, and examine every Thing, with the ſame Spirit as the *Decemviri*, diſpatch'd by the *Roman Senate*, may be ſuppos'd to have examin'd the Laws and Cuſtoms of *Greece*. They were not to be prejudic'd in favour of any Legiſlator, or any People; they were to look upon every Thing with the ſame Eyes, and examine every Thing with the ſame Liberty. It is ridiculous to be taken up with the Cuſtoms of our own Nation: We are Citizens of the Univerſe. What ſignifies it of whom I learn, if I do but learn? Gold is acceptable out of whatever Mine it comes; and there is no Hand can make Poiſon agreeable, becauſe no Hand can change the Nature of it. We may be prepoſſeſs'd in favour of all ſorts of Subjects, and ſhould therefore

(*c*) Ex omni natione ſi à Philoſophiâ longiſſimè averſa eſt, erucre aliquid conor, & utile efficere. *Sen. Ep.* LVIII.

therefore be always upon our Guard; and we may also benefit by them all, and should therefore not run over any thing too hastily. Oftentimes a ridiculous Humour, which we should never have perceiv'd in our selves, is discover'd in its true Light by our Observation of it in others; and sometimes we form our selves to Virtue by the Example of others, which perhaps, without this Inducement, we never should have thought of.

The Force of the Mind, in what it consists, and how to be acquir'd.

V. ONE of the principal Characters which distinguish great Minds from the Vulgar, is, that these always approve, without reasoning, whatever is conformable to their own Methods of Thinking or Acting, and reject whatever is contrary to them: Whereas those are above this Prejudice; and abstracting from them what Custom has made agreeable or disagreeable, they examine all Things in themselves as tho' they were all equally new, or equally familiar to them. (*d*)

THE true Force of the Mind does further, in my Opinion, consist in its being able to quit the present Condition it is in, and to suppose it self in another in which it really is not; to place it self in what Situation it pleases, and to look upon Things from such Points of View, and on such Sides, not as offer themselves first, but such as it is proper to examine them by. When a great Genius asks himself, *Which of any two Opinions he should prefer, if, without considering which is new or old, they were then only immediately to be broach'd, as the first time of their being mention'd*; he has the Power to examine them with the same Disinterestedness, as tho' in effect he had never heard of them before. When he asks himself, *In case he were in the same Dispositions with some others he sees, what Arguments would be most likely to prevail with him*; He enters into their Sentiments, as tho' they were actually his own, and sees every thing that is capable of confirming or changing them, as perfectly as if he could enter into their Hearts, and actually transform himself into their Condition: So that the Rules we have laid down against the Prejudices of Custom, conduce as much to the Skill of an Orator, as to the Exactness of our Judgment, and the Equity of our Decisions. To know how to put one's self into the Place of a stupid and obstinate Man,

(*d*) Magni est ingenii revocare mentem à sensibus & cogitationem à consuetudine abducere. *Cic. Tusc. Q. Lib.* I.

Man, and who, beſides all this, has been very ill educated, is the true way to diſcover how to enlighten and convince him.

Principal Habits to be acquired.

VI. To acquire this Force, needs nothing but our ſincere Endeavours. The great Author of Nature has ſo prudently order'd it, that, by a juſt Recompence, good Habits become more eaſy the more they are practiſed, and by a juſt Puniſhment ill Habits, the more we give our ſelves up to them, the more difficult they are to be conquer'd.

SINCE then the Power of Cuſtom is ſo great, we may eaſily ſee of what Conſequence it is to confirm our ſelves in good Habits, in which, as we have before obſerv'd, Natural Logic does conſiſt, and in general to acquaint our ſelves betimes with the Maxims that lead to Truth and Wiſdom, that is, with the Rules of our Thoughts and of our Morals. We ſhall make them natural to us, and at laſt find the Practice of them very eaſy, if upon every Occaſion we immediately enquire how far we are ſhort of them, and what Advantages we may receive from them. On the contrary, nothing is of worſe Conſequence, than to conſider them as Matters of Speculation, and almoſt perfectly indifferent, without giving our ſelves the Trouble of making any Application of them: It is this that makes ſo many Logicians reaſon ſo unjuſtly, and ſo many Caſuiſts behave ſo unhandſomely. Morality is perpetually in their Mouth, but never in their Practice: They content themſelves with giving Rules to others, with remarking and criticiſing upon them; and as to themſelves, they ſtick at nothing, but entirely give way to their Inclinations, being not more ſevere upon others than they are indulgent to themſelves: They condemn Men by wholeſale and retale, and think their Zeal in ſo doing is to them ſufficient Satisfaction: They are ſo blind as to think this Contradiction betwixt their Words and Actions is not to be perceiv'd; but they are incurable, becauſe having had their Remedy a long Time, without being the better for it, they are harden'd againſt the Virtue of it; like thoſe, who having made a too frequent and unſeaſonable Uſe of corporeal Medicines, receive no Benefit from them when they come to have occaſion for them. It is, without doubt, one of the moſt unfortunate Errors we can be guilty of, to accuſtom our ſelves to lay down Rules, without following them. Nothing is more eaſy than to propoſe good Laws; and it was proper it ſhould be leſs eaſy to ſet good Examples. (*e*).

WE

(*e*) Plus operi eſt in eo, ut propoſita cuſtodias, quàm ut honeſta proponas. *Sen. Ep.* XVI.

We ought to be alarmed at every Thing that leads to ſo fatal an Habit, tho' it be never ſo diſtant. As ſoon as ever we have underſtood the Uſefulneſs of any Maxim, we ought immediately to make uſe of it; for fear we ſhould accuſtom our ſelves to look upon it with Indifference. He who defers the Application of any Rule till to-morrow, ſeems to be but little acquainted with the Heart of Man, which loves to be always projecting, but never putting in Execution. The whole Life of a great many People is ſpent in promiſing themſelves that they will become, what they never do become. (*f*) When in reading we meet with any Maxim that may be of uſe, we ſhould take it for our own, and make an immediate Application of it, as we would by the Advice of a Friend whom we have purpoſely conſulted.

By Means of this Cuſtom of regarding Rules as Matters of Speculation, rather than of Application, we often ſee People of the laſt Degree of Credulity preaching up Circumſpection to others, and Men of a childiſh Timerouſneſs ſpeaking of the Contempt of Death, and of Reſignation to Providence in the moſt couragious Terms, and with the moſt compoſed Countenance. They ſee clearly into the Faults of others, and are blind to their own: The Merchant that cheats all he can, complains that the Magiſtrate ſells his Juſtice; and the Magiſtrate cries out upon the Extortion of the Merchant at the ſame time that he is a great deal more unjuſt himſelf, and ſells in Secret, what it is a Shame to ſet a Price upon, *Juſtice* and the *Rewards* of Merit.

We ſhall better confirm our ſelves in the Habit of practiſing theſe Precepts, if, in our Attention to every Thing we hear or ſee, we do but take care to obſerve that the Errors of Men, both in their Diſcourſe and Conduct, always ſuppoſe a Neglect of theſe Rules. But the Faults of others will be of ſo much the more Service in reminding us of theſe Rules, by how much the more we place our true Felicity in the Obſervation of them. To think juſtly, and to live wiſely, to know Truth, and to practiſe Virtue, is the undoubted and eſſential Foundation of our Happineſs: All the reſt do but border upon it, and are no more than Amuſements, and ſlight Helps towards eſtabliſhing our Satisfaction. It is by this Way that we muſt become Philoſophers in Reality, and not

(*f*) Recognoſce ſingulos, conſidera univerſos: nullius non vita ſpectat in craſtinum. Quid in hoc ſit mali, quæris? infinitum: non enim vivunt, ſed victuri ſunt; omnia differunt. *Ep.* XLV.

not only in Name; and inſtead of diſhonouring this Title by vain Babbling, we ſhall render our ſelves worthy of it, and even do an Honour to it. (*g*) Thoſe whoſe Studies learn them only to ſpeak, and not to live, are only *Grammarians*, and not Philoſophers. (*h*)

THERE

(*g*) Illud admoneo, auditionem Philoſophorum, lectionemque ad propoſitum beatæ vitæ trahendam: non ut verba priſca aut ficta captemus, & tranſlationes improbas, figuraſque dicendi, ſed ut profutura præcepta, & magnificas voces, & animoſas, quæ mox in rem tranſferantur. Sic iſta diſcamus, ut quæ fuerunt verba, ſint opera. Nullos autem pejùs mereri de omnibus mortalibus judico, quàm qui Philoſophiam velut aliquod Artificium venale didicerunt; qui aliter vivunt, quàm vivendum eſſe præcipiunt. Exempla enim ſeipſos inutilis diſciplinæ circumferent, nulli non vitio quod inſequuntur obnoxii *Ep.* CVIII.

(*h*) "Let him judge of the Advancement he has made, not by the "Teſtimony of his Memory, but of his Life: Let him, when he has "learn'd any thing, put it into an hundred different Lights, and apply "it to as many different Subjects, to ſee if he has taken it right, and "made it perfectly his own." *Mont. B.* I. *Chap.* 25.

"According to the preſent Method of Teaching, it is no wonder "if neither the Scholars nor the Maſters attain to greater Abilities, "tho' they become more learned. The Truth is, that the Care and "Expence of our Fathers go no farther than to furniſh our Heads "with Knowledge: As to Judgment and Virtue you hear little "enough of them. If one ſhould paſs by our People, and cry, O ye "learned Men! And another, O ye good Men! The firſt would "infallibly draw all their Eyes and Reſpect. There would be a "third wanting to cry, O ye ſenſeleſs Wretches! Our firſt Enquiry "is, Does he underſtand *Greek* and *Latin*? Does he write in Verſe "or Proſe? But the principal Queſtion ſhould be, whether he is be-"come wiſer and better; and this is always put laſt. We ſhould en-"quire who is the *beſt* learned, not who is the moſt learned. We "take Pains only to fill our Memory, and leave our Underſtanding and "Conſcience quite empty. - - - -

"If the Mind does not take a better Biaſs, if the Judgment does "not become ſtronger, I had rather my Scholar ſhould have ſpent "his Time in playing at Tennis; for this at leaſt would make the Body "more active. After fifteen or ſixteen Years have been ſpent at School, "you find the Youth return the moſt unfit for Buſineſs that can be: "All you will think him improv'd in, is, that his *Latin* and *Greek* "have made him a greater Fool and Coxcomb than he was when he "went from home. Inſtead of bringing back a Mind well fill'd, it "proves to be only puffed up. Theſe Maſters are the only Perſons "that not only do not mend what is committed to their Care, as Car-"penters and Maſons do, but make it worſe, and yet are paid for ſo "doing." *Ch.* 25.

THERE are two Sorts of Sciences: The one is confined to Speculation; the other extends farther to Practice: There is no Neceſſity of making an Habit of the firſt. When you have once clearly comprehended a Propoſition in Geometry, for inſtance, or the Solution of a Phænomenon in natural Philoſophy, and have conſider'd it over and over, ſo often as to be able to recollect it again, whenever you ſhall

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Inhæreat iſtud animo, & tanquam miſſum Oraculo placeat:
Optima quæque dies miſeris mortalibus ævi
Prima fugit. ------

Quare optima? quia reſtat quod incertum eſt. Quare optima? quia juvenes poſſumus diſcere, poſſumus facilem animum, & adhuc tractabilem, ad meliora convertere: quia hoc tempus idoneum eſt laboribus, idoneum agitandis per ſtudia ingeniis, & exercendis per Opera corporibus. Quod ſupereſt, ſegnius & languidius eſt, & propius à fine. Itaque toto hoc agamus animo, & omiſſis ad quæ divertimus, in rem unam laboremus: ne hanc temporis perniciſſimi celeritatem, quam retinere non poſſumus, relicti demùm intelligamus. Primus quiſque tanquam optimus dies placeat, & redigatur in noſtrum. Quod fugit occupandum eſt. Hoc non cogitat ille, qui Grammatici oculis Carmen iſtud legit, ideo optimum quemque primum eſſe diem, quia ſubeunt morbi, quia ſenectus premit, & adhuc adoleſcentiam cogitantibus ſupra caput eſt: ſed ait, Virgilium ſemper unà ponere morbos & ſenectutem, non mehercule immeritò. Senectus enim inſanabilis morbus eſt. Præterea, inquit, hoc ſenectuti cognomen impoſuit, triſtem illam vocat.

Subeunt morbi triſtiſque Senectus.

Non eſt quod mireris, ex eâdem materiâ ſuis quemque ſtudiis apta colligere. In eodem prato bos herbam quærit, canis leporem, Cicoma incertum. Cùm *Ciceronis* libros de *Republicâ* prehendit hinc Philologus aliquis, hinc Grammaticus, hinc Philoſophiæ deditus: alius aliò curam ſuam mittit. Philoſophus admiratur, contra juſtitiam dici tam multa potuiſſe. Cùm ad hanc eandem lectionem Philologus acceſſit, hoc ſubnotat, duos Romanos reges eſſe, quorum alter patrem non habet, alter matrem. Nam de *Servii* matre dubitatur: *Anci* pater nullus, *Numæ* nepos dicitur. *Sen. Ep.* CVIII.

Vetus quidem illa doctrina eadem videtur & rectè faciendi & benè dicendi magiſtra, neque disjuncti doctores, ſed iidem erant vivendi præceptores atque dicendi, ut ille apud *Homerum Phœnix*, qui ſe à *Peleo* patre *Achilli* juveni comitem eſſe datum dicit ad bellum, ut illum efficeret oratorem verborum actoremque rerum.

Diſſidium illud extitit quaſi linguæ atque cordis, abſurdum ſanè & inutile, & reprehendendum, ut alii nos ſapere, alii dicere docerent

ſhall have occaſion for it, this is ſufficient. But it is not ſo with the Precepts of Morality, and the Rules of Logic: they muſt take Poſſeſſion of the Heart and Underſtanding; the Faculties muſt be moulded and framed according to them, and will by this Means be made to obſerve them by their own natural Tendency and Inclination, without any occaſion for reflecting on them: We ſhall never come at the Fruits of them, if we once content our ſelves with barely comprehending them. (*i*) We muſt make them our own, by applying them to an infinite Number of Examples, and by comparing with them, and examining by them, every Thing we hear, or read, or even compoſe our ſelves. So that what *Seneca* ſaid of ſome other Sciences is more particularly true of theſe: *There are ſome Things that cannot be ſaid to be known, by being barely underſtood, except they be alſo continually meditated on.* (*k*)

EVEN in Sciences of Speculation, if we would make much Progreſs in them, we muſt make the Principles of them very familiar to us; we muſt be able to recollect them without Trouble, and to have them, as it were, always preſent, in order to manage them with perfect Eaſe and Readineſs. In a word, it is neceſſary to contract an Habit of applying them upon every Occaſion that offers. Without this we may indeed be able to underſtand what we read, and to benefit by the Inſtructions of others, but we ſhall never be capable of diſcovering any Thing our ſelves.

A FEW *Precepts which are always at Hand, are of much greater Service than a very great Number which we perfectly underſtand, but cannot manage with the ſame Dexterity*, is a Leſſon

(*i*) *Such is the Conduct of Men. They leave Laws and Precepts to take their Courſe, while they themſelves purſue a different Road; not only thro' the Irregularity of their Manners, but oftentimes thro' Opinion, and a contrary Judgment. If you hear read a Lecture of Philoſophy, the Invention, the Eloquence, the Propriety of it immediately affects and moves you. There is nothing in it that pleaſes or pricks your Conſcience, that is not at all ſpoken to. Is it not true, what* Ariſton *ſays, That neither a Bath, nor a Lecture will be of any Service, unleſs they be keep ſweet and clean? We may have ſome Regard to the Shell, but it ought to be after we have taken out the Kernel; as we are uſed to admire the Engraving and Workmanſhip of the Cup, after having drunk out the Wine that is in it.* Mont B. III. Ch. 9.

(*k*) Quædam res ſemel perceptæ hærent; quædam ut Scias, non eſt ſatis didiciſſe, intercidit enim eorum ſcientia, niſi continuetur. *Sen. de. Benef. Lib.* III. *Cap.* 5.

Leſſon of *Demetrius* the *Cynick*, recorded by *Seneca*. (*l*) The ſame Philoſopher adviſes that the Precepts of Wiſdom ſhould ſo far penetrate into us, and as it were make part of us, that they might be conſtantly ready the Moment we have occaſion for them; and what St. *Auguſtin* has ſaid of the Rules of Eloquence, ought to be applied to all theſe Rules: *It is certain that in the Heat of Compoſing, we think no more of them than if we never had learn'd them; ſo that we are not eloquent becauſe we follow them; but we follow them becauſe we are eloquent.* So likewiſe a perfect honeſt Man, and a perfect underſtanding Man, have no occaſion to conſult every Moment, one of them the Rules of Morality, the other the Rules of Logic, in order to form their Actions and their Reaſonings; their Hearts being under Subjection to theſe Rules, need only follow their own Inclinations to obſerve them. The End of Precepts is to perfect and poliſh Nature; but they never produce this Effect, unleſs they be converted into Nature. All that Art can do is found of no farther Service, than in proportion as it imitates Nature ſo very nearly, as to be taken for Nature it ſelf.

Ideas that are familiar, have ſometimes too much Influence.

VII. THE Road to Truth is ſo encompaſſed with Rocks and Precipices, that you cannot quit the one, without falling upon the others. If the Readineſs with which our Habits preſent our Ideas has its good Effects, ſo likewiſe has it its bad ones; and the Difficulty is to keep a juſt Medium betwixt theſe two Extremes. The Ideas that are familiar to us preſent themſelves upon the leaſt Occaſion, and taking Poſſeſſion of our Mind, oppoſe and hinder its Fruitfulneſs in producing other Ideas. The Imagination of

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(*l*) Plus prodeſſe, ſi pauca præcepta ſapientiæ teneas, ſed illa in promptu tibi & in uſu ſint, quàm ſi multa quidem didiceris, ſed illa non habeas ad manum. *Sen. de Benef. Lib.* VII. *Cap.* 1.

Hæc nuſquàm dimittere, imò & affigere & partem ſui facere eòque quotidianâ meditatione perduci ut ſuâ ſponte occurrant ſalutaria, & ubique ac ſtatim deſiderata præſtò ſint: & ſine morâ ullâ veniat illa turpis honeſtique diſtinctio. *Sen. de Ben. Lib.* VII. *Cap.* 2.

Quæcunque ſalutaria ſunt, ſæpè agitari debent, ſæpe verſari, ut non tantum nota ſint nobis, ſed etiam parata. - - - -

Philoſophia dividitur in hæc, ſcientiam & habitum animi. Nam qui didicit, & facienda ac vitanda percepit, nondum ſapiens eſt, niſi in ea quæ didicit, animus ejus transfiguratus eſt. *Sen. Ep.* XCIV.

It is not enough to give Knowledge to the Mind, it muſt be incorporated with it. It is not enough to have it ſprinkled with it; it muſt be throughly tinctured with it. Mont. B. I. Ch. 24.

a Painter furniſhing out his Objects, makes him ſee Regularities that have no Exiſtence. The Moon is believ'd to reſemble an human Face. A Man that has been already deceiv'd by ſtrong Aſſurances, and ſtill remembers it, ſuſpects every one that talks in the ſame friendly manner to have the ſame Deſign. A Chymiſt would explain every Thing by his three Principles. A Divine who is warm upon any ſide of a Controverſy, imagines he finds in every Paſſage Arguments to eſtabliſh and confirm it. A Preacher full of a particular Averſion for certain Vices, falls perpetually upon them. And in common Converſation, how many People make themſelves intolerable, by always repeating the ſame Maxims, or telling the ſame Stories? The oftner they fall into this Error, the more difficult is it for them to guard againſt it.

WE may poſſibly adhere to Truth by a kind of Infatuation; and then we find it where it is not, in the very ſame manner as where it is. Every Page of the *Holy Scriptures*, and every celebrated *Father*, do equally contain it. (*m*) It is with their Expreſſions, as with the Sound of Bells, they ſay whatever we would have them. The *Moliniſts* and the *Thomiſts* do each find their Syſtem in St. *Auguſtin*. *Budæus* and *H. Stephens* derive the *French* Language from the *Greek*; *Guichard* makes it decend from the *Hebrew*; according as each of them is taken up with one or other of theſe antient Languages. Doctor *Hammond* finds every where the Principles of the *Gnoſticks*. A learned Man, whoſe Memory is full of fabulous Hiſtory and Mythology, preſently finds Means to demonſtrate the Truth of the *Revelations*. If an Author expreſs himſelf modeſtly, without aſſuming a deciſive Authority, a *Sceptick* liſts him in for one that doubts of

(*m*) " We preſently wreſt the Sayings of others in favour of the " Opinions with which we have already prepoſſeſſed our ſelves. To an " Atheiſt all Writings are tinctured with Atheiſm: He infects with " his Poiſon the moſt innocent Expreſſions.

" Is it poſſible that *Homer* could ever mean all the Things he has " been made to ſay? Could he ever intend to furniſh with ſo many " different Figures, that Divines, Legiſlators, Generals, Philoſophers, and " all ſorts of Men that treat of any Science, tho' they treat of them ever " ſo differently and even contrary one to another, ſhould build all upon " him, and refer themſelves to him as to the general Maſter of all " Offices, Works, and Artiſts, and univerſal Counſellor for all Enter- " prizes? Whoever have had Occaſions for Oracles and Predictions, " have found in him ſeveral for their Purpoſe. *Mont. B.* II. *Ch.* 12.

every Thing, and dares be ſure of nothing. If an Author expoſes the Extravagancies of Superſtition, and enlarges upon the Diſorders it occaſions in Society, a Libertine concludes preſently that he agrees with him in making light of Religion, and that according to him Men have no Obligation even to common honeſty.

THE *Civilians* have very ingeniouſly reſolv'd a great many Caſes, by ſuppoſing tacit Contracts. This Succeſs has taken; and upon this an infinite Number of tacit Contracts have been imagined, where they were not at all neceſſary. There are ſome who have eſtabliſh'd the whole Syſtem of Morality upon theſe imaginary Contracts. But by virtue of what are we obliged to keep our Word? Is it by virtue of a tacit Contract, which muſt it ſelf ſuppoſe another tacit Contract? We muſt in the End agree that it is therefore neceſſary, becauſe we ought to live conformably to Nature, and becauſe that infinite Being, who is the Author of it, would have us live ſo. From theſe two Principles we deduce an infinite Number of Rules without the Help of theſe ſuppoſed Contracts.

AT the firſt Sight of a Perſon's Outſide, we preſently form to our ſelves an Idea of his Inſide; for we never love to remain in Suſpence: And from this Idea, which even the Novelty of it makes more lively, it is not eaſy to depart. Sometimes a Man's making a Miſtake in his firſt Salute, is enough to diſguſt us againſt every Thing he ſhall ſay afterwards.

SOME happily explain ſeveral Effects of Nature, by means of ſome nitrous Spirits which the Air is charged with. Upon this, there are ſome Authors that attribute to theſe nitrous Spirits, all the Fermentations that happen in the animal Body, the glandular Secretions, the Formation of the Spirits, Nutrition, and in a word every thing elſe that we meet with, or enquire after. So ſome have endeavoured to account for the Nature of Colours from theſe Spirits.

A CERTAIN Author has applied himſelf to examine the Phænomena of the Load-Stone, and has contrived a new Syſtem to explain them; with which his Imagination is ſo fill'd, that every thing in Nature ſeems to him to be cauſed by ſome magnetick Power.

DESCARTES has been reproached with having brought into Philoſophy the Mathematical Ideas, which he was wholly taken up with, and by this means making the Univerſe a vaſt Machine, which includes an infinite Number of others; all the Effects of which conſiſt in certain Proportions of

Bulk

Bulk, Figure, Celerity, and Direction of the ſeveral Parts that ſtrike upon one another. But if Philoſophy ought in reality to be nothing elſe but a perpetual Application of Mathematical Truths; if all that paſſes in Nature be only a Series of Geometrical Principles evolved; if all the Phænomena of the Univerſe be only ſo many different Conditions of Extenſion, the Univerſe it ſelf being only a vaſt Extenſion; it is happy for a Mathematician, as *Deſcartes* was, to incline to become a Philoſopher.

WE *ought not to do any Ill; but being incapable of doing any Good, we cannot act without acting ill: Therefore the beſt Way will be to do nothing, to abſtain from all Action, and to remain entirely paſſive.* This Concluſion is extravagant, and overturns the Principles from whence it is drawn; for to reſolve to remain without Action, is to determine upon a certain Condition, and is therefore acting, and conſequently acting ill. But an Imagination entirely filled, and entirely overwhelm'd with Diſputes upon Man's Incapacity to do good; an Imagination, which eſteems as a Robbery committed upon his Maker, the Thought of our being able to receive from him ſome Faculty, which if we make but a right Uſe of, we ſhall do as we ought: An Imagination ſo prepoſſeſſed, gives into a Concluſion ſuitable to thoſe Ideas which influence it, and entirely poſſeſs it. It is ſo taken up with an extreme Fear of committing a Robbery upon its Maker, that it is not at Liberty to perceive the Extravagancies it gives into.

XI. IT is living by Clock-work, to give our ſelves up to our firſt Ideas and Habits. (*n*) We ſhould therefore be always upon our Guard, to prevent their too great Power, and to call to our Aſſiſtance our Attention, Circumſpection, and Diſtruſt of our ſelves. Moreover, to prevent the Imagination from confirming

Means to prevent them.

(*n*) " We ſhould not nail our ſelves ſo faſt to our Humours and " Complexions: Our chief Capacity is to know how to apply our " ſelves to different Imployments. We may exiſt, but we do not live, " if we oblige and confine our ſelves to one only View. The fineſt " Souls are thoſe that can conform to the greateſt Variety. We have an " honourable Teſtimony of old *Cato* to this Purpoſe: *Huic verſatile* " *ingenium ſic pariter ad omnia fuit, ut natum ad id unum diceres,* " *quodcunque ageret.* My Opinion of Dreſſing is, to tie my ſelf down " to no particular Faſhion, be it ever ſo good, ſo as never to be able to " leave it: Life is an unequal, irregular, and various Motion. It is " not being Friends to our ſelves, much leſs Maſters of our ſelves; it is

firming it ſelf to a ſmall Number of Ideas, and being accuſtomed ſo to do, we ſhould avoid fixing upon one particular Subject, or giving our ſelves up entirely to one only Application. The Variety of Studies, and the different Genius's of Men with whom we converſe, are very proper to furniſh it with Extent and Variety.

THE Truth is, we cannot excell in all Things; for which Reaſon it is but for every one to endeavour to compleat himſelf in that which his Talent and Taſte leads him to. But all the Sciences are ſo cloſely connected, that is difficult to excell in one without having a moderate Knowledge of the reſt. (*o*) Theory ought to ſerve for our Guide in Practice, and all its Rules are founded upon ſpeculative Principles. The Nature and Origin of our Paſſions being well underſtood, will be of real Aſſiſtance towards eſtabliſhing the Rules of Morality; Hiſtory illuſtrates with Examples; Philoſophy alſo finds in Hiſtory Facts to explain; *Logic* ſerves as a Guide to the Critick, and the Critick rectifies *Logic*. But if this were not ſo, if every Science were independent of others, and received no Aſſiſtance from them, yet would it be neceſſary for Men of Letters to acqire a general Knowledge, and an univerſal Learning in order to be able to converſe together. Society would be compoſed for the moſt Part of Members incapable of Union, and by conſequence ſhould be deſtroy'd, if every one ſhould apply himſelf but to one particular Thing. Each would every Moment look like a Stone jutting out of a Building; one would be mutually inſupportable to another. It has been ſaid with a great deal of Juſtice, That an honeſt Man ſhould be of all Profeſſions, and, above all, to make no Oſtentation of his own. Thoſe that underſtand but one Thing, continually affect to be harping upon it; and this Affectation is Pedantry. A Soldier that can talk of nothing but Battles, a Story-Teller that can do nothing elſe, are Pedants in their kind, as much as a Man of Letters, that

" being Slaves, to follow our ſelves perpetually, and to be ſo engaged to " our Inclinations, as not to be able to leave, or vary them.

" The Excellency of the Soul is to ſuit with all Heights; to know both " to raiſe and to lower it ſelf; to behave with Decency whereever " Fortune leads; to confer with our Neighbours about our Buildings, " our Diverſions, and our Quarrels; to entertain with Pleaſure a Carpenter or a Gardiner. *Mont. B.* III. *Ch.* 3.

(*o*) Difficile eſt in Philoſophiâ pauca ei nota eſſe, cui non ſint aut omnia, aut pleraque. *Cic Tuſc. Q. Lib.* II.

that can't ſpeak a Word except it be out of *Homer* or *Horace*.

IT is a great Fault in Men of Letters, eſpecially in thoſe that make it their Buſineſs to Teach, that they love to Speak rather than to Hear, and are better pleas'd to inſtruct others than to learn themſelves. (*p*) By this means it happens, that Company which might enliven their Imagination, and renew and enrich it with Ideas and Turns, only furniſhes them with Opportunities of repeating their Thoughts, and of confirming them in their Habits and Prepoſſeſſions. It will be therefore no ſmall Progreſs for theſe to learn to be ſilent, and to hearken to others. If we engage Men to diſcourſe upon ſuch Subjects as they very well underſtand, we ſhall both do them a Pleaſure, and our ſelves a great deal of Service; and by adding their Obſervations to thoſe we have already, we ſhall very much improve and enlarge our Underſtanding. BUT

(*p*) "We owe this Care and this conſtant Correction and Inſtruction "to thoſe that are committed to us: But to go and preach to the "firſt we meet with, and to reprimand his Ignorance and Folly, is a Pre- "ſumption not to be endured. I would rarely do it on purpoſe to "thoſe that go along with me, and rather quit the Whole, than to "make uſe of ſuch far-fetch'd and imperious Inſtructions." *Mont. B.* III. *Ch.* 8.

"If you happen to clear and enlighten their Underſtanding, you "will have no Thanks for your Pains. This is what I would ſay; "My Conception is clear; and if my Expreſſion be not ſuitable, it is "the Fault and Defect of Language. It is lawful to make uſe even "of Malice it ſelf, to correct this haughty and brutiſh Diſpoſition.

Charron *of Wiſdom* B. II. Ch. IX. *gives it for his third Advice*, "To ſpare and husband the Knowledge and Abilities we have "acquired; and to be more ready to hear than to ſpeak, to learn "than to teach: For it is a Fault to be more forward it making our "ſelves known, and in talking of and ſhewing our ſelves, than in "receiving the Inſtructions of others; and in making uſe of the "Matter they furniſh us with, rather than to bring in ſome new "of our own." *And for his Fifth:* "To have an honeſt Curio- "ſity of enquiring into all Things, or after having underſtood them, "to husband and make a proper Advantage of them all." *All this is founded upon this Principle*; "That it is a great Capacity and Wiſ- "dom to be able to apply our ſelves to every thing; to be conformable "and tractable; to know how ſometimes to riſe and aſpire, and "and ſometimes to ſtoop and condeſcend, upon proper and ſuitable "Occaſions. The fineſt and beſt Capacities are the moſt univerſal; "the moſt publick, applicable to all Ways of thinking perfectly "communicative, and open to every body.

BUT there is a Whimſicalneſs that reigns amongſt Men of Letters, as much, at leaſt, as in any other Profeſſion. If we ſee ſome that place their Eſteem upon that Science which they chuſe for their Object, and in which they believe themſelves to excell: We meet with others alſo that beſtow leaſt of their Time upon that which deſerves moſt of it; whilſt they bend all their Studies and Pains towards thoſe Things which they are much leſs obliged to underſtand. I am of opinion that this laſt Error is principally occaſioned for want of making an Affection for Knowledge, and a Reliſh for Truth, the Foundation of our Studies. It is for the ſame Reaſon that we learn Things but very imperfectly, and only juſt touch upon them; but when we begin to teach, we give our ſelves the Trouble of repeating over and over again, what we know but ſuperficially, and, as it were, by rote. The Neceſſity we find our ſelves under of returning back to it every Day, makes it inſupportably diſagreeable; ſo that we quit what belongs to our Profeſſion, to amuſe our ſelves with what belongs to others, in which we yet inſtruct our ſelves but in the groſs, and confuſedly.

VANITY contributes alſo to theſe Irregularities: When a Man, by the Addition of a Title of his proper Name, finds himſelf placed in the Rank of Maſters, he believes himſelf to be a great Maſter. This Suppoſition gives too much Pleaſure, and ſuits too well with Idleneſs and Vanity, to admit of a Reſolution of examining it nearer, and more cloſely conſidering it. Finding therefore that we cannot but paſs for Learned in the Profeſſion we regularly exerciſe; we are apt to look upon it as a needleſs Piece of Trouble to ſpend our Time in making our ſelves perfect Maſters of it. We expect to ſhine to greater Advantage, by attaining to ſome Skill in the Profeſſion of others. This Remark is verified in all Conditions of Life, from the higheſt to the loweſt; what we ought to know moſt, we know leaſt. We may ſay that this unreaſonable Affectation is one of the principal Sources of the Ignorance and Unskilfulneſs that reigns amongſt us, and conſequently of all the Diſorders that ariſe from them. A great Man knows little or nothing of the Art of Governing, the Knowledge of which would do him ſo much Honour: Perhaps he is got into ſome certain Method of it; but he has never conſidered the Principles of it, nor ſtudied the Foundation of it. Inſtead of this, he has been taught to ſpend his Time in learning a great many Languages, reading the Poets, and troubling himſelf with Trifles. In a word, he has been entirely imployed in Things

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that indeed have their Merit, and may paſs for Ornaments in Perſons of an inferior Rank, but are no better than Digreſſions to him. (*q*) A great many Men run into the contrary Extreme, and under the Pretence that they are not born to ſhine in an Univerſity, they neglect and ſhun the Sciences as tho' they were created to know nothing. And as

(*q*) *The Speech of* Aurengzebe *to his Præceptor, in the firſt Volume of Mr.* Bernier's Voyages, *may ſerve for a Leſſon to a great many People.* " What " do you pretend to me *Mullah-gy*, Mr Præceptor, " that I ſhould make you one of the chief Omrahs of my Court? " Undoubtedly if you had inſtructed me as you ought, there could " be nothing more reaſonable. For, as to my ſelf, I was always " of Opinion, that a Child, well educated, is more obliged to his " Maſter than his Father. But what are all the fine Things thou haſt " taught me? Thou haſt taught me that all this whole Frangiſtan " is I don't know what little Iſland, of which the King of *Portu-* " *gal* was formerly the greateſt King, afterwards the King of *Hol-* " *land*, and ſince that the King of *England*; as to the other Kings, " as thoſe of *France* and *Andalouſia*, thou haſt repreſented them to " me like our little *Rajas*, giving me to underſtand that the Kings " of *Hindouſtan* were ſuperior to them all. That here only were " the true Houmayons, the Ekbars, the Jehan-Guyres, the Chah-Je- " hans, the Fortunate, the Great by Merit, the Conquerors, and " Kings of the World. And that *Perſia*, *Usbec*, *Kackguer*, *Tatar*, and " *Catay-Pegu*, *Siam*, *Thina*, and *Matchina*, tremble at the Name of the " Kings of *Hindouſtan*. Admirable Geographer! Thou ſhouldſt have " taught me to diſtinguiſh exactly all theſe different Parts of the World, " and made me acquainted with their Force, their Method of Fight- " ing, their Cuſtoms, their Religion, their Government, and their " Intereſts. And by a ſolid Lecture of Hiſtory inform'd me of " their Beginning, their Advancement, and their Decline; how, from " whence, and by what Accidents and Steps theſe great Changes and Re- " volutions have been brought about. I have ſcarce learned from thee, the " Name of my Predeceſſors, the famous Founders of this Empire; " much leſs the Hiſtory of their Lives, and of all their ſo much celebrated " Conqueſts. Thou haſt rather choſe to teach me Arabick than to " write and to read; and I am very much obliged to you for ha- " ving made me ſpend my Time in learning a Language which re- " quires ten or twelve Years to come to any Perfection in it; as tho' the " Son of a King ſhould value himſelf for being a good Grammarian, " or a Doctor of our Law, or for underſtanding other Languages, " rather than thoſe of his Neighbours, which he cannot well be " without. As tho' he, whoſe Time is ſo very precious, and ſo much " wanted for ſo many other Things of the greateſt Importance, " ſhould have his Genius diſcourag'd and cramp'd with a Task ſo " dull and dry, ſo long and tedious, as that of learning Words.

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as the Mind cannot be without ſome Imployment, their's are amus'd with Trifles that diſhonour them; and we find them applaud themſelves for their Underſtanding in Dogs and Horſes, in Eating and Drinking; and ſometimes after having ſpoken of a great Man, that he is a *Count* or *Duke*, *&c.* and after having added to his Titles, that he is a Sportſman, or ſome ſuch trifling Obſervation, there is all they can ſay. The Affectation of appearing skilful in what we are either entirely ignorant, or know very little of, as well as in what does not belong to us to know, occaſions Men to make ſo ridiculous a Figure, that it is a perpetual Comedy to thoſe that know how to diſtinguiſh ſuch Appearances. A Gentleman has his Heart full of his Family and Eſtate: You need only to ſee him to be convinced of it; yet when he ſpeaks of good Eating, and of ſome favourite Sauce, the affected Air and Manner with which he expreſſes himſelf, would make one believe he values himſelf as much for being a good Cook, as he does for being a great Man. A Mother that has a great many Children, and is perfectly blind in their Education; if you banter her Ignorance in this Point, will never bluſh, but ſay perhaps that ſhe never ſtudied it; but if you charge her with not underſtanding the Rules of Gaming, ſhe will not readily forgive you. A Soldier ſhall affect to ſay little of Fighting, but will wretchedly play the Diſputant as long as you will have Patience to hear him. A Merchant will regulate Sieges and Campaigns with as much Aſſurance as he does the Papers of his Counting-Houſe. Every one would act a Part different from his own. And upon this Subject I never remember to have met with a ſharper and wiſer Saying than that of *Hannibal*, when he had been tired with a long Diſcourſe, which a Pedant had made upon the Art of War, *I have ſeen*, ſays he, *a great many old Men that have talk'd idly; but I never yet met with one ſo extravagant as the Man I have been hearing.*

Advice againſt the Force of Cuſtom.

XII. Our Prepoſſeſſions for Cuſtom will be remedied, if we frequently reflect upon the Ridiculouſneſs of Men, in preferring themſelves ſucceſſively without Reaſon one to another. (*r*) To weaken the too great Power of the Imagination, and to bring it into a Dependance

(*r*) "I could freely excuſe our People for making their now "Cuſtoms and Uſages the ſole Rule of their Perfection. For it is "the

dance upon Reaſon, it will be proper from time to time to deny our ſelves thoſe Things which we find our Inclinations ſtand to, how well ſoever we find our ſelves diſpoſed to ſucced in them: And ſometimes, on the contrary, we ſhall do well to force our ſelves upon others which we have an Averſion to. It is true, our Succeſs will be but ſmall in what we are compell'd to, becauſe it does not engage our Attention; but there are Means of exciting it by little and little. A Converſation, for inſtance, upon the Subject we propoſe to meditate on, a Lecture relating to it, will diſpoſe us towards it, and at laſt make that eaſy to us, which was at firſt extremely diſagreeable.

WHEN by theſe Precautions we ſhall once become Maſters of our ſelves, it is certain that the greater Government we have over our Thoughts, and by this means the greater Liberty of Mind, the more eaſily ſhall we excite in our ſelves all Ideas that are proper to give Light to ſuch Subjects as we ſhall apply our ſelves to the Knowledge of. Theſe Ideas will riſe pure and unſtained with any Prejudices.

XIII. THE Force of Habits is ſo great, and their Influence extends ſo far, that if it were poſſible for us to remember every thing that has happened to us from our firſt Infancy, we ſhou'd thereby diſcover the Origin of an infinite Number of Miſtakes, falſe Judgments, and unreaſonable Inclinations, that attend us thro' the whole Courſe of our Lives. All our Prejudices flow from this Spring. There happens

The Habits of Youth continue our whole Lives.

" the common Fault, not only of the Vulgar, but even of all Man-
" kind, to have their Aim nnd Attachment perpetually ſubject to
" the Direction of thoſe, amongſt whom they are born. I can be
" content if when they ſee a *Fabritius* or *Lalius*, they judge their
" Air and Behaviour ſtrange and uncouth, becauſe neither their Ha-
" bits nor Manners are ſuitable to ours. But I am much offended
" at their ſingular Indiſcretion, in ſuffering themſelves to be ſo led
" away and blinded by the Authority of a preſent Faſhion, that they
" change their Opinions and Meaſures every Month, if Cuſtom ſhall
" ſhall ſo direct, and can judge ſo differently from themſelves.
" When they wear the Whalebone of their Doublet up to their
" Breaſt, they have convincing Arguments to prove that it is in its
" right Place: A few Years after, you ſee it lower'd to their very
" Hips, and the former Faſhion is exploded as ridiculous, unbecom-
" ing, and intolerable. The preſent Faſhion of Dreſs makes them
" immediately condemn the paſt with ſo much Warmth and Una-
" nimity, that it muſt be a kind of a Madneſs that can thus turn
" round the Underſtanding. *Mont. B.* I. *Ch.* XLIX.

happens to all Men, upon different Subjects, ſomething like what *Deſcartes* has proved in his Chapter of Squint-Eyes. He was aſtoniſhed himſelf to find ſomething agreeable in that which, according to his own Ideas, was a real Deformity; but he remembred his Nurſe was ſquint-eyed, and this Remark diſcover'd to him the Cauſe of this fantaſtical Inclination. The Reflections he makes upon this Subject, and the Principles which he takes occaſion from hence to eſtabliſh, will ſerve yet farther to explain a great many ſurprizing Effects. A compounded Effect ariſing from two Cauſes long acting together, being often repeated, will at laſt be turn'd into an Habit, and one Part will never be produced without the other accompanying it; ſo that what at firſt was the joint Effect of two Cauſes, will in the end be produced by either of thoſe Cauſes ſingly. If we look upon a Perſon the firſt time we ſee him, under ſome particular View and Habit, it will be enough to repreſent him, whenever we ſhall afterwards hear him ſpeak, in the very ſame manner as he appear'd to us at firſt. Even Places alone will diſpoſe us to Joy or Sorrow, according as we have been uſed to be merry or melancholy in them. The Averſion which Men, otherwiſe very reaſonable, have for the Sciences, and the Hatred they bear to Men of Letters, is the Conſequence of an Habit contracted in their Infancy, by the Ridiculouſneſs of the Tasks that were ſet them, and the odious Behaviour of thoſe that had the Care of their Studies. We ſhall find from the ſame Spring the Cauſe of the Diſreliſh, and even Averſion, which a great Number of People have for Piety and Religion. Children are made to learn long Leſſons, and long Prayers, which they underſtand nothing of: Upon which afterwards, without clearing them up any more, they muſt have long Diſcourſes made to them with a ſolemn, ſevere, and diſcouraging Air. A wiſe and rational Man, who loves Truth, Religion, and his Duty, who is capable of Attention, and loves to read good Books, and to meditate upon ſerious Subjects, ſometimes finds it difficult to forbear ſleeping, even whilſt he is hearing an excellent Sermon; and has occaſion for all his Reſolution to keep his Thoughts from wandering, even tho' the Subject pleaſes him, and is well treated of. The Reaſon of this is, that in his Infancy he was uſed to ſleep at Church, or have his Thoughts wandering there; and as he advances into Years, he meets with but too many Occaſions, almoſt pardonable ones, of being confirm'd in thoſe Habits. Upon this Account it is, that an infinite many Circumſtances will, in ſpite of him,

affect

affect him with Sleepineſs and Wandering, which, without the Force of Habit, would have been of no Effect.

RELIGIOUS Perſons, even thoſe that are truly ſuch, and are perfectly pious, ought to be extremely upon their Guard with reſpect to the Force of Cuſtom: They make an Habit of their Duty, and there is no Idea more dear and familiar to them. By this Means they are apt to look upon every Thing that is familiar to them, as an Appendix to their Duty. From hence every Thing that is new, by ſurprizing them, becomes ſuſpected. They even go ſo far as to be offended at it; and their Imagination, warm'd by Zeal, furniſhes them immediately with Reaſons to condemn it. A religious Man that ſmokes Tobacco, and chaws it, will eſteem thoſe that open their Snuff-Boxes in Churches, to be Perſons that pay but little reſpect to Religion. Another, who loves to be pleaſant and good Company at Table, will condemn Muſick as an effect of Debauchery and Licentiouſneſs. If he is uſed to ſee Womens hands naked, to uſe Gloves is Coquetry: To draw their Headclothes cloſe to their Face, or wear them more airy, is equally a Fault, if it be but a Novelty. To change Shoes for Slippers, or Slippers for Shoes, is want of Decency and Modeſty. What a great Noiſe does St. *Chryſoſtom* make againſt embroidered Shoes, when that Faſhion began? If it had been eſtabliſhed before his Time, he would never have ſpoke one Word of it, whereas now he appears as zealous againſt this Trifle, as if it had been ſetting up Idolatry.

BUT *what can be a more trivial Sin, you will ſay, if it be any Sin at all, than to wear a Shoe well made, ſuited, and adjuſted to the Foot? Will you then give me leave to ſtop the Mouths of theſe People, by ſhewing them the Meanneſs of this ſhameful Vanity? Then hear me without being uneaſy; or I muſt tell you, that if you be uneaſy I ſhall very little regard it. For you your ſelves are the Cauſe of my giving you this Trouble, it is you your ſelves that oblige me to deſcend to this Detail; in order to ſhew you the Extravagance of this Error, and to bring you out of the falſe Perſwaſion, that there is very little Sin in theſe ridiculous Vanities. Let us conſider then whither this Evil tends, and examine it with ſome Care. Is it not a Meanneſs we ought to bluſh for, to have Silk embroidered on your Shoes, which you ought not to wear upon your Garments? If you will not be convinced with what I ſay, hear with what Earneſtneſs St.* Paul *condemns this Exceſs, and ſubmit your ſelves to ſo inconteſtable an Authority.* LET HER NOT APPEAR ADORN'D, ſays he, WITH THE PLAITING OF THE

HAIR, WITH GOLD, WITH PEARLS, OR WITH PRECIOUS STONES. *What Excuſe therefore can you have, when St.* Paul *does not allow married Women to be curious in their Habits, to be ſo in your Shoes? Do you know what Hardſhips and Dangers Men are expoſed to, in fetching you from foreign Countries theſe ſuperfluous Ornaments? Ships muſt be built, and Men procured to handle the Oars, ſteer the Helm, and manage the Sails: All theſe People muſt abandon their Country, their Wives, and their Children, and even Life it ſelf, to traffick in* Barbarian *and ſtrange Countries; and all this in order to gratify your Curioſity, and to make you fine Shoes. Is there any thing more ſhameful than this Weakneſs? Our Fathers had an Averſion to this childiſh Finery: Their Dreſs was decent, without this unmanly Softneſs. For my own Part, I foreſee that in a little Time the young Men of this Age will wear, without bluſhing, the ſame Habits with our Women. What is yet more inſupportable in all this is, that the Fathers, who ſee this Extravagancy in their Sons, permit it without teſtifying their Diſpleaſure, as tho' it were a Thing wholly indifferent. But if you would know what moſt moves me in this Affair, it is that you ſhould run into theſe vain Expences, whilſt ſo many poor Creatures are dying with Hunger. You ſee* JESUS CHRIST *in the midſt of you both hungry and naked, and loaden with Irons: What Thunder-Bolts are you not worthy of, to neglect him in this Manner; and whilſt he wants Neceſſaries, to employ the Money, with which he ought to be reliev'd, in adorning your Shoes after a new and extravagant Faſhion?* JESUS CHRIST *formerly forbad his Diſciples to wear any Shoes; but ours are ſo far from denying us this Conveniency in Imitation of them, that we muſt not be contented to uſe them only ſo far as Neceſſity and Decency require. I am in doubt whether to laugh at, or lament the Irregularity of thoſe People, who at the ſame time diſcover the Effeminacy of their Heart, the Cruelty of their Temper, and the Weakneſs and Vanity of their Mind? Can a Man that is taken up with theſe Trifles, be capable of thinking of any thing uſeful or ſerious? Can he have any Regard for his Soul, or any Belief that he has a Soul? And muſt he not have an Heart of Iron, to beſtow upon this cruel Vanity, that which is appointed for the Relief of the Poor? How can your Thoughts be applied to Piety and Virtue, when they are taken up entirely with ſuch frivolous Subjects? How can he whoſe chief Glory is in being fine about the Feet, and in having Men admire as he walks the Brightneſs of the Silk, the Flowers and Colours of the Needle-Work, and all that Art can invent of this kind that is curious and agreeable, lift up his Eyes*

to Heaven? How can he attend to the Beauties of the Universe, who minds only those of his Shoes? The Lord has extended the Heavens above the Earth, and placed the Sun there so beautiful and luminous, on purpose that your Eyes might be engaged by so admirable an Object: And you on the contrary keep them fix'd on the Earth, in opposition to the Designs of the Almighty, and in Favour of those of the Devil, who is the Author of these Vanities. It is he that has invented these shameful Ornaments, to seduce you, and divert your Attention from the true Beauties. It is he that employs all his Power to make you descend from Heaven to Earth: And he has succeeded in it so perfectly, that whilst God shews you Heaven, and the Devil a Shoe, you postpone Heaven and prefer the Shoe. I condemn not the Matter of it, because it is the Workmanship of God; but the Luxury and Finery of it, because it is the Contrivance of the Devil. We see a young Man walking with his Eye fix'd on the Earth, altho' God commands him to lift them up to Heaven; and placing his Glory not in a good Life, but in a fine Shoe. We see him walking in the Streets on his Tiptoes, under the utmost Apprehension, least a little Dirt in the Winter, or a little Dust in the Summer should tarnish the Beauty of his fine Shoes? How! will you plunge your Souls in the Dirt, by a Passion so mean, and not vouchsafe to relieve or raise it out of this Baseness, and yet be afraid to sink your Shooes in the Dirt! Consider but the End and Use of them, and you will quit these vain Apprehensions. Are not Shoes designed to walk in, without Fear, in the midst of the Dirt, and thro' the worst of Ways? If you be so afraid of walking for fear of spoiling such precious Shoes, why do you not put them on your Head, or hang them about your Neck, that they may serve only to adorn you. You laugh, my Brethren, whilst I am saying this; and for my part I can scarce forbear crying; for this Folly pierces me to the Heart, and this Attachment to Fooleries grieves my very Soul.

EXPERIENCE obliges Men that have any Reason, to submit at last to Truth. We see in the present Age Women of good Understanding and undoubted Piety, that wear Shoes with these Ornaments, which the famous *Chrysostom* look'd upon as invented by the Devil

HIS Ridicule is just upon such as are dazzled at the Sight of so insignificant a Trifle, and think themselves upon the same Account worthy of the Admiration of others, if it be possible there could be any so extravagantly ridiculous. But these are rather Follies that move our Compassion, than Crimes that deserve our Horror.

ST. PETER does not diſapprove of Ornaments, ſince the holy Women, which he cites for an Example, wore ſuch themſelves. But he commands us to give a quite different Attention to the Ornaments that make the true Merit; it is by theſe Ornaments we muſt perform our Duty if we would expect to pleaſe.

WHAT Zeal put into the Mouth of this celebrated Preacher againſt the Silk with which they embroidered Shoes, concludes equally ſtrong againſt all ſort of Commerce by Sea, which is at leaſt ſo highly uſeful and neceſſary towards uniting all the Children of our common Father, and giving them an Opportunity of benefiting by the Labours of one another, and of ſeeing that the Wiſdom of our Creator has with his Bleſſings and Favours amply furniſh'd all the Climates of the Earth.

ALL that is ſaid on the Subject of the Poor, the common Place which Preachers uſually apply to vague and uncertain Ideas, is of the ſame Strain. It is a Piece of Charity wrong underſtood, that makes its Boaſt of feeding the Hungry. This Indulgence is a Cruelty that encourages them in Vice: They ought rather to be provided with Opportunities of working, and as all are not equally ſtrong, it is neceſſary there ſhould be Arts that may employ the moſt Feeble.

NOTHING is more Sophiſtical than his Reaſoning deduced from Man's Grandeur; who to preſerve his Dignity, ſhould always as he walks be looking up to the Stars; but in order to this, it is neceſſary the Earth ſhould be as level and even as a Floor. Beſides, it is cover'd every where with Wonders, which ſo much the more demand our Attention, as we are able to conſider them more nearly, and as we are much more intereſted in the Knowledge of them. The Light of the heavenly Bodies is not intended only for the Object of our Admiration; it is deſigned alſo to diſcover to us an infinite many Objects, beſides enabling us to walk with Security. If we make uſe of the plaineſt Shoes that can be made, our Reaſon will teach us not to trail them in the Dirt: Decency and Reſpect to other Men will oblige us to take care that we do not appear before them unhandſomely, which always gives Uneaſineſs to thoſe that have any Reliſh for Politeneſs and Decency.

ST. *CHRYSOSTOM* therefore was not a Friend to new Faſhions; beſides, he was out of Humour with the Court. Every thing diſpleaſes in thoſe we hate; and there are a great many who condemn in general whatever they do not do themſelves. When we are not in the Intereſts of the Great,

we

we endeavour to gain upon the Multitude, for our Hearts muſt have hold of Men in one Condition or another. The Applauſes of the Vulgar are obtain'd by ſoothing their Poverty. But we ought to conſider that by diſguſting the Minds of the Great on Account of Trifles, we prejudice them againſt hearing us, when we undertake to recommend to them Duties that are truly important, both for themſelves, and the Society which they govern.

THE moſt dangerous of all Habits are ſuch as we contract in our Infancy, and which Education fortifies. It is extremely difficult to correct them entirely: Thro' the whole courſe of our Lives, they ſeduce us every Moment, and when we leaſt think of it. Children give Life to every thing, and imagine in every thing that ſurrounds them, ſomething reſembling to what they feel in themſelves, ſome Idea, ſome Sentiment, ſome Deſire. They cry, if we abuſe their Babies: They imagine that an heavy Body preſſes upon their Hand on purpoſe to incommode them. I ſhall ſay nothing of the Prepoſſeſſion of the Schools, which has involved Philoſophy in ſuch Darkneſs for ſo many Ages. Since the happy Reſtoration of the Sciences, have not the moſt enlighten'd Philoſophers, and ſuch as have been beſt acquainted with the Mechaniſm of the Univerſe, frequently made uſe of the word *Nature*, as the Name of ſome ſecret Agent, which, with a limited Power and Knowledge, proceeds in the beſt manner it can to the End which it has in View? This Language does by no means expreſs their true Meaning; and yet by means of hearing it often repeated, they are at laſt inclined to think as they ſpeak, and their Minds are taken up with two oppoſite Opinions. If it be thought of attentively, *Nature* will be found to be only a Maſs of Corpuſcles ranged in certain Proportions: But if it be conſider'd careleſly, it may be imagined to have Knowledge. Under this Suppoſition we take our full Swing, and fall into a thouſand bright Expreſſions, but not at all juſt: For if by *Nature* we underſtand the *Work*, theſe Expreſſions will be found falſe, or will have no Meaning at all: If by this Word we would underſtand the *Author* of the Univerſe, then they are indecent, and as little conformable to the Duty we owe to him, as they are to Truth. But we liſten with Pleaſure to a Language in faſhion, which ſuits with the manner we have been taught to think in from our Infancy.

NOTHING is more common than to ſee Fathers complaining of their Sons Expences, and Sons exclaiming againſt their Fathers Avarice. It is probable the Reaſon of this may

be, that in their firſt Infancy, Children need only ask in order to obtain; for in that Age they require little elſe but what is abſolutely neceſſary, and what is of little Value. Being accuſtomed therefore for ſome Years to an Habit of never being refuſed any thing, they are at laſt brought to look upon the Affection of their Fathers as an inexhauſtible Source, and their Surprize is infinite, to find that in an Age in which they think themſelves moſt worthy of it, they ſhould then ceaſe to receive the ſame Meaſure of it.

WE love to ſee in Children a blind Submiſſion to their Governors: This Deference is abſolutely neceſſary in their moſt tender Age; for being incapable of diſtinguiſhing by themſelves what is uſeful for them from what is hurtful, they ought to undertake nothing, whatever it be, without firſt conſulting thoſe that have the Care of their Conduct. After they are out of their Infancy they are committed to School-Maſters, who always appear ſatisfied with their Scholars in proportion as they are found punctual in retaining and repeating exactly what has been taught them. They do not love ſuch as exceed theſe Bounds; nor can they endure any young People ſhould perplex them with Queſtions, and ſeem wiſer than their Teachers. Hence it is that we are forced to confine our ſelves to an Imitation of our Maſters: If their Inſtructions are truly learned, it is happy for us; if they are inſignificant, or even erroneous, we receive and adopt them in the very ſame manner: And by this means the Chairs are ſucceſſively fill'd with Maſters that teach with Authority; but having never examined any thing, they know not whether they teach Nonſenſe or Truth.

THE pompous Ceremonies of Baptiſm and Marriage in the Church of *Rome*, with all their Train of Formality, are very proper to make deep and lively Impreſſions upon the Imaginations of young People, and to diſpoſe them to look upon the one as a Sacrament, and upon the other as a Sacrament abſolutely neceſſary for all. They need only be told ſo after the fine Shew to believe it; they ſubmit immediately to Perſwaſions mix'd with ſuch lively Ideas, and ſuſpect no Deceit where the Imagination is ſo agreeably affected. A *Princeſs Palatine* of eight Years of Age, was made to be preſent at a Diſpute concerning the Neceſſity of Baptiſm, and as there was care taken to form Ideas proper to make an Impreſſion upon the Imagination of an Infant, ſo hers was ſo entirely taken up with them, that ſhe determined in the end to abandon the Proteſtant Communion.

WHAT

WHAT Outrages has not Envy committed? It barbarouſly arms Men one againſt another; and when they have done making War, the ſame Paſſion deprives them of all the Benefits of Peace, by Parties, Cabals, Intrigues, Backbitings, and underhand Dealings, by which they continually endeavour to undermine one another. What a Scandal to Sciences are the Diſputes and Quarrels of thoſe that make Profeſſion of them! Diſputes, which Envy carries to ſo great a length, that as ſoon as ever they begin, they underſtand one another no longer! From whence ariſes the tyrannick Power of this Paſſion, which in croſſing the Repoſe of others, does alſo at the ſame time deſtroy that of thoſe that purſue it? One of the Cauſes of it, without doubt is, that Children are preſently tired with their Play-Things, Levity being peculiar to that Age, and are ever deſirous of having what they ſee before them; and what they have already pleaſes no longer, when once they ſee their Play-Fellows have ſomething elſe which they have not. Thoſe that have the Care of their Education, think they do Wonders by taking the Advantage of this Weakneſs, finding that it is a Handle they are always to be taken by. There are no Motives that have more certain and ſudden Effects: They are reproach'd and made aſhamed, when they ſuffer themſelves to be outſtripp'd by their Comrades, and are encouraged to take an ill-natur'd Pleaſure in leaving them behind. But does all they learn by this means deſerve to be put in competition with the Poiſon they ſuck in with it? Can all the Inſtructions that are given them make amends for the horrid Diſpoſition of envying the good Fortune of others, and the deteſtable Inclination of finding Truth leſs amiable in the Mouth of others?

SINCE therefore Habits determine Men after ſuch a manner, we ſee how important it is to know their Strength, to diſcover their Principles, and to diſengage our ſelves from them. If we are but on our Guard, nothing is eaſier than to prevent them, as nothing is more difficult to correct them when confirmed. *Principiis illarum obſtemus, Melius non incipient quam deſinent.* Sen.

Of the Influence of the Air, and of Diet.

XIV. I DO not deny but that the Air contributes alſo to the Varieties of the Imagination. But as its Effects may be referr'd to thoſe of the Temperaments, I imagine we have already laid down Maxims ſufficient to prevent its bad Conſequences. Every one ought to abſtain from ſuch Diet, and Circumſtances of Life, as give to the Mind either

an Heavineſs, or Livelineſs, which it cannot govern. Each muſt conſult himſelf upon this Head; and if there be a general Rule to be given, it is to make uſe of the Words of Scripture, *To eat our Meat with Gladneſs and Singleneſs of Heart*. The divine Providence, by joining to the Pains we are at in ſeeking our Food the double Pleaſure of ſatisfying our Hunger, and of reliſhing the Savour of our Dyet, has in this, as well as in all other Inſtances, given full Demonſtration of his Wiſdom and Goodneſs. By this Means not only the Body, but the Mind alſo is furniſh'd with new Supplies of Strength and Vigour. Our Dyet affects us differently, according to the Humour we are in when we take it; if it be taken in a bad Humour it diſpoſes us to Gloominеſs. And as nothing opens the Mind more than Chearfulneſs, ſo nothing contracts it ſo much as Sadneſs. Thoſe that are ill-humour'd, have their Underſtanding alſo indiſpoſed; they are barren in their Conceptions, and opinionated in their Sentiments. The firſt of theſe Faults keep them in Ignorance, the laſt confirms them in Error. Theſe are Truths of Experience, which I need not bring Inſtances to prove, there being no Body that doubts of it, except it be ſuch as have never reflected upon what paſſes within themſelves; and it is not for ſuch as theſe that *Logic* is intended, for Rules to them can be of no uſe at all.

The Imagination loves lively Ideas.

XV. We have before diſtinguiſh'd our *Perceptions* into two *Claſſes*: Into Senſations, which are ſimple Perceptions of themſelves; and into *Ideas*, which repreſent to us ſomething different from themſelves. Sometimes the ſame Perception has a Mixture of both: Our Ideas are ſometimes more, and ſometimes leſs accompanied with Senſations; and thoſe which by this Mixture preſent themſelves the more lively, uſually engage our Approbation: We are pleas'd with them, we ſubmit to them, and acquieſce in them. This is the Source of an infinite Number of Illuſions: We do not regard Ideas that are ſimple, and whoſe Effects are more languid, but haſte on to thoſe that are more compounded, and which by their Mixture make Impreſſions that are more lively, tho' leſs clear; and by this wrong Method, we often determine upon that which we have but imperfectly diſtinguiſh'd.

Metaphorical Terms, and a figurative Language, by preſenting at one and the ſame Time both the Idea and Sign of the Thing ſignified, affect the Mind more powerfully, and by this means pleaſe and ſeduce it. By preſenting corporeal Images, they excite briſk Senſations, which the Mind gives

gives it ſelf up to without being the leaſt enlightened. The Air, the Tone of the Voice, and all the Helps of this kind, owe their Effect to their adding to the Livelineſs of the Ideas which he that ſpeaks excites in us. It is by this Means that a Genius which is an Original, preſently makes a Party, and gains Diſciples: His Turn is bright and diſtinguiſhing; whereas thoſe that have but little Fire, will never riſe high enough above the common Pitch to be remarkable. Beſides, he who appears in a Character peculiar to himſelf, pleaſes even by his Novelty; and we readily ſubmit to the Opinion of an Author whom we hear or read with Pleaſure.

HE who ſpeaks paſſionately of a Thing which extremely affects him; an unfortunate Man that deplores his Misfortunes; a Man full of Joy, that deſcribes the particular Subjects of it; an angry Man that exclaims againſt what has offended him; all theſe People raiſe very moving Sentiments in thoſe that hear them. It is to theſe Sentiments, the Effects of *Paſſion*, or of Contrivance, that Enthuſiaſts give the Title of *Divine Inſpiration*, an aſſured Character of Truth, according to them, altho' the Sentiments and Emotions which they honour with this great Name, do often accompany Chimeras, the Productions of a Mind tranſported, and hurried away with its Fire.

THOSE whoſe Imaginations are eaſily moved, do alſo with the ſame Facility move thoſe of others, and make very lively and deep Impreſſions. To theſe Impreſſions anſwer powerful Expreſſions, and ſprightly Turns. He that is very much moved himſelf, makes others have a Fellow-feeling of all that concern him. This was one of the Characters of *Montagne:* Whatever he gave his Attention to, always affected him in an extreme Manner. *B. I. Ch.* 20. FORTIS IMAGINATIO GENERAT CASUM, *ſay the Learned. I am one of thoſe that are extremely ſenſible of the Force of the Imagination. Every one is ſubject to it; but ſome are overwhelm'd with it. The Impreſſion of it ſtrikes through me; and my Art is in avoiding it, for want of being able to withſtand it. I could not live but in the Converſation of ſuch as are Healthful and Gay. The Sight of other People's Misfortunes afflict me perpetually; and my own Sentiments are always under the Influence of the Sentiments of others. To converſe with one that is always coughing, would affect my Lungs with the like Diſorder. I go with a great deal more Unwillingneſs to ſee my Friends when they are ſick, than to ſee other People that are indifferent to me. I am ſeiz'd, and fall down with the Diſtemper I ſtudy upon. Nor do I wonder that the Imagina-*

tion ſhould give Fevers, and even Death it ſelf, to thoſe that give way to it.

WE agree that a wiſe Man may be at firſt deceiv'd, and find in the Livelineſs of his Senſations a more exquiſite Pleaſure, than he does in ſimple Ideas and Speculations. But as ſoon as ever he diſcovers the Illuſions of this new Charm, and compares what it preſents to him with what it deprives him of, he returns back to his firſt Tranquility, with a Reſolution never to abandon it more. It is not ſo with Men of a little Genius, who are taken up entirely with Senſations: Cuſtom always dulls the Edge of them, and by that Means leſſens their Value. That which before charm'd them, does now cloy them; their Spirits languiſh for want of Impreſſions, till a new Object ſtrikes them briskly enough to engage them forthwith. This will have the ſame Fate with the reſt, and the ſecond Paſſion will ſoon languiſh and cool, to give way to a third. When we are under the Conduct of Knowledge, we are wiſe and conſiſtent; when we follow our Senſations, we are reſtleſs and inconſtant.

IT is therefore of the utmoſt Importance to accuſtom our ſelves to diſtinguiſh our Evidence, which informs us of ſomething from our Senſations which affect us inwardly, but teach us nothing: Without this Diſtinction, we become the Sport of a falſe and corrupt Imagination, of which I ſhould give ſome Examples. It is very dangerous amongſt thoſe that are truly Religious, as well as amongſt thoſe that would be thought ſo; but yet more dangerous amongſt thoſe that are Irreligious. A Debauchee that ſpeaks of his Pleaſures; a worldly Man that deſcribes the Glory and Majeſty of the Senſes; an Atheiſt that makes a Ridicule of Religion, and of the Myſteries and Duties which it contains; all theſe People expreſs themſelves with ſo much Earneſtneſs and Aſſurance, that they often ſeduce thoſe that are not upon their Guard, and perſwade them to become conformable, without furniſhing them with the leaſt Reaſon for being ſo. To follow theſe obſcure Impreſſions in the room of Evidence and Reaſon, is to purſue *Folly* in the room of *Wiſdom*. Add to this a ſufficient Quantity of Zeal, and you have a compleat Definition of a *Fanatick*. Every Thought which does not agree with the Ideas of the Underſtanding, ſavours of Enthuſiaſm in Proportion as it is lively.

Humour. XVI. THE Temperament, Education, Habits, Kinds of Life, in which we are engaged, do all unite to form what is call'd *Humour*. This Name is given to certain confuſed Sentiments, and to certain

tain Inclinations, which determine our Judgment and Actions, and which govern them preferrably to our Ideas and Knowledge. Whatever agrees with the Humour which prepoſſeſſes and governs us, is ſure to pleaſe and engage our Approbation: Whatſoever oppoſes it diſpleaſes us, and is upon this Account rejected as falſe.

WHEN an Author abandons himſelf to his Humour, and follows the Inclination of his Temperament, without giving himſelf the Trouble of correcting and regulating it, we may diſcover in this Humour and Temperament the true Source of all his Sentiments, and even of his Contradictions; for he who obſerves no other Rule than his Humour, can not be always conſiſtent with himſelf.

I SHALL make uſe of *Montagne* for an Example, becauſe his Characters are the moſt remarkable. He had too much Fire, and by that Means too much Penetration, not to be ſenſible that a weak Argument is but a weak Argument, and that Probability is but Probability. His being ſenſible of his Fire, and of the Force of it, gave him ſo high an Idea of himſelf, that he would not diſcredit himſelf with the leaſt Diſguiſe, nor lay down for certain what did not appear to him to be demonſtrated. On the other ſide, having been uſed to give himſelf up to his Fire, it would have been too difficult for him to fix it, and to reſolve to dwell upon a Subject long enough to acquire ſome certain Knowledge of it not to confine himſelf, not to trouble himſelf, or take much Pains to riſe from Probability to Certainty, was a Part the moſt conformable to his Humours. *I have nothing of my own, wherewith to ſatisfy my Judgment: I have my Sight ſufficiently clear and regular, but it is troubleſome to make uſe of it: ----- What I have ſketch'd out, I chuſe rather to touch over again, than to ſtrike out and begin again. ------ I can endure ſome Trouble; but then it muſt be of my own chuſing, and juſt ſo long as it is agreeable.*

Molliter auſterum Studio fallente laborem.

Hor. Lib. II. *Sat.* II. 12.

OTHERWISE, *if I be not invited by ſome Pleaſure; if I have no other Guide than my own pure and free Will, I am good for nothing, extremely idle, extremely free, both by Nature and by Art: I can as ſoon die as go through any Fatigue. I have a Soul that is free and abſolute Miſtreſs of it ſelf, and accuſtomed to follow its own Directions. --- My Infancy it ſelf was indulgent and free, and even then exempt from a rigorous Subjection.*

jection. All this has given me a Complexion that is delicate and incapable of Solicitude. I love to keep no exact Account of what I have, that I may be less sensible of what I lose. And for my own Part, I know of no Passion which I could take any Pains to conceal and maintain. I would not prize Wisdom at so dear a Rate. I do not so much regard what I do, as what Pains it costs me not to do worse. --- And I had rather expose my Passions, than conceal them at my own Expence. It is better their Edge should fall upon any Thing else, than upon my self. Thus is he continually speaking of himself, being a Subject he was full of; and it would have been too much Pain to him to have opposed so agreeable an Inclination. He makes a thousand Apologies for it, and the most insignificant Reasons appear to him a sufficient Justification for it; for his Heart is entirely taken up with any thing that flatters his favourite Passion. *If the World complains that I speak too much of my self, I also complain that it should think of any thing else but it self. I say indeed not all I would say, but all I dare say. And I take the greater Freedom upon account of my Years; for Custom has indulged old Age with the Priviledge of Babbling, and speaking impertinently of one's self.* He will not so much as repent of his Faults, for fear of disturbing himself: He leaves his Reformation to the Lord's Management, as to his Divine Wisdom shall be thought convenient; but for himself he still pursues the same Courses. *As to my self, I can wish in general that I were otherwise: I can condemn and be displeased with my universal Frame, and pray to God for my Reformation, and for Pardon of my natural Infirmities: But this, in my Opinion, ought no more to be call'd Repenting, than my being displeased that I am not* Cato, *or an* Angel. *My Actions are regular and conformable to what I am, and to my present Condition. I am not able to do better; and Repentance does not properly belong to those Things that are not in our Power, tho' I grant Sorrow may. I conceive Beings infinitely more exalted and regular than my own: But this does not mend my Faults, any more than the conceiving an Arm or a Mind, more vigorous than my own, will make mine stronger or better.*

Book 2. Ch. 17. Chap. 38.

I DO *not comfort my self so much for having my Notions sprightly and learned, as I do for having them easy, and accommodated for the Purpose of Life. They are to me sufficiently true and sound, if they be but useful and agreeable.* Mont. B. III. Ch. 9.

IT *is my Misfortune, (for, God forgive me, to this very Hour it has not been my Fault,) that whereas other People take Time and*

and Opportunity to think before they ſpeak, I am forced to avoid any ſuch Preparation, for fear of bringing my ſelf under ſome Obligation, upon which I muſt afterwards depend.

HE carries this Humour ſo far, that thoſe Virtues of great Souls, Gratitude and Generoſity, are a Burden to him. *My moſt favourite Qualities are, Idleneſs and Freedom: On account of theſe I have a mortal Hatred againſt being obliged to any other, or by any other than my ſelf. I endeavour to the utmoſt of my Power to do without them, before ever I make uſe of the Kindneſſes of others, let my Wants be what they will, either great or ſmall. My Friends importune me ſtrangely, when they beg of me to ask ſomething more of them.*

FEW People undertake the Trouble of correcting their Humour by Reaſon. They follow it exactly ſuch as it is: And if we could but know perfectly each Perſons Humour, and his prevailing Intereſts, we might almoſt conſtantly find the Cauſes of their ſeveral Sentiments. And it is becauſe his Intereſts change, and his Humour varies, that we ſee a Man maintaining with Earneſtneſs, what he had a little before condemned with the ſame Warmth. He approves and condemns according to his Taſte, not according to Knowledge. An infinite Number of Men are like the Perſon in one of *Plautus*'s Plays, who thought the beſt Reaſon for the doing any thing was, becauſe he himſelf liked to do ſo. *To correct a Friend who has deſerv'd it, is doing as one ought, becauſe I my ſelf ſhall this very Day correct a Friend of mine for deſerving it.* (s) The celebrated *Montagne* reaſons pretty much upon the ſame Foot, when ſpeaking of Sadneſs, he ſays, *I am the moſt exempt from this Paſſion of any Man, and neither love nor value it, tho' the World has undertaken, as tho' upon ſome valuable Account, to honour it with particular Favours: It is made the Dreſs of Wiſdom, Virtue and Conſcience. Fooliſh and Vile Ornaments!* What he ſays is very true; but he begins with a Reaſon that is enough to make his Truth ſuſpected: *He is the moſt exempt from this Paſſion*, that is to ſay, prepoſſeſſed with Chearfulneſs. We have already obſerv'd, that he entirely follow'd his Humour, which was exceeding lively, and hence proceed his Flights: He loved alſo exceſſively his Eaſe and his Freedom, and hence comes his want of Method; for it required too much Pains

(s) Amicum caſtigare ob meritam noxiam,
Immune eſt Facinus: verum in ætate utile,
Et conducibile: nam ego Amicum hodiè meum
Concaſtigabo pro commeritâ noxiâ.

Pains to digeſt his Thoughts in order: Whatever he liked, he found Means to commend; whatever he diſliked, he contrived Reaſons to condemn.

HUMOUR oftentimes gets the better of Intereſt. In vain all Intereſts imaginable conſpire to keep two Brothers united: Their Humours being oppoſite, determine them to Contradictions and Quarrels, and at laſt to become each other's mutual Ruin. Two neighbouring Nations might live in the moſt profound Tranquility, grow formidable to all their Enemies, and reap daily new Advantages from their Union: But they cannot love one another, their Humours being too different. The Thoughts of humbling the one are ſo pleaſing to the other, that there is no room left for reflecting that the Miſchiefs it is pleaſed with may fall at laſt upon its own Head. I have heard ſay, that if we would tranſact an Affair after the moſt ſucceſsful Method, we muſt not reckon upon the Strength and Evidence of our Reaſons; the ſureſt Handle is to take Men by their particular Intereſts, and convince them that Way. This is the Art and Secret of perſwading. Perhaps alſo it will be no leſs advantageous to conſult their ſeveral Humours, and learn to conform to them. To ſtudy Mens Humours, is the way to diſcover which ſide they incline to.

THE *Barbarian* Nations thought themſelves happy under the Government of the *Romans*, after they had got a Reliſh of their Politeneſs. But after the Infamy of the Emperors, and the Brutality of the Legions, that ſpared not their Maſters, and whoſe Caprice could either inthrone or dethrone, had brought the *Barbarians* into the Court and Capital, the Provinces that had never given into this Degeneracy, having ſuffered ſo much by it, regarded the Government which their Fathers had ſo much eſteemed as an intolerable Yoke, and their Hatred inſpired them with Courage to throw it off.

SOME People have thought I ought to have mentioned *Original Sin*, amongſt the principal Cauſes of the Irregularity of our Faculties. I take it as an Honour to find that I lye under this Charge in common with one of the moſt celebrated Divines, who has likewiſe omitted it in his excellent Treatiſe *of the Cauſes of the Corruption that reigns among Chriſtians*. We are both contented with enquiring into thoſe Cauſes which are in our Power to remedy, and the greateſt Part which we may poſſibly prevent. And it is for the ſame Reaſon, I have avoided ſpeaking of the ill Conſtruction of the

Mr. Oſtervald.

the Brain, tho' it is often the Cauſe of Madneſs and Enthuſiaſm. Laſtly, if I have not benefited by the Advice that has been given me, any more than by the Examples of ſome other learned Men, that have thought proper to mention in their *Logic* what I have omitted in mine, I muſt ſay in my Juſtification, that as I never expect to ſee my ſelf a Profeſſor of Divinity, I have not fallen under the Temptation of treating of a Subject out of its Place, in hopes of making my Court to Men of that Faculty.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the WILL.

The Power of the Will over our Ideas.

I. THE Will is abſolutely neceſſary to the exciting and perfecting our Ideas; for according as we will apply our ſelves to the Examination of any Subject, we ſhall procure a more or leſs exact and enlarged Knowledge.

The Will determines it ſelf.

II. IN order to underſtand what I mean by the Word *Will*, we need only deſcend into our ſelves, and obſerve with Attention our own proper Acts. By this Attention to what paſſes within us, we perceive and are convinced that the Will, or, if you pleaſe, our Soul it ſelf, that which thinks in us, that Thought which is our ſelves, determines it ſelf to will this or that ſo arbitrarily, and is ſo much the ſole and immediate Cauſe of its own Reſolution, Choice, and Determination, that we cannot poſſibly alledge any other Reaſon for our Will, than our Will it ſelf: Why have we *will'd* ſo and ſo in one Caſe? Why we have *will'd* differently in another Caſe? The Reaſon is, we all know, becauſe we have *will'd* ſo.

Proofs of Liberty.

III. WHEN I am pleaſed to make uſe of my Liberty by putting down my right Arm, or lifting up my left; by opening one Hand, or ſhutting the other, juſt as I like beſt; what is it that determines me to one or other of theſe Choices? My ſelf only. I will ſhut my left Hand; and why rather than

than my right? Becauſe I will. The Will would not be the Will, if it were not Miſtreſs of it ſelf. So again, when a certain Number of Guineas are put into a Purſe, and I am deſired to gueſs whether the Number is even or odd, on Condition they ſhould be mine, if I gueſs right; I ſee plainly 'tis my Intereſt to ſpeak, but I don't know what. I have no Light or Information to encline me to one more than to another of the Words to which my Choice is confined; and when I ſay Even, for inſtance, rather than odd, it is the pure Effect of my Choice: I will ſo, is all the Reaſon I can give. I have Reaſons indeed to determine me to ſpeak, rather than to hold my Tongue; but I have none to determine me to ſay Even rather than Odd.

THERE are ſome Men, tho' few in Number, that deny Man's Liberty. You ſeem, ſay they, to act freely, but you are not really free. A ſecret, ſuperior, and neceſſary Cauſe, forms all your Determinations. They may as well ſay, that I ſeem to think, but that perhaps, in truth, I no not think at all. For if our being ſenſible of any thing does not amount to an abſolute Certainty, I can neither be ſure that I think, nor that I exiſt: For we can have no ſtronger Demonſtrations, than our inward Perceptions. And we have not a ſtronger inward Evidence and Perception of our Thinking or Exiſting, than we have of our being free and abſolute Maſters of our own Choice and Will.

Anſwer to Objections,

IV. BUT, ſay they, does not your Will ſeem to move your Arm? It ſeems ſo, and yet we are not ſure that it is ſo; the greateſt Part of Philoſophers deny it; and there is not one of them but is puzzled to explain ſo common an Effect. I anſwer, that if it does ſeem to me that my Will does move my Arm, and I accordingly believe it, tho' really it does not do ſo, and conſequently I am miſtaken; my Fault is in judging raſhly of that which I do not underſtand. Indeed I am perfectly ſenſible that I will that my Arm ſhould be moved, and I am certain that I will it; I am ſenſible alſo that I form this Will, and am for the ſame Reaſon certain that I am the Author and Cauſe of this Act: I perceive alſo in the third Place that this Will is ſucceeded by a Motion of my Arm. This is alſo very certain, and not to be conteſted; but I do not perceive at all, nor am any way ſenſible, how or in what manner I my ſelf produce this Motion, or am the Cauſe of it: So far from this, that I do not know how it is done. All therefore that I am ſenſible of is certain; and that is only doubtful which I am not ſenſible of.

THERE

THERE are ſome who oppoſe Liberty with Arguments drawn from the divine Præſcience, and the Decrees and Appointments of Providence. But it is a dreadful Miſtake and Contradiction to make uſe of the moſt myſterious, or, if you pleaſe, of the moſt ſublime Parts of Religion, to ſubvert the very Foundations of Religion. For without Liberty there can be neither Law, nor Virtue, nor Vice, nor Rewards, nor Puniſhments, and eſpecially no Puniſhments, exexcept ſuch as are unjuſt. That which is moſt out of the Reach of our Underſtandings, ought not in the leaſt to make us call in queſtion that which is moſt evident to us. The Obſcurity of ſuch Conſequences as we do not at all comprehend, ought not to ſhake the Certainty of ſuch Principles as are moſt ſimple and evident.

I CONFESS, after ta Determination of the Will is once form'd, its Exiſtence is neceſſary in one Senſe, that is to ſay, it is no longer in our Power to cauſe it not to have been, or not to be, at the Moment wherein it exiſts; for this would be a Contradiction, it being impoſſible for a Thing to be, and not to be at the ſame Time. But before it was form'd, it depended upon our Choice to produce it, or not produce it. Liberty is concerned in ſuch Acts as are to be done, not in ſuch as are already done, and by that means determined.

BEFORE we determine our ſelves we are free, when we are acting, we are free to continue or diſcontinue our acting; and when we have acted, we are at Liberty to act differently a ſecond Time.

IF a Man who denies Liberty, ſhould do me ſome conſiderable Services, promote my Intereſts amongſt the Great, lend me Money, defend my Life, and, in ſhort, publiſh my Praiſes upon all Occaſions; if I ſhould refuſe to return what he lent me, if I ſhould do him ill Offices amongſt his Superiors, and ſhould threaten and actually do him a Miſchief, what would he not ſay to the Blackneſs of my Ingratitude? If after all this, the Judges ſhould pronounce againſt him in my Favour, what Complaints would he not make of their Iniquity? He would have Reaſon, and yet would contradict himſelf; for if no body is free, no body is blamable: It is by Clock-work he has obliged me; and it is by Clock-work I have diſobliged him. The Day and Night ſucceed one another ſo by Turns. We are ſure to contradict our ſelves when we declare againſt ſome certain inward Principles; and theſe Principles will always demonſtrate themſelves when we do not endeavour to ſuppreſs them. When *Seneca*'s Mind is taken up entirely with his Hypotheſis

of

of Fate and Deſtiny, he declares expreſly, *Fruſtra vote & ſtudia fiunt.* "Vain are all our Wiſhes and Endeavours." But as ſoon as ever he lets drop this Subject, he is preſently laying down Precepts and Rules for our Behaviour. See *Conſol. ad Marciam.* A Man that makes a generous Uſe of his Wealth, and chuſes with a great deal of Diſcretion whom to beſtow part of it on, his Expences are elegant, he is beloved, and his Generoſity and Diſcretion commended: But he would without doubt receive much leſs Pleaſure in hearing theſe Praiſes, and in finding himſelf ſuch as he is, if he did not perceive that his Actions were in his own Power, and the Effect of his own Choice. He perceives this Truth directly, who to this direct Pleaſure avoids joining the Pleaſure of perceiving it again by his Reflections; for after he is once convinced of his Liberty, he would find himſelf obliged to a great many other Things that are not agreeable to him, and by which he is reſolv'd not to be confined.

The Will determines it ſelf.

V. BUT laſtly, ſay ſome, nothing can be produced without a Cauſe; therefore it is neceſſary there ſhould be ſome Cauſe to determine the Will. It is eaſy to anſwer this Objection. The Will determines it ſelf: It chuſes, becauſe it wills; it is it ſelf the Cauſe of its Determination. If every Being muſt neceſſarily be determined by ſome Cauſe different from it ſelf, then there could never be a firſt Cauſe, and conſequently there could be no Cauſe at all.

It is not a Faculty really diſtinct from the Underſtanding.

VI. WHEN we ſpeak of the Will, we ſhould not conceive it to be a Faculty diſtinct from the Underſtanding, as our Hearing is diſtinct from our Seeing, and the Hands from the Feet. It is not thus. There is not ſo much Compoſition in the Mind. One and the *ſame Soul*, one and the *ſame Principle*, is ſometimes conſider'd ſimply as *perceiving*, and at other times as *willing*. All the while it is in a State of perceiving, it *wills* to *perceive*; and all the while it is in a State of willing, it does at the ſame time *perceive* it *wills*. The Will perceives its ſelf, and is an Act conſcious of it ſelf, as well as our Ideas. The Will and the Underſtanding are not ſo much diſtinct Faculties, as different Methods of Thinking: And it the ſame with the other Faculties. One and the ſame Soul ſees Colours, hears Sounds, recollects paſt Ideas, and conceives Things without the Help of Images. Theſe are the three different Methods of perceiving; which are each of them ſubdivided into a great Number of others. And theſe three general Heads, under which we rank our different

different Methods of Thinking, we call the Faculties of the *Senſes*, of the *Imagination*, and of the *Underſtanding*.

VII. IT is therefore a certain Truth, that our Mind has the Power of determining it ſelf by its own proper Choice. But this does not at all hinder, but that it ſhould often regulate this Choice by the Ideas that enlighten it. *It regulates its Choice by its Ideas.*

We love our ſelves eſſentially and neceſſarily, though voluntarily. It is not in our Power not to love our ſelves: We will love our ſelves, and it is not in our Power to will otherwiſe. When therefore we once know clearly what is for our Advantage, our Love of our ſelves never fails to determine us this Way. We will whatever we look upon as a Good, the Moment we believe it to be ſo; and by loving our ſelves, we are ſure to love whatever is good for us.

VIII. IF Men had no Liberty, but were determined always to will by the Impreſſions of preſent Objects, or by the Footſteps and Remains of thoſe Impreſſions, and to act conformably to theſe Impreſſions or Reliques, they would be perpetually acting amiſs. A preſent Advantage is often times attended with a great many Evils; and a preſent Evil, may on the contrary, be follow'd with divers Advantages. It was therefore very neceſſary we ſhould have the Power to reſiſt preſent Impreſſions, to ſuſpend their Effects, and to refuſe complying with the Determinations which they do of themſelves occaſion, till we have Time enough to learn thoroughly their Nature, to diſtinguiſh all their Principles, and to prevent all their Conſequences. *The Uſe of Liberty.*

IN vain do we endeavour to keep Men to their Duty, or to expreſs our ſelves in Terms conformable to the Hypotheſis which denies Liberty; in vain do we endeavour to reſtrain them from ſuch Acts as are injurious to Society, that is, ſuch as would do too much Prejudice to other Men, by threatning them, by preaching to them, and by ſetting Puniſhments before their Eyes, if they have not the Liberty to reflect upon theſe Threatnings, and to give Attention to the Idea of Puniſhments to come, rather than to preſent Intereſts, from which theſe Threatnings and theſe Puniſhments ought to divert them. The Preſent and the Certain will always be more engaging than the Future and the Poſſible.

IF we have no Liberty, the Reproach we ſuffer for having failed of our Duty, our Confuſion for having preferr'd Vice to Virtue, are nothing but Weakneſſes, which have no other

Foundation than the miſtaken Suppoſition of our being free. The returning of Thanks, and the beſtowing of Commendations, can pleaſe none but Madmen, who believe themſelves to be what they are not; and if all Men were learned, yet if none of them believe themſelves to be free, they would never blame or commend any Perſon whatſoever. But if any one ſhould think fit to prefer himſelf to one of theſe learned Men, who believe themſelves without Liberty, and to judge himſelf to have much greater Abilities; if the Publick ſhould appear inclined in favour of him who thus prefers himſelf; what Complaints and Clamours would they not make againſt the Inſolence of the one, the Injuſtice of the other, and the Ignorance of them both? We would be commended; we think we deſerve it; and conſequently we perceive our ſelves to be free: We perceive it, I ſay, from time to time; we experience the Effects of it, altho' we refuſe to reflect upon it, and to agree with it.

IT *is a pleaſant Imagination*, ſays *Montagne*, B. II. Ch. 14. *To conceive the Mind at the ſame Moment equally influenced by two equal Deſires. For it is certain it can never comply with either of them; becauſe the Application and Choice ſuppoſes a Difference in the Value. And if any one ſhould place us betwixt a Bottle of Wine and a* Weſtphalia *Ham, with an equal Deſire of Eating or Drinking, there could not poſſibly be any Remedy, but that we muſt neceſſarily die of Hunger or Thirſt. To provide againſt this Inconvenience, the Stoicks, when they are asked, whence our Mind ſhould be able to chuſe out of two Things that are perfectly indifferent; and what ſhould be the Cauſe that out of a great Number of Crown-Pieces we ſhould chuſe one rather than another, there being no Reaſon to incline us to this Preference; anſwer, That this Movement of the Mind is extraordinary and irregular, and ariſes in it from an Impulſion that is ſtrange, accidental, and fortuitous. It would be better, in my Opinion, to ſay, That no two Things can be preſented to us ſo perfectly equal, but that there muſt be ſome Difference, tho' it be never ſo ſmall; and that either to the Sight, or to the Touch, there is always ſome Choice which draws and engages us, tho' never ſo imperceptibly.*

Montagne had Reaſon to ſay it was a pleaſant Imagination: And beſides the Pleaſure he always took in laying down Paradoxes every Moment, and of eſtabliſhing by this or that Principles tending to Scepticiſm and Infidelity, he would have perceived and deſpiſed the Extravagance of this Imagination; but he wanted to come to the Concluſion with which he

finiſhes this Chapter, * *Solum certum nihil eſſe certi; & homine nihil miſerius aut ſuperibus.* * *Plin.*

" All we can be certain of, is, that every Thing is uncer-
" tain; and that there is nothing more deſpicable than Man,
" nor at the ſame Time more conceited: His Vanity
" is equal to his Imperfection. " It is in order to come to this fine Concluſion, that he makes an Hotch-potch of the *ſquaring the Circle*; *of the Philoſophers-Stone*; *of two Lines that continually apppoach, and yet can never meet*; *of a Centre as large as the Circumference*; *of a Man, in ſhort, dying with Hunger and Thirſt betwixt a Bottle of Wine and a* Weſtphalia *Ham, becauſe he had an equal Appetite to either of them.*

THE Suppoſition of Liberty diſcovers the Ridiculouſneſs of this Imagination; but rather than confeſs that we can chuſe and determine our ſelves, he rather likes to lay it down as Fact, That there is always ſome Difference that determines us, tho' it be but imperceptible! That is to ſay, he rather likes to ſuppoſe that which cannot be proved or perceiv'd, than to agree with the Notion of Liberty, of which we need only conſult and reflect upon our ſelves with Sincerity and Attention, to be fully convinced.

IT is true, that as we are encompaſſed with a great Number of different Goods, and as we can procure our ſelves Pleaſures of all Kinds, our Will determines it ſelf ſometimes on one Side, and ſometimes on the other; we ſometimes are inclined to this, and ſometimes to that. When our Attention is ſolely and entirely fixed upon an Object that is capable of ſerving our Wants, or our Pleaſures, and we neither do or deſire to think upon any other, it is not poſſible, in this Caſe, but that the ſole Good that affects us ſhould alſo be the only one that determines us: We will thus infallibly. But as we have the Power to divert our Attention from an Object, in order to fix it upon another, we always find our ſelves, in this Senſe, to have the Liberty of chuſing. Of all the Objects that encompaſs us, there is none that can ſo far get the Maſtery of our Will, as entirely to enſlave it; we can always paſs from one to another, and whatever Reaſons occaſion us to act after a certain manner, or to make a certain Choice, determine us no farther than as we will conſent to follow the Impreſſion of theſe Reaſons. A Man, for Example, that is taken up entirely with the Ideas of an Affront which he thinks he has received, join'd with the Ideas of the Injuſtice, Ingratitude, and Pride of a falſe Friend; and who being ſunk in theſe Reflections, can ſee no other Remedy for the Uneaſineſs which they occa-

ſion in him, than that of Revenge, chuſes to revenge himſelf. He reckons that this is his Good, and the only Good that can reduce him to his Tranquility of Heart, and change his Condition of Uneaſineſs into a Condition of Satisfaction. So long as no other Ideas than theſe paſs in his Mind, and that he will conſult no other, he will perſevere in the Will of revenging himſelf, and can have no other. But if he would but ſay to himſelf, (which is a very eaſy and natural Reflection,) Men are every Day blinded by their Paſſions, and do by this Means make themſelves a Chain of Misfortunes, and to get clear of the firſt, they plunge into a ſecond: Shall I not alſo add one to the Number of thoſe that prejudice themſelves? My Intereſt is concern'd, ſhall I neglect to examine it, and ſhall I my ſelf add new Injuries to thoſe I have received from others? If the unjuſt Action, of which I complain, has not robb'd me of all my Goods, why ſhould I not enjoy the Pleaſure of the reſt? If I have Learning; if I have Virtue; why ſhould I not enjoy the Pleaſure of being ſenſible that I am above all Inſults, and that I am Maſter of Treaſures that are out of the Reach of Mankind? That if I find my ſelf weak enough to make my Happineſs depend upon their Caprices, why ſhould I, in revenging my ſelf, draw my ſelf into new Difficulties, and find my ſelf under a perpetual Neceſſity of diſengaging my ſelf from them? By purſuing theſe Reflections, we change our Will, and theſe new Ideas are follow'd by a new Determination. Our Liberty having been given us on purpoſe to ſuſpend our Determinations and our Actions, till we can have ſufficient Evidence of what is true and good. To *ſuffer our ſelves to be determined* by this *Evidence*, as it is the *End*, ſo is it of *conſequence* the *Perfection* of Liberty.

It is made little uſe of.

IX. I confeſs that it is not common to Men that are moved with any Ideas, or poſſeſs'd with any Sentiments, to ſuſpend determining themſelves, till they have examin'd them, and till they have form'd ſome ſecond Thoughts to compare with the former. Few give themſelves this Trouble; and thoſe who neglect it, deny to the others that Liberty which they do not experience in themſelves, but which they might experienee, if they would but vouchſafe to make uſe of it. The little Uſe that is made by moſt Men of this Liberty, is the Reaſon, that when we have reflected with Attention upon the Train of Ideas in the Mind,

Mind, and the Succeſſion of Deſires and Paſſions, we can explain and account for the Actions of Men pretty juſtly, and even foretell them very ſucceſsfully in a great many Caſes; becauſe, in effect, their Liberty, which is the only Power that could interrupt the Chain of this Subordination of Ideas and Wills, and contradict this Piece of Mechaniſm, does not at all meddle with it.

BUT it is going too great a Length, to conclude that we have not this Faculty, becauſe we commonly neglect to make uſe of it. It can never be juſt to draw this Conſequence, till we have taken all poſſible Pains to diſcover whether we have it, or not, and to exert ſome Acts of it. The Hypotheſis of a Piece of Mechaniſm has ſomething taking in it; it flatters the Corruption of the Heart, and it is by this Means it pleaſes, and finds Patrons: But even whilſt we ſuffer all this Mechaniſm to follow its own Movements, we yet continue all the while free, becauſe we freely neglect making uſe of our Liberty.

IT is with this Faculty as with all others; it is ſtronger or weaker, in proportion as we uſe it more or leſs. It is for this Reaſon that we ſee an infinite Number of People, who being accuſtomed in Attention and Inconſiſtency, can never afterwards correct theſe Faults, but continue Machines even to old Age; for one of the ſame Habit both ſtrengthens their Mechaniſm and weakens their Liberty: It does a double Miſchief with one and the ſame Blow; one in making the Diſtemper, the other in taking away the Remedy.

WISDOM conſiſts in never exerciſing the Will, without having firſt deliberated with all poſſible Attention; in never determining our ſelves, but upon very clear Ideas; and in never forming a Reſolution, but upon Concluſions well demonſtrated upon the Foot of Evidence only, without Paſſion having the leaſt Share in them. This is the great End of Philoſophy, which the nearer we approach, the more we deſerve the Name of a Philoſopher.

IF all the Objects, out of which we are to chuſe, were perfectly known to us, or were all of the ſame Nature, we ſhould never have any Trouble in determining our ſelves; but their Worth and Uſefulneſs to us being of a different kind, it is ſeldom eaſy to make exact Compariſons of them. The Objects that are preſented to our Senſes, and the Ideas that engage our Imagination, precipitate our Deliberations, and enſnare our Choice.

The Influence of Sentiments and Inclinations over our Will.

X. A MAN who hates Trouble, and who from his Infancy has been uſed to ſhun examining himſelf, and to ſuffer himſelf to be led by his firſt Views and Inclinations, inſtead of conſulting juſt Ideas, gives himſelf up uſually to confuſed Sentiments, to the Bent of his Inclinations, and to the Tranſport of his Paſſions. We will Things, or not will them, we court or avoid them, we like or diſlike them, according as they ſuit our Inclinations, with which we are prepoſſeſs'd.

SINCE then the Will has ſo great a Part in the Origin and Perfection of our Ideas, and our Paſſions and Inclinations have ſo much Power over our Will, or rather are themſelves only certain Conditions of the Will, we ſee plainly of what Importance it is to govern them rightly, that we may have the Benefit of that Part of them which may be uſeful, and avoid that Part of them which may be hurtful. This is the proper End of Logic and Morality. *Morality* lays down Rules to form *good Lives*, *Logic* to form *juſt Thoughts*; in which they appear to have a very ſtrict Connection. Wiſdom leads to Truth, and Truth to Wiſdom. Theſe Parts of Philoſophy hold one of another, and are mutually aſſiſtant.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Inclinations and Paſſions.

The Neceſſity of ſpeaking of them in Logic.

I. THERE is not perhaps any Subject more properly belonging to Logic than this, nor more neceſſary to explained. When once Reaſon loſes the Government of the Paſſions, it is ſure to be overturn'd by them, and we think no longer, but conformably to their Intereſts. Objects appear no longer, but under the Colours that theſe give them, and we ſee them always ſuch as our Paſſions preſent them to us. Theſe are the Powers that carry us away; and the Paths by which they lead us always appear to us to be the beſt. In vain is the Mind furniſh'd with all other

Rules

Rules: It can make no uſe of them; but as ſoon as ever it is poſſeſs'd by Paſſion, it loſes Sight of them. The Illuſions of the Paſſions have been a long Time diſcovered. *Seneca* has remark'd, *Tamdiu officiorum malî Judices, quamdiu illa depravat ſpes & metus, & vitiorum inertiſſimum voluptas.* De Ben. Lib. IV.

"We always judge ill of our Duties, (he "might have ſaid in general of every Thing,) ſo long as "Hope, and Fear, and Voluptuouſneſs, are ſeducing us". We ſee Men of a good natural Underſtanding, and further alſo endued with Learning, act ſuch unreaſonable Parts when ſurpris'd by Paſſion, and maintain themſelves upon ſuch frivolous Grounds, that we can hardly know them again. And we ſee others, who, with fewer Advantages, ſee clearly in all Caſes what they ought to Think or Act, becauſe a prevailing Inclination for Truth, for Equity, and for their Duty, prevents every Thing that may divert their Attention, and hinder their making Choice of what is True, Juſt, and Uſeful.

I CONFESS Probity is often accompanied with Preſumption and Obſtinacy in narrow Souls, and that Men of Character determine ſometimes raſhly, and condemn with too much Precipitation and Heat what diſpleaſes them, tho' it be often too indifferent to merit their Diſpleaſure. But when a Man is good in all Reſpects, when with his other Virtues, he has a Greatneſs of Soul, and an enlarged Underſtanding, he contains within himſelf a ſufficient Force againſt Error. Prepoſſeſſions appear to him a contemptible Meanneſs; he does not think Attention any Trouble; he does not ſuffer himſelf to be moved with the Pleaſure of being applauded by an ignorant Multitude; and the Reliſh which he has eſtabliſh'd in himſelf for ſolid Virtue, hinders him from reckoning amongſt the Duties of Man ſuch Actions as are indifferent. It is ſurpriſing, that it ſhould be ſo lately thought proper to mention in Logic a Subject that belongs to it ſo eſſentially. Innovations always expoſe their Authors to ſome Hazards, and perhaps I ſhould not have had the Courage to have publiſh'd what I have here write, if the Example of the famous Father *Malebranche* had not given me an Authority.

What is meant by Inclination.

II. ONE Example will be ſufficient to Shew the Difference I make betwixt *Inclination* and *Paſſion*. A wiſe Man regards Riches as the proper Means to procure to himſelf and others ſeveral ſolid Advantages of Mind, as well as of Body. In this

this View he values them, and neglects no lawful Opportunities of acquiring them: He will be very watchful to lay hold of such Occasions, and will be pleas'd to meet with them: He will take care to keep what he has acquired, will never spend them, except it be to purchase something truly valuable, but will never waste them. To be thus disposed, is to have an *Inclination* for Riches. When we have an Inclination for an Object, we esteem it, we court it with Pleasure, and with *some Eagerness*; but we think of it *without Trouble*, we seek it without Uneasiness, we endeavour for it without Alarms, and we lose it without Mortification.

What Passion adds to it.

BUT it is not so when *Passion* is join'd to it: Our *Ideas* are then more *lively*, our *Sentiments* more *piercing*, our *Emotions* more *frequent* and *powerful*, our *Desires* more *impetuous*, and we are a great deal less Masters of our Joys and Sorrows, more elevated with Success, and dejected with Disgrace, and, in short, entire Strangers to Tranquillity. Passions therefore are the *most vehement Inclinations*; so that the Rules which serve to regulate them, serve the more strongly to moderate the simple Inclinations; and for this Reason we shall not treat of them distinctly.

Their Usefulness.

IV. WHEN we determine our selves by the Ideas that enlighten and convince us, if some agreeable Sentiment does not invite us to pursue what our Ideas recommend to us, we find it difficult to proceed in such Determination. We very readily form Resolutions from the Ideas which teach us our Duty; but it is necessary to have the joint Assistance of our Inclinations to persevere in such Resolutions. It is therefore of the utmost Importance to learn the true Government of the Passions and Inclinations, to benefit by their Assistance. I have already remark'd, that they differ only in Degree: The Passions are the most dangerous and most to be fear'd, because being the most violent, Reason has not always Power enough to govern them as it would. There is reason to believe that an Inclination becomes too powerful, and degenerates into Passion, when it does not allow us the Liberty to think of what we would, when the Idea of its Object follows and distracts us, even when it is of Importance, and when we desire, to bestow our Attention upon something entirely different. A Passion that makes a Progress, will presently become suspected by those that are accustomed to reflect and consider with themselves; but those that live without much Thought, and descend but rarely

into

into themſelves, will never take Notice of it till it be too late, and next to impoſſible to find any Remedy.

Admiration the Foundation of all the others.

V. ALL the Paſſions have their firſt Riſe from *Admiration:* They derive their Force from a certain *Surpriſe*, with which we regard the Object that excites and entertains them. When we ceaſe to be agitated with this Motion, the Paſſions ſink, and come to an End. This is the Reaſon that it is rare to ſee them continue long for one and the ſame Object. Cuſtom ſullies their Brightneſs, and diminiſhes their Power. It is ſomething extraordinary, if a very ſtrong and lively Paſſion, when it loſes the Vehemence that made it a Paſſion, ſhould ſettle into a calm and conſtant Inclination.

In what Manner we ſhall treat of the Paſſions.

VI. I SHALL not undertake in a Treatiſe of *Logic*, to examine ſtrictly into the Nature of the Paſſions, their Cauſes, and the Manner of their Original, any more than into the Manner of their producing their Effects. I ſhall not enlarge upon every Thing that may be ſaid upon this Head curious and uſeful; but ſhall content my ſelf with eſtabliſhing upon ſome Principles of Experience, Rules that may ſerve to produce ſome Fruits from the Paſſions, and to prevent the Interruptions they give us in the Search of Truth.

Admiration produces good and bad Effects.

VII. IT has been eſteemed amongſt Philoſophers, a very great Conqueſt of Mind to get above Admiration, (*a*) that is to ſay, to be able to hinder our admiring whatever it be that ſurrounds us; becauſe they regard this Paſſion as the Original of all the others, and think Wiſdom incompatible with the Paſſions. We are prepoſſeſs'd for what we admire: An Object that ſurpriſes tranſports us, and as it affects

(*a*) Nil admirari propè res eſt una Numici,
Solaque quæ poſſit facere & ſervare beatum.
Hunc Solem, & Stellas, & decedentia certis
Tempora momentis, ſunt qui formidine nullâ
Imbuti ſpectent. Quid cenſes munera Terræ?
Quid maris, extremos Arabas ditantis, & Indos?
Ludicra quid, plauſus, & amici dona Quiritis,
Quo ſpectanda modo, quo ſenſu, credis & ore?
Qui timet his adverſa, ferè miratur eodem
Quo cupiens pacto: pavor eſt utrique moleſtus,
Improviſa ſimul ſpecies exterret utrumque, &c.

Hor. I. Ep. VI. 1.

affects us agreeably or disagreeably, it engages or disgusts the Heart; we presently conceive for it either too much Esteem, or too much Aversion.

THE proper Government of our Admiration, has certainly a great Influence over our Felicity. A Good newly acquired, of what Nature soever it be, whether House, Land, Wife, Preferment, presently renders the Possessor easy and satisfied, at least for a Time. If he could persevere in this State of Satisfaction, he would continue to live contented. This is our greatest Happiness, and one of the principal Characters of a Wise Man. When the Object remains the same, and the Eyes that behold it unchanged, how comes it to appear different from what it appear'd at first, and that Indifference succeeds Inclination? The Reason is, because we admire it no longer: As the Object has ceas'd to be new, it has ceas'd to surprise; and because we are no longer affected but very weakly, we behold it without Emotion; and a State of Indolence being a State we are soon tired of, we seek others to move the Heart afresh. But we should not fall into this Indolence, if we could have kept up our Admiration; and we should have continued our Admiration, if we could have continued to think attentively. The Novelty of an Object engages our Attention without our meddling, and excites it without any Effort at all on our Part. We are always most affected with what we least expect, and most sensibly mov'd with it. A merry Expression out of the Mouth of a grave Man, gives a quite different Pleasure to what it does out of the Mouth of a merry Man: But as soon as this Object is become familiar to us, it no longer engages our Attention, but we must give our Attention to that. Our Attention must excite it self, and be join'd with Thought and Reflection, which few People are capable of, this being not to be done without a great deal of Trouble, and an acquired Habit.

How it is to be used.

VIII. OFTENTIMES our Admiration does it self oppose its own Continuance. We can never resolve to lose Sight of an Object which we find worthy of our Admiration; all the Time we refuse for this purpose, we seem to refuse to our own Felicity. (*b*) But an Impression, even by its being

(*b*) Difficile dictu est, quænam causa sit, cur ea, quæ maximè sensus nostros impellunt, voluptate & specie primâ acerrimè commovent, ab iis celerrimè fastidio quodam & satietate abalienemur. Quantò co-

lorum

being a long time continued, ceaſes to be perceiv'd; ſo that our very Deſire of enjoying, without Interruption, the Pleaſure of admiring makes it vaniſh. We perceive it no longer, becauſe we could not reſolve to interrupt theſe agreeable Sentiments. From Livelineſs we fall into Wearineſs: We are ſurpris'd at the Change, and impute it to the Object; we believe our ſelves to have been deceived in the Judgment we have made of its Worth, we condemn the Eagerneſs we have ſhewn for it, and we ſeek for others that may better deſerve it: That Part of it which was moſt fine and delicate, and which was reliſh'd with moſt Surpriſe and Pleaſure, is the very Part which we firſt ceaſe to admire, becauſe the moſt delicate Impreſſions are ſuch as are of the ſhorteſt Duration. We ought therefore to take upon us, and aſſume the Courage to deny our ſelves from time to time the Pleaſure we take in admiring an Object that appears worthy of it; and if we would admire it long, we muſt not admire it continually. Thus we ſee an Orator who would ſhine, without

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lorum pulchritudine & varietate, floridiora ſunt in picturis novis pleraque quàm in veteribus! Quæ tamen, etiamſi primo aſpectu nos ceperunt, diutiùs non delectant, quàm cum iidem nos in antiquis tabulis, illo ipſo horrido, obſoletoque teneamur. Quanto molliores ſunt & delicatiores in cantu flexiones, & falſæ voculæ, quàm certæ & ſeveræ! quibus tamen, non modò auſteri, ſed, ſi ſæpiùs fiunt, multitudo ipſa reclamat. Licet hoc videre in reliquis ſenſibus, unguentis minùs diù nos delectari ſummâ & acerrimâ ſuavitate conditis, quàm his moderatis, & magis laudari, quæ ceram quàm quæ crocum olere videantur, in ipſo tactu eſſe modum & mollitudinis & lævitatis. Quin etiam guſtatus, qui eſt ſenſus ex omnibus maximè voluptarius, quique dulcedine præter cæteros ſenſus commovetur, quàm citò id, quod valdè dulce eſt, aſpernatur ac reſpuit? quis potione uti, aut cibo dulci diutiùs poteſt? Quum utroque in genere ea, quæ leviter ſenſum voluptate moveant, facillimè fugiant ſatietatem: ſic omnibus in rebus voluptatibus maximis faſtidium finitimum eſt. Quò hoc minùs in Oratione miremur, in quâ vel ex Poëtis, vel ex Oratoribus poſſumus judicare, concinnam, diſtinctam, ornatam, feſtivam, ſine intermiſſione, ſine varietate, quamvis claris ſit coloribus picta, vel Poëſis vel Oratio non poſſe in delectatione eſſe diuturna: atque eò citiùs in Oratoris aut in Poëtæ cincinnis ac fuco offenditur; quòd ſenſus in nimiâ voluptate natura, non mente ſatiantur, in ſcriptis & in dictis non aurium ſolùm, ſed animi judicio etiam magis infucata vitia noſcuntur. Quare, benè & præclarè, quamvis nobis ſæpè dicatur bellè & feſtivè: nimium ſæpè nolo, quanquàm illa ipſa Exclamatio, NON POTEST MELIUS, ſit velim crebra, ſed habeat tamen illa in dicendo admiratio ac ſumma laus, umbram aliquam & receſſum, quo magis id quod erit illuminatum, extare atque eminere videatur. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* III.

without interruption, from the Beginning of his Speech to the End of it, fall ſhort of his Aim, by having it too much at Heart. That which is extraordinarily beautiful, ought to be mix'd with Beauties that are more ſimple and common, if you would have them perfectly admired. He who endeavours to keep the Mind always elevated, will only fatigue it, but not charm it. It is neceſſary to let it take Breath, and Repoſe it ſelf after the Fatigues of Attention, by employing it upon Subjects that deſerve it leſs. Shades ſet off Colours, and two fine Strokes, that are equally beautiful, ſeem to obſcure one another. We are leſs ſenſible of the Beauty of each of them, when we cannot perceive any thing to ſet them off. Thus Criticks of the firſt Rank find the Virtues of *Æneas* leſs bright than thoſe of *Achilles*, becauſe they are not mix'd with Defects.

WE ſee by this, that to ſupport our Admiration we muſt preſent to the Mind Subjects worthy of its Attention and which will not ceaſe to appear ſuch, even after they are perfectly known. The Advantage of Words, and the Elegancy of Turns, ought not to promiſe any thing more to the Imagination than what the Things themſelves will preſent to it. When a Diſcourſe is not founded upon good Senſe, it will engage the Admiration only of narrow Minds; and even this Admiration ſo engaged will very often be changed into Contempt.

GOOD Senſe, and a compleat Underſtanding, are even Qualities ſo very rare, that till they grow more common, they will be ſure to engage the Admiration even by their Rarity.

WE have already obſerv'd, that we always admire moſt what we leaſt expect. For which Reaſon an Orator ought to take care that his Performance be better than his beginning Promiſes. Many a Diſcourſe would have been heard quite out with Admiration, if the firſt Lines had not engaged it too much. *Oratio creſcat*, ſay the Maſters of the Art. The Beauties of a Diſcourſe will not be truly reliſh'd, if they do not riſe and improve one above another. The Reputation of the Orator will ſink, if it does but maintain it ſelf in an equal Degree of Brightneſs: If he would be eſteem'd always the ſame, he muſt be always ſurpaſſing and exceeding himſelf; without this he will find himſelf fallen.

WE are always agreeably ſurpriſed with the Abilities of a Man, who without making uſe of any other than ordinary Expreſſions, yet by chuſing them judiciouſly, and placing them ſucceſsfully, raiſes the Mind to ſuch ſublime

Ideas,

Ideas, and excites in the Heart Sentiments ſo little common, that one would not think they could be poſſibly expreſſed or excited without contriving a Language on purpoſe.

ON the contrary, he who has nothing extraordinary beſides Words, and who under very much labour'd Turns and Expreſſions couches only ſuch Thoughts as are falſe, or ſuch Ideas as are very common, inſtead of engaging our Admiration, will meet with our Contempt, and make himſelf ridiculous.

THE Deſire of making our ſelves admired is very natural and common: It often throws us into Miſtakes, and becomes a Source of Illuſions. For which Reaſon the Remarks that tend to regulate it, appear to me to belong very properly to a Science, which makes the Subject of this Treatiſe.

Its Uſes.

IX. SINCE then our Admiration renders us attentive, and our Attention produces more lively and more numerous Ideas, we cannot deny but it muſt be of great Uſe to the Diſcovery of Truth. A Man who admires not the Beauties and Wonders of the Univerſe, and whoſe Admiration encreaſes not, nor riſes higher in proportion as he advances, and comes to enter into Particulars, for want of meeting with the Pleaſure of Surpriſe, to make amends for the Pains of his Study and Application, will preſently quit ſuch high Attempts, and content himſelf with low and ſuperficial Knowledge. He who does not know how to admire the Abilities of excellent Poets and Orators, will never be capable of imitating, or even coming near them. Our greateſt Artiſts in Mechanicks, Painting, and Sculpture, *&c.* owe their Succeſs to their Application to their Work, in which they frequently find Occaſion, by meeting with ſomething very beautiful, to employ their Admiration. And we ſee thoſe remain in Ignorance and Inaction, who are indolent, and without Curioſity, and who neither admire nor are lively affected with any Thing. So that to know how to admire, and to perſevere in admiring, is a very neceſſary Help towards making any conſiderable Progreſs. We give no Attention to what we do not admire, but let it preſently ſlip out of our Memory (*c*).

X. WE

(*c*) Si quas res in vitâ videmus parvas, uſitatas, quotidianas, eas meminiſſe non ſolemus: propterea quòd nullâ niſi novâ, aut admirabili re commovetur animus: at ſi quid videmus, aut audimus egregiè turpe, aut honeſtum, inuſitatum, magnum, incredibile, ridiculum, id diu meminiſſe

How to keep it up.

X. We may find ſeveral Helps towards exciting and keeping up our Admiration. What appears to me to be one of the moſt natural, the moſt effectual, and at the ſame time the moſt innocent, is an Habit of Application. The more lively our Ideas are, the more are they accompanied with this agreeable Emotion, in which Admiration conſiſts: But the more attentive we render our ſelves, the more lively are our Ideas; and conſequently we ought, from the firſt, to contract an Habit of conſidering every Thing with Application. By this means we ſhall perceive a thouſand Beauties which would have eſcaped a leſs ſteady Mind, and we ſhall find our ſelves ſenſibly affected with what would hardly have been taken Notice of, if conſider'd with leſs Exactneſs. We ought therefore to indulge our ſelves in the Pleaſure of conceiving Things with this Senſibility, in order to have the Satisfaction of having underſtood them exactly, and entirely exhauſted them. This is the Way to form an excellent Taſte; and in order to gratify it, we muſt continue to examine every Thing with Application. This Application will be follow'd with Pleaſures, which we ſhall never think too dearly purchaſed at any Rate.

Bad Effects of Admiration.

XI. But that our Admiration may produce no other than good Effects, and may be ſerviceable without being alſo hurtful, it ought, as we are about to demonſtrate, to be it ſelf the Effect of our Attention: It ought to follow, rather than to go before it. Our Admiration blinds us, when it is not conducted

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meminiſſe conſuevimus. Itemque, quas res ante ora videmus, aut audimus, obliviſcimur plerumque: quæ acciderunt in pueritiâ meminimus optimè ſæpè: nec hoc aliâ de cauſâ poteſt accidere, niſi quòd uſitatæ res facilè & memoriâ elabuntur, inſignes & novæ manent in animo diutius. Solis exortus, curſus, occaſus nemo admiratur, propterea quòd quotidiè fiunt: at Eclipſes ſolis mirantur, quia rarò accidunt: & ſolis Eclipſes magis mirantur quam Lunæ, quòd hæ crebriores ſunt. Docet ergò ſe natura, vulgari, & uſitatâ re non exſcuſcitari; novitate verò & inſigni quodam negotio commoveri. *Cic. ad Herat.* III.

To engage the Attention, you muſt find out the Secret of exciting Surpriſe and Curioſity. The reader of Virgil *finds himſelf thus ſurpriſed, when* Æneas *ſays to* Anchiſes;

O pater anne aliquas ad cœlum hinc ire putandum? *Æn.* VI. 719.

And this Surpriſe makes him more attentive to every Thing wonderful that Anchiſes *is about to ſay.*

conducted by Knowledge. There are ſome People with whom Novelty alone has the Power of exciting Admiration; but as it laſts no longer than whilſt the Object that excites it continues new, it ceaſes always before they can have time enough to conſider and comprehend ſuch Object compleatly.

Levity and Vain Curioſity.

XII. MEN of this Humour who are ſenſible of the Pleaſure of admiring, but know not how to keep it up by a continued Attention, run perpetually after Novelty, and paſs without ſtopping from Object to Object; and being curious of knowing every Thing, they never know any Thing. Their Eagerneſs is content with being always inquiring, and never inform'd. (*d*) They admire, for the ſake of admiring, and the moſt trifling Thing, as much as the moſt ſerious; and their Admiration being only founded upon Ignorance, ceaſes as ſoon as ever they begin to know any Thing. They no longer admire the moſt valuable Things, when once they come to be acquainted with them. They appear curious to know every Thing, and learn hardly any Thing, becauſe they do not dwell long enough upon what they learn, to receive any Benefit from, or to make any Progreſs in it.

Prepoſſeſſion for the Wonderful.

XIII. WHEN once we are accuſtomed to the Pleaſure of Admiring, every Thing which is ordinary becomes dull. We have no Taſte for any Thing but what is extraordinary: This alone pleaſes, alone engages our Application and Inclination. Men that are thus prepoſſeſs'd, when they form Projects, give into Chimera's, and build Caſtles in the Air. In their Converſation they exaggerate every Thing, for fear, they think, leaſt they ſhould diſguſt others in diſguſting themſelves. In their Syſtems and Opinions, in the room of Certainty and Evidence, which ſhould be their eſſential Character, they ſeek for nothing but what is bright, great and ſurpriſing; and their Paſſion for what is Extraordinary, makes them often abandon common Senſe. We become incapable of forming any rational Projects, or even of reliſhing thoſe that are propos'd by others, when once we are confirm'd in a Cuſtom of being pleas'd with ſuch as are imaginary. Thus the reading of Romances, makes us deſpiſe the Truth of Hiſtory: This is too ſimple, we are moſt delighted with what is compounded and ſurpriſing. If Diſguiſes

(*d*) Imperitorum oculi omnia ſubitò, quia Cauſas non nôrunt mirantur. *Sen.*

guiſes deceive, they deceive agreeably; and the Life of ſome People is altogether like a Dream. There are ſome that think almoſt they do a particular Favour, and ſhew a great Piece of Complaiſance, in vouchſafing to lend an Ear, and give Credit to ſimple and very natural Accounts of Things, whilſt they give all their Attention to the moſt improbable Things in the World, and do not ſo much as queſtion the Truth of them; ſo that in order to gain their Ear and Credit, you need only tell them ſuch Stories as are incredible. We ſometimes take this Turn of Mind in our Infancy, by the Miſmanagement of thoſe that educate us. We contrive ſomething wonderful to amuſe Children, and engage their Attention, and ſo form them to the reciting Stories, of what Nature ſoever they be. To encourage their Application, and to engrave in their Memory what we would have them repeat, we furniſh their Narrations with great Ideas, and ſurpriſing Circumſtances, and oftentimes ſo much the more ſurpriſing as they are impoſſible; but by this means their Minds are depraved, and by being accuſtomed to the extraordinary, the Truth appears dull to them for want of the marvellous to attend it: Their Caſe is ſomething like that of hard Drinkers, who by uſing themſelves to more ſpirituous Liquors, find Wine inſipid and flat; their Taſte is vitiated, and has neither Delicacy nor Diſcernment.

THE Weakneſs which human Nature has for the marvellous, and for every Thing, which, by its extraordinary Quality, ſtrikes and ſurpriſes the Imagination, has not a little contributed, in Times of old, to change the majeſtick Simplicity of Natural Religion, and to diſguiſe it with a Mixture of a thouſand Stories and Superſtitions. It conſiſted in the Study of the Great Book of Nature, in cultivating REASON, in perfecting the Mind, in acknowledging the Creator of the Univerſe, in reſpecting his Providence, in admiring his Works, in diſtinguiſhing Virtue which he loves, from Vice which he condemns, and in paſſing this Life in his Preſence in Moderation and Juſtice; and laſtly, in an Expectation of a better Life to come. But it was alſo agreeable to think, that Souls ſeparated from their Bodies ſhould yet take an Intereſt in the Concerns of this Life, we have lent an Ear to thoſe that have undertaken to aſſign their Imployments, and at laſt have invoked them. Hence the Univerſe has been peopled with *Genies*, and ſubordinate Divinities; all kinds of them have been invented, both good, and bad, and indifferent; and a Worſhip has been invented ſuitable to the Object. The Groſs of the People have been contented

contented with external Pomp; thoſe that have undertaken to think above the Vulgar, have rendred every Thing myſterious, and when the Chriſtian Religion was to be propagated thro' entire Kingdoms, ſome have thought fit to have regard to theſe rooted Prejudices, and to tranſlate into Chriſtianity, what Paganiſm has added leaſt offenſive to Natural Religion. And by this Means it has happen'd, that Religion, which was intended to draw Men from a Dependance on their Senſes, has ſubjected them to Externals, to Trifles and Amuſements, which divert them from the true Devotion, and far from bringing them to it, make them loſe Sight of it. For this true Devotion conſiſts in forming juſt Ideas of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, who exacts nothing of Men but what is very reaſonable, a ſolid and rational Virtue, which in preparing them for the Happineſs of the World to come, makes at the ſame Time their greateſt Happineſs in this.

MONTAGNE confeſſes, *That of different Leſſons that are often interwoven with Hiſtories, he holds moſt to that which is moſt rare and memorable:* This is the Rule of his Critick. Notwithſtanding he valued himſelf upon his Liberty, and was exceſſively fond of Independence; yet the Pleaſure he found in Thinking after an extraordinary Manner made him a Slave to that Habit, ſince he diſcover'd an extraordinary Reliſh for it. *I ſhould as ſoon chuſe to have my Life taken away, as to be debarr'd from living in the Way I have been ſo long uſed to. I am not now in a Condition to undergo any great Change, or to begin a new ſort of Life, tho' it were for the better. I have not Time to become any Thing elſe than what I am. ---- I ſhou'd even complain of any new Perfection I ſhou'd acquire: And it is almoſt better never, than ſo late to become an honeſt Man: To begin to think to live well, when Life is at an End. I that am going, am ready to reſign to any one that comes, all the Knowledge I have acquir'd from the Commerce of the World: After Meat comes Muſtard. ---- I would give this by way of Example: That the Alteration of ten Days in the Pope's Calendar, has given me ſuch a Shock, that I have not yet recover'd it: I have liv'd a great number of Years after another way of reckoning: This long and antient Uſage claims and challenges me: I am forced to be a little Heretical in this Matter, being incapable of Novelty, even tho' it be by way of Amendment. My Imagination, in ſpite of my Teeth, caſts me always either ten Days forward, or ten Days backward.* B. III. Ch. 10.

HE makes, in other Places, very judicious Remarks upon this Weakneſs of Mankind for any Thing extraordinary. In Minds not juſtly form'd, nor truly enlighten'd, Vanity very eaſily mixes with Devotion, and makes them think of Men, when they ſhould have nothing in View but God Almighty, and content themſelves with their Piety or Zeal, in proportion as they look upon themſelves as extraordinary Perſons, without conſidering that they may be extraordinary in Folly and Vice, even more eaſily than in Wiſdom and Virtue. What I am going to quote out of the ſame Author will hold in a great many more Caſes than that I ſhall apply it to. *In the Empire of* Turky *there are a great many Men, who, in order to excel others, will not be ſeen when they eat, who will make but one Meal in a Week, who will cut and ſlaſh their Face and Members, who will not ſpeak to any Body. Fanatical People, who think to honour human Nature by diſhonouring it, who value themſelves for what makes them contemptible, and mend themſelves by growing worſe! How monſtrous is the Animal, that makes Himſelf dreadful to himſelf, and makes Pleaſures of his Pains: There are ſome that conceal their whole Lives,*

B. III. Ch. 5.

Exilioque domos & dulcia limina mutant.

Virg. Georg. II. 511.

and avoid the Sight of other Men; who ſhun Health and Chearfulneſs as prejudicial and hurtful Qualities. Not only ſeveral Sects, but ſeveral Nations curſe their Birth, and bleſs their Death. In ſome Places the Sun is abominated, and Darkneſs adored. Our Ingenuity lies in miſleading our ſelves: This is the Game our Intellects play: Dangerous Inſtruments of Irregularity.

O miſeri quorum Gaudia crimen habent! *Gall.*

Alas, poor Man! thou haſt enough of neceſſary Inconveniencies, without inventing any more; and art miſerable enough by thy Condition, without being more ſo by Art: Thou haſt a Sufficiency of real and eſſential Deformities, without forming any imaginary ones. Doſt thou find thy ſelf too much at Eaſe, if one half of that Eaſe be not turn'd into Torment? Doſt thou think thou haſt diſcharged all the neceſſary Duties that Nature has obliged thee too? and that thou haſt nothing more to do, unleſs thou obligeſt thy ſelf to new Duties? Thou art not afraid of tranſgreſſing the Univerſal and Eternal Laws, and yet ſtandeſt

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up for thy own partial and fantaſtick Laws; and art ſo much the fonder of them, as they are more ſingular, uncertain, and contradictory.

THE Inclination for the Marvellous has fill'd our Natural Hiſtory with Fables, and made it impoſſible for us to rely upon Facts, which ought to be the Baſis of Philoſophy, and to conſtitute the moſt certain Part of it.

ABOUT four Leagues from *Grenoble* is a Piece of Earth ſix Foot long, and three or four broad; from whence iſſues a light wandring Flame, like that of burning Spirits. This Earth, which is nothing but a dead Rock, and like a putrified Slate, has been taken for a burning Fountain; and St. *Auguſtin* has already ſpoken of it as a ſupernatural and miraculous Appearance. *Hiſt. of Acad. Sc. 1699. p. 26. Ed. Amſt.*

THE Grotto of our Lady of the *Balm*, has been ſaid to lead to a Lake, which after running two Leagues, loſes it ſelf in a Gulph. All this is no more than a little Rivulet that runs into the *Rhine*, the Depth of whoſe Baſon, from whence it ſprings, is ſcarce a Foot, and the ſubterraneous Paſſage, where this pretended Lake is to be found, is not above twenty Fathom long. *Hiſt. of Acad. Sc. 1700, p. 4.* *Hiſt. 1703. p. 26.*

THE inacceſſible Mountain in *Dauphine*, which has been affirm'd to have its Point downward, and Baſis upward, is ſet right again, as the ingenious Writer of that Hiſtory did foretell. * *The Academy*, adds he, (in ſpeaking of another miraculous Fiction,) *thinks it ſelf as well employ'd in diſabuſing the Publick with reſpect to falſe Wonders, as in preſenting it with real ones.* *Hiſt. 1700, p. 6.* * *Hiſt. 1703. p. 27.*

MEN have learn'd to reckon upon their Fingers, and by this means have got as far as Ten, and have at laſt form'd an Arithmetick, whoſe Numbers are no other than ſuch Tens repeated to Infinity. The *Pythagoreans* have ſought for Wonders in the Number Six. Perhaps the ſame Thing might happen to the *Chineſe*, who had a very ſimple Arithmetick of two Numbers, invented by the Emperor *Fohi*, but forgotten in the End; a Foundation of childiſh and chimerical Alluſions. *See Hiſtory Acad. Sc. 1703.*

XIV. MOST Men prepoſſeſs themſelves exceſſively for every Thing they admire; whether their Admiration ariſes ſimply from No- *Prepoſſeſſion.*

velty and Surpriſe, or whether it is the Effect of a continued Attention and cloſe Application. To prevent giving into theſe Prepoſſeſſions, we ſhould never compare what we do admire, with what we do not admire. For to judge of the Value of Things, we muſt be ſuppos'd to have equally examined, and to have form'd an Idea of that which we poſtpone, at leaſt as clear and exact as of that which we prefer. We attribute Grandeur and Dignity to thoſe Objects that affect us ſtrongly with very lively Ideas. But there are a great many Things we neglect, with which we ſhould be as briskly affected, as we are with thoſe we admire, if we did but conſider them with the ſame Care and Attention.

IT is this that *infatuates* and blinds ſo many People, and makes thoſe that give themſelves up entirely to the Purſuit of any Science, prefer it commonly to all the reſt; any of which they would have preferr'd before this, if they had but happened to have made it their Study. And, in general, it is this that makes every one applaud himſelf in his own Taſte, his own Manners, and his own Maxims. It is true that Self-love plays a great deal of this Game: For it is agreeable to perſwade our ſelves, that what we apply our ſelves to, deſerves in effect to be eſteemed above what we do not apply our ſelves to: We ſee ſome Scenes of this Nature, upon very ſerious Occaſions, that are full as ridiculous as the Conteſt in *Moliere* betwixt the Muſick Maſter and the Dancing Maſter; every one prefers his own Art before the others. A Mathematician will pretend that there cannot be a good General without underſtanding Military Architecture, and conſequently Geometry, *&c.* that is to ſay, without having been a long time his Scholar. A Rhetorician will maintain, with the graveſt Countenance in the World, that nothing can contribute more towards the forming a General than the Art of Oratory, which enables him to harangue his Soldiers elegantly, and to enliven their Courage with the Spirit of his Diſcourſe.

IT is good to have ſome Admiration for the Subject we apply our ſelves to; but there is a great deal of Difference betwixt reliſhing more ſenſibly and more perfectly the Beauty of ſome particular Art or Science than that of the reſt, and actually preferring it to all the reſt which we have not ſtudied with the ſame Application. It happens ſometimes that the Learned themſelves, do, in their Harangues, fall into the ſame ridiculous Folly, which the Preachers of an inferior Rank are commonly reproach'd with, That when they make a Panegyrick upon their Saints, they degrade all the

the reſt, to make way and ſecure the higheſt Place for that particular Saint whoſe Feaſt they celebrate, and to whom they owe the Enjoyments of the Day.

IT is very ſeldom that we think but of one Thing. Our Ideas ariſe one from another: A Firſt produces a Second, and a Second produces a Third. The Name of a Man recollects to me the Idea of his Perſon, and this here is preſently follow'd with a great many others: I repreſent him to my ſelf in all the Habits I have ſeen him in: I think of all his Titles, and imagine I ſee his Equipages: I remember all his Diſcourſes, his Actions, and his Deſigns. But after the ſame manner that our Ideas ſucceed one another, our Admiration alſo extends it ſelf from Idea to Idea. Whatever we perceive for any Object, we alſo preſently perceive for whatever has the leaſt Relation to it. This is one of the Sources of Superſtition; we perceive the ſame Movements for the Image as for the Original; and we conceive for Churches, and for the Stones of them, almoſt the ſame Veneration as we do for the Truths that are preach'd there, and the Divine Worſhip that is perform'd there. Age brings Wiſdom, by extinguiſhing the turbulent Paſſions of Youth; but it brings alſo very often Peeviſhneſs, ill Humours and Complaints: And theſe Weakneſſes oblige old Men to betake themſelves to a retired Life. We confound all this, and admire as much the Retirement and Auſterity of old Age, as we do its pureſt Wiſdom, and its moſt eſſential Duties. By the ſame Principle we imitate the Defects of great Orators, and in general of all celebrated Perſons: Any one of their Qualities raviſh us; and upon this Occaſion we are ſtruck with Admiration for their Perſons; and every thing that belongs to them appears equally extraordinary. A Man is conſider'd for his Wiſdom and his Probity; but at the ſame time his Corpulency, join'd to his advanc'd Age, obliges him to walk ſlowly, and to ſpeak gravely. We regard with Veneration, even thoſe weak Circumſtances of the outward Behaviour, and endeavour to imitate them; and by our too much Eagerneſs of being thought wiſe, we ceaſe in effect to be ſo, becauſe we fall into Affectation, by quitting our own proper Character, and doing Violence to our own natural Genius. It is yet a great deal worſe, when by giving Way to the Impreſſions of the Senſes, we admire firſt the Pomp, Wealth, Birth, Dignities, and afterwards, (by the extreme Blindneſs into which all this leads us, and to which we give up our ſelves) all the other Qualities, good or bad, of thoſe who poſſeſs theſe external Advantages. A

great Lord has ſaid ſo, therefore he has Reaſon: A great Lord lives thus, therefore it cannot be ill to live ſo. We certainly act very wrong in eſteeming as Proofs of a juſt Underſtanding and ſolid Merit, ſuch Circumſtances and Snares as very often hinder the acquiring of it.

THE Remedy to theſe Inconveniences, is, to examine ſeparately every Part of a Subject that is compounded, and to judge of them by the Ideas which they repreſent to us, conſider'd in themſelves, and not by our Sentiments and Emotions.

All the Paſſions prepoſſeſs us.

XV. WHAT I have ſaid of Admiration, is true of all the Paſſions in general. Love and Hatred extend themſelves to every thing that has any relation to their principal Object. We hate the Friends of thoſe we do not love; and by this means the Innocent often fall a Sacrifice to our Malice. We oppoſe a Man we know nothing of, and ſometimes one whom we cannot avoid eſteeming, becauſe he has a Patron that is not in our Intereſt. (*e*)

Admiration of our ſelves.

XVI. BUT our Admirarion is never more hurtful, than when it falls upon our ſelves. We never are more in the wrong, nor more ridiculous in this Paſſion, than when we admire our ſelves. He that is prepoſſeſs'd in his own Favour, decides haſtily, and is opinionated in his Determinations. Precipitation therefore, and conſequently Error, Infatuation, Obſtinacy, Pride, and Inſolence, are the Conſequences of the high Eſteem we have for our own Abilities. He that forms a great Idea of his own Merit, admires every thing which his Underſtanding brings forth, and believes it true, becauſe he admires it. But he that is afraid of being prepoſſeſs'd in favour of his own Abilities, diſtruſts his Thoughts, and waits the paying any Reſpect to his Diſcoveries, till he is aſſured of their Truth by a ſtrict Examination.

IT is as good as a Comedy to obſerve the ridiculous Things Men give into, by their Fondneſs for what is extraordinary, and their Inclination to admire themſelves. They are accuſtom'd to admire the Extraordinary, and would have the Pleaſure of admiring themſelves: But oftentimes they are either too idle, or incapable, and ſometimes both, to diſtinguiſh

(*e*) Et erat æque lex & vobis, Judices, atque omnibus qui noſtris familiaritatibus implicantur, vehementer utilis, ut noſtras inimicitias ipſi inter nos geramus, amicis noſtrorum inimicorum temperemur, *Cic.*

ſtinguiſh themſelves from the Vulgar by any thing excellent, and therefore diſtinguiſh themſelves by their Follies, Extravagancies, and Affectation: *Nihil juvat obvium.* They turn Night into Day, and Day into Night: They quit common Senſe, by their eager Deſire of purſuing untrodden Paths; and oftentimes the Earneſtneſs with which they aſpire to the firſt Rank, of which they think themſelves worthy, prevents their ever riſing to the third or fourth, *&c.* (*f*)

A MAN of this Temper rides his Horſe thro' the worſt Ways, only becauſe he has obſerv'd that others chuſe the good, and he would not have any Equals.

IT is not becauſe they are more thirſty than other People, nor becauſe they find Wine better taſted, much leſs in order to enliven their Spirits, which on the contrary ſuffer by it, that Men drink to exceſs: They diſtinguiſh themſelves by it, and ſhew that every one cannot bear their Quantity.

THERE are ſome that think themſelves happy for being baptized by a Name that is very rarely to be met with. It would be a ſad Mortification to them, if it ſhould become common. If a Woman of Quality meets a Citizen's Wife dreſs'd in flower'd Clothes, and fine Lace, ſhe will wear them no longer, but immediately makes up both Clothes and Linnen entirely plain.

I AM ready to believe, that a great many Men would become rational, if all the reſt would agree not to be ſo. And as to this, I think there is Encouragement enough for them to become ſo; for they will diſtinguiſh themſelves but too much. Let them think judiciouſly, and govern their Behaviour by the Rules of Virtue, and they will have very few Equals. Probity, Underſtanding, and Politeneſs, make a very rare Compoſition. But if every one ſhould endeavour to acquire theſe good Qualities, how could Men diſtinguiſh themſelves? To thoſe that look upon this as a Misfortune, I have nothing to ſay, but to wiſh them an entire Satisfaction, that they were perfectly ſingular in their Taſte, and that no body elſe may ever be of the ſame Opinion but themſelves.

I KNOW ſome Men, that would think it the greateſt Infamy in the World to find themſelves reduc'd to the Neceſſity of thinking like other People. But they need not alarm themſelves ſo terribly: For this ſort of Fright carries its

(*f*) Ita ferè fit ut qui primi omnium eſſe contendunt, vix in tertio, quartove loco poſſint conſiſtere. Vulgaria contemnunt, nova affectant, dum in omnibus regnum tenere volunt. *Huetius.*

own Remedy with it; and it is a ſure Way of always thinking with an uncommon Singularity, to look upon it as a Diſcredit to fall in with the Opinion of others. Nothing is more diverting, than to obſerve the Contradictions which People of this Humour fall into, whenever they think fit to appear humble, and to affect a ſubmiſſive Language. There is nothing their Heart fears ſo much, as the Shame of being of the ſame Sentiment with others; and yet their Mouth confeſſes, that they dare not preſume to be able to think ſo juſtly as others. As ſingular as they are, there are however ſome Occaſions when you may be ſure to have them; for if you do but make a Compariſon of two Authors, you may be ſure to win, if you lay a Wager that they will give the Preference to the worſt.

WITH what repeated Attention ought we to ſtudy our ſelves, if we would know our ſelves? We muſt diſtruſt our firſt Thoughts, examine them ſtrictly, conſult others with Sincerity, ſuſpend our own Judgments till we have weigh'd theirs, and think in exact Order. And yet all theſe Precautions will hardly ſecure us from Illuſions. How will not our internal Defects conceal us from our ſelves, and our Self-love, that is, the Pleaſure of believing our ſelves perfect, or in the way to Perfection, caſt a Veil of Darkneſs over all our Faults! How many are there who admire themſelves for thoſe very Things, which make them ridiculous to all the World beſide? Some are complaining continually of the extreme Delicacy of their Smell, who, at the ſame time, make thoſe they converſe with wiſh that they themſelves had none at all. Some are every Moment boaſting of the extreme Fineneſs of their Ear, who, by the manner of their ſpeaking and reading, would be inſupportable to others, if they were oblig'd to hear them without laughing, at leaſt in their Sleeves.

How Men are confirmed in it.

XVII. WE ſhould not deceive our ſelves ſo much, if we were not aſſiſted in it by others. Some by Complaiſance, others out of Intereſt, ſome by Malice, and others out of a Principle of Indifference, leave a Man that is prepoſſeſs'd in the peaceable Poſſeſſion of all the favourable Ideas he has form'd of himſelf. Why then ſhould it not be allow'd a Man to think of himſelf conformably to what other People think of him? But who has diſcover'd to you their true Sentiments? Have they no Intereſt in diſſembling or flattering you? How can you be ſure they conceal nothing, or magnify nothing? One Man is continually the Sport and

Bubble

Bubble of another: If you would have the Pleaſure of being truly applauded, take care, above all Things, not to applaud your ſelf. When this is once perceived, you fall into Contempt; and if any one praiſes you afterwards, it is certainly for nothing but to laugh at you.

PRAISES are for the moſt Part, neither a Proof of Merit in him who is praiſed, nor of Diſcernment in him who praiſes. It is a Language of Intereſt or Inclination. *P.* declares with an Air and Tone proper to command our Belief, that *B.* underſtands *Algebra* compleatly. Does *P.* know what *Algebra* is? Not at all. But *B.* is his Couſin. *C.* ſpeaks of the intrepid Valour of *S.* and prefers him above all other Officers, with as much Aſſurance, as if ſhe her ſelf perfectly underſtood the whole Art of War, and had ſeen with her Eyes all that *S.* had done. We may imagine that *S.* is her Lover, and be ſure we gueſs right.

THERE ſometimes happen Caſes, where it is impoſſible to withſtand all together, not only our continual Inclination to Self-love, but alſo the Torrent of Flatterers, who all unite to confirm us in it, and who deceive us not only in the Praiſes they beſtow, but alſo in the Admiration they ſeem to have.

WE may, however, guard our ſelves againſt the moſt ſeducing Circumſtances, and ſupport our ſelves againſt all theſe Attacks, if we take care not to join with them againſt our ſelves; if we think rather upon what remains to be acquired, than upon what we have already acqnired; if we eſteem the Progreſs we are ſenſible of having made, not ſo much a Reaſon to be content with our ſelves for having acquired it, as an Encouragement for us to endeavour to go farther; if we remember all the Pains we have been at, and all the Precautions we have us'd to ſecure us from Error, in order to continue them, for fear of loſing all the Fruits of them; laſtly, if above all we avoid comparing our ſelves with others, whoſe Worth we are no Judges of; or if we do, it ought to be with thoſe whoſe good Opinions of themſelves has thrown them into a thouſand Errors, that we may be ſure not to imitate them.

XVIII. BUT if it be permitted to beſtow our Admiration on the Subject to which we apply our ſelves; and if it is of Importance, to be ſenſible of the Pleaſure of the Progreſs we make, in order to encourage us to purſue it farther, and to be always advancing yet more forward; how ſhall we avoid admiring our ſelves, and by what Precautions ſhall we contain our ſelves

Precautions to avoid it.

ſelves in ſuch exact Bounds, as not to paſs from an Admiration of the Works, to that of the Author? I confeſs the Tranſition is very natural, and for that Reaſon it appears to me to be ſo neceſſary to be upon our Guard. A Man indulges himſelf in the Pleaſure of a Diſcovery, either becauſe it is true, or becauſe he himſelf is the Author of it. If he loves it principally becauſe it is his own, he will certainly become too partial, both to himſelf and to it. But we may be ſatisfied, that the Pleaſure we find in reflecting upon a Truth which we have diſcovered, comes from the Value we have for every Thing that is true, when we are as agreeably affected with the Diſcoveries of others, as with our own, and when we are as much pleaſed with learning from them, as with having them learn from us. We ought to have juſt ſuch a Thirſt for Truth, as covetous Men have for Riches: Whether their Wealth be owing to the great Liberality of others, or to their own Scraping and Pains, is all one to them: They want only to grow Rich, and either of thoſe Ways will equally anſwer their Purpoſe. But we have a great deal of Reaſon to be diffident of our ſelves, and to fear that we are in Diſpoſitions altogether oppoſite to thoſe we have recommended, when we let ſlip no Opportunity of ſpeaking of our ſelves; when we think we do not do our ſelves Juſtice, if we publiſh the leaſt Diſcovery, without declaring at the ſame Time, that we owe it entirely to our ſelves, and that it never was hit upon by any Body elſe. This Folly furniſhes us with Proof of another Error which our Paſſions occaſion: Their uſual Effect is to diſappoint us of our true End, and to engage us in Excurſions, from our real Intereſt. This is what befalls thoſe who ſeek to make themſelves admired. What, do they propoſe by this Earneſtneſs to draw upon them continually the Eyes of others? Will not the Learned diſcover of themſelves whether what we publiſh be all our own, or borrow'd from others? But the common Sort of Readers will not be able to make this Diſcovery; and therefore it is neceſſary to advertiſe them of it, if we would have them do us Juſtice. But are their Applauſes worth expoſing our ſelves to the juſt Suſpicions of want of Modeſty? Beſides, thoſe that are leaſt Learned are oftentimes moſt ambitious of being applauded themſelves; and none are more watchful to take all Opportunities that offer to refuſe and obſtruct the Applauſes of others.

IF the Rule I have here laid down to content our ſelves with the Pleaſure of finding our Diſcoveries to be true and uſeful, without adding any dangerous Conſideration of our ſelves as being

being the Authors of them, and ſo taking part of the Admiration upon our ſelves, which is due only to the Work; if this Rule, I ſay, ſhall be thought too Nice and Speculative only, and conſequently impoſſible to be reduced into Practice, that we may judge of this the better, and be convinced that there is not betwixt theſe two Acts ſuch a ſtrict Connection, as makes them impoſſible to be ſeparated, we need only reflect upon what happens every Day with reſpect to diſagreeable Sentiments. As little rational as a Man is, when he has committed a Fault, and is made ſenſible of it, he confeſſes it, and blames the Action, acknowledges the Injuſtice, Ridiculouſneſs, and Deformity of it: But then he generally ſtops here, and does not proceed ſo far as to condemn himſelf, or own himſelf ridiculous, contemptible and odious; he complies with the eaſieſt part of the Penance, but excuſes himſelf this laſt Severity of it. There are ſome, indeed, that go ſo far as to condemn and puniſh themſelves with juſt Sentiments of Contempt; and this is the true *practical Repentance*, a *Repentance of the Heart:* Whereas we may call that which contents it ſelf with condemning the external Action, without any Reflection upon our ſelves, a *Repentance in Idea, and in Speculation.* It is therefore poſſible not to impute to our ſelves the Merit or Demerit of the Actions we are Authors of.

CHAP. X.

Of Contempt, of Love, of Hatred, of Deſire, of Fear, of Joy, of Sorrow.

The Origin of Contempt, and Precautions againſt its bad Effects.

SO long as we are ſtrongly affected with a new Object, and the Surpriſe, which it occaſions, continues, we loſe all other Thoughts, and in ſome Meaſure forget our ſelves, to give our ſelves up to this new Sentiment, and to the Contemplation of this new Object. But as the Heart is incapable of forgetting its ſelf long, and of loſing entirely the View of its Intereſts, it will ſoon ask its ſelf

ſelf of what Service this new Subject of Admiration may be, and of what Influence towards our Felicity.

IF we diſcover nothing of it which may either ſerve or prejudice us, we repent our having admired it, and revenge our ſelves of the Confuſion we are under, by a Contempt and total Negligence of it. (*a*) But we ought to remember that the human Underſtanding, which is confined within very narrow Bounds, and which, beſides this, does by Reaſon of its Emotion uſually proceed too precipitately, cannot perceive ſo immediately all the Uſes and Services a Thing may be capable of, and conſequently ought to take the Pains to examine it well, and allow it ſelf time to be throughly acquainted with it, inſtead of rejecting with Impatience and Contempt that which we do not ſufficiently underſtand. Idleneſs makes us deſpiſe a great many excellent Things, which if purſued would have been extremely uſeful. It is troubleſome to learn them, and for that reaſon we refuſe to bend our Thoughts to them; and becauſe, before we do learn them, we are ignorant of their Service and Value, we ſuſpect that they are not of any uſe at all; and this Suſpicion ſo agreeably flatters and encourages our Idleneſs and Vanity to reject them, that we adopt it for a certain Truth.

THERE are ſome Minds that cannot ſtop at any Thing. As ſoon as ever they are once in Motion, they yield themſelves up to it; they cannot abandon one Extremity, without running into another; and whenever they come to abate ever ſo little of their Eſteem for any Object, they begin infallibly to deſpiſe it. By their Inconſtancy they admire every thing that is new; and by the ſame Inconſtancy they are diſguſted with every Thing that is not ſo. But the Merit that is found in new Objects, and the Praiſes that are beſtowed upon them, are not always a Proof of Inconſtancy. A Heart full of Goodneſs, and by the Effect of this Inclination, accuſtomed to perceive in every Subject whatſoever is good in it, finds immediately ſome Good, becauſe there is indeed ſome Good in every Thing. Time may diſcover at length what it was unwilling to ſee; and when it changes its Sentiment, it is not becauſe it is tired with what it at firſt eſteemed, but becauſe it is ſhock'd with what it did not at firſt perceive. If it is changed it is not any Fault of its own, the Rule of its firſt Eſteem was Evidence and Goodneſs; and it is abated by the ſame Rule

(*a*) *Sorrow and Commiſeration are mixed with ſome Eſteem for the Thing we are ſorry for: But thoſe Things which we make a Jeſt of, we do not value at all.* Mont. B. I. Ch. 50.

Rule, by farther Evidence, and the Effect of its good Taste. It admires less, but yet admires.

WE are so desirous of being content with ourselves, that we are not at all difficult in the Means that may contribute to it. How little soever we find our selves applauded, how few soever they are who esteem us, we yet perswade our selves, without the least doubt, that we have Reason to be content with our selves; and under this blind Prepossession we look upon Things as superfluous which others pursue and acquire, if we possess them not. A Professor has run thro' his Course, oftentimes very imperfectly, as it happens when a first Work is hastily perform'd. That signifies nothing: It is finish'd, and therefore compleat: His Pupils admire it, and his Collegues approve it: *They allow his Bleeding, that he may allow their Vomiting.* But every Day sees the Sciences more advanced and enriched with new Discoveries. Men go too far, says one, and soar into the Clouds, and lose themselves. Instead therefore of following those that proceed forward, and making an equal Progress with them, we chuse to go by our selves, in order to lay hold of what we call Solid; and this Solid is to provide for a good Time, and to treasure up Wealth. Or if we do chuse to appear in Action, it is to put us in a Condition of obtaining a new and more considerable Employ either for Honour or Profit.

WHENCE come it that so few People apply themselves to the Mathematicks? It is demonstrated that all, or the greatest part of Philosophy depends upon it; and it is equally ignorant and presumptive to call a Man a Philosopher, who is no Mathematician. Yet notwithstanding this, in our University, a Professor of Natural Philosophy shall have one or two hundred Pupils, whom he teaches nothing but general and trifling Matters; whilst a Professor of the Mathematicks, who would direct them in the true Road that leads to the Knowledge of Nature, has not above ten or a dozen that will attend his Lectures. But Natural Philosophy formerly knew nothing at all of that mechanical Part, which is not to be understood rightly without the Help of the Mathematicks. So that a long Custom having separated and made these two distinct Sciences, those who have learned the first without the last, can by no means consent to have them united, because that would be declaring themselves to be such as pretend to know something, but do in reality know nothing.

II. AS on one Hand we refuse our Attention to those we despise, and on the other prejudice our selves against those that despise us, *An exact Idea of Contempt.*

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and find an Averſion to all their Sentiments, it is very viſible that Contempt is very capable of hindring the Truth from enlightening the Underſtanding. A Man who ſhall appear contemptible, may yet think juſtly; and being too proud, does not always deceive. It is therefore of Importance to be upon our Guard againſt this Paſſion, and for this Purpoſe we can do nothing better than to form an exact Idea of it: Contempt may either be juſt or unjuſt; we oftentimes treat others with Contempt without deſigning it.

IT is certain that all Men are not equally to be eſteemed, becauſe they have not all the ſame Degree of Merit. It is certain alſo, that we do not owe them all the ſame Reſpect, becauſe they are advanced in different Ranks, and bear different Relations in the Society. But there is a great deal of Difference betwixt deſpiſing a Man, and not having ſo much Eſteem for him as for another; and there is alſo a great deal of Difference betwixt not having ſo much Eſteem for him, and not paying him the ſame Reſpect.

ONE Man has leſs Merit than another, either by his own Fault, or not. When a Man has neglected to cultivate his Talents, and to improve the Opportunities he has had of advancing himſelf, he deſerves to be made ſenſible of his Fault, and to perceive that he is placed by way of Puniſhment, in an inferior Station to that he might have enjoy'd. But it would certainly be a Piece of Hardſhip and Injuſtice, to treat him in the ſame manner, who cannot be reproached with any ſuch Neglect. If an infinite Number of Men be inferior to others, it is altogether their Misfortune: Circumſtances which they were not Maſters of, were the Occaſions of it; if they had met with the ſame Helps, and the ſame Education, they would have obtained the Places and Merit of thoſe that are their Superiors. But it is always cruel and unjuſt to make an unfortunate Man more ſenſible of the Wretchedneſs of his Condition: Humanity on the contrary teaches to divert him from the Thoughts of it. The Injuſtice therefore of Contempt ſeems to me to conſiſt, in the Pleaſure we take to make others ſenſible that they are our Inferiors, and that we think our ſelves happy in ſeeing them below us. A Condition which we are accuſtomed to, is not found uneaſy, or thought troubleſome. The Pleaſure we find in the Informations we receive from Men of greater Learning, makes us delight in their Abilities, and think our ſelves happy in the Opportunities we have of conſulting them. The Benefit we receive from the Protection of a Superior, makes us eſteem it our Happineſs, that he is

in

in that high Station. But if the Learned and the Great ſhould take a Pleaſure in mortifying others, by making them perfectly ſenſible of the great Diſtance there is betwixt them, it would be impoſſible not to be diſturb'd at a Station that gives ſuch a cruel Power, and not to lament our being expoſed to ſuch barbarous Inſults.

To deſpiſe, is not to prize juſtly, that is to ſay, *not to eſteem* an Object according to its *true Value:* It is the Fault of thoſe, who treat others haughtily, and with too much Pride. If they did but conſider that thoſe they treat in this manner are Men, and conſequently are born with Faculties and Diſpoſitions, which, perhaps, would have given them the Superiority, if their Birth or Education had been accompanied with the ſame Circumſtances: They would be aſhamed of inſulting their Misfortunes, and would be afraid to draw any Part of their Happineſs from the barbarous Pleaſure of diſturbing that of others, who have as good a Foundation for it as themſelves. He who finds himſelf ſuperior to others, by what ever Advantage it happens, may by his gracious and courteous Behaviour to them, make them content with themſelves, at the ſame time that they know themſelves to be his Inferiors: He may alſo by a contrary and haughty Uſage make them yet more wretched. The Choice is in his Power; but then he ſhould conſider, that the Difference of his Choice makes in himſelf the Difference of a *Man of Honour* from a *Brute*.

Love is a Source of Prepoſſeſſion.

III. WHEN we diſcover in the Object we admire, and with which we are ſtrongly affected, Qualities proper to contribute to our Felicity, the Emotion of the firſt Surpriſe makes way for a ſecond, which is call'd *Love*. When we are poſſeſſed with this Paſſion, the very ſimple Idea of the Object already gives Pleaſure, we applaud it under the Notion of our eſteeming it. And becauſe we are pleas'd with this Condition, and are reſolv'd to perſevere in it, and have the Power of exciting in our ſelves Ideas ſuitable to our Inclinations, ſo long as this Paſſion laſts, we perceive in the Thing we love nothing but what enhances its Value: If any thing preſents that would abate it, we preſently divert our Thoughts from it. *To love*, is to take a *Pleaſure in eſteeming*; but when the Idea of an Object gives a great deal of Pleaſure, the Delight we take in thinking upon it extends to every thing it contains, and to every thing that accompanies it; we ſee all of it with Pleaſure, and conſequently we love and eſteem all of it; for we never are willing to croſs the Pleaſure we find in loving, by con-

confeſſing to our ſelves that we love that which does not at all deſerve it.

THE Heart is always much more engaged with Senſations, than with Ideas; it loves agreeable Senſations, and yields it ſelf up to them in Proportion as they are lively. A State of Tranquility appears comparatively tireſome to it; and it returns not thither without having firſt cruelly proved, that it has paid too dearly for the Pleaſure of its Paſſions. There is nothing ſo inſupportable as diſapproving and condemning our ſelves: There is nothing we fly ſo much as being at War with our ſelves. For which Reaſon, after an Object has once engaged our Affection, we imploy all our Thoughts upon what may juſtify it: We elude all other Conſiderations; and as we have no regard to them, they are nothing to us.

OUR Ideas ariſe one from another: They ariſe alſo from our Senſations, as Experience demonſtrates. Whoever will take the Pains to reflect upon himſelf, and attend to what paſſes within himſelf, will be convinced, that every Idea has ſo much more Relation to the Idea or Sentiment that ſucceeds it, as we are more attentive to it. But as the Paſſions engage the Attention, and poſſeſs it entirely, they do not ſuffer any Ideas to ariſe but ſuch as are agreeable to them, they permit Objects to be ſeen only on this ſide; and Reaſon perceives no more than what is to authorize them, and therefore all its Abilities are imployed to juſtify them. If ſome Circumſtance happens to open our Eyes, and makes us ſee Things as they are, a little more perfectly, this Light laſts but for a Moment; we may have a Glimpſe of what is contrary to our Paſſions, but we do not attend to it, but loſe Sight of it preſently. We ſee with Pleaſure this Game of the Paſſions in thoſe Places, where Poets deſcribe the Agitations of the Heart floating betwixt two contrary Paſſions, and engaged in a Conteſt betwixt what it ought and what it is enclined to do.

ALL the Paſſions juſtify themſelves; and by juſtifying them, we encourage our ſelves to perſevere in them, we oblige our ſelves to them, (*b*) and confirm our ſelves in them, indeed by

(*b*) Concipit interea validos Ætias ignes:
Et luctata diù poſtquàm ratione furorem
Vincere non poterat; Fruſtrà, Medea, repugnas;
Neſcio quis Deus obſtat; -------
Excute Virgineo conceptas pectore flammas,
Si potes infelix. Si poſſem, ſanior eſſem.

Sed

by a Reaſon miſled, but always by Reaſon. *Luctus ſibi jus facit, eóque adducit ut putet turpe deſinere.* Sen. A Man who afflicts himſelf, would believe himſelf wanting to his own Well-being, if he did not do ſo: (*c*) He would be aſham'd to finiſh his Sorrows all at once; and it is but by little and little that he reſolves to become pacified. When we are given up to any Paſſion, we ſuffer our ſelves to ſee nothing but what favours that Paſſion, and reject every Thing that would ob-

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Sed trahit invitam nova vis; aliudque Cupido;
Mens aliud ſuadet; video meliora, proboque:
Deteriora ſequor. Quid in hoſpite, regia virgo,
Ureris? ------- -------
----- Vivat tamen; idque precari.
Vel ſine amore licet. Quid enim commiſit Iaſon?
Quam, niſi crudelem, non tangat Jaſonis ætas,
Et genus, & Virtus? Quam non, ut cætera deſint,
Forma movere poteſt? certè mea pectora movit.
------ Prodamne ego regna parentis,
Atque ope neſcio quis ſervabitur advena noſtrâ,
Ut per me ſoſpes ſine me det lintea ventis,
Virque ſit alterius; pœnæ Medea relinquar?
Si facere hoc, aliamve poteſt præponere nobis,
Occidat ingratus. Sed non is vultus in illo,
Non ea nobilitas animo eſt, ea gratia formæ.
---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Ergò ego Germanam, Fratremque, Patremque, Deoſque,
Et natale ſolum ventis ablata relinquam?
Maximus intrà me Deus eſt. Non magna relinquam;
Magna ſequar. ---- ---- ----
Quemque ego cum rebus, quas totus poſſidet Orbis,
Æſoniden mutaſſe velim: ----- ----
Quid quòd neſcio qui mediis concurrere in undis
Dicuntur montes, ratibuſque inimica Charybdis.
---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Nempe tenens quod amo, gremioque in Jaſonis hærens
Per freta longa ferar. ------ ------
------- Quin aſpice quantum
Aggrediare nefas; &, dum licet, effuge crimen.
Dixit: & ante oculos rectum, pietaſque, pudorque
Conſtiterant: & victa dabat jam terga Cupido.
Cum videt Æſoniden, ---- -----
Spectat; & in vultu, veluti nunc denique viſo,
Lumina fixa tenet: nec ſe mortalia demens,
Ora videre putat: ---- -------

Ovid. Metam. Lib. VII. 9. & ſeq. *See alſo the Beginning of* Book IV. *of the* Æneid.

(*c*) Eſt quædam flere voluptas.

obſtruct and weaken it. Particularly, when Love has once taken Poſſeſſion of our Heart, it takes away the Reliſh of every thing that has not ſome Relation to the Object with which we are enamour'd; and by this Indifference for every thing elſe, we loſe an infinite Number of Pleaſures, for which we have but very poor amends. For the few and oftentimes very imperfect Pleaſures of that Paſſion are not equal to the Torments and Uneaſineſs that always accompany it; for Complaints are the uſual Language of Lovers, and their Looks are almoſt a continual Proof of their Diſcontent. Trouble, Uneaſineſs, Diſtractions, Deſires, Jealouſies, Reproaches, and Injuries, are ſure to be their Lot. If you would conclude from hence, that Love has ſome very pretious Recompences for thoſe that are under its Influence, ſince ſo many Evils do not at all diſcourage them, you will be very much deceiv'd. Its principal Endearment is not ſo much owing to the Pleaſures it affords, as to the Indifference it occaſions with reſpect to all other Engagements. It does not hinder our thinking our ſelves unfortunate; but then it blinds us ſo far, as to make us believe we ſhould be more ſo in any other Condition of Life. Love makes leſs Conqueſt by the imaginary Charms it adds to the Object beloved, than by the real ones it takes away from all others, and by the Veil it caſts over all they have that is valuable.

THE Beginning of Love preſents nothing but Pleaſures. We are never more happy than at the commencing of this Paſſion: Our Deſires are then but moderate, and the little we wiſh for is eaſily obtain'd. Beſides, every Thing which is accuſtomed to give Pleaſure, continues ſtill to give it, and the Heart enriches it ſelf with a new Satisfaction, without loſing any of thoſe it has already. And as we are never ſo much Maſters of this Paſſion as at the Beginning, we may ſay, that Love is never ſo eaſy to conquer, as when we have moſt reaſon to be ſatisfied with it, and when we leaſt think of getting rid of it. Does it then owe its Power to the Pains it makes us ſuffer? It is ſaid ſo; but I do not believe it: Our *Songs* nouriſh it with Tears, but in reality it owes its Empire and tyrannick Power only to our Blindneſs. When it is but beginning, we have yet ſome Value left for other Objects, and might deliver our ſelves up to one to cure our ſelves of the other: But when once we find our ſelves enamour'd with one particular Good, becauſe we have loſt the Idea and Reliſh of all but this one, if we would diſengage our ſelves from what we love, we muſt break at once with all the Remains we have left of Felicity.

MEN

MEN of Letters have alſo their Affections as well as other Men, and theſe Affections engage them in the ſame Illuſions: They affect one particular Science; and for no other Reaſon than becauſe they ſtudy none but that, are infatuated with it: They add to its real Merit an imaginary one, and ſeldom or never ſee any Worth in other Sciences; becauſe to give themſelves Time to ſtudy thoſe, requires them to loſe too much in the Study of that which they particularly love.

COMMENTATORS are like Lovers: They make every thing beautiful, and admire Trifles; every Thing is of weight, every thing is of value, which they engage in; and after having finiſh'd one Work, they undertake another, like thoſe that cannot live without their favourite Paſſion. They change the Object without changing the Diſcourſe. The laſt Work they are upon, if you will believe them, is always the moſt to be admired; but if you examine well all they ſay, you will find they have already ſpoken of others with the ſame Exaggeration.

PASSION engroſſes every Thing. The moſt trivial Diſputes appear of the utmoſt Importance to thoſe that maintain them, and are urged with the greateſt Warmth one againſt another; and for fear of acknowledging, even to themſelves, that they are warm about nothing, they find means to intereſt *Religion* in Trifles, and by this means diſhonour that to make it a Cover to their Honour.

WE love in different Manners, and in different Degrees, but ſeldom or never without ſome Illuſion. We praiſe in proportion as we love; and this is a Key very neceſſary towards the explaining the *Stile of our Praiſes*. They ſeldom expreſs the Ideas of an enlighten'd Underſtanding, but are the Language of an Heart that is prepoſſeſs'd. Thoſe whom we love, have Underſtanding, Virtue, and, in general, Merit, in proportion as we love them. I know a great many People, in whoſe Mouth all theſe Expreſſions, *He has an infinite Underſtanding, He has a perfect Piety, He is extremely obliging, He comprehends every Demonſtration with the utmoſt Clearneſs, He has an invincible Valour*, ſignifies nothing more than that *he is their near Relation*; and, in the Mouth of others, that *he is their Friend*, or *their Protector*.

AS Children are never in a Condition of conducting themſelves by Reaſon, it would be uneaſy for them to diſcover the Faults of their Parents, and of thoſe that are entruſted with their Education; and this Diſcovery might engage them to Sentiments of Contempt, and even of Hatred.

Nature has provided for this, by making their Inclination precede their Knowledge, and their Love prepoſſeſs their Reflections. By this Prepoſſeſſion they regard nothing but what they ought to regard, and do not at all concern themſelves with what it is not proper for them to conſider: So that if this Prepoſſeſſion does deceive and impoſe upon them, it does upon the whole do a great deal more Good than Miſchief. It is better that Children ſhould imitate ſome Faults; and, as to the reſt, live in Obedience and Reſpect to their Governors, than that they ſhould proceed to Contempt, and ſhake off the Yoke, and, in an Age of Fanciſulneſs, refuſe to receive any Law but from themſelves.

Means to prevent them.

IV. BUT after we have attain'd to the Age of Diſcretion, and have acquired ſome Power over our ſelves, after we have learn'd to conduct our ſelves by Ideas, and to regulate our ſelves by Evidence, if we perceive that we begin to be in love with an Object, even before we are perfectly acquainted with it, we ought immediately to divert our Thoughts from it, (*d*) in order to let theſe firſt Emotions vaniſh, till we can bend all our Attention to make a full Diſcovery of it. It is by a compos'd Examination that we come to this Diſcovery.

THE Diverſion which I here recommend, is the moſt certain Remedy againſt the Paſſions. We never ſucceed in attacking them directly; we muſt give them time to cool, by diverting our Attention to other Objects; and what *Cicero* ſays of Anger, is equally true of all the Paſſions, *We only enrage and enflame them by a direct Oppoſition.* (*e*)

BEFORE therefore we fix our Inclination upon any Thing whatever, we ought to diſcover, and be aſſur'd of the Value of the Object. But, in order to maintain this Maxim, it

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(*d*) Sine dediſcere oculos tuos; ſine aures aſſueſcere ſanioribus verbis. Quoties proceſſeris, in ipſo tranſitu aliqua quæ renovent cupiditates tuas, tibi occurrent. Quemadmodum ei, qui amorem exurere conatur, evitanda eſt omnis admonitio dilecti corporis: nihil enim facilius, quàm amor recrudeſcit: ita qui deponere vult deſideria rerum omnium, quarum cupiditate flagravit, & oculos & aures ab his quæ reliquit avertat. *Sen. Ep.* LXIX.

Faciliùs initia illorum prohibere quàm impetum regere. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXV.

(*e*) Ab iratis, ſi perſpicuè pax & benevolentia petitur; non modo ea non invenitur, ſed augetur atque inflammatur odium. *Cic. de Inv. Lib.* I.

it is neceſſary to turn it into an Habit, and for this Purpoſe to follow it conſtantly in the moſt inconſiderable, as well as in the moſt important Objects.

The Uſefulneſs of Love.

V. BUT when we have evidently diſcover'd that an Object is worthy of our Pains, our Application, and our Enquiries, we may very well ſubmit our Hearts to it. (*f*) This is not difficult; for the Attention which we give to its Excellencies, will of it ſelf engage our Affection; and if it be a Work, or a Science, our Inclination will very readily ſupport our Endeavours and Perſeverance; to ſucceed in it we proceed farther, and finiſh more perfectly whatever we are in love with. But here we ought to be upon our Guard; and as every part of one and the ſame Subject is not of the ſame Importance, we ſhou'd take care not to diſhonour our Affection for what deſerves it, by an equal Reſpect to what deſerves it not. We ſhou'd be jealous of placing our Eſteem right, and take care to conduct always by Evidence, and never by Inconſiderateneſs; we ſhould be attentive to diſtinguiſh what is uſeful from what is not ſo, and ſuch Advantages as are real, from ſuch as only appear ſo.

IT is not uſual to make this Diſtinction; and for the moſt part we ſhew an equal Earneſtneſs for all that has any relation to the Subject we are fond of. Thoſe who have the Care of the Education of Youth, are impatient to ſee their Scholars accompliſhed: They would teach them all at once, and mend all their Faults at the ſame time. This Eagerneſs making it impoſſible for them to diſſemble, or excuſe any thing; they look upon every Fault as capital, and all Idleneſs as an irreparable Loſs of Time. They torment and chide them; and by recommending ſometimes, and even very often, the *Circumſtantial* and the Inconſiderable with the ſame Air as the *Eſſential*, they give occaſion to their Scholars to regard, in their Turn, the Eſſential in the ſame Light as the Inconſiderable, and to neglect it with the ſame Security.

THE Mathematicks are of great Uſe; which no body, that knows what Service they have been of, can deny. But are we not too fond of every Thing that bears this Name?

(*f*) Tu verò omnia cum amico delibera, ſed de ipſo prius. Poſt amicitiam credendum eſt, ante amicitiam judicandum. Iſti verò præpoſterè officia permiſcent, qui contra præcepta Theophraſti, cum amaverint, judicant, & non amant, cum judicaverint. Diu cogita, an tibi in amicitiam aliquis recipiendus ſit: cum PLACUERIT fieri, TOTO ILLUM PECTORE ADMITTE. *Sen. Ep.* III.

Do we not give into Subtilties that perplex thoſe of the firſt Rank? Is it worth the while to take ſo much Pains, to convince a few Men of our Abilities and Patience? Would not the Labours of great Genius's be more uſefully imploy'd in Subjects of greater Importance? And would they not make even a better Uſe of their Underſtanding and Time, by putting in a better Order, and ſetting in a clearer Light, thoſe Things that have been already diſcovered, than by drawing, as it were, out of nothing, new Speculations, which the human Underſtanding, being ſoon tired with the Uſeleſſneſs and Difficulty, will in time ſuffer to return to their Original Darkneſs.

BUT Religion it ſelf, which relates entirely to Eternity; Religion, which is ſo auguſt, that its very Name engages our Reſpect; and Divinity, which contains its Myſteries and Evidences, are not in every Part of equal Importance, but have ſomething that may be omitted, and not underſtood, without Prejudice or Danger. And yet we ſee but too many learned Men, whoſe Zeal ſometimes gives ſad Shocks to Religion by their Raſhneſs and Obſtinacy in defending and explaining what they do not at all underſtand. Do we not ſee mutual Forbearance, Love, and Charity, Virtues ſo neceſſary, ſo worthy of Mankind, and ſo eſſential to Chriſtianity, trampled under Foot in favour of other Things, which may even be placed below Circumſtantials, and which are the Sport of Infidels, and the Concern of all that are rational?

IF I make a particular mention of Divines, it is becauſe I think them under a greater Obligation to ſet good Examples. But as to the reſt, what Profeſſion is exempt from the ſame Reproach; and in what Science do not Men of Letters controvert with Paſſion ſuch Subjects as do not deſerve to divide them? At leaſt the warm Controverſies of Divines have a plauſible Pretext: They ſay that the Glory of God, and the Salvation of Men are concerned in them; but when Philoſophers and Mathematicians grow angry and hot, their *Diſputes* are childiſh; and we cannot forbear concluding, that it is not Love alone, of all the Paſſions, that makes Men appear like Children, but that Ambition produces the ſame Effect, and makes thoſe that give themſelves up to it, look upon Trifles as Things of Importance, as neceſſary to their Quiet, and worthy of their Pains.

VI. I HAVE all along reason'd upon this Principle, That we esteem, and take a pleasure in esteeming, because we love. But if this be true, whence comes it that we are sometimes ashamed of having it perceiv'd that we love? and that there are some Things which we use, and which we destroy for the very Reason of our loving them? Two Observations will be sufficient to clear these Difficulties: There are some Things which we love for their own Sakes; and whatsoever we love after this manner, we always esteem. There are others which we love as Means conducing to some certain End, which is esteem'd and lov'd for its own Sake. It is thus we love to use disagreeable Remedies, and to take some difficult and troublesome Precautions to preserve or recover our Health; the Idea of which does already give Pleasure. We value these Remedies, and these Precautions, because they are so useful, and oftentimes even admire their Virtues; but we should esteem them much more, and at the same time love them also better, if we did not find something troublesome in them; for it is only that which gives Pleasure that we love in them. *Answer to Objections.*

THERE are Things which we take care to preserve upon the Acconnt of our loving them: Thus we preserve, for instance, a fine House, fine Pictures, &c. There are others that give Pleasure in proportion as they are consumed, and which they would not, without this, think worth their Attention: Thus we love good Eating and Drinking, &c. Lastly there are others which please of themselves, and which we for this Reason are fond of preserving; but which we still love better to make use of, than barely to preserve. We preserve for instance, a Warren, and kill the Rabbets for our Use; we take care of our Horses, in order to make use of them; we love Soldiers, whose Valour may be of Service.

I OBSERVE in the second Place, that the Passions are not always in Friendship with themselves. We sometimes esteem an Object, and are charm'd to find something agreeable in it; but at the same time perceive that the Passion we have for it is directly opposite to our Views of Interest, or Ambition, and in this Respect, we esteem it not, nor love it any longer. Sometimes Reason shares in deceiving us, and furnishes Passion with some Pretences to justify it self in secret: But this Reason has still Light enough left to condemn, in divers Respects, a Passion which it justifies and excuses in other Respects. We turn our Eyes from a Light, which does not give Pleasure to a Heart that is unwilling to follow it. But

becauſe we do not believe that others will ſhut their Eyes with the ſame Complaiſance, we conceal from them as much as we can of a Paſſion which we foreſee they will condemn. But if once our Paſſion can get the better of our Reaſon, and entirely hoodwink, and fix it in all its Intereſts, then we regard thoſe who think otherwiſe as People that are deceiv'd: We deſpiſe them; and make not only a Pleaſure, but an Honour in contradicting them; and we place our Glory where we ought to find our Shame. The moſt Vicious would find leſs Pleaſure in their Infamies, if they did not glory in them, either among themſelves, or each to himſelf in the Secret of his Heart, and attribute ſuch Names to them as are only due to Virtue (*g*).

Error the Effect of Hatred

VII. THAT which produces diſagreeable Sentiments, that whoſe Idea diſpleaſes, that which may contribute to our Miſery, becomes an Object of Hatred. But for the ſame Reaſon that it diſpleaſes and mortifies us, we divert our Attention from it, and conſequently become incapable of perfectly knowing it; and if we take a little Pains to conſider it, it is to make our ſelves amends for the Trouble it has given us, by diſcovering ſomething in it which deſerves to be diſpiſed, diſliked, and condemned. Our Eyes are open to all its Faults, which are preſently diſcover'd, becauſe our Attention is fix'd upon them, and they are ſhut to every Thing that may be remarkable for its Goodneſs. This Paſſion may then very eaſily miſlead us from Truth, and is of great Force to throw us into Error and Exceſs. We reject every Thing, where we ought only to reject ſomething.

WHAT an Extravagance is this! We will not embrace the Truth, becauſe it comes out of the Mouth of one who has ſometimes advanced Errors. An Author is fallen into contemptible Miſtakes; therefore he is himſelf odious, and to be condemned in every Thing: We muſt not agree with him in any Thing, if he does but miſtake in one Thing: But from whom muſt we receive our Informations, if we muſt only liſten to ſuch as are infallible?

THE

(*g*) Ille effuſus in voluptates, reptabundus ſemper atque ebrius, quia ſcit ſecum voluptate vivere, credit & cum Virtute: - - - - deinde vitiis ſuis ſapientiam inſcribit, & abſcondenda profitetur. - - - Itaque quod unum habebant in malis bonum, perdunt, peccandi verecundiam. Laudant enim ea quibus erubeſcebant, & vitio gloriantur: ideoque ne reſurgere quidem adoleſcentiæ licet, cùm honeſtus turpi deſidiæ titulus accеſſit. *Sen. de Vit. Beat. C.* 12.

THE Love of our Intereſts oftentimes mixes, and is confounded with Truth: I am willing a Sentiment ſhould pleaſe me becauſe it is true; perhaps alſo it pleaſes me becauſe it is my own, that is to ſay, becauſe I am the Author of it, or have adopted it. Our Zeal for Truth wou'd be uſually leſs lively, if it was not ſupported by ſome Intereſt, and this Intereſt is for the moſt part prejudicial to Truth. It caſts into Impatience; it hinders us from ſeeing it, when preſented by Perſons we do not love; and it is with Difficulty we ſubmit to Truth, even when we are throughly perſwaded of the Superiority of the Teacher. To love it as we ought to do, we ſhould love Truth only, or love it to ſuch a Degree, that every Thing elſe ſhould ſeem to deſerve our Neglect in compariſon with that.

We muſt hate Faults without hating their Authors, and endeavour their Reformation.

VIII. WE ought to hate Errors and Vices; for we ſhall keep at ſo much the greater diſtance, by how much the greater Averſion we conceive for them. (*h*) In order to this we ſhould fix our Attention upon all the Blemiſhes of each of them, and upon whatſoever they have that is unworthy of us; we ſhould dwell upon their fatal Conſequences, and purſue all the Prejudices that we may poſſibly receive from them. We ſhall then be ſufficiently apprehenſive of being miſtaken, and ſhall always take care to diſtinguiſh Virtue, which we love, from Error, which we hate: We ſhall be ſure to reject the laſt, and imbrace the firſt, wherever we meet with them; and no Circumſtances will make Error favourable, nor Truth diſagreeable, ſo as to confound them, and make us miſtake the one for the other. The ſame Precautions which guard us againſt Error, will guard us againſt Vice, ſince the Reaſon of our ſinning, is our not knowing how odious Vice is.

BUT as we are not Maſters or Judges of thoſe that ſin and commit Miſtakes, it does not belong to us to hate them, and to puniſh their Faults and Miſtakes with our Averſion, and all its Conſequences: It is more agreeable to pity their Follies, and to endeavour to cure them. Above all, it is juſt to compaſſionate thoſe who have been miſled by the Example or Perſwaſion of others, and who perhaps are not come to the ſame Degree of Obſtinacy. But nothing is more effectual in recovering Men out of their Errors, whether they be in Speculation or Practiſe, than to gain them upon their

(*h*) Magna pars hominum eſt, quæ non peccatis ſed peccantibus iraſcitur. *Sen. de Irâ, Lib.* II.

their own Principles, to make them ſenſible that they have themſelves laid a Foundation for clearer Knowledge, and that they have fallen into their Miſtakes by deſerting their own Maxims. When a Man deceives himſelf, or ſins, it is certain he does not at all reaſon and conduct himſelf after the ſame Manner, upon the ſame Principles, and in the ſame Way, as when he thinks juſtly, and diſcharges his Duty. Since then he has ſometime follow'd the univerſal Laws of Evidence and of Order, and has underſtood and perceived their Beauty, Force, and Neceſſity, we ſhould recall to his Memory, and ſet before his Eyes, what he himſelf has approved. The greateſt Enthuſiaſts ſometimes reaſon very well, and the moſt Vicious do good Actions, and from time to time reſpect Virtue, and find themſelves inclined to follow it. It is proper to make them obſerve that theſe Parts of their Conduct and Management have been ſignalized with a glorious Diſtinction, and to adviſe them to continue and not diſcredit them by a contrary Behaviour.

I QUESTION whether it ever happens for a Man to deceive himſelf in all Reſpects: He who deceives himſelf, ſees ſome part of Things as they really are, but ſuppoſes ſomething of them that is really not ſo. One great means to bring him to ſee his Error in what he thus ſuppoſes, is to agree with him in what he ſees aright. To reform Men therefore, we ought to obſerve every Thing which they ſay true, or do well, in order to make a good Uſe of it. To recover them from their miſtaken Sentiments, and convert them to ours, we muſt have ſome common Maxims by which we may unite together. This is what may very eaſily be done, if we love them; but will be never thought on, or very difficultly reſolved upon, and very imperfectly performed, if we hate them.

IN endeavouring thus to diſcover Truths amongſt the Errors of thoſe that deceive themſelves, and the Traces of Virtue amongſt the Faults of thoſe that deſert it, we ſhall perceive the Diſtance which our Prepoſſeſſion made us believe too great leſſen by little and little, and even our Averſion often change into Eſteem. And can we perceive any Humanity, without being charm'd with ſuch Reaſons as offer to make us find thoſe amiable, who might have appear'd odious to us.

WE ought to have a great Foundation of Eſteem for our ſelves, and to believe our ſelves above Error and Vice much more than we really are, to conceive againſt thoſe, who do not think or live juſtly, an Averſion, which we ſhould be troubled

troubled to be the Object of our ſelves, and which perhaps we merit as much as they. Who would dare to ſay to himſelf, I deceive my ſelf in nothing, and no body can condemn any Thing whatſoever in me? Our Hatred for thoſe that err, is therefore an Effect of Injuſtice and Inconſiderateneſs. (*i*) Our Hatred for the Faults of others, and our Indulgence for our own, do moſtly go hand in hand: We allow in others only ſome of our own Vices. To be favourable to our ſelves, and ſevere to others, is a Vanity that proceeds from the ſame Principle. This is ſo true, that the moſt *rigid* are not commonly the moſt able, nor the moſt zealous the moſt upright. They pardon in themſelves what they cannot bear in others: Indulgence is for themſelves, and Severity for others.

WE are all of us born in too great Darkneſs, we are all of us educated into too many Prejudices, we are naturally ſubject to too many Infirmities, to deſerve to be ill treated by Men, when we happen to be miſtaken. Shall we be angry at a Man that ſtumbles in the Dark, at a deaf Man that does not hear perfectly, at an Infant, or Perſon that is diſtempered? To err is a Diſtemper, and a Conſeqence of Childiſhneſs. (*k*)

WHEN

(*i*) Peccantes verò quid habet cur oderit, cum error illos in hujuſmodi delicta compellat? non eſt autem prudentis, errantes odiſſe, alioquin ipſe ſibi odio erit. Cogitet quam multa contra bonum morem faciat, quàm multa ex his quæ egit, veniam deſiderent: jam iraſcetur etiatm ſibi. Neque enim æquus Judex aliam de ſuâ, aliam de alienâ cauſâ, ſententiam fert. Nemo, inquam, invenitur qui ſe poſſit abſolvere: & innocentem quiſque ſe dicit, reſpiciens teſtem, non conſcientiam. Quantò humanius, mitem & pacatum animum præſtare peccantibus, & illos non perſequi, ſed revocare? Errantem per agros ignorantia viæ, melius eſt ad rectum iter admovere, quàm expellere. Corrigendus eſt itaque qui peccat, & admonitione, & vi, & molliter, & aſperè: meliorque tam ſibi quàm aliis faciendus, non ſine caſtigatione, ſed ſine irâ: quis enim, cui medetur, iraſcitur? *Sen. de Irâ, Lib.* I. *Cap.* 14.

(*k*) Illud potius cogitabis, non eſſe iraſcendum erroribus; quid enim ſi quis iraſcatur in tenebris parùm veſtigia certa ponentibus? Quid ſi quis ſurdis, imperia non exaudientibus? Quid ſi pueris, quod neglecto diſpectu officiorum, ad luſus & ineptos æqualium jocos ſpectent? Quid ſi illis iraſci velis, qui ægrotant, ſeneſcunt, fatigantur? Inter cætera mortalitatis incommoda, & hæc eſt caligo mentium: nec tantùm neceſſitas Errandi, ſed Errorum amor. Ne ſingulis iraſcaris, univerſis ignoſcendum, Generi humano venia tribuenda eſt. Si iraſceris juvenibus, ſenibuſque, quòd peccant: iraſcere infantibus, quod peccaturi ſunt. Num quis iraſcitur pueris: quorum ætas nondum novit rerum diſcrimina? Major eſt excuſatio & juſtior, hominem eſſe quam puerum

WHEN I make a wide Difference betwixt the Averſion we ought to have for Error and Vice, and the Hatred we may conceive for thoſe that think or live amiſs, I diſtinguiſh two Things that are actually ſeparated every Day; for not only Parents, but in general all honeſt Men to whom the Education of Youth is committed, do not go through with the great Pain and Trouble of their Office ſo much out of Reſpect to their Scholars, as out of the Averſion they have to the Errors againſt which they endeavour to ſecure them, and to their Faults which they apply themſelves to correct.

ONE of the firſt Movements which the Heart of moſt Men is ſenſible of, at the Sight of one that thinks differently from them, is that of Hatred: The Reaſon is obvious, becauſe this leads them naturally to make two Reflections, which are both very diſagreeable. Perhaps he has Reaſon to think differently; and this Suſpicion preſently Shocks their Self-love, and gives them Pain to ſee another more knowing or happy than himſelf. To extricate them out of this Uneaſineſs, there is no other way beſides a very ſtrict Examination, which is a ſecond Mortification for Men who are not pleaſed with Trouble, and who are afraid that their Pains may poſſibly end in convincing them of the Superiority of their Antagoniſts. The *Education* which is uſually beſtow'd upon Children, can alone produce the ſame Effect with theſe two Principles. What then muſt they do when joined together? Children are taught to regard with Horror thoſe that live not in the ſame Communion with themſelves, and who do not join in the ſame Confeſſion of Faith for a Rule of their Belief and Morals, or rather of their Inclinations and Averſions. In Matters of leſs Importance than theſe of Religion, as in Philoſophy and Humanity, the Profeſſors for the moſt Part never ſpeak of thoſe whoſe Sentiments they reliſh not, in any other than Terms of Hatred; and thoſe of their Pupils that enter moſt into the Paſſion of their Profeſſors, are ſure to be the moſt favour'd. In Colleges the Youth loſe the Pleaſure of advancing in their Studies, by the Reproofs they find it proper to give to their Comrades, and by the Mortification of falling back when they come to be corrected by them in their Turn. The Apprehenſion they are under for fear

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rum. Hac Conditione nati ſumus, animalia obnoxia non paucioribus animi, quàm corporis morbis: Non quidem, obtuſa, nec tarda, ſed acumine noſtro malè utentiâ, alter alteri vitiorum exempla. Quiſque ſequitur priores, malè iter ingreſſos; quidni habeant excuſationem, cùm publicâ viâ erraverint? *Lib.* II. *Cap.* 9.

fear another ſhould differ from, and outſtrip them, forces them to take Pains, to which they have naturally an Averſion: If they could but all agree to do alike, they would all live at Eaſe. Upon the leaſt Inclination to become reaſonable, it is eaſy to cure theſe Weakneſſes, by reflecting upon the Ridiculouſneſs of their Principles. To theſe may alſo be joined the Inconveniencies of their Conſequences.

IF we cannot bear the Idea of a Sentiment that is oppoſite to our own, without Emotions of Hatred and Impatience, we can never poſſibly enter far into the Minds of thoſe who think differently from our ſelves; for we never do exactly, what we do with an Averſion: We ſhall therefore confine our ſelves within our ſelves, and within our own Ideas; and by this Means ſhall every Day more and more contract our Genius, and hinder it from receiving either Manners or *Learning*.

BESIDES this, till we have got rid of our Prepoſſeſſions, we can never taſte any Tranquility: For we muſt either bury our ſelves in Retirement, without informing our ſelves of what paſſes beyond the Walls, where we think fit to immure our ſelves, or to reſolve to live unhappy; or laſtly, to bring our ſelves to ſee every Moment, without any Uneaſineſs, Men who, upon an infinite many Subjects, have Sentiments different from ours.(*l*)

WHEN we love Virtue perfectly, this is not at all difficult: When we are pleas'd with a Man, who, upon all Subjects whatſoever, thinks in the ſame manner with our ſelves, what Obligation is he under for our Eſteem and Friendſhip? Is it the Effect of my Choice? or do I not rather find my ſelf determined by a Mechaniſm of which I am by no means Maſter? But when two Men eſteem and love one another, tho' upon a great many Subjects, and even Subjects of Importance, they do not think alike; theſe Differences even enhance the Merit of their Union: They ought to eſteem themſelves happy, and muſt neceſſarily be mutually poſſeſs'd of ſome excellent

(*l*) "I condemn my Impatience, and maintain, firſt, That it is equally "vitious in him that is in the right, as well as in him that in is the "wrong; for it is a tyrannical Averſion not to be able to bear a Form "different from one's own. And next, That is in truth the greateſt, "moſt conſtant, and extravagant Foolery of all, to be diſguſted and angry "with the Foolery of the World." *Mont. Book* III. *Chap.* 7.

Folly is a very bad Quality; but not to be able to bear it, to be always angry, and piqued with it, as I am, is another ſort of Imperfection, full as importunate as Folly it ſelf. Ibid. Ch. 8.

cellent Qualifications which prevent the natural Effect of other Oppositions; and this only Thought, that they are both above the Weakness that is common to almost all Mankind, deserves to bind them, and does always effectually bind them the faster. But most Men know no other Merit in others, than that of thinking upon certain Points of Speculation, after a certain manner; because they themselves think of them after that manner. He is an excellent Man, of a good Life and Conversation, a Child of God, and one of his Elect, because he relishes my Method: He explains a Phænomenon upon the same Principles, and draws from them the same Consequences; he approves of the same Ceremonies, and the same Habits; he gives to obscure Words the same Signification, and follows the same Methods with me in his Sermons, or in his Calculation. It is by this sort of Weakness that Men are united, and it is by the very same sort of Weakness that they hate and persecute one another. But do you not know a great many Men, who live in the same Sentiments, or Speculations, with your selves, and yet are covetous, proud, deceitful, idle, envious, *&c.*? And have you not seen, on the contrary, those that are prepossessed with Opinions opposite to yours, who have yet been polite, friendly, sincere, generous, Lovers of Equity, full of Duty to the Divinity, and of Humanity for their fellow Creatures? Let us be content therefore with proposing our Reasons modestly to those whom we believe to be in an Error; and it is a good Point gain'd, if we can get them to take kindly the Pains we give our selves to undeceive them. We shall never prevail with them by assuming an Air of Authority; and we shall yet encrease the Distance that is betwixt us by Marks of Hatred and Impatience.

OUR Passions, being whimsical in themselves, are already so in their Birth: Sometimes the Aversion we have to some certain Sentiments makes us hate those that maintain them; and sometimes also the Hatred, with which we are prepossessed against a Man, makes us contradict the Opinions of which he is the Author. Some would never have thought fit to oppose with Warmth the Philosophical Conjectures of another, if it had not been the Work of a Collegue, whose Character they envy, and with whom they have had Disputes.

IT cannot be denied, but that we are obliged to *love Truth*, and to *search* it heartily and *sincerely*: But in searching it thus, it may sometimes happen that we cannot possibly find it. And I would fain ask whether this Misfortune, which is the Effect of human Weakness, is a *Misfortune* not to be excused

excuſed before the Throne of the infinite Mercy of our Creator, who knows the Extent of our Weakneſſes.

The Conſequences of Love and Hatred.

IX. WE deſire the Good before we poſſeſs it, and we rejoice when we obtain it. We fear the Evil before it comes, and it brings Sadneſs with it when it comes. Deſire and Fear reſpect the future, but Joy and Sadneſs the preſent. As theſe Paſſions are founded upon Love and Hatred, and ariſe from thence, their Effects, with reſpect to the Knowledge of Truth, are very little different from thoſe of their Originals.

The Illuſions of Deſire.

X. As we apply our ſelves to Ideas that give Pleaſure, and fly from thoſe that give Pain, the Pleaſure we find in thinking that what we deſire ſhould come to paſs, makes us confine our Thoughts to ſuch Things as may facilitate its Succeſs, without troubling our ſelves with what may obſtruct it. A Man who ſuffers himſelf to be ſeduced with this Pleaſure, never ſees Things but by Halves; The moſt difficult ſeem to him very eaſy, becauſe he has not ſufficiently attended to all that is neceſſary to execute them. He often attempts Things that are impoſſible; and whenſoever his Projects fail by Obſtacles and Accidents, which he never attended to, but might have foreſeen and prevented, he ſooths and comforts himſelf with the Thought that they were above all human Foreſight, judging of other People's Sagacity by his own.

THIS is the Character of the *Chimerical* Claſs; who when once they have given into great Ideas, find every Thing that is ſimple, every Thing that is common, every Thing that is of the ordinary Taſte, become inſipid to them. They are not at all affected with, nor ſo much as vouchſafe even to think of what is practicable. Nothing but what is extraordinary appears worth their purſuing. They love to promiſe themſelves Succeſs, and ſo flatter themſelves with Hopes of obtaining. And when their Hopes are vaniſhed, how can they, under their preſent Reliſh, find any Amends for the Loſs of an Hope ſo ſhining, by the Purſuit of what is eaſy and common? They begin therefore a new Project of the ſame Nature with the firſt; and being always dazzled with ſome Deſign that charms them, they ſpare themſelves as much as poſſible the mortifying Trouble of conſidering its Difficulties. Their Sight dims and extinguiſhes the Joy they would obtain, and which they would be pleaſed to give themſelves up to.

DESIRE has alſo its Uſes: By Means of deſiring a Thing, we promiſe our ſelves to acquire it the more eaſily. By this means we are encouraged to take Pains: The Hopes of Succeſs animates

animates us, and we never doubt of Succeſs, becauſe we look upon our ſelves as in Poſſeſſion of what we ſo earneſtly deſire.

Precautions. XI. WE ſhall always fall from Miſtake into Miſtake, if before we give Way to our Deſires, we do not take care to examine not only whether what we deſire deſerves the Eagerneſs with which we deſire it, but alſo, and above all, whether it be a Thing that is practicable. The Way then to be aſſured of the whole Probability there is of Succeſs, is, to compare exactly the Means which may promote it, with the Obſtacles that may hinder it.

WE would be happy; and in order to become ſo, we find it neceſſary to be put in Poſſeſſion of ſome Goods. Theſe Principles generally reign in all Hearts. But the greateſt Part ſuffer themſelves to be gain'd upon by the firſt Objects that preſent themſelves: They find in the Ideas of theſe Objects ſomething that pleaſes them, and they meet with ſomething agreeable in their Impreſſions. Thus their Affection engages their Application to them: Firſt they love them; preſently after they deſire them; and, laſtly, inform themſelves of the Means of acquiring them: But the Paſſion which animates them does not allow them to ſtay and examine them, nor give them time to deliberate upon the Choice they ought to make. When Paſſion thus regulates our Deſigns, we ſucceed ſometimes, but are for the moſt Part diſappointed, and our Life paſſes partly in vain Deſires, and partly in Diſappointments.

BUT if we would take the Light of Reaſon for our Guide, and make no falſe Steps, that would teach us preſently that we cannot acquire every Thing, and conſequently that we ought to limit our Deſires, and not to give way to others before we have acquired them. But where ſhall we begin? Muſt it be by the moſt ſhining ones? If private Men ſhould direct their Views and Deſires to Scepters and Crowns, all the World would take them for Madmen. We approach therefore the nearer to this *Folly*, the nearer what we deſire comes to an Impoſſibility, and conſequently we are *wiſe* in proportion as our Determinations are practicable.

TO ſubmit only to Evidence, to make that our only Rule, to endeavour to diſcover it, to proceed from Knowledge to Knowledge, to improve every Day the Order of our Thoughts and Motions, are, in my Opinion, the Goods which are not only moſt worthy of our Application, but, beſides this, the moſt in our Power. To be born with Principles that render us capable of extending our Knowledge to Infinity, to be capable of knowing even God himſelf, are the inexhauſtible Source

Sources of Happineſs.(m) If after we have beſtow'd our Attention to this End, and have engaged our ſelves in theſe Views, we think fit to add to this Solid ſomething that is only circumſtantial, that is to ſay, to join to thoſe internal Advantages ſome others that are only external; our Mind being eaſy and already ſatisfied with the Poſſeſſion of the firſt, does not ſuffer it ſelf to be dazzled with the latter, and its principal Deſire being to commit no Faults, he will begin by the Examination of the Eaſineſs of any Thing, afterwards by that of Merit, and will at laſt determine himſelf to deſire or neglect it, from an exact Compariſon of the Value of it with the Pains it will coſt us.

Would you ſpend your Time with Eaſe? Regulate your Deſires, by limiting them to Things that are within your Power. When you have undertaken an Enterprize, the Succeſs of which appear'd probable, and which Reaſon approved of, and ordered you to put in Execution, and after ſome Care and Pains have it fruſtrated by ſome Events which you did not attend to; if you could not poſſibly have foreſeen them, take the Advantage of this Leſſon of Experience, and become more circumſpect, and think your ſelf happy for an Opportunity of growing Wiſer. If you could not poſſibly foreſee thoſe Obſtacles, Reaſon will never enjoin you either to forſee or to ſurmount them; you have made a Tryal of what it engaged you to undertake. If your principal Aim be to obey and act according to Reaſon, you have attained your End, and ought to be content. In all our Enterprizes we ſhould not have the Succeſs of them ſo much at Heart, as to omit nothing that is within our Power to ſucceed in them. To act reaſonably, and to behave according to our Duty, ought to be our principal Deſire, and moſt pleaſing Satisfaction: The reſt is only acceſſory. Every Project ought to be accompanied with this Exception, *Si nihil inciderit quod impediat*, and with this Clauſe, *If the Lord Will*. He who thinks after this manner is ſure never to

Sen.

James iv. 15.

(m) Bonâ conditione conditi ſumus, ſi eam non deſeruimus. Id egit rerum natura, ut ad benè vivendum non magno apparatu opus eſſet: unuſquiſque facere ſe beatum poteſt. Leve momentum in adventitiis rebus eſt, & quod in neutram partem magnas vires habeat; nec ſecunda ſapientem evehunt, nec adverſa demittunt. Laboravit enim ſemper, ut in ſe plurimùm poneret, intra ſe omne gaudium peteret. *Sen. Conſ. ad Helv. Cap. 5.*

be deceived in his Projects, becauſe he never promiſes himſelf any thing but conditionally. (*n*)

Effects of Fear. XII. A Man that does not know how to regulate his Deſires, finds himſelf preſently a Prey to Diſguſt and Repentance, or to Fears and Alarms; (*o*) unhappy if he does not obtain what he deſires, and oftentimes more unhappy if he does obtain them. Some unforeſeen Obſtacles do every Moment demonſtrate their Labours to be to no purpoſe, and diſappoint their Expectations. Every Thing which ſurpriſes, makes powerful Impreſſions upon an Heart which is governed by Paſſions, and do not fail of covering it with Diſorder and Confuſion. When we are ſeized

(*n*) Huic enim propoſitum eſt in vitâ agendâ, non utique quod tentat efficere, ſed omnia rectè facere. ------ Non enim prohibentur opera ejus omnia, ſed tantùm ad alios pertinentia, ipſe ſemper in actu eſt, non in effectu. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXV.

(*o*) Apud Hecatonem noſtrum inveni, cupiditatum finem, etiam ad timoris remedia proficere. DESINES, inquit, TIMERE, SI SPERARE DESIERIS. Dices, quomodo iſta tam diverſa, pariter ſunt? Ita eſt, mi Lucili: cum videantur diſſidere, conjuncta ſunt. Quemadmodum eadem catena & cuſtodiam & militem copulat: ſic iſta quæ tam diſſimilia ſunt, pariter incedunt: Spem metus ſequitur. Nec miror iſta ſic ire, utrumque pendentis animi eſt, utrumque futuri expectatione ſoliciti. Maxima autem utriuſque cauſa eſt, quod non ad præſentia aptamur, ſed cogitationes in longinqua præmittimus. Itaque providentia, maximum bonum conditionis humanæ, in malum verſa eſt. Feræ pericula quæ vident, fugiunt; cùm effugêre, ſecuræ ſunt: nos & venturo torquemur, & præterito. Multa bona noſtra nobis nocent; timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantùm præſentibus miſer eſt. *Id. Ep.* V.

Nam qui multa agit, ſæpè fortunæ poteſtatem ſui facit: quam tutiſſimum eſt rarò experiri, cæterùm ſemper de illâ cogitare, & ſibi nihil de fide ejus promittere. Navigabo, niſi ſi quid inciderit; & Prætor fiam, niſi ſi quid obſtiterit: & negotiatio mihi reſpondebit, niſi ſi quid intervenerit. Hoc eſt, quare ſapienti nihil contra opinionem dicamus accidere; non illum caſibus hominum excepimus, ſed erroribus: nec illi omnia ut voluit cedunt, ſed ut cogitavit; in primis autem cogitavit, aliquid poſſe propoſitis ſuis reſiſtere. Neceſſe eſt autem leviùs ad animum pervenire deſtitutæ cupiditatis dolorem, cui ſucceſſum non utrique promiſeris. *Id. de Tranq. An. Cap.* 13. Faciles etiam nos facere debemus, ne nimis deſtinatis rebus indulgeamus; tranſeamus in ea, in quæ nos caſus deduxerit: nec mutationes aut conſilii aut ſtatus pertimeſcamus: dummodò nos levitas, inimiciſſimum quieti vitium, non excipiat. Nam & pertinacia neceſſe eſt anxia & miſera ſit, cui fortuna ſæpe aliquid extorquet: & levitas multo gravior, nuſquam ſe continens. *Ibid. Cap.* 14.

ſeized with Fear, our Attention is too much taken up with this very lively Impreſſion, and with this violent Emotion, to be in a Condition of diſcovering the true Means of putting our ſelves in Safety. Under this Agitation the Mind forms none, or very few Ideas, and thoſe very weak, and very imperfect. For want of a greater Choice, we are confined to do what firſt preſents, and limited to uſeleſs Precautions, and oftentimes determined to Means that do more Hurt than Good. Fear is always an evil Counſellor, *Nunquam fidele conſilium daturus timor:* He that is afraid may be made to believe any Thing. When after having repreſented to a vicious Man the Horror of his ill Courſes, or aggravated even to an honeſt Man, but timorous either by the Means of his Conſtitution, or his Education, the Slips and Omiſſions which he may have been guilty of, we farther overwhelm them with terrible and repeated Deſcriptions of Hell, and the inſupportable Ideas of eternal Puniſhments, when we lead their Imaginations thro' Millions and Millions of Ages of Torment and Miſery, without ever approaching in the leaſt any Thing nearer an End, how largely ſoever they heap Duration upon Duration: They are ſo overwhelm'd, and confounded with theſe Ideas, that they loſe all Liberty, Strength, and Capacity of Reaſoning, and receive any Impreſſion we think fit to give them. It is thus Men are fill'd with Superſtition; it is thus that Penitents are carried to ſuch vain Extravagancies; it is thus that Fanaticiſm has been eſtabliſh'd. A Man whoſe Ideas have all been hurried with terrible Alarms, gives immediatly into Enthuſiaſm. It is upon this Foundation that a cunning Prieſt of a ſubtle Underſtanding, and outward Gravity, by joining to the natural Fears of Death the Terrors of an ill ſpent Life, ſell their Ghoſtly Advice and Conſolation to dying Perſons at what Price they think fit; and if he gives them any Hopes, he makes them pay as dearly for them as he pleaſes.

XIII. When we are ſeized with Fears, are we in a Condition of examining, or making Inquiries? We arm our ſelves with whatever we can find, we lay hold of every thing that preſents it ſelf. It would be uſeleſs to ſearch for Precepts, by which to regulate our ſelves when under Fears, becauſe when once we are ſeized with them, we are no longer Maſters of our ſelves. Happy is he who has then in his Intereſt a faithful and underſtanding Friend! But it is in our Power to prevent our Fears: We need only forbear running Hazards; and without Reflection upon what may come to paſs, lay down a Plan of an exact Life, foreſee the Evils to which we may be expoſed, take

Remedies.

take our Reſolutions before-hand upon every thing that we ſhall have to do in every Caſe, and repeat them over and over again; and when one of theſe Caſes ſhall happen, it is but following, without wavering, the Reſolution, we have taken before-hand.

THAT we may not be without Remedy in the Evils which we may be expoſed to, it is a wiſe Precaution to take Meaſures at a diſtance, to form Schemes, and determine before-hand what we ſhall do in Misfortunes.(*p*) But it would be a ſenſeleſs Precaution to be perpetually looking for ill Fortune, for fear the Surpriſe ſhould increaſe the Weight of it. Such a Remedy is worſe than the Diſeaſe. It is plunging into certain Miſchiefs, in order to ſoften ſome uncertain ones, and making our ſelves very miſerable by our Fear of becoming ſo. Our Happineſs depends upon our way of thinking, and it is impoſſible to be happy whilſt the Mind is conſtantly dealing in melancholy Ideas. Of a thouſand Evils which we may fear, we rarely meet with one; and, beſides, it is often with our Evils as it is with our Goods, they are found much leſs than what our Imagination promiſed them to be, and the Miſchief ſometimes cures the Fear of it.(*q*)

FRE-

(*p*) Aufert vim præſentibus malis, qui futura proſpexit. *Sen.*

(*q*) "A great many Things ſeem greater in Imagination than in Fact. "I have paſs'd a good part of my Age in a perfect and entire Health, "I ſay, not only in an entire, but in a chearful and vigorous Health: "This jovial and feſtival Condition made me find the Conſideration "of Sickneſs ſo terrible, that when I came to experience it, I found it "tolerable and eaſy, in compariſon to my Fears." *Mont. B.* II. *Ch.* 6.

Plura ſunt quæ nos terrent quam quæ premunt, & ſæpiùs opinione quàm re laboramus. *Sen. Ep.* XIII.

"To what Purpoſe is this Curioſity of anticipating all the Inconve-"niences of human Nature, and of preparing with ſo much Pain how "to behave even under thoſe which there is no like-*Sen. Ep.* LXXIV "lihood of our ever meeting with? *Parem paſſi* "*triſtitiam fecit pati poſſe.* Or what Madneſs is it to "puniſh our ſelves this very Moment, becauſe it may happen that "Fortune will one Day puniſh us after this Manner; or to put on a "great Coat at *Midſummer*, becauſe we ſhall have Occaſion for it at "*Michaelmas?* Learn to experience all the Miſchiefs that can befall "you, even the moſt extreme; prove them, ſay they, and make ſure of "them: But on the contrary, the moſt eaſy and natural Method "would be to diſcharge even the Thought of them." *B.* III. *Ch.* 12.

FREQUENT Reflections upon the Steadineſs of others will give us Courage, by making us aſhamed of our own Weakneſs. We fear as inſupportable Evils what others bear with Eaſe, and even regard with Indifference. (r)

FEAR is never uſeful: (s) It is a Weakneſs which is even but very rarely pardonable, and is, for the moſt part, a Proof either that we do not know how to form a Scheme, or to follow it when form'd. (t) The better we have taken our Meaſures againſt a Storm during the Time of a Calm, the more exactly we ſhall determine what our Behaviour ſhall be when it comes, and we ſhall be ſo much the more above being afraid of it. It is therefore during a Calm that we ſhould learn to deſpiſe a Storm, (u) and convince our ſelves that no Event ought to give Fear to a good Man, becauſe he cannot be overwhelm'd with any Loſs, which his Virtue and good Courſes will not make him amends for. Thoſe who without this Foundation ſet themſelves above Alarms, have nothing but a Fool-hardineſs founded upon Stupidity, or upon the Heat of Paſſions, which blind them like a kind of Drunkenneſs.

THE Ardor with which a Man precipitates himſelf againſt his Enemy, hinders him from ſeeing the Danger to which he is expoſed; and if he fears them not, it is becauſe in that Moment he has no Idea of them. How many Soldiers appear to contemn Fire and Sword, only becauſe they feel

(r) "I ſee to what Limits natural Neceſſity extends; and conſidering the poor Beggar at my Door is often times more cheerful and healthful than I am, I put my ſelf in his Place, and endeavour to frame my Mind according to his Model. And thus purſuing the Examples of others, altho' I think Death, Poverty, Contempt, and Diſeaſe at my Heels, I readily reſolve not to be afraid of that which one inferior to my ſelf takes with ſo much Patience; and am unwilling to believe that a mean Underſtanding can do no more than an able one, or that the Effects of Reaſon are not of equal Force with the Effects of Cuſtom. And finding how little there is in theſe acceſſory Conveniencies, I do not fail, in the full Enjoyment of them, to put it up to Heaven, as my principal Requeſt, that I may be made content with my ſelf, and with the Goods that are born with me." *Mon. Book* I. *Ch.* 38.

(s) Deſpectum utilitatis timor periculi excutit. *Sen. Ep.* CIX. Cauto decet non timere.

(t) Quidquid deinceps dierum rerumque venturum eſt, ex alto proſpicit, & cum multo riſu ſeriem temporum cogitat. *Ep.* CI.

(u) In ipſa ſecuritate animus ad difficilia ſe præparet, & contra injurias Fortunæ, inter beneficia firmetur. *Sen. Ep.* XVIII.

them not! This Courage, which we admire in them, abandons them to the leaſt Wound, and gives Place to Conſternation. An heedleſs Man, that waſtes his Eſtate with as much Eagerneſs, as the moſt covetous have hoarded it up, does he regard Poverty with Indifference? His Deſpair will ſoon make him know the Difference, when once he is fallen into this Poverty, which he certainly ran into, and contemn'd, only becauſe he did not know it.

IT is not only to military Men that Courage is neceſſary. There are Occaſions, where the Profeſſion of a Man of Letters requires it as much as that of a Soldier. Some Men may in a Day of Battel be able to raiſe themſelves above the Fear of Death, who would not have Courage enough to oppoſe Errors univerſally receiv'd, or defended by Perſons of great Rank and Credit. The Fear of Infamy does often extinguiſh the Fear of Death. But when we advance new Truths, we expoſe our ſelves to the Reflections, the Contempt, and the Inſults of thoſe whoſe Approbation we are accuſtomed from our Infancy to court, and with whom we have propoſed to paſs all our Days agreeably. Nothing but a very great and pure Application to our Duty can make us reſolve to take the Pains to undeceive and inſtruct thoſe who are ſure to take it very ill from us. The Thought that Poſterity will judge of it more ſoundly, and the Idea of a Piece of Juſtice, which we ſhall never be Witneſſes to, would never be able to ſupport us, if that were all, againſt a long Courſe of preſent Mortifications.

THERE are ſome, whom the ſole Thought of its being poſſible for them to fall from their Dignity, or to loſe ſome part of their Pleaſures, affects ſo much, as to deprive them actually of this Tranquility ſo neceſſary, not only to think juſtly, but alſo to enjoy what is already in their Poſſeſſion. They would find themſelves above theſe Alarms, if they had experienced that its poſſible to be happy in a Condition, even inferior to that whoſe Idea they are afraid of. To be convinced of this, let them diſengage themſelves of this Pomp, (*w*) and paſs by this Pride that blinds them; let them deny themſelves theſe Superfluities that govern them, and keep them in a kind of Slavery; let them make themſelves familiar with their Inferiors, and make a Tryal of the Pleaſure there is in enjoying one ſelf, in reliſhing the Charms of Simplicity, and in finding that the moſt valuable Bleſſings which the Author of Nature

(*w*) Aliqui dies interponendi, in quibus imaginaria paupertate exerceamur ad veram. *Sen. Ep.* XX.

Nature has beſtow'd upon Mankind, are actually the moſt common. This is the Advice of *Epictetus*; *Live ſometimes as a ſick Man, in order to learn to live as it becomes a Man in perfect Health. Suppreſs your Deſires, in order to bring your ſelf into a Condition to form none but ſuch as are reaſonable.*

As a Man, at the Approach of Death, gives into Superſtitions and Extravagancies, we have Reaſon to impute his Eaſineſs of Belief to the Fears with which he is ſeized. It is not ſo, when a dying Perſon comes to think more rationally than ever he did before. We often ſee Examples of this: When we end our Days, we begin to be aſſured of what we before have all along doubted. If a Libertine thinks fit to ſay, that all this is the Effect of Fear, he betrays his Cauſe; for what is become of all thoſe Principles which made him lead his Life in ſo much Security? What is become of thoſe Reaſonings ſo juſt and ſo ſenſible, which made him regard the reſt of Mankind as the Sport of Error and Superſtition? What is become of thoſe Lights, by which he pleaſed himſelf with being freed from the Yoke of Fear and Obedience? He was deceived: He had nothing in him determined, proved, or demonſtrated: Vanity, a Deſire of Independence, a Love of Pleaſures, a Spirit of Contradiction, Intrigue, Party, or Impoſture, and ſuch like Principles as theſe, furniſh him with certain Maxims, which he believes to be true, only becauſe they are agreeable to him; and by means of repeating them, he comes at laſt to regard them as demonſtrated. But as ſoon as the Charm is ceaſed, the drunken Fit off, the Pleaſures and Intereſts that ſupported theſe Illuſions vaniſhed, Light ſucceeds to Darkneſs, Ideas to Paſſions, and ſo Truth comes to be perceiv'd. Without Contradiction, it cannot be, becauſe we have a troubled Underſtanding, that we ſee more clearly, and have our Ideas more exact. A Man that is dying, eſteems Wiſdom, Modeſty, Moderation, Sincerity, Juſtice, Generoſity, and Humanity; and condemns Pride, Debauch, Infidelity, Cruelty, Extravagancy, and Idleneſs: Will any one ſay that this is an Exceſs of Extravagance, which then comes to ſeize him? He recovers his Health again, and preſerves theſe Sentiments, becomes ſober, honeſt, adores the Creator of the Univerſe, and thinks himſelf happy when he meets with any Opportunities of ſerving Mankind, or of procuring them any ſolid Advantages. Will any one ſay that his Follies have not at all left him? For whom then is the Title of Wiſe intended? For thoſe that have no View beſides Self-in-

tereſt? for the Debauchees, for the Revengeful, for the Proud, for Impoſtors? for thoſe whoſe Pleaſures muſt be ſeaſon'd with Miſchief, the Scourges of Mankind?

Deſire and Fear ſometimes produce the ſame Effects.

XIV. THE different Diſpoſition of the Temperament, or Habits, in which Men find themſelves, does ſo much influence the Effect of Fear and Deſire, that Deſire ſhall produce upon one the very ſame Effect which Fear ſhall do upon another. A couragious Man, made for Pleaſure, and accuſtomed to flatter himſelf, eaſily believes whatever he deſires: Deſire with him ſtands in the room of Proof, and excuſes his ſeeking for any other: When once what he is made to hope for is agreeable to his Inclinations, he doubts no farther of it, but thinks every Thing which flatters his Expectation to be inconteſtable: He forbears with the ſame Partiality; believing whatever diſpleaſes him, he denies it, even till Truth appears before his Eyes in ſpite of him.

ON the contrary, a Man of a Diſpoſition inclined to Fear, or who is become timorous, by having met with a great many Misfortunes, fears every Thing, and can hope for nothing: His Fear with him ſtands in the ſtead of Proof; and to terrify him, is ſufficient to make him believe whatever we pleaſe. The ſole Idea of a Miſchief, the ſole Recital of a Piece of ill News, confounds him, and takes aways the Power of informing himſelf: He is ſo moved, that he thinks he already ſees it: He receives every thing that is ſaid to him as ſo many Realities, inſtead of uncertain Conjectures, which he is all the while entertained with,

Of Joy and Sorrow.

XV. I SHALL ſay one Word more upon Joy and Sorrow, with reſpect to their Influence over our Knowledge. I have already remark'd, that the Acts of the Mind have a very near Relation to the Condition of the Body. The Union of theſe two Subſtances conſiſts in this Relation, or at leaſt, is the Effect of it. Sorrow equally overwhelms the Mind and the Body. In this Condition we are without Vigour, without Activity; we form very few Ideas, and thoſe but very weak and imperfect; we have no Power of exciting our Attention, and much leſs of continuing it. Whoever loves Knowledge, ought to guard againſt this fatal Paſſion, and it is perhaps eaſier to prevent it, than is generally believed.

I SHALL reſume a Principle, which I have already made uſe of: We would be happy; and in order to this, it is neceſſary not only to poſſeſs ſome Good, but alſo to be ſenſible of it. It is our Attention that makes us ſenſible, and

gives

gives Advantage to Objects over us. (*x*) But moſt Men are ignorant of fixing their Attention, or of exciting it by themſelves: It muſt be the Objects that muſt engage it. As therefore theſe excite it no longer, when once they become familiar, it happens that we quickly ceaſe to think of what we have, in order to employ our ſelves about what we have not. (*y*) By means of this Habit, a Good which we do not regard, whilſt it is in our Poſſeſſion, becomes the Subject of our Attention when we want it, and the Loſs of it afflicts us, how indifferent ſoever it appeared whilſt we poſſeſs'd it.

XVI. LET

(*x*) "Even Pleaſure and good Fortune are not to be reliſh'd without "Vigour and Underſtanding."

---- Hæc perinde ſunt, ut illius animus qui ea poſſidet,
Qui uti ſcit, ei bona, illi qui non utitur rectè, mala.
Ter. Heaut. Act. I. *Sc.* II. 23.

"The Goods of Fortune, ſuch as they all are, require a Diſpoſition "proper to taſte them. It is enjoying, not poſſeſſing them, that makes "us happy."

Non Domus & Fundus, non Æris acervus & auri,
Ægroto Domini deduxit corpore Febres,
Non animo curas; valeat poſſeſſor oportet,
Si comportatis rebus benè cogitat uti,
Qui cupit aut metuit, juvat illum ſic domus aut res,
Ut Lippum pictæ tabulæ, Fomenta Podagram.
Hor. Lib. I. *Ep.* II. 47.

"He is a Fool: His Taſte is vitiated and loſt. He enjoys them no more, "than a Man that has a Cold does the fine Flavour and Taſte of the *Gre*"*cian* Wines, or than an Horſe does the Riches of the Harneſs with "which he is betrapped. *Plato* ſays the ſame Thing, That Health, "Beauty, Strength, Riches, and whatever of this Kind is called Good, are "equally evil to the Unjuſt, as they are good to the Juſt; and Evil on the "contrary. And therefore where the Body and Mind are in a bad State, "what will ſignify theſe external Advantages, ſince the leaſt prick "of a Pin, or Paſſion of the Mind, is ſufficient to ſpoil the Pleaſure of "the Monarchy of the World? --- Is it to be imagined, that the Singing "Boys in a Choir take any great Pleaſure in their own Muſick? Sa"tiety ſoon cloys them, and makes it tireſome. Feaſting, Dancing, "Maſquerading, and other publick Diverſions, pleaſe thoſe that enjoy "them but ſeldom, and ſuch as are Strangers to them; but to them who "have much of them, they become dull and diſagreeable. He that "does not give himſelf time to be Thirſty, can never know the Plea"ſure of Drinking. The Feats of Activity of the Mountebank are "to us a Diverſion, but to himſelf a Drudgery."

(*y*) Hæc quidem eſt natura mortalium, ut nihil magis placeat quàm quod amiſſum eſt; iniquiores ſumus adverſus relicta ereptorum deſideria.

Means of procuring lasting Content.

XVI. LET us accuſtom our ſelves therefore to be ſenſible of what we poſſeſs; To fix our Attention upon what we have, and to divert it from that which we have not, is the ſure Means to baniſh Sorrow. In every Condition there will be ſomething left that is proper to adminiſter Satisfaction. It is a great Art to procure it; and in order to this, we ought firſt to know from whence it Springs: *Hoc ante omnia fac, diſce gaudere, nunquam deficiet, cum ſemel unde paretur inveneris.*

ALL the World ſeeks Joy, but few know from whence it ariſes: We ſeek it where it is is not, and where it is only for a Moment; like the Joy of thoſe that are drunk, it diſappears preſently, and, that I may ſo ſay, falls aſleep, and Sorrow immediately takes its Place. Such is the Effect of all Kinds of Debauches: This is the End of our Ambition and a Deſire of ſhining, by what means ſoever we ſeek to ſhine, tho' it were even by Virtue. (z)

THE Soul contains always the greateſt of all Goods in (a) the Knowledge of Truth, in an Application to Wiſdom, and in the Liberty of making perpetually a Progreſs in each of them: And theſe are Goods which cannot be taken away from us. As to others, we need only open our Eyes, and do our ſelves Juſtice; we ſhall find them almoſt always ſuperfluous. If a Man ſhould go out of the Kingdom with an Underſtanding as well form'd as can be at the Age of Twenty Years, or more, and with Inclinations to Pleaſure alſo as ſtrong as they are found in the moſt voluptuous of Men: If this Man having ſeen nothing, heard nothing, taſted nothing, ſhould find himſelf all at once in the Condition which we call a moderate Fortune, a ſmall convenient Houſe, a ſuitable Neighbourhood, ſome Fields to till and anſwer his Cares, two or three Diſhes for his Table, and a Revenue capable of ſupplying this little Expence; let us beſides

(z) Omnes tendunt ad gaudium; ſed unde ſtabile magnumque conſequantur, ignorant. Ille ex conviviis & luxuria: ille ex ambitione, & circumfuſâ clientium turbâ: ille ex amicâ: alius ex ſtudiorum liberalium vanâ oſtentatione, & nihil ſanantibus liberis. Omnes iſtos oblectamenta fallacia & brevia decipiunt: ſicut Ebrietas, quæ unius horæ hilarem inſaniam, longi temporis tædio penſat. *Sen. Ep.* LIX

(a) Utique animus ab omnibus externis in ſe revocandus eſt; ſibi confidat, ſe gaudeat, ſua ſuſpiciat: recedat, quantum poteſt, ab alienis, & ſe ſibi applicet, damna non ſentiat, etiam adverſa benignè interpretetur, *Sen. de Tranq. Anim. Cap.* 14.

ſides this, place him in a healthful Air, and pleaſant Situation; voluptuous as we ſuppoſe him to be, if he could complain of any thing in this Condition, it muſt be that he has no more Eyes or Hands than two, or Mouths than one. Could he have an Opportunity of thinking that any Body is better furniſhed with them than him ſelf? But this Reflection would come in the End. This would be his Fault, if he ſtopp'd here. Let him continue to fix his Attention upon the Objects which did at firſt give ſo much Satisfaction: They are not changed, and his Senſes are always the ſame; there is nothing wanting but himſelf to receive their Impreſſions. Why ſhould we thus enhance the Price of what we deſire, and undervalue what we poſſeſs? Inſtead therefore of letting our Thoughts rove after what we have not, let us reflect upon the Advantages we are already poſſeſs'd of; let us try to reckon them up, that we may ſee what we have to loſe, and we ſhall be tired before we have made an End of counting.

HE who cannot make himſelf content with the Goods I have already mentioned, will never be ſo at all. They would be ſufficient, if any thing could be ſo; (*b*) and if he is inſatiable, it is his own Fault. His bad Taſte is the only Cauſe of his Uneaſineſs; and in order to be happy, he muſt cure himſelf, and become reaſonable; he muſt learn to ſee and perceive. (*c*) *A Man contains within himſelf immenſe Advantages; He who cannot ſee or taſte them, were he Maſter of the Univerſe, would be always miſerable.* It is thus that *Epicurus* himſelf ſpeaks. An Uneaſineſs for a Superfluity, which we imagine we want, hinders us from reliſhing the neceſſary and even ſuperfluous Goods which we already have in abundance. He that knows how to content himſelf with what he has, is already arrived at the Point, which the Coveous and the Ambitious do but vainly aim at. (*d*)

XVI. BUT

(*b*) Ei ſatis fuiſſet, ſi quid ſatis eſſe potuiſſet. *Sen. Ep.* XV.

(*c*) Si cui ſua non videntur ampliſſima, licet totius mundi Dominus ſit, tamen miſer eſt. *Sen. Ep.* XV.

(*d*) Petite hinc Juveneſque Seneſque,
Finem animo certum, miſeriſque viatica Canis.

"The Heart of Man is made to Love and to Deſire; and becauſe it "does not know how to employ it ſelf in what it ought, it conſumes "it ſelf in Superfluities. *Charron of Wiſdom.*

In what Sense it is that Nature is content with very little.

XVI. But some will say, it is very easy to advise Men to content themselves with what they can easily procure; but, perhaps, when we come to think of it, we shall find it impossible to put this Advice in Practice. The Heart of Man was not made for a moderate Happiness: A secret Inclination leads him on to advance himself, and to procure Pleasures more exquisite than those he has already experienced. And so this Maxim, so much celebrated, that *Nature is content with very little*, is found to be absolutely false. Nothing moderate can satisfy her. Whilst she eagerly pursues the infinite Advantages for which she is intended, what she meets with on the Road may amuse her for some Time; but she soon considers that this is not the Point she aspires to, and so her Desires engage her as before to new Pursuits. All that is true in this Objection, perfectly confirms the Principles I intend to establish. The Heart of Man will never find it self in the sole Possession of sensual Pleasures sufficient to fix and satisfy it entirely: But when it has once tasted the most solid Pleasures that arise from the Knowledge of Truth, and the love of Virtue; and by the Care it takes in improving in Wisdom, finds it self in the way to infinite Happiness; then it can easily dispense with Externals, and become so much Master of its Senses, as to make them be contented with very little. Then we presently find it useless to have a great Number of Apartments, when we can take up but one; and that it is as vain to fill our Table with a great Number of Dishes, when the Capacity of our Stomach can receive but a very little part of one of them. (*e*) It is only when we deceive our selves in seeking for perfect Felicity where it cannot be found, I mean in the Objects of the Senses, that we give our selves up a Prey to Desires which we can never satisfy. (*f*) Very few Things will content

(*e*) Quid prosunt multa cubicula? in uno jacetis. Non est vestrum, ubicunque jacetis. Ad vos deinde transeo, quorum profunda & insatiabilis Gula hinc maria scrutatur, hinc terras: Alia hamis, alia laqueis, alia retium variis generibus cum magno labore persequitur; nullis animalibus, nisi ex fastidio, pax est. Quantulum enim ex istis epulis, quæ per tot comparatis manus, fesso voluptatibus ore libatis? Quantulum ex istâ fera, periculosè captâ, dominus crudus ac nauseans gustat? Quantulum ex tot Conchyliis, tam longè advectis, per istum Stomachum in explebilem labitur? Infelices etiam quod non intelligitis, vos majorem famem habere, quam ventrem. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXIX.

(*f*) Naturalia desideria finita sunt: ex falsâ opinione nascentia, ubi desinant, non habent; nullus enim terminus falso est. *Sen. Ep.* XVI.

tent the Senſes of a Man who is attentive upon much greater Pleaſures. The Satisfaction of finding our own Strength deſerves to be eſteemed ſomething; and it is no ſmall Pleaſure to be able to find Content in that, which to another would only be the Subject of complaint.

WHEN a Man is never content with what he has; when he is perpetually deſiring, and purſuing with Uneaſineſs, what he will be ſure to regard with Indifference a little time after he has obtained; when he thus ſpends his Life in great Diſquiets and moderate Pleaſures, it is a Demonſtration that he neither poſſeſſes nor underſtands the true Goods. When we have a Heart content, every Thing pleaſes; when we are prepoſſeſs'd with Diſcontent, nothing gives Pleaſure; the Objects that preſent themſelves ſeem to take a Tincture from the Humour we are in. One Man, if he gets an important Cauſe, will make good Cheer of a moderate Meal: But another, if he fails in a Claim which he has at Heart, can find no Reliſh in the moſt delicious Entertainment, perhaps, even his Concern will embitter it. It is therefore true, that when we have a Fund of Joy, every Thing amuſes agreeably; and it is from hence that external Objects borrow their greateſt Value: But whence muſt we procure this ſolid and unchangeable Fund of Joy? From the greateſt of all Goods, and the only ones that are in our own Power, I mean Wiſdom and Virtue. It is a very clear Demonſtration that theſe are what deſerve our principal Care, becauſe, without them, the greateſt of all others are nothing, and with them the leaſt are conſiderable. He that ſhall love them for their own ſake, will ſoon experience this to be true; and to learn to love them thus, we need only attend to their Worth, and compare their Value with that of the others. Which is moſt preferable to fill the Mind with perfect Ideas, or the Stomach with Dainties? the Heart with good Principles, or the Stable with fine Horſes? to build Learning upon Learning, and Knowledge upon Knowledge, or a Palace of one Story upon another? Ought we to take moſt Pleaſure in placing our Pictures, or in ranging our Ideas? in commanding a great number of Domeſticks, or being Maſter of our Paſſions? When we have an Heart poſſeſs'd with theſe true and eſſential Advantages, if the Acceſſory be added to them, we reliſh it agreeably; if not, we do not find any want of it.

XVII. THE ſame Precautions that ſerve to remove Sorrow, will procure Joy. This condition is almoſt of abſolute Neceſſity to *The Uſefulneſs of Joy.*

diſcover

discover Truth, and advance in Knowledge. Joy opens the Mind, as much as Sorrow does the Mouth; it gives Vivacity and Fruitfulness, and excites and keeps up the Attention. When we have an Heart content, we find Pleasure in every Thing; and what we do with Pleasure, we apply our selves to with Perseverance; so that we see by this, that what is useful to the Body, is no less so to the Mind.

I NEED not observe here, that this Joy which I recommend is widely different from those Pleasures which prejudice the Health, and weigh down the Mind, are inconsistent with our Ease, and make the Heart successively the Seat and Sport of Trouble, Impatience, Uneasiness, and lastly of a Contentedness which presently gives place to new Desires, and, in the end, to Impatience, *&c.* So that in all these different Conditions thro' which we pass, we find our selves equally unsettled.

The Usefulness of Sorrow,

XVIII. I KNOW but one Case where Sorrow may be useful; and that is, when we have deviated from our Duty, by some ill Bias either of our Temperament or Habits, and that the same Circumstances, as well internal as external, may be very likely to unite to cast us a second time into the Forgetfulness and Error. It is good, in such a Case, to view attentively the Deformity of the Fault, to be overwhelmed with Confusion for it, and to persevere in these mortifying Reflections, that we may conceive for the Subject which causes them, a Displeasure, a Disgust, and Aversion, which may deprive it of what it has tempting and seducing. But after having corrected and conquered this evil Tendency, it is just to enjoy the Pleasure of the Victory; for this will be one of the most effectual means to encourage us to new Attempts, and to maintain the Ground we have already conquer'd.

THERE must be Care taken to avoid two Extremities: Some are content with seeing their Faults, and think it sufficient to cast an Eye upon them, but, after the first View, ask nothing farther, nor speak any more of them. You would imagine, that in ceasing to Think of them, they had renounced the Occasion of them, and entirely destroy'd all the Principles of Evil: And yet it is quite the contrary; the Circumstances that misled and seduced the Heart at first, cannot return a second Time without bringing back to the Mind the Sorrows they have occasioned, if they have been once truly felt, or thought of a sufficient Time; whereas the Care that is taken to avoid them, and the Readiness to forget them, throws down all these Fences against present and deceitful

ceitful Pleaſures; and a ſecond or third Temptation has even more Force than the firſt, becauſe aſſiſted by Habit.

XIX. BUT to ſpend, under this Pretence, the greateſt part of our Days in Sorrow and Remorſe, is running out of one Extreme into another. What we truly love, cannot fail of pleaſing and giving us Joy; and a Man who muſt take Pains and Trouble to do his Duty, has not underſtood the Beauty of it. Every Thing turns into an Habit, and ſo does Sorrow; and we find a ſort of Pleaſure in following it, becauſe it is an Habit: If we abſtain from Joy, Vanity makes us amends by the Pleaſure we take in condemning thoſe that give way to it, and in believing our ſelves to be far above their Weakneſſes: And in this manner we cure one Vice by the Aſſiſtance of another; or rather do not Cure any, ſince *he that offendeth in one Point of the Law, is guilty of all.* Zealots of an auſtere and diſcouraging Humour, do certainly violate one of the greateſt Duties, that of edifying and engaging others to do what they ought by the Force of a good Example: They make Virtue ſuſpected; and no body can perſwade himſelf that an All-wiſe and infinitely Good Maſter ſhould take a Pleaſure in making his Creatures miſerable, and in giving them Pleaſures only to prohibit their enjoying of them, and in denying them Happineſs till they have purchaſed it with the moſt ſhocking Struggles, and the moſt terrible Dangers.

Bad Effects of Sorrow.

Jam. ix. 10.

THE Heart of Man is by Turns govern'd by two Principles, Reaſon and Paſſion: Reaſon enlightens it, Paſſion blinds it; Virtue is the effect of Light, and Vice of Darkneſs. Every thing which ſerves to enlarge our Knowledge, is capable of making us more readily acquainted with Virtue, and to reliſh it more perfectly: Every thing, on the contrary, that contracts and darkens the Underſtanding promotes Error, and is apt to hinder us from diſtinguiſhing the Good from the Bad. But, without Contradiction, Sorrow contracts the Underſtanding: A Man overwhelmed with Grief is credulous, and gives into every Thing that may give him hopes of getting rid of it. In this Condition we are not inclinable to examine; and if we are, we have not Power to do it. Obſerve but the Credulity of ſick Men to their Phyſicians; not only the Patient himſelf, under the Oppreſſion of his Diſtemper, but alſo thoſe about him, if they are truly intereſted in, and ſenſibly affected with the Diſtemper of their Friend, believe without Proof or Foundation what the firſt Comer ſays, and over-load the Patient by their Eagerneſs to cure

cure him. When he is dead they make a Duty of lamenting him; and the Thought of being comforted appears a Temptation to Ingratitude: The Rites of Burial would not have been mix'd with so much Superstition; the mournful Solemnities of Funerals would never have been thought grateful to the Dead, nor the Pains we take in honouring their Name and Memory. These Imaginations would have found no more Credit in the Mind than Dreams, if Sorrow had not made it credulous: But we are never so incapable of of distinguishing the Certain from the Uncertain, as when we are in Distress, and have our Faculties depress'd.

How to conquer it.

XX. I KNOW nothing more difficult than to get above Sorrow, when we are every Moment Witnesses to so much Injustice and Infamy; when we hear nothing talk'd of but Baseness, Treachery, Hardships, and Cruelties; when we see that Vice is made the Road to Honour, and that good Men are every Hour expos'd to the Insults of the Wicked. To be able to lead our Lives with any Ease in the midst of so many Abominations, is assuredly a Conquest of Philosophy. The Maxims which I think most proper for this purpose are these:

FIRST, What Advantage can we have from our Sorrow? Will our grieving make the Wicked, who take a Pleasure in our Mortification, change their Courses for fear of giving us Pain? This is the very Thing they want, and our Enemies are never so well pleas'd with themselves, as when they perceive that they disturb our Peace. (*g*) Can a Traveller dry up the Roads by storming against the Dirt? After he has thrown

(*g*) "Hatred is a strange Passion, which disturbs us extremely, "and without Reason; and what is there in the World that can "Torment us more? By this Passion we put our selves in the Power "of those we hate, to vex and afflict us. The Sight of them troubles "our Senses, and the Remembrance of them disturbs our Minds, "both sleeping and waking. We represent them to us with Cha- "grin and Disquiet, which put us beside our selves, and strike to "our very Heart; and by this means receive our selves the Pain and "Mischief which we desire to others. He that hates is the Patient, "and he that is hated the Agent, in Contradiction to the Terms them- "selves. The Hater is in Torment, and the Hated at Ease: But "what do we hate? Men or Things? Certainly we hate nothing "we ought: For if there be any thing in the World to be hated, it "is Hatred it self, such like Passions as are contrary to what ought to "govern us. There is not in the World a greater Mischief than this." *Charron of Wisdom. Book* I. *Ch.* 21.

thrown off his great Coat and Boots, he will find no Remains of it; nothing can ſuffer from it but his Clothes. The Attempts of the Wicked can reach only thoſe Things that ſurround us; they cannot affect what is properly our own, and what we ought moſt to eſteem. This is my ſecond Reflection. They can neither rob us of our Ideas, nor of our Integrity. (*h*) Throw them ſome of your looſe Corns, and they will leave you in quiet Poſſeſſion of your Loſſes. If you purſue Knowledge and Wiſdom, if you make theſe your principal Aim, you will have very little Concern with impertinent People. Would not you think your ſelf happy, if in croſſing a Foreſt you ſhould meet with Rogues that would let you paſs quietly, upon condition that you would not deſire to ſhare their Plunder with them? or that ſhould find only Papers about you, your true Riches, and ſhould not think it worth while to trouble themſelves with them?

WHY ſhould you complain of your Lot, ſince if you take it altogether, it is infinitely preferable to that of thoſe whoſe Elevation and Power begin to move and mortify you? Would you change Conditions with them? Would you like to be altogether as they are, and to exchange your Internals for their Externals? Would not you like better to pay your Ranſom to a Pyrate, than to enrich your ſelf with taking Ranſom from others? If we judge of Men by true Ideas, they are all equal, except only ſuch as the Knowledge of Truth, and Wiſdom which is the Conſequence of it, advance above others. All the reſt is but like the Externals of Comedians: One plays the Maſter, and another the Man; but they will not be always upon the Stage. You are concern'd becauſe the King of the Play acts his Part ill, and, being dazzled with his glittering Ornaments, forgets what he is to ſay, and how he ought to expreſs himſelf. Inſtead of being concern'd, you ought rather to laugh at his Folly: He looks upon himſelf as an extraordinary Perſon, whilſt he is only a Servant, that will ſoon be puniſh'd as he deſerves, for having acted his Part ſo indifferently. (*i*) Let us take Things as they

(*h*) Proprium magnitudinis veræ non ſe ſentire percuſſum. *Sen.*

(*i*) Nemo ex iſtis, quos purpuratos vides, felix eſt, non magis quàm ex illis quibus ſceptrum & chlamydem in ſcenâ fabulæ aſſignant; cum præſente populo elati inceſſerunt, & cothurnati, ſimul exierunt, excalceantur, & ad ſtaturam ſuam redeunt. Nemo iſtorum, quos divitiæ honoreſque in altiore faſtigio ponunt, magnus eſt. Quarè ergò magnus videtur? Cùm baſi illum ſuâ metiris. Non eſt magnus Pumilio, licet

they come, and in their ſeveral diverting Appearances. If an Actor keeps up to his Part, I laugh at the Original, which he repreſents; if he plays his Part poorly, I laugh at his Acting. The World is a Comedy: When I ſee a good Actor, I commend him; when I meet a bad one, I deſpiſe him; and whatever Part he acts, I find my ſelf ſuperior to him. Men who conſult Reaſon, are the proper Judges of thoſe that act contrary to it.

IN the great Theatre of the World, have but a little Patience, wait but till the End, which will certainly not be long, continue to be Wiſe, and a Death-Bed, which will be to you a Bed of Triumph, will be to the Wicked a Scaffold, ſo much the more dreadful, as it is Eternal Juſtice that pronounces their Sentences. Correct therefore the Vicious, whenever a proper Opportunity offers; and if they be incorrigible, deſpiſe their Brutiſhneſs, and laugh at their Folly: Their Ridiculouſneſs will furniſh you with continual Matter of Diverſion, and the Miſchief they do falls heavier upon themſelves than any other Perſon whatſoever (*k*).

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licet in monte conſtiterit: Coloſſus magnitudinem ſuam ſervabit, etiamſi ſteterit in puteo. Hoc laboramus errore. Sic nobis imponitur: quod neminem æſtimamus eò quod eſt, ſed adjicimus illi & ea, quibus adornatus eſt. Atqui cum voles veram hominis æſtimationem inire, & ſcire qualis ſit, nudum inſpice; ponat patrimonium, ponat honores, & alia fortunæ mendacia. Corpus ipſum exuat: animum intuere, qualis quantuſque ſit, alieno an ſuo magnus. *Sen. Ep.* LXXVI.

Ille qui in ſcenâ elatus incedit, & hæc reſupinus dicit,

En impero Argis; regna mihi liquit Pelops,
Quà Ponto ab Helles atque ab Ionio mari,
Urgetur Iſthmos.

ſervus eſt, quinque modios accipit, & quinque denarios. Ille qui ſuperbus, atque impotens, & fiduciâ virium tumidus ait,

Quod niſi quieris Menelaë, hâc dextrâ occides.

Diurnum accipit, in cænaculo dormit. Idem de iſtis licet omnibus dicas, quos ſuprà capita hominum, ſupráque turbam delicatos lectica ſuſpendit: omnium iſtorum perſonata felicitas eſt. Contemnes illos, ſi diſpoliaveris. *Ep.* LXXX.

(*k*) Heraclitus quoties prodierat, & tantum circa ſe malè viventium, imò malè pereuntium viderat, flebat, miſerebatur omnium qui ſibi læti feliceſque occurrebant, miti animo, ſed nimis imbecillo: & ipſe inter deplorandos erat. Democritum contrà, aiunt, nunquam ſine riſu

THE celebrated *Scarron* is to me a great Hero; and I place him far above *Democritus*, becauſe he laugh'd in Pain, and almoſt in continual Pain. A Man muſt have an Heart uncommonly ſoft, to be able to read the following juſt Encomium on him, without being tranſported with ſuch uncommon Courage.

Ille ego ſum Vates, rabido data præda Dolori,
Qui ſupero ſanos Luſibus atque Jocis.
Zenonis ſoboles, vultu Mala ferre ſereno,
Et potuit Cynici libera Turba Sophi.
Qui medios inter potuit luſiſſe Dolores,
Me præter toto nullus in orbe fuit.

THERE is ſo much Grandeur in the Sentiments which theſe Verſes expreſs, that whoever attends to them, can hardly forbear wiſhing that he might deſerve ſuch an Elogium himſelf. He was able to brave continual Pain with continual Mirth, *Medios inter potuit luſiſſe dolores.* But what are the other Calamities of Life in compariſon to Pain? A Man muſt make himſelf unfortunate on purpoſe, and take

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riſu in publico fuiſſe; adeo nihil illi videbatur ſerium eorum, quæ ſerio gerebantur. *Sen. de Ira, Lib.* II. *Cap.* 10.

Quanto riſu perſequenda ſunt quæ nobis lacrymas éducunt. *Sen. de Ira. Lib.* III.

Occupat enim nonnunquam odium Generis humani, & occurrit tot ſcelerum felicium turba, cùm cogitaveris, quàm ſit rara ſimplicitas, quàm ignota Innocentia, & vix unquam, niſi cùm expedit, fides, & libidinis lucra damnaque pariter inviſa, & ambitio uſque eo jam ſe ſuis non continens terminis, ut per turpitudinem ſplendeat. Agitur animus in noctem, & velut everſis virtutibus, quas nec ſperare licet, nec habere prodeſt, tenebræ oboriuntur. In hoc itaque flectendi ſumus, ut omnia vulgi vitia non inviſa nobis, ſed ridicula videantur, & Democritum potiùs imitemur, quàm Heraclitum. Hic enim quoties in publicum proceſſerat, flebat; ille ridebat: huic omnia quæ agimus, miſeriæ; illi ineptiæ videbantur. Elevanda ergò omnia, & facili animo ferenda; humaniùs eſt deridere vitam, quàm deplorare. Adjice, quod de humano quoque genere meliùs meretur, qui ridet illud, quàm qui luget. Ille ſpei bonæ aliquid relinquit: hic tamen ſtultè deflet, quæ corrigi poſſe deſperat: & univerſa contemplatus, majoris animi eſt, qui riſum non tenet, quàm qui lacrymas; quando leviſſimum affectum animi movet, & nihil magnum, nihil ſeverum, nec ſerium quidem, ex tanto apparatu putat. *Sen. de Tranquil. Anim. cap.* 15.

Pains to make himſelf miſerable, if he will be ſo ſenſibly affected with what paſſes without him, as with what paſſes within him, and what is indeed himſelf: And he muſt have a very uncommon Strength of Mind, and Greatneſs of Genius, who can conquer the Senſe of Pain by agreeable Reflections, and ſtifle what he ſuffers by the Attention he gives to his Thoughts. But why ſhould any Man diſturb himſelf with external Accidents, and afflict himſelf by dwelling upon melancholy Events, which ought only to affect People of a narrow Genius? We are encompaſs'd with an infinite Number of Objects, which ſollicit us to this Concern; we need only open our Eyes, and both Heaven and Earth will preſent them on all Sides of us. When a Miſchief is without Remedy, and when our Mind is neither ſteady enough to bear the Idea of it, nor volatile enough to ſpeak of it without Attention, there is yet one ſure Way left, and that is, not to think of it at all.

BUT what hinders our purſuing this Method, is, that we have a Notion and Deſire of living happy in the Imagination of others. It is from them we borrow the Idea that we form of our ſelves; and we imagine our Felicity really to diminiſh, in proportion as it leſſens in their Eſteem. We ſhun our ſelves, and want to govern others: We deſire to have a Part in the Affairs of the World; and when they do not go according to our Minds, we look upon it as a Misfortune to be oblig'd to retire into our ſelves. This is our Fault; if we have but the greateſt Hand in them, we are always beſt pleas'd: Every Thing ſeems to go well, when it goes to our Satisfaction, and is under our Management; and every Thing goes ill, when it is under the Government and Direction of others. But this very Thing ſhould rather be a Subject of Laughter to us, to ſee the Folly of others, who think themſelves above regarding us, and do every Thing in Contradiction to us, becauſe they believe themſelves ſuperior to us.

THERE are a great many good Men, whoſe tender Hearts are very ſenſibly affected with the Misfortunes of others: Their Life is ſpent in Sorrow, becauſe they lay it down as a Rule to themſelves, to ſhare in all Afflictions and Misfortunes. It is a Weakneſs of Mind which ariſes from a very *good Foundation*; and I make a great deal of Difference betwixt a Man who ſees unmov'd the Abominations of Mankind, becauſe they are all indifferent to him, and Vice and Virtue are no more with him, than fair Weather and foul; and one that ſpends his Life in Tears, becauſe he

he ſees others ſpend theirs to make themſelves eternally miſerable.

BUT when ſhall we have an Opportunity of *being joyful*, and enjoying the Bleſſings of this Life with Thankfulneſs, if we muſt wait till there be no Misfortune in the World, and if we muſt never allow our ſelves to laugh, ſo long as ſome ſhall think fit to laugh, and others to cry, unſeaſonably. I look upon God as a good Father: Reaſon and Revelation agree to give us this Idea of him. But if in a numerous Family one Child ſhould become vicious, another ſhould be undone by or without its own Fault, a third ſhould fall ſick, a fourth die, in what Condition would a Father, whom we ſuppoſe full of Wiſdom and Goodneſs, like beſt to ſee the reſt of his Family? In Tears, in Affliction, overwhelm'd with Sorrow and Uneaſineſs, inſenſible of all Pleaſure, averſe to Joy, in a languiſhing and unhealthful Condition? or rather unſhaken in the midſt of all Misfortunes, attentive to repair them, engag'd in their Buſineſs, taking care to preſerve themſelves, looking upon that Part of Happineſs which they have left, and ſeeking their greateſt Conſolation in their Steadineſs and Application to their Duty and to Virtue? *Eccl.* vii. 14.

GOD has created *Man upright*; but he has alſo created him free: And this Liberty was abſolutely neceſſary, that he might chuſe what is Good, and might ſay, with the Apoſtle, *Glory, Honour, and Peace, to every Man that worketh Good.* For if there was only the ſame Mechaniſm in the Soul, as there is in the Body, the Virtuous would deſerve no more Commendation for being virtuous, than Water for moiſtening, or Fire for burning. Rom. xi. 10.

MEN happen ſometimes to abuſe this Liberty, and by this means diſhonour their Nature, and draw down terrible Miſchiefs upon themſelves, and occaſion a great many to others. God himſelf, to whom all Diſorder and Abuſe of his Favours is much more odious than to me, is Witneſs to them, and permits them for Reaſons worthy of his Wiſdom; and why then ſhall I think ill of, and make my ſelf uneaſy at them? Would we have God deprive a Man of his Liberty, as ſoon as ever he finds him ready to make an ill Uſe of it? This would be the ſame Thing as if he had not any Liberty at all; and a good Man would never have the Satisfaction of his acting with Choice; an Heart devoted to Wiſdom would act juſt in the ſame manner as one abandon'd to Folly. Art does its Author ſo much the more

Honour, as the Mechaniſm of its Works are the leſs capable of being put out of Order; but where there is Liberty, the Deformity of the Licentious ſets off the Beauty of the Obedient. It is from ſuch Reflections as theſe, and from an entire Reſignation to Providence, that we derive this *Greatneſs of Soul*, which keeps us eaſy and unmov'd in Adverſity, and is quite different from the *eaſy Stupidity* of ſome Men, who do not think at all, and from the *eaſy Indifference* of thoſe who think irregularly. Thoſe who occaſion in Society Diſorder and Confuſion, are not at all the leſs criminal, becauſe it is in our Power to avoid being affected with this Diſorder and Confuſion; for there is a great deal of Difference betwixt not bearing them at all, and bearing them without being put out of order by them. We may ſee an hundred odious Objects, without being ſhock'd at them, and preſerve our Tranquillity in ſpite of ſo many diſagreeable Impreſſions; but yet we are ſenſible of theſe Impreſſions; and that we ſuffer no more from them, coſts us a great deal of Time, Reflection, and Trouble, which might be employ'd more uſefully, as well as more agreeably, both for our ſelves and others.

BESIDES, there is an infinite Number of good Men, very much to be valued for the Uprightneſs of their Heart, who having been diſappointed either of a Genius, or Education ſufficient to procure ſuch a Steadineſs of Mind as I have been ſpeaking of, do yet paſs their Lives in Trouble and Uneaſineſs, and all their ill Conſequences. There are ſome, who, by the Injuries of wicked Men, find themſelves depriv'd even of Neceſſaries; and what Philoſophy can ſupport them againſt extreme Neceſſity? There are ſome whoſe moderate Virtue is ſoon diſcouraged and extinguiſh'd, and who being weary with reſiſting, ſuffer themſelves to be carried down the Stream of thoſe, againſt whom it is ſo difficult to maintain themſelves. The Happineſs of thoſe that deſpiſe wicked Men, and who have learn'd the Secret of being above their Reach, does not at all extenuate their Crime, any more than the giving Poiſon is any thing to be excuſed, becauſe the Force of Remedies may poſſibly prevent the fatal Effects of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the different Objects of our Affections.

I. DESIRE makes us uneasy: Fear is the most galling Yoke that can be: Joy is often of a very short Duration: Sorrow makes us miserable: But Love pleases us; and for this Reason we take a great deal of Pains to preserve it; so that by its Pleasure and Constancy it is a most powerful Passion, and, when wrong apply'd, one of the most dangerous. It is therefore of Importance to study all its Varieties, in order to prevent all its Illusions, and enjoy all its Advantages.

Love is the most powerful of all the Passions.

II. THE Love of our selves is the Foundation of all the rest of our Affections: We love other Things, because they procure us some Satisfaction, and appear advantageous to us. But we should not love that which pleases, and is advantageous to us, any more than that which is useless and disagreeable to us, if we do not love our selves.

Self-Love the Foundation of all the rest.

THE Enthusiasts, who condemn all Self-love, and imagine themselves to have renounced it, do not perceive that they contradict themselves, which is their usual Fault; and it cannot be otherwise, since one of their Maxims is to avoid reflecting upon themselves. When they condemn every other Motive but simple Obedience, it is without doubt because they consider this Motive as the most pure, and such as renders Virtue the most perfect. But why should they prefer the most perfect Condition to that which is less so, if they were indifferent to themselves? If they did not love themselves, it would be indifferent what Condition they were in.

To do that which God commands by Obedience, is to submit to his Grandeur: To propose to be happy by him, is to give Glory to his Bounty: To seek in him perfect Felicity, is to acknowledge him supremely amiable. It is ne-

ceſſary to join theſe Motives; for *to approach God Almighty*, and endeavour to pleaſe him only by pure Obedience, is what we ſhould do out of the Acknowledgment of his Power, even tho' we ſhould not believe him amiable. It is neceſſary therefore to deſire him: This is one part of our Homage; for we muſt acknowledge and ſerve him as God, and conſequently as very deſirable. But to deſire a delightful Object, ſuppoſes our deſiring to be happy, and conſequently ſuppoſes our loving our ſelves.

THIS renouncing of our ſelves, ſuch as theſe extravagant People ſuppoſe and recommend, would put it out of God Almighty's Power to recompence ſuch of his intelligent Creatures as ſerve him with the greateſt Reſignation and Devotion: For whenever he ſhould pleaſe to beſtow any Favours upon us, we ſhould receive them, indeed, out of reſpect to the Hand from whence they come, but we ſhould neither value theſe Bleſſings, nor take any Pleaſure in the Enjoyment of them; only fearing to offend our Maſter by refuſing them, we accept of them by pure Obedience. And how ſhall this new Obedience and Homage be recompenced? Muſt it be by new Favours? We ſhall regard theſe alſo with Indifference, and they will only furniſh us with new Opportunities of honouring our great Maſter. Beſides, how ſhall we acknowledge our ſelves obliged to him for this Life and Exiſtence, if we do not love this Life and this Exiſtence? And if we love this Exiſtence, is not that loving our ſelves? The true Acknowledgment conſiſts not in making Compliments, but in being truly ſenſible of the Value of the Favours conferr'd upon us.

THIS Love of our ſelves is not only very innocent, and very lawful, but alſo eſſential to us. A Being which knows, perceives, and wills, and yet does not love it ſelf, is an inconceivable Chimera. Thoſe that kill themſelves, do it to avoid living unhappy. Thoſe that are ſevere to themſelves, and become their own Tormentors, do it only to prevent their undergoing greater Miſeries, or becauſe they are diſcontented with themſelves, and conſequently have an Intereſt in all they do. (*a*)

IT

(*a*) Neque enim, ſi nonnulli reperiuntur, qui aut laqueos, aut alia exitia quærant, aut, ut ille apud Terentium, qui decrevit tantiſper ſe minus injuriæ ſuo gnato facere (ut ait ipſe) dum fiat miſer, inimicus ipſe ſibi putandus eſt; ſed alii dolore moventur, alii cupiditate, iracundiâ etiam multi efferuntur: & cum in mala ſcientes ruunt, tamen ſe optimè ſibi conſulere arbitrantur: itaque dicunt nec dubitant.

Mihi

IT would be a very odd Notion, if we ſhould imagine that a good Man ſhould ceaſe to be ſo from the Moment he begins to ſet a Value upon himſelf. If we are obliged to know our ſelves, we are obliged to ſtudy our ſelves. And can we ſtudy our ſelves as we ought, when we do not diſcover in our ſelves what really is there, and imagine to be there what really is not there? A wiſe Man, therefore, an attentive Man, who ſeeks the Truth, and fears Miſtakes, ſees that he has ſome good Qualities, and ſees them as they really are, and conſequently eſteems them: But if he is not inſenſible of the Good, neither does the Evil eſcape his Notice. The Knowledge of our Faults teaches us what we ought to apply our ſelves to, and that of our good Qualities ſupports us in this Application. When we ſee nothing but the Good, we let our ſelves go quietly on; when we ſee nothing but the Evil, we loſe our Courage: The Knowledge therefore both of the one, and of the other, may be of great Service to us. But we have no Intereſt that engages us to compare our Merit with that of others, in order to know if we ought to *prefer* our ſelves to them, or them to us. It is even a Compariſon which is almoſt impoſſible to be made with Juſtice; for without mentioning the Pleaſure we find in preferring our ſelves to others, which is extremely apt to ſeduce us, if it be difficult to know our ſelves, it is yet perhaps much more difficult to know others exactly. We can ſee nothing of their Inſides, but muſt judge of them only by Externals; which are for the moſt part deceitful, and capable of being juſtified or excuſed by an infinite Number of Circumſtances.

THERE

Mihi ſic uſus eſt: tibi ut opus eſt facto, face: velut qui ipſi tibi bellum indixiſſent, cruciari dies, noctes torqueri vellent: nec verò ſeſe ipſi accuſarent ob eam cauſam, quòd ſeſe malè rebus ſuis conſuluiſſe dicerent: eorum enim eſt hæc querela, qui ſibi cari ſunt, ſeſeque diligunt: quarè quotieſcunque dicetur malè de ſe quis mereri, ſibique eſſe inimicus, atque hoſtis, vitam denique fugere: intelligatur aliquam ſubeſſe ejuſmodi cauſam, ut ex eo ipſo poſſit intelligi, ſibi quemquam eſſe carum. Nec verò id ſatis eſt, neminem eſſe, qui ipſe ſe oderit; ſed illud quoque intelligendum eſt, neminem eſſe, qui, quomodo ſe habeat, nihil ſuâ cenſeat intereſſe: tolletur enim appetitus animi, ut iis rebus, inter quas nihil intereſt, neutram in partem propenſiores ſimus, item in nobiſmet ipſis, quemadmodum affecti ſimus, nihil noſtrâ arbitramur intereſſe.

THERE are ſome that adviſe our fixing a ſtrong Attention upon what we find in our ſelves that is faulty, and to paſs haſtily over what is deſerving, under the Notion that this Precaution may ſerve to moderate the Inclination we find to value our ſelves too much, and to prefer our ſelves to others. This Advice may have its Uſes: But if we find that it is too difficult to proportion our Attention in this manner, and to meaſure with this Exactneſs the Degrees which we may give to the Good with thoſe which we ought to reſerve for the Bad, we may attain to the ſame End, and even avoid with greater Eaſe the dangerous Conſequences of our Eſteem for our ſelves, provided, that amongſt the Qualities which we eſteem, we eſteem moſt thoſe that are actually the moſt deſerving our Eſteem, and without which we ſhould not have the leaſt Reaſon in the World to think well of our ſelves: Theſe Qualities are Attention, Circumſpection, Moderation, and Diffidence in our ſelves. He who knows theſe, and is convinced that they are the Source of every Thing that is true in our Thoughts, and regular in our Actions, will take care never to be without them: He will continue to keep himſelf attentive, circumſpect, moderate, and diffident of his firſt Thoughts, and of his firſt Inclinations: He will not give way to them, nor purſue them, till he has firſt ſtrictly examined them; and the more Satisfaction he receives from the happy Conſequences of this Attention and this Diſtruſt, the more will he be confirm'd in the Reſolution of never determining any Thing haſtily, and of never preſuming upon his Capacity, or Probity, or Underſtanding.

VIRTUE can never be an Enemy to Truth; and no body ſhall ever perſwade me that there is any Merit in deceiving our ſelves. We ought not indeed to affect any Thing; and it is equally extravagant to imagine, that *Virtue totters when once we begin to eſteem it, and that it cloaths it ſelf with the Appearance of Faults to avoid Preſumption.* We muſt not become a bad Example, by the Appearance of Faults, to prevent an exceſſive Love of our ſelves; which is ſo ſtrange a Precaution, that even this would make us prouder of our ſelves than any Thing.

IF we deſpiſe our ſelves too much, we are injurious to our Maker, in not ſufficiently eſteeming his Preſent. *Non eſt vilis ſibi, quia ſcit ſe ſuum non eſſe.* The Wiſe Man knows he is not his own Property; and therefore takes care not to deſpiſe what belongs to God, and is his Work.

Sen. de Tranq. An. cap. 11.

THE

THE Miſtakes which are owing to Self-love, do not ariſe barely from our loving our ſelves, and ſeeking to procure to our ſelves Pleaſures and Advantages, but from our ill Choice of the Objects from which we expect to procure them.

The Manner of eſteeming our ſelves.

III. IN Self-love, and in general in all ſorts of Love, we ought to diſtinguiſh two Acts, which tho' they conſtantly go together, are yet entirely diſtinct. Theſe two Acts in Self-love are, *to eſteem our ſelves*, and *to wiſh our ſelves well.* Both the one and the other may be well or ill regulated: There are a great many People that love themſelves they know not why. They would not change their Condition with any body elſe; they would do this, and they would ſuffer that: With them, to ſay themſelves, is to ſay every Thing: They love and eſteem themſelves, you muſt expect no other Reaſon from them. It is thus that Fools eſteem themſelves.

WE ſee others whoſe blind Extravagance goes ſo far as to publiſh their Vices, and make a boaſt of their Faults. (*c*) The Eſteem which they have conceived for themſelves, without knowing why, is ſo exceſſive, that it extends it ſelf to every Thing that belongs to them. Perhaps they may pleaſe themſelves with thinking that what diſgraces others, is drowned in them by the reſt of their excellent Qualities, and no Detriment in the leaſt to their Merit. They congratulate themſelves upon the imaginary Privilege of being the only Perſons that are in the Right, and not to be contradicted.

ONE Part of Mankind therefore eſteem themſelves without knowing why: They eſteem themſelves, becauſe it is agreeable to them ſo to do. And of thoſe who ſeek to have the Pleaſure of eſteeming themſelves with ſome Reaſon, or at leaſt with ſome Appearance of Reaſon, the greateſt Part uſe their Eyes ſo ill, that every Thing appears valuable which they ſee in themſelves. If there be but few that go ſo far as to admire their Vices, almoſt every body excuſes and palliates them; and if they cannot change them into Virtues, they yet honour with that Name the moſt indifferent Inclinations, and all the Conſequences of their Humour and Temperament. The Virtues which they want, are not in their Eyes very neceſſary; thoſe which they have, or believe themſelves to have, are the eſſential Virtues.

ONE

(*c*) Vitia noſtra quia amamus, defendimus, & malumus excuſare illa quàm excutere. *Sen.*

ONE admires his Strength; and to keep up his Pride, has no occaſion for any other Quality. Another is charm'd with his Beauty and good Addreſs, and contents himſelf with theſe. Thoſe who have not ſo much Reaſon to be pleas'd with their Bodies, find ſome Excellency in their Minds: A Fineneſs and Subtilty of Thought, an extenſive Memory, and a Readineſs of Expreſſion in the Mind of thoſe that poſſeſs them, paſs for the moſt excellent Qualifications.

A GREAT many have little or no Value for Memory, Subtilty, Eloquence, Vigour and Gracefulneſs: Theſe are what they are too cunning to examine themſelves upon, being very ſenſible that ſuch Examinations are uſeleſs: The Externals which ſurround them, their Riches, Titles, and Dignities, are the Mirrors which they look at themſelves in. A Man of Wealth, who wants the Advantage of Birth, looks upon Nobility as a Chimera, and thinks the true Diſtinction amongſt Men to be founded upon Riches. A Gentleman without Fortune, on the contrary, knows nothing more glorious than the Privileges of Birth, nothing pleaſes and delights him ſo much as the running over in his Mind his Anceſtors, whoſe Name he inherits.

IF you were to hear the Reaſonings of all theſe ſeveral People, they all terminate in this; I will eſteem my ſelf, therefore I deſerve to be eſteemed; I will think my ſelf ſuperior to all others, therefore what I find in my ſelf is more valuable than what I ſee in them.

LASTLY, There are ſome who know true Merit, and who give Attention to the Qualities of their Minds, to regulate their Eſteem of them; and theſe do not all proceed alike. Some of them give to their good Qualities no more than their juſt Value, eſteem them no farther than they deſerve, and confine themſelves within the Bounds of Truth and Modeſty. When they examine themſelves, they ſet the Ill which they diſcover in themſelves againſt the Good, turning their Eyes upon the one as well as upon the other. Others on the contrary, not liking to ſee their Faults, content themſelves with perceiving what they have that is valuable, and not only ſo, but they even magnify and heighten this, by the flattering Compariſons they make of themſelves with others.

A CERTAIN Sign of our not having truly regulated our Eſteem of our ſelves, is, the Humour of being perpetually ſpeaking of our ſelves. It is a Demonſtration of our being full of it, when we ſee nothing in our ſelves but what pleaſes, and when we think it a Favour to believe others have any thing like the good Taſte which we have our ſelves.

THIS

THIS is a Fault which reigns amongſt the Great; but it is a Fault for which their Inferiors are very reſponſible. For as each of them aims principally to pleaſe thoſe upon whom his Fortune depends, he entertains his Superiors with nothing but themſelves, and with ſuch Events as they have had a Share in. If they would forget themſelves, it is not poſſible they ſhould, becauſe it is the conſtant Endeavour of others to remind them continually of what they have ſaid and done. Theſe never liſten to them with ſo much Earneſtneſs, as when they make themſelves the Subject of their Diſcourſe: But it is good for them to conſider, that thoſe that give the greateſt Attention to them, are the firſt to expoſe and ridicule them.

TO take this Matter right, we are not at all more unreaſonable in ſpeaking of our ſelves, than in ſpeaking of others, provided we do it but ſeaſonably, and conformably to Truth. But a wiſe Man chuſes rather to abſtain from ſpeaking of himſelf when he has a juſt Occaſion, than to run the Riſque of ſpeaking more than he ought; and as a juſt Averſion for ſuch preſumptuous Wits, who determine boldly upon every Thing, as well upon thoſe Things which they do not underſtand, as upon thoſe which they do, oftentimes occaſions reaſonable Perſons to propoſe Truths, which they are very well aſſured of, with as much Modeſty, as tho' they were doubtful. So likewiſe a Man who is an Enemy to Vanity, expreſſes himſelf upon what he has already acquired and obtain'd, as tho' he was only about to acquire it. For fear of eſteeming our ſelves beyond our juſt Value, and falling into the Nets of Flattery, where the Tongue always goes before the Thought, we ſhould never forget this fine Maxim of *Seneca*'s, *Neminem tanti ab alio, quanti à ſeipſo æſtimari:* "We ſhould be ſure "that others have as good an Opinion of us, as we have of "our ſelves."

TO regulate truly the Eſteem which we ought to have of our ſelves, we ſhould give as much Attention to our Faults, as to our good Qualities: I dare even ſay that we ought to give a greater, becauſe our good Qualities engage our Attention to them, and fix it by the Pleaſure which we find in ſeeing them; whereas if we do not take ſome Pains to ſupport it, it is immediately diverted from the Sight of our Imperfections. To take notice only of our Advantages, in order to judge by this means of our Worth, is juſt the ſame Fault, as if in computing the Wealth of a Man, we ſhould only

only reckon up what is in his Poſſeſſion, without taking any Account of what he owes. (*d*)

A MAN of Merit has a clear Underſtanding, and knows as well what he wants, as what he has: But a Man of Vanity flatters himſelf, attributes to himſelf what he has not, and ſees not what he wants: He is more ſatisfied with an imagined Merit, than he would be with a real one, if it were to fall ſhort of his vain Ideas.

The Advantage and Diſadvantage of Self-love.

IV. AS to the good Things which we wiſh for, and endeavour to procure, Self-Love truly enlightned inclines to the Solid, and when blinded to the Superfluous. The Love of our ſelves makes us wiſh for two Things; for excellent Qualities, and for an agreeable Senſe of them. And as the moſt ſolid Satisfaction is the Effect or Conſequence of the moſt perfect Diſpoſitions; and as the moſt accompliſh'd Condition, with reſpect to Knowledge and Virtue, is always attended with the moſt exquiſite Reliſh; we ought firſt to make it our Buſineſs to enlighten and reform our ſelves; and the Love of our ſelves ſhould immediately ſollicit us to an Improvement in Wiſdom and Goodneſs. From theſe Acquirements will naturally, and of themſelves, ariſe the moſt agreeable Sentiments.

INSTEAD

(*d*) Contra totius Generis humani opiniones mittenda vox erat: Inſanitis, erratis, ſtupetis ad ſupervacua, neminem æſtimatis ſuo. Cum ad patrimonium ventum eſt, diligentiſſimi computatores, ſic rationem ponitis ſingulorum: quibus aut pecuniam crediturî eſtis, aut beneficia: (nam hæc quoque jam expenſa fertis.) Latè poſſidet, ſed multum debet: habet domum formoſam, ſed alienis nummis paratam: familiam nemo citò ſpecioſiorem producet, ſed nominibus non reſpondet. Si creditoribus ſolverit, nihil illi ſupererit. Idem in reliquis quoque facere debebatis, excutere quantum proprii quiſque habeat. Divitem illum putas, quia aurea ſupellex etiam in viâ eum ſequitur, quia in omnibus provinciis arat, quia magnus calendarii liber volvitur, quia tantum ſuburbani agri poſſidet, quantum invidioſè in deſertis Apuliæ poſſideret: Cum omnia dixeris, pauper eſt; quare? quia debet. Quantum, inquis? Omnia; niſi fortè judices intereſſe, utrum aliquis ab homine, an à Fortunâ mutuum ſumpſerit. Quid ad rem pertinent Mulæ ſaginatæ, unius omnes coloris? Quid iſta vehicula cælata?

---- Inſtrati oſtro alipedes, pictiſque tapetis,
Aurea pectoribus demiſſa monilia pendent.
Tecti auro fulvum mandunt ſub dentibus aurum.

Iſta nec dominum meliorem poſſunt facere, nec mulam. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXVII.

INSTEAD of this, our firſt Care is to procure agreeable Sentiments. This Eagerneſs inclines and confines us to the Pleaſures of the Senſes, becauſe they preſent themſelves firſt. By this means our Blindneſs encreaſes; theſe Pleaſures ſtupify and divert us from Truth; and being altogether taken up with Senſations, we know not how to regulate our ſelves by Ideas. Beſides this, the Pleaſure which we find in admiring our ſelves, and in believing that we have Reaſon ſo to do, makes us join an Idea of Eſteem with whatſoever gives Pleaſure, and add a Value to whatſoever occaſions in us an agreeable Determination. This is an inexhauſtible Spring of Prepoſſeſſions, and of ill-match'd Ideas.

FROM the ſame Principle, from this too eager Inclination to Pleaſures, ariſes alſo this fatal Delicacy, and this obſtinate Repugnancy, which we naturally find to every Thing that gives Trouble, and which is not to be obtain'd without Difficulty. A *Self-love*, rightly inform'd, *animates* us to *Labour*, ſupports our Application, and makes us think the Pains nothing, by the Attention it gives to the Advantages which theſe Pains will procure. But if inſtead of reaſoning, and being conducted by Knowledge, we determine our ſelves only by Senſation, as moſt Men do, we ſhall always incline to what is eaſy, in preference to that which is difficult.

THESE two *prima Mobilia*, the *Inclination to Pleaſure*, and *the Averſion to Pain*, are not ſo inſeparable, but that they may be found ſometimes in Oppoſition. There are Caſes where they poſſeſs the Heart at the ſame Time; and there are others where they reign by Turns, and ſucceed one another. This is the Cauſe of thoſe Contradictions ſo frequently to be met with in the Conduct of Man. Sometimes he buys his Pleaſures by Labour, and ſometimes he ſacrifices his Pleaſures to his Averſion for Pain.

WE ſhall always live miſerable ſo long as we are ſubject to ſo many Contradictions. In order to be Happy we muſt be in perfect Agreement with our ſelves

THESE two Principles are united in thoſe that paſs their Lives in Pleaſure and Amuſement: But ſometimes we are ſo terrified at Pain, that the greateſt Intereſts in the World ſollicit us to it in vain; and ſometimes, again, the Violence of a Paſſion does not allow us to take the leaſt Repoſe or Eaſe.

THE Eagerneſs which we have to become happy, makes us take the firſt Means towards it that offer themſelves, without previouſly conſidering what may contribute moſt to our Happineſs; ſo that we might more eaſily make our ſelves happy, if we made leſs haſte to become ſo.

THE

THE *Principles* in the Soul are the *Seeds of Knowledge*: We cannot give too much Attention to them, or make them too familiar to us; it is by this Application that they become active and fruitful: But as they have nothing Attracting, we have no Reliſh for them, and ſo paſs lightly over them: They are eaſy to comprehend, and alſo eaſy to recollect; but becauſe they are ſimple, inſtead of making lively Impreſſions, they affect us but weakly; and if we do but give the leaſt Attention to them poſſible, we are yet apt to think it ſo much Time loſt. Thus for want of conſidering and attending to them, they become almoſt uſeleſs; they do not preſent themſelves when we have occaſion for them, and we are at a Loſs for all thoſe Conſequences which might be drawn from them. We do not only not benefit ſufficiently by the true Principles, but for want of taking ſome Pains to know them, we often embrace the falſe, becauſe they have ſome Appearance of Truth; and the more we build upon them, the more we heap Error upon Error. Theſe are the Fruits of Impatience, which hinders us from attending to thoſe Things for which we have not naturally a ſufficient Reliſh.

ALTHO' Mathematicians are eſteemed the moſt exact of all Men of Letters, yet even they ſometimes are too tedious in their Demonſtrations, and ſometimes draw them from from falſe Principles: Their Impatience to advance prevents their attending ſufficiently to their Principles; they do not apply themſelves with Induſtry enough to confirm themſelves in an Habit of Simplicity; they are not ſenſible of its value, but prefer in their Works every Thing that ſeems labour'd and intricate, as like to do moſt honour to its Author. It is by having firſt taken the Pains to underſtand ſuch complicated Demonſtrations, that we come to admire the Abilities of one that demonſtrates the ſame Truths in a few Words, by deducing them from the moſt ſimple Principles.

THE Philoſophers do every Moment, upon the particular Phænomena of Nature, indulge themſelves in Conjectures, which however ingenious, are not at all ſolid, becauſe they agree not with the Nature of Body, or that of Motion. But they paſs lightly over theſe Principles, and form only uncertain and ſuperficial Ideas of them, becauſe they haſten to Particulars with Precipitation and Eagerneſs. It is the ſame in Morals: If after having exactly eſtabliſhed the true Definitions of Nature and Virtue; after having clearly diſcover'd the true Foundations by which we are to diſtinguiſh Mens Actions into good, bad, and indifferent, we ſhou'd accuſtom our ſelves to make a juſt and immediate Application

tion of these Principles to all our particular Actions, to discern what is convenient for us to do, from what is otherwise, I do not at all doubt but we should forbear to confound with our Duties those extravagant Maxims, those superstitious Customs, those useless Ceremonies, which are even as slavish and troublesome as they are useless, by which Men clogg and make the Way to Heaven more difficult, and without advancing at all in it themselves, do yet keep others out of it.

WE do not attend sufficiently to the Principles; and so by despising their Simplicity, deprive our selves of the Consequences that flow from them: But for the same Reason, one would think we should at least have a Relish for Particulars: They furnish us with a pleasing Variety; and he that makes himself Master of some of them, finds he knows something. But these Particulars cost too much Pains, and we love nothing but Ease and Pleasure. It is nothing to know Things only in the Gross: To receive the Fruits of our Studies, we must enter into Particulars. But these Particulars are long and difficult, and therefore few apply themselves to them.

WE make a great Account of the Course of Logic, of Morality, of Natural Philosophy, *&c.* which lays down perfectly all the chief Heads of them, but does nothing else besides laying them down. We applaud our selves under the Notion of being compleat Masters of a Science, because we have form'd some uncertain Ideas of all the Parts of which it treats: But if we stop here, what Fruit can we receive from them? what Use can we make of these uncertain Ideas? We know in the Gross, for Example, that Colours arise from the Modifications and Motions of the Rays of Light; but so long as we do not know the particular Mode and Motion which forms each Colour, we shall be incapable of explaining the Phænomena that affect us every Moment. We know also in the Gross, and it has been proved to us, that we must not revenge an Injury; and that we must love our Neighbour as our selves: But if we do not understand that Love and Revenge are very complicated Acts; that the Sentiments which concur to form these Passions are of different Kinds, and are sometimes united, and at other times separated; that certain Circumstances may forbid all of them, others enjoin all of them, and others again only forbid or enjoin part of them; if all these Particulars are not distinctly known, we shall run the Hazard of being often deceiv'd, and of miscalling the Acts of Justice, and the Precautions of Prudence, by the Name of Revenge, and of making the

Want of Charity pass for the Perfection of Zeal. Toleration and Compassion for those that deceive themselves in Matters of Religion, pass with a great many People for a loose Indifference, and is, in their Opinion, carrying the Love of our Neighbour too far. We see some, on the contrary, who complain that we do not love them so much as we ought; that we treat them too unkindly and unequally, in preferring to them those who do indeed, by their Knowledge and Virtue, actually deserve to be preferr'd to them. When our Ideas are not perfectly clear and distinct, when we do not know how to apply general Principles to particular Cases, and when we have not considered our Duties in their utmost Extent, the Passions very easily play their Game, and by the Favour of the Darkness which they spread over us, they turn our uncertain Ideas which Way they please.

Precautions against Self-love.

V. The usual Weakness of Men in approving, admiring, and loving every Thing in such Objects as have once gain'd their Affection, is more particularly remarkable in the Love which they are prepossess'd with for themselves. A great Means of curing this Weakness, is to reflect attentively upon the ridiculous Effects of it in others; but then those Reflections must be made only with a View of guarding our selves against it. Every one almost follows the Direction of a Taste, which he can justify upon no other Reason than that it is his own: Every one almost is charm'd with his own particular Stile and Method. Do we ever meet with a Poet who reckons many superior to him? (*e*) Is there ever an Orator that does not regard his own Thrash, as the most sublime Production of his Pen? Let us study to look upon our selves with the same Eye as we look upon others, for fear of giving them a just Occasion to look upon us with the same Eye we look upon them.

It is visibly our Interest not to be mistaken in the Choice of such Objects, in the Possession of which we seek for Happiness, and, by consequence, the Love of our selves engages us to examine them with all the Precaution imaginable. When once any End appears to be convenient for us, it is farther our Interest to see if it is actually worth all the Trouble we must necessarily take to obtain it: If it deserves our Pains, the Love of our selves, that is to say, of our own proper Interest, will determine us to think them nothing, and to undergo them readily. We need only therefore begin by a

(*e*) Suum cuique pulchrum est: Adhuc neminem cognosci Poëtam qui sibi non optimus videretur: sic se res habet, te tua, me delectant mea. *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. Lib.* V.

a ſtrict Examination, by conſulting Evidence, and by determining our ſelves according to Knowledge; and with theſe precautions Self-love will be of very great Service

THOSE who neglect ſuch Precautions, and think after another manner, that is to ſay, the Groſs of Mankind, deliver themſelves up immediately to ſenſual Pleaſures, and from thence grow preſently covetous of Riches, which ſerve to procure them. They at laſt aim at Glory, which pleaſes of it ſelf, and at the ſame time leads to Riches, as Riches reciprocally in their Turn lead to Glory. Theſe are, as all the World knows, the three great Objects of our Deſires; and becauſe they are alſo three Sources of Error, it properly belongs to Logic to treat of them, in order to preſerve our Minds from their fatal Influences.

VI. We have already treated of the Miſtakes we are apt to be led into by our Inclinations to Pleaſures, and have propoſed the neceſſary Means and Precautions to prevent them, under the Head of Temperaments. A Man who is, by his Inclination to the Pleaſures of the Senſes, carried away from the Application he ought to make to the Pleaſures of the Mind, that is to ſay, to the Knowledge of Truth, the Poſſeſſion of Wiſdom, the Practice of our Duty, will rarely render himſelf attentive, and frequently fall into Miſcarriages. His prevailing Inclination recalling him perpetually to the Pleaſures of the Body, will not give him Time enough to form exact Ideas of any thing whatſoever; and this Confuſion will ſpread it ſelf every Day more and more, ſo that it will be impoſſible for him ever to arrive at any true Knowledge. The little Pleaſure he will find in ſeeking what he does not love, not allowing him Time enough for the finding it, he will content himſelf with his firſt Conjectures, and will decide raſhly, and haſten to conclude, to be excuſed the Trouble of a longer Examination. *Of the Love of pleaſures.*

BUT after a Man has once taſted the ſolid Pleaſures, after he has once known the true Advantages, and is ſo well confirmed in them, as to find himſelf in his Element; whenever he endeavours to inform and regulate himſelf by the Light of Reaſon, it will then be proper to add the Acceſſary to the Principal, and to make ſome Allowance to the Deſires of the Senſes, and not to deſpiſe Recreations. (*f*)

By

(*f*) Naſcitur ex aſſiduitate laborum, animorum habetatio quædam & languor: nec ad hoc tanta hominum cupiditas tenderet, niſi naturalem quandam voluptatem haberet Luſus Jocuſque. *Sen. de Tranq. Anim. Cap.* 15.

By this, the Body will maintain it ſelf in Vigour, and the Mind will perceive its Activity, as we have elſewhere ſhewn. When the Mind wants Fruitfulneſs, as it confines it ſelf to a few Ideas, not only its Knowledge will not be advanced, but it will eaſily fall into Prepoſſeſſion and Obſtinacy, and compoſe narrow Syſtems, and reject every Thing which they do not include.

BESIDES this, the Averſion to Pleaſure weighing down the Body, will throw it into a gloomy Humour, and make it unfit for the Converſation either of thoſe that are inclined to Mirth, or of thoſe that are inclined to Melancholy: For the firſt will be made uneaſy by ſuch Converſation, and the laſt will be confirm'd in their Error; ſo that he will quickly fall into all the Inconveniences that are the Conſequence of an extreme Retirement, and which we have already treated of. The languid Imagination of Men of this Stamp giving no Fire to their Diſcourſe, the Attention of their Audience will not be excited, and conſequently little Improvement can be made by their Inſtructions. They therefore become uſeleſs, and not only ſo, but alſo hurtful, and diſcouraging to all thoſe that do not find themſelves born to Auſterity and Contradiction. They are the Cauſe that the Sciences are eſteem'd the Sponge of Politeneſs: They fright away by their Gloomineſs thoſe that would have the Curioſity to ſtudy them; and whenever they endeavour to ſoften themſelves, they differ ſo greatly from their uſual Character, and appear ſo intolerably affected, that we find them as deſpicable in their Fawning, as odious in their Auſterity. A Man of this Temper, eaſily becomes cenſorious: He imagines himſelf to hate Vice, becauſe he loves to cenſure it: He eſteems an unreaſonable Humour for a Virtue. *(g)*

THERE

Quædam enim, etiamſi in ſummam rei parva ſunt, ut & ſubduci ſine ruinâ principalis boni poſſint, adjiciunt tamen aliquid ad perpetuam lætitiam, & ex virtute naſcentem. Sic illum afficiunt divitiæ, & exhilarant, ut navigantem ſecundus & ferens ventus, ut dies bonus, ut in brumâ ac frigore apricus locus. Quis porro ſapientum, noſtrorum dico, quibus unum eſt bonum virtus, negat etiam hæc quæ indifferentia vocamus, habere in ſe aliquid pretii, & alia aliis eſſe potiora. *Sen. de Vit. Beat. Cap.* 22.

(g) Sicut ſapiens nullum denarium intra limen ſuum admittet, male intrantem; ita & magnas opes, munus fortunæ, fructumque Virtutis, non repudiabit, nec excludet. Quid enim eſt, quare illis bonum locum invideat? veniant, hoſpitentur. Nec jactabit illas, nec

THERE are ſome therefore whoſe Hearts are wholly taken up with ſenſible Objects. They take Pleaſure in theſe alone: And as to Knowledge and Virtue, if ever they take Pains to acquire them, it muſt be by continual Efforts upon themſelves, and by the Purſuit of ſerious Reflections to which they are ſollicited with great Reluctance. We ſee others, on the contrary, who having accuſtomed themſelves to abſtain from the Recreations of the Senſes, do ſo entirely break off Commerce with external Objects, that you would think them ſhut up within themſelves as in a ſort of a Priſon. (*h*) The Medium betwixt theſe two Extremities ought to be made choice

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nec abſcondet; alterum infruniti animi eſt, alterum timidi & puſilli, velut magnum bonum intra ſinum continentis. Nec, ut dixi, ejiciet illas è domo. Quid enim dicet? Utrumne, Inutiles eſtis; an, Ego uti divitiis neſcio: Quemadmodum etiam ſi pedibus ſuis poterit iter conficere, aſcendere tamen vehiculum malet: ſic ſi poterit eſſe dives, volet: & habebit utique opes, ſed tanquàm leves & avolaturas: nec ulli alii, nec ſibi graves eſſe patietur. *Id. ibid. Cap.* 23.

(*h*) "It is the ſpecious and ſettled Opinion of thoſe that would appear learned, and Profeſſors of ſingular Sanctity, to deſpiſe and trample under Foot all ſorts of Pleaſures in general, and all Improvements of the Body, withdrawing the Mind to it ſelf, without allowing any Commerce with the Body, and raiſing it to higher Objects, ſo as to paſs this Life, as it were, inſenſibly, and without reliſhing or giving any Attention to it. To this ſort of People, the common Phraſe of *paſſing their Time* agrees perfectly well; for they imagine themſelves to make a perfect good Uſe and Application of this Life, in letting it ſlide and paſs away; and, as it were, in ſtealing themſelves and withdrawing from it, as tho' it were ſomething wretched, burdenſome, and grievous; and are ſo careful in ſhunning and declining the World, that not only the Converſation, Recreation, and Paſtimes of it, but even the natural Neceſſities, which God has encouraged by Pleaſures annex'd, appear diſagreeable, and odious to them. They never ſubmit to them without Reluctance; and whilſt they are forced to attend to them, they always keep their Mind exerciſed in ſomething elſe; ſo that, in ſhort, Life is a Pain to them, and Death a Comfort, according to that unnatural Sentence, *Vitam habere in patientiâ, Mortem in Deſiderio*. But the Extravagance of this Opinion may be made to appear ſeveral Ways: Firſt, There is nothing ſo beautiful and reaſonable, as to act the Part of a Man well, and to go through this Life decently and as we ought to do. It is a divine and very difficult Task, to know how to enjoy our Being in a proper Manner, and to conduct our ſelves according to the Laws of Nature and our own preſent Circumſtances, without ſeeking for any others. All theſe Extravagancies, all theſe artificial and ſtudied Efforts, theſe Lives ſo contrary to Nature, ariſe from Folly and Paſſion: They would throw aſide the Infirmities of Mankind, and become Conjurers, and they become Fools." *Charron of Wiſdom*

choice of. This Medium is to esteem the Advantages of the Mind above all, to be pefectly sensible of their Excellence, and to think nothing equal to them, or to bear any Proportion to them: It is also to love the Pleasures of the Body, but very far below those of the Mind, whose Taste and Value they are only intended to heighten, and to support it by this Means in a Condition of pursuing its true Interests with more Liberty and Activity, and, consequently, with more Success.

If we are upon our Guard, and truly apprehensive of being deceiv'd, we shall easily perceive the Difference we ought to make betwixt these two sorts of Objects. Do we not love a great many Things in very different Degrees? We love a full Consort of Musick much better than the Sound of any one single Instrument; and yet we love sometimes to hear one Instrument by it self. We prefer a Palace to a small Country Seat; and yet we sometimes quit the first for the Pleasure of the latter. The meaner Pleasures owe their Value to this Difference, and serve to heighen the greater ones which they are made to succeed.

We need only consult Experience, and how little soever we assist it with our Reflections, it will presently teach us what we have to do. We are made neither solely, nor principally for the Pleasures of the Senses; for if we abandon our selves entirely to them, it will cost us too dear, and it will cost us also too dear to moderate them. (*i*)

On the other side; He that has no Taste but for the Pleasures of the Mind, he that forgets the Care of his Body by his Eagerness to enrich his Soul with Knowledge, will presently put himself out of the Condition of enlarging his Knowledge. Our Strength will instruct us in the Extent of our Duty: To undertake more than we are able, is an Effect of Ignorance or Vanity, or rather of both at once.

Of the Love of Riches.

VII. A Man that is rich, and by this means exempt from a thousand Cares to which Men are naturally subject, finds himself at liberty to bestow what Time he pleases upon the Improvement of his Mind, and is in Possession of all the necessary Help towards it, as Books, Voyages, and Experiments. All these are expensive; and how many excellent Genius's have liv'd in Obscurity, who would have done an Honour to the Sciences, as well as to their Name and their Country, if their Fortune

(*i*) "I would not have the Pleasure of going abroad take away the "Pleasure of retiring within my self: On the contrary, I find that they "maintain and improve one another." *Mont. Book* III. *Ch.* 9.

Fortune had been better. It would therefore be very wrong to deſpiſe Riches, becauſe it is extravagant to propoſe any End, and to neglect the Means that ſerve to obtain it.

WE ſhall be no longer ſurpriſed at the little Progreſs Mankind have made in Knowledge, or at the Obſcurity under which the Sciences do ſtill labour after ſo many Ages, if we do but once reflect upon the mean Circumſtances of thoſe who have had the Care of them, and upon the Wants they live under, to the eternal Diſgrace of thoſe who have it in their Power to put them in a Condition of purſuing them with greater Succeſs. A poor Man, who, for an Addition to his Misfortune, ſees himſelf ſurrounded with a Family, which he has very much ado to maintain, how can he arrive to any great Pitch of Learning! Can he examine his Thoughts? Will his Neceſſities allow him any ſpare Time? Whilſt he is overwhelm'd with Cares, can he be in a Condition to reflect upon Matters of Theory, and to poliſh theſe Reflections, and ſet them in their beſt Light? That he may more readily perſwade and pleaſe, he is reduced to read but little, and to follow blindly what he ſees eſtabliſh'd by others. A Man under Poverty is too much overwhelm'd with the Senſe of his Wants, not only to think agreeably, but even to think juſtly. He follows what he finds eſtabliſh'd, and makes Profeſſion of the Sentiments to which he owes his Livelihood.

INTO what Ignorance, groſs Errors, and Brutiſhneſs, muſt a Man plunge himſelf by ſubmitting himſelf thus, without Examination or Diſtinction, to whatever he finds receiv'd? Every Age adds ſome new Miſtake to thoſe that are already authorized by Cuſtom: The New mix themſelves with, and ſlip inſenſibly amongſt the Old. Theſe Errors are not even always in Agreement amongſt themſelves. Thus we blindly receive Heaps of Extravagancies and Contradictions: We have Eyes on purpoſe not to ſee.

BUT under the Pretence that Riches have their Uſes, an infinite Number of People ſpend their Lives in the purſuit of them, without ever making them ſubſervient to the Ends for which they are appointed. To make the Means the End, is an uſual Miſtake; and how groſs ſoever it be, we are not willing to diſcover it, becauſe we ſhould be too much aſhamed to be ſo impoſed upon, and to confeſs ſo much to our ſelves. The greateſt Part of Mankind therefore love Riches, and are eager in the Purſuit of them, upon Principles quite different from thoſe that make them truly amiable. From our firſt Infancy we are accuſtomed to ſee Men labouring almoſt continually to become rich; we ſee them appear chearful or

ſad, haughty or humble, in Proportion as they meet with Succeſs or Diſappointments. The Attention to procure Wiſdom and Knowledge is no where to be ſeen; but the Endeavours to heap up Riches are every where before our Eyes. If we judge therefore of Mankind by what we ſee, we muſt believe they make Riches their capital Concern; and with reſpect to the Majority we ſhall not be miſtaken. Hence we regulate our ſelves by Example, and live by Imitation, and uſe our ſelves to make that our principal End which we ſee every Body elſe purſuing.

WHEN our Reaſon is once cleared up, and we are a little better inſtructed in what we ought, and ought not to do; if we ſhou'd be asked concerning our Eſteem for Riches, whether we make them our End, or only the Means that conduce to a better, our Anſwer will be not only comformable to our real Thoughts and Sentiments which we ſhall then have, but alſo to ſuch Thoughts and Sentiments as we ought to have. And as we are not apt to take too much Pains to know our ſelves to the bottom, but rather to perſwade our ſelves eaſily in whatever pleaſes us, and to give our ſelves up preſently to whatever flatters us, we ſhall ſoon believe our ſelves actually to be, what our Anſwer will ſhew it our Duty to be. By this Deceit a Man will always have the Pleaſure of proceeding in his own Pace, and of following his prevailing Inclination, without once thinking of examining it, and much leſs of correcting it; nor will his Reaſon, to which he has the Satisfaction to believe himſelf entirely conformable, ever reproach him.

BUT if Men were ſuch as they profeſs themſelves, and even if they were ſuch as they believe themſelves, I don't know whether there would be one covetous Man, at leaſt there would be very few; for who is there that confeſſes he makes Riches his principal Object and Aim? But without amuſing our ſelves with hearing Men, when they ſpeak a Language which deceives themſelves firſt, let us conſult their Conduct with a greater Attention than they are uſed to do themſelves. Fathers have uſually more at Heart to find Knowledge and Wiſdom in their Children, than to acquire it themſelves. The Underſtanding and Virtue of their Children do honour to them, without putting them under any Reſtraints, and coſting them any Pains. And yet with Regard to theſe Children, whoſe Education they ſeem to have ſo much at Heart, which do they think on moſt ſeriouſly, which are they moſt uneaſy about, and which do they take moſt Care of? Their Externals, or their Internals?

their

their Probity, or their Fortune? They very quietly resign to others the whole Care of their Education and Conduct; but do themselves continually labour to procure them a good Settlement in the World. What Zeal do they shew for those who are able to contribute towards it? and what Acknowledgements do they make to those that do contribute towards it? We may say, in truth, that it is with this View they bestow so much Care of their Education; and that this is the End of all the Expences they are at in forming their Heart and Understanding. For they hear of the Progress they make with more or less Satisfaction, and excuse their Negligence with more or less Readiness, according as, by the Condition of their Birth and Estate, they have more or less Need of the Assistance of others, or of advancing themselves by their own Merit, in order to make a Figure in the World.

A FATHER sees that he cannot leave all his Children rich; he has too many of them, and therefore must needs think of giving them an Education, which may supply the Smallness of their Inheritance. But if he finds himself in a Condition to establish them in Wealth and Honours by his own sole Power, he then thinks of nothing more than to secure their Health, and make them live agreeably: Wisdom and Knowledge would be superfluous Helps; the good Fortune of their Birth exempts them from these Wants. As we endeavour to supply Riches by Merit, so also we take it for granted, that Riches in their Turn will supply Merit.

WE ought to think quite otherwise. A Man of an obscure Birth, lives in Obscurity, and scarce are his Faults known to his Neighbours: He need take no care of them; for he will have no occasion to have them seen any more than his Virtues, if he had any. But all the World have their Eyes upon a Great Man; and it is absolutely necessary for him either to be greatly honoured or dishonoured in the Eyes not only of honest Men, but in general in the Eyes of all such as are not prepossessed. Their Vices, or their Virtues, have too great an Influence, and are conspicuous either to their Shame, or to their Glory.

CHILDREN enter absolutely into the Mind of those to whom they owe their Birth and Education: (*k*) Their only

(*k*) Admirationem nobis Parentes auri argentique fecerunt: & teneris infusa cupiditas altiùs sedit, crevitque nobiscum. Deinde totus populus in alia discors, in hoc convenit: hoc suspiciunt, hoc suis optant, hoc Diis

only View is to make their internal Riches ſerve to acquire the External: Their Zeal for Knowledge and Goodneſs is in proportion to the Pitch of Fortune they aſpire to. He who aims at the higheſt Employments, and greateſt Places, takes all poſſible Pains to obtain ſome uncommon Excellencies: He who contents himſelf with lower Views, is ſatisfied with a ſlighter Tincture, and does not give himſelf that Trouble. They apply themſelves to the Sciences that are moſt eſteemed, rather than to thoſe that deſerve to be moſt eſteemed; and in their Studies, they chuſe not that whic his moſt excellent, but that which is moſt faſhionable, and moſt likely to advance them: They are prepoſſeſſed preſently for thoſe Opinions which they cannot relinquiſh, without giving themſelves up to Poverty, or abandoning ſome great Expectations: They never reſt till they have given them ſome plauſible Turn; and as ſoon as ever they appear on any ſide tolerable, they lay hold of them immediately, and think no more of others; they avoid ſeeing them in any other Light, than that which pleaſes them. They regard at the ſame time with Averſion, all ſuch Sentiments as cannot be embraced without coſting too much; they diſguiſe them, they ſhut their Eyes againſt the Brightneſs of them, they conceal what they contain that is true, evident, and deſerving, and turn them on all ſides ſo long, till at laſt they believe they have found ſome weak and obſcure Place, on which account they may ſafely be rejected.

UPON theſe Principles, Men change their Sentiments, as their Intereſts change. When a new Fortune, and a new Point of View makes them ſee Objects in a different Light from what they have appeared in before, they love to think that

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Diis velut rerum humanarum maximum, cum grati videri volunt, conſecrant. Denique eò Mores redacti ſunt, ut paupertas maledicto probroque ſit, contempta divitibus, inviſa pauperibus. Accedunt inde carmina Poëtarum, quæ affectibus noſtris facem ſubdant, quibus divitiæ velut unicum vitæ decus ornamentumque laudantur. Nihil illis melius nec dare videntur Dii immortales poſſe, nec habere.

Regia ſolis erat ſublimibus alta columnis,
Clara micante Auro.

Ejuſdem Currum adſpice.

Aureus Axis erat, temo aureus, aurea ſumma
Curvatura Rotæ, radiorum argenteus ordo.

Denique quod optimum videri volunt ſæculum, aureum appellant.

Sen. Ep. CXV.

that this is the moſt Juſt, and ground themſelves upon this Thought. *Pope Pius* II. one of the moſt zealous Defenders of the Liberties of the Church at the Council of *Baſil*, exerted all his Power, after he was elected Pope, to aboliſh the *Conſtitution of Prague:* He then ſaw Things with a different Eye.

Means to regulate the Love of Riches.

VIII. Ought we not to be aſhamed to make our ſelves Slaves to an external Advantage, which ſoon paſſes away, ſo far as to ſacrifice Truth to it, which will for ever endure? It is certainly ſhameful to weigh Truth in the Ballance of Intereſt. Can Men that value themſelves upon Knowledge and Virtue, continue to make their Glory and good Fortune conſiſt in what is common to them with the moſt Ignorant and the moſt Wicked? Can reaſonable Men ſink into ſuch Sentiments ſo unworthy of them, that they neither dare declare them to others, nor own them themſelves, ſo that to retain them with any Eaſe, they are obliged to diſguiſe them to others, as well as to themſelves?

Is it not better to have every Thing at Peace within our ſelves, and to have our Heart actually prefer that which Reaſon cannot avoid preferring, and which the Virtuous love, and the Vicious themſelves are forced to commend above all Things? If any one has found this Preference not to be juſt, and has made it with Sincerity, and yet repents himſelf of it, let him declare it, and we will hear him. Sometimes, after ſome Efforts, we come at laſt to ſacrifice Fortune to Truth; but if this Sacrifice does not come from the Heart, if only ſome gnawing Remorſe has extorted it, we ſhall afterwards recover our ſelves, and return to our firſt Inclination. But he will prefer with Perſeverance, who prefers with Knowledge and Affection: Such a Preference is never revoked. He who has once known the ſolid Pleaſures, will never quit them for ſuch as are ſuperficial. The Reliſh of the true Riches will put us in a Condition of making a right Uſe of the external Riches when they ſhall happen to us, and of loſing them with a good Grace whenever they leave us.

Every Thing that favours this Paſſion for Riches, and is apt either to excite or improve it, ought to be ſo much the more ſuſpected by us, as it belongs to every Age, and encreaſes with our Years, and is ſtrengthened by all the other Paſſions. The Inclination to Pleaſures, and the Inclination to Glory, are in themſelves oppoſite; but in the preſent State of Things, and at the Paſs that Men are now come to,

Riches

Riches do effectually conduce both to Pleaſures and to Glory. There is no Paſſion which they do not contribute to ſatisfy: As many Errors, ſo many Occaſions for Riches: We want them to gratify all our Whimſies. Age commonly makes us neglect Pleaſures, and abates the Eagerneſs with which we purſue them; and the Difficulties which we are oblig'd to undergo to obtain our End, makes us ſometimes abandon Projects of Ambition. But being convinced by a continual Experience that Money ſupplies the moſt deſpicable Imperfections, that they cover the moſt odious Defects, and eaſily ſurmount the moſt difficult Obſtacles, the Covetouſneſs of acquiring them encreaſes in Proportion as we think we ſtand in need of external Helps. At firſt therefore we love them for the ſake of what we procure by their Means; afterwards the Love of the Effect extends to the Cauſe which produces it; and by thus loving the Cauſe, together with the Effect, we at laſt come to love it by it ſelf. We come by little and little to make our End, of what we loved only at firſt as the Means leading to other Ends. When once we are arrived thus far, it is abſolutely neceſſary that the Love of Riches ſhould have no Bounds; we find Pleaſure in heaping them up, and can never have enough of them. For want of knowing that we are born for ſome greater Purpoſe, we ſeek in the heaping up of Riches for a Greatneſs and Eſteem which cannot be found there. Thoſe who inſtead of making uſe of the Advantages which Riches give them to acquire more Knowledge with greater Eaſe, on the contrary do not apply themſelves to acquire any Knowledge but as a Means to procure Riches, diſhonour the Sciences; and ſuch Men have always done them a great deal of Injury. This is what made *Simonides* ſay, *There would be no Doubt but to be Learned and Wiſe is of much greater Value than to be Rich, if we did not ſo often ſee the Wiſe and the Learned at the Gate of Riches.* But theſe Riches ought to have a double Shame: One, in not knowing that the principal Goods are ſtill wanting, and in being ignorant where to find them; the other, in ſtaying to ask of them, what they ought of themſelves to offer.

When we are ſick, we think only of recovering our Health: We make our ſelves eaſy; we trouble our ſelves no more about our Trade, or our Eſtate; we reject all the Ideas of Fortune; we think of no Intrigues; but liſten ſolely to our Phyſicians, and adhere to their Medicines. But we are far from taking that Care of the Soul: That is almoſt blind, lives in Darkneſs, is inclined to a great many Vices, is poſſeſſed

ſeſſed with a thouſand Errors, and oppreſſed with a thouſand ill Habits: But we do not endeavour to cure them; we have a great many other Things to do: We muſt purſue the moſt urgent; we muſt heap up Wealth; we muſt make our ſelves a Name in the World; and, in one Word, we muſt ſacrifice to a Fortune always uncertain, and which will at laſt very certainly paſs away. (*l*) Inſtead of giving to external Things no more Attention than a Mind duly inform'd by right Reaſon would think proper, we beſtow upon the internal and eſſential no more Time than what we have left to ſpare from the ſuperfluous Cares of the Body.

ARE the Advantages of this World worth the Trouble and Conſtraints we muſt undergo to acquire them? We have a little Part of Life left to finiſh, and Time ſteals upon us, is hurrying us away to the Grave. We have within ſome Treaſures that are properly our own, and in the great Theatre of the Univerſe ſome that are in common with other Men; which then ought we to be moſt concerned about? which ought we to be thinking upon? Provided we would, we ſhould have always ſomething to admire in our ſelves; and ſhall we quit this ſolid Satisfaction to run after Shadows? Muſt our Lives be ſpent in purſuing without enjoying? and in order to obtain what we ſhall be very little ſatisfied with, when obtained, muſt we flatter a Fool, and make our Court to a Knave? Happy is he who, knowing exactly the Value of external Advantages, does not think them worth purchaſing at ſuch a Rate.

IX. GLORY

(*l*) Contra evenit in iis morbis, quibus afficiuntur animi: quo quis pejus ſe habet, minus ſentit. Non eſt quod mireris Lucili, cariſſime. Nam qui leviter dormit, & ſpecies ſecundùm quietem capit, aliquando dormire ſe dormiens cogitat: gravis ſopor etiam ſomnia extinguit, animumque altiùs mergit, quàm ut uti ullo intellectu ſinat. Quare vitia ſua nemo confitetur? Quia etiam nunc in illis eſt. Somnium narrare, vigilantis eſt: & vitia ſua confiteri, ſanitatis indicium eſt. Expergiſcamur ergò, ut errores noſtros coarguere poſſimus; ſola autem nos Philoſophia excitabit, ſola ſomnum excutiet gravem. Illi te totùm dedica: dignus illâ es; illa te digna eſt; ite in complexum alter alterius: omnibus aliis rebus te nega, fortiter, apertè. Non eſt quod precariò Philoſopheris. Si æger eſſes, curam intermiſiſſes rei familiaris, & forenſia tibi negotia excidiſſent: nec quemquam tanti putares, cui advocatus in cauſam deſcenderes: toto animo id ageres, ut quamprimum morbo liberareris. Quid ergò? non & nunc idem facies? omnia impedimenta dimitte, & vaca bonæ menti; nemo ad illam pervenit occupatus. *Sen. Ep.* LIII.

Of the Love of Glory.

IX. GLORY conſiſting in the Approbation of Perſons of a good Taſte, who think judiciouſly, and aſſign to every Thing its true Value; to be inſenſible of true Glory, would be to regard with Indifference that Eſteem which of all Things in the World is moſt to be eſteemed. I agree, therefore, that we may take a Pleaſure in being well thought of by all the World, eſpecially by the learned and wiſe Part of it; that we may find in their Converſation, and in the Pleaſure of their Approbation, a Reward for the Pains it coſt us to diſtinguiſh Truths that are but little illuſtrated, and to diſcover thoſe that are not yet known. The Pleaſure which we taſte in finding our ſelves eſteemed by Perſons whom we honour, ſerves alſo to encourage a reaſonable Man in his Purſuits; which are often ſo difficult, that he is obliged to raiſe himſelf above all his Prejudices and Habits, and to withſtand the ſeducing Allurements of a thouſand Objects, which often divert him from the moſt juſt Reſolutions. It is ſo important, and at the ſame Time ſo difficult, to maintain our ſelves in the Diſcharge of all our Duties, that we ſhould be much in the wrong to neglect any Aſſiſtance that might ſerve to confirm us in it.

THE Love of Glory, for the Comfort of the World, ſupplies the Place of Virtue in the Hearts of a great many Men, and the Fear of Ignominy that of the Hatred which we ought to have for Vice it ſelf. It is for this Reaſon that Satire is of ſo great Uſe. There are few that love Virtue; but there is hardly one who is not jealous of his Reputation. An infinite Number of People, to whoſe Paſſions the Voice of Conſcience oppoſes but weak Obſtacles, are ſtopp'd ſhort by *what People will ſay of them.* And thoſe who ſeem not to fear this Cenſure, would live after a quite different manner, if they did not indeed fear it at all. *O Athenians*, ſays ALEXANDER, *what Hardſhips have I ſuſtained, and what Dangers have I deſpiſed to be commended by you!* The Sentiment which occaſioned his ſpeaking in this manner, is very common to all Men: The Great feed themſelves up with the Applauſes of the Multitude, which they regard ſo much below them; and altho' they appear to reckon them as nothing, they yet notwithſtanding are afraid of their Cenſure. When a Man ſells his Reputation for five hundred Pounds, we may conclude from thence, that his Virtue could not have defended it ſelf againſt one hundred. And in general, the Appearance is eſteemed of greater Conſequence than the Reality it ſelf; and the ſame Perſon ſhall comfort himſelf in a

Week's

Week's Time for a private Misfortune, whoſe Concern would be of much longer Continuance, if the Publick were but informed of it. We make our ſelves a kind of a Life in the Imagination of others.

BUT nothing is more common than to allow this Paſſion too great a Sway. (*m*) Glory is a very empty Diet; a Vapour that never ſatisfies; and the Deſire of which encreaſes in Proportion to the Poſſeſſion, of which there is no End. It is the violent Thirſt after a Glory not rightly underſtood that has arm'd Men one againſt another, that has given a ſpecious Pretence to the Rage and Fury of Children of the ſame Father to deſtroy one another, that has fill'd the Earth with Murders and Deſolation, and under a pompous Title has made it the Image of Hell. The Love of Glory is capable of annihilating the moſt natural Sentiments; and an Heart that is abandon'd to Ambition, quits by Degrees all Compaſſion, Humanity, and Juſtice. But I would confine my ſelf to the Injury it does to the Sciences. A Man that is greedy of Glory, and thinks only of eclipſing that of his Contemporaries and Predeceſſors, being hurried away by this Paſſion, and making haſte to heap Knowledge upon Knowledge, examines very ſlightly, or not at all, and precipitates his Judgment every Moment, that is to ſay, falls frequently into Error. He ſtudies the moſt obſcure rather than the moſt uſeful Subjects, and prefers thoſe that are moſt ſhining to thoſe that are moſt neceſſary to Mankind. By this means his Succeſs is more difficult; for thoſe Things that are leaſt neceſſary, are generally leaſt eaſy, and even if he does ſucceed, the Fruits of his Diſcovery are very ſmall.

A MAN

(*m*) "There is ſome, I do not know what, natural Pleaſure in be-
"ing commended; but we make a great Addition to it our ſelves."

Laudari haud metuam, neque enim mihi cornea fibra eſt
Sed recti finemque extremumque eſſe recuſo
Euge tuum & belleè.

Perſ. Sat. I. 47.

"I do not comfort my ſelf ſo much with what I am in the Opinion
"of others, as with what I really am within my ſelf. I would be
"rich in my ſelf, without borrowing. Strangers can ſee nothing but
"external Events and Appearances; one may put on a good Out-ſide,
"tho' he be internally much out of Order. They cannot ſee my
"Heart; they can only ſee my Countenance." *Mont. Book* II. *Ch.* 16.

A MAN that purſues Glory, regards as his Rivals all thoſe that are engaged in the ſame Purſuit. Envy and Hatred preſently take Poſſeſſion of his Heart; and how can he ever arrive at Virtue under the Conduct of ſuch dangerous Guides? None love to receive Inſtruction from their Rivals, or to be taught by their Enemies; they like better to contradict them: And if theſe advance any Truth, they for that very Reaſon incline to the ſide of Error.

HE that ſtudies only to ſhine amongſt Men of Letters, and to procure himſelf a great Name, ſeeks impatiently for ſomething new; and when he has found it, embraces and defends it with Warmth: For he takes Paſſion for his Guide inſtead of Reaſon; and his Aim is not Knowledge and Wiſdom, but the Reputation of them. But if he does not find his Genius lie at Invention, deſparing to diſtinguiſh himſelf by new Diſcoveries, he then conceives a ſecret Diſguſt againſt all new Diſcoveries: He deſpiſes them without underſtanding them; his Diſlike furniſhes him with Weapons to attack them, he fortifies himſelf with the Antients, he ſubmits and liſts himſelf blindly on their ſide, ſo as to be a mere Echo of their Sayings, whether good or bad.

LASTLY, This Thirſt of Honour ill underſtood, this ardent Paſſion for Glory, often makes thoſe that poſſeſs it give into every thing, without Reaſon, that carries any Mark of Diſtinction. It is by this Means that Men are infatuated with the Extraordinary, and lay down Maxims that are ſingular, and affect to think and ſpeak differently from the reſt of Mankind. You would think that they would believe themſelves diſhonoured, to have the ſame Notions with other People: Every thing which is common, appears dull and inſipid; and they have ſo great an Averſion to the ordinary Methods, that for fear of coming any thing near them, they quit the Road of good Senſe. This laſt Character is confirmed by the Pleaſure they take in doing themſelves that Juſtice, which is refuſed them by others. There are Diſtempers of the Mind, as well as of the Body, which ariſe from a Complication of Cauſes: All the Seducements of Admiration join to make this laſt Infatuation incurable. This Inclination to be diſtinguiſh'd, produces different Effects, according the different Inclinations with which it is combined.

THERE are few People who do not wiſh to ſhine; every body loves to be in this World upon a Foot of Diſtinction. But then on the other ſide, there are but few that are willing to give themſelves the Trouble of it: They are, above all, averſe

averſe to take Pains in the Reformation of themſelves. Under theſe Diſpoſitions we neglect acquiring the ſolid Merit, and content our ſelves with external Advantages, and when we are in Poſſeſſion of them, we give to ſlight Appearances the entire Value of the Reality. Few People think as *Cicero* ſpeaks: *Satius eſt enim me meis rebus florere, quàm majorum opinione niti, & ita vivere, ut ego ſim potiùs meis nobilitatis initium & virtutis exemplum.* "I love to ſhine by my "own proper Merit, rather than by a Name inherited from "my Anceſtors; and like beſt to begin my own Nobility my "ſelf by the virtuous Examples I leave to Poſterity." In truth, we may ſuſpect thoſe that uſe this ſort of Language, make a Virtue of Neceſſity; but what can we ſay againſt thoſe, who being born with an illuſtrious Name, do yet reckon this Glory nothing, unleſs they ſupport and honour it by their own perſonal Merit?

Remedies and Precautions.

X. THERE are few Means more effectual for curing of Ambition, than that of attending to the Extravagances into which it hurries thoſe whom it poſſeſſes. Diſquiet, Envy, Infatuation, Affectation, Error, and Conceitedneſs, are its ordinary Effects; ſo that the Vanity of Men oftentimes prevents our honouring them, and their Eargerneſs for Glory makes them take the Way that leads to Contempt. The ſureſt and almoſt only Way of eſtabliſhing a Man's Reputation, and of ſecuring the Eſteem and Commendation of others, is never to think of it, or to have it in View. There is nothing that Men love to give with more Freedom; but when once they perceive it is expected and ſought after, they are always ſure to refuſe it. To beſpeak Praiſe, is for ever to be diſappointed of it; to fear it, is to deſerve it; and to turn one's Back of it, is to be ſure to have it follow. The Reaſon of which I take to be this: To take a Pleaſure in regarding the Merit of others, and after having diſcovered it, to love to do it Juſtice, and make it taken Notice of by others, is one of the moſt certain Characters of a fine Soul, and of an Heart truly great; but the more Greatneſs of Soul there is in doing Juſtice to true Merit, the more free we would be in the doing it; and we imagine there is ſo much more Honour in diſcharging this Duty, by how much leſs they that are the Objects of it think themſelves entitled to lay Claim to it. Eſteem is a *Recompence*, not a *Debt* to Virtue; and we beſtow it out of Generoſity, not by Compulſion. We have Foundation enough for Complaint againſt thoſe that refuſe to pay us what they owe, it being a manifeſt In-

juſtice; and we have no Obligation to them that diſcharge a Debt which we could compel them to pay. But whatſoever Merit we may have, we ought to be thankful to thoſe that give us what they might as well have refuſed. The Glory there is in recompenſing, always loſes Part of its Luſtre when the Recompence is ſollicited; and there is a far greater Generoſity in preventing the Requeſt of others, than in complying with them. Men are ſo deſirous of being free in the beſtowing of Praiſes, and ſo little willing to be prevented in this Affair, that commonly they that praiſe firſt are thoſe that praiſe moſt: They ſeem to partake of the Glory of a good Action, or of an excellent Diſcourſe, by their Earneſtneſs to do the Authors of it Juſtice. We alſo obſerve that thoſe who ſay fine Things, are always the leſs applauded for them, the more they are found to be ſenſible of them themſelves, and the more they appear to have ſaid them with a Deſign of being admired.

GLORY therefore flies him who ſeeks it; but he who only ſeeks to acquire Merit, will together with it acquire all the Conſequences of that Merit. A Man that beſtows all his Pains to think judiciouſly, and to live juſtly, is ſure to diſtinguiſh himſelf without propoſing any ſuch End to himſelf; but he that ſighs only for Diſtinction, will never be diſtinguiſh'd, except it be from wiſe Men; for he will be rank'd with Fools, and will at beſt be only the Head of a particular Species of Folly.

IT is very ſeldom that we have any Eaſe, when we propoſe Glory for our Aim: That which comes without our ſeeking it, is the only one that affords us a reaſonable Satisfaction. *(n)* Ambition is a Source of Troubles; and for this Reaſon all the World is averſe to thoſe that are poſſeſs'd of it. Modeſty, on the contrary, makes the Pleaſure of Society; it gains all Hearts; and when it is accompanied with excellent Qualities, makes them Objects of the higheſt and moſt conſtant Admiration.

WE ſee by this, that what we call Glory and Reputation, the Bubble which we purſue with ſo much Pains, is a very trifling Thing: If we deſire it much, we uſually go without it; and if we obtain it without wiſhing for it, we have not much Reliſh of it: For the Heart of Man ſeldom taſtes any Pleaſure, but in proportion to the Warmth with which it is purſued.

ONE

(*n*) Opinionem quidem & famam eo loco habeamus tanquam quæ non ducere, ſed ſequi debeat.

ONE of the moſt fatal Effects of this Thirſt of Glory is, when it is wrong underſtood, and carried to an Exceſs; when we are fond of all ſorts of Praiſe, and even have a Dependance upon Flatterers. In truth, it is my Opinion, that he who pretends to look upon theſe Marks of Eſteem with Indifference, is either a Lyar, or a Fool; he is in Society a Stone that jutts out of the Building, a perfect Manhater, if there be one. Since God himſelf eſteems Praiſes, when they come from the Heart, can it be lawful to look on them as abſolutely contemptible, or entirely indifferent? It would be deviating from Virtue, to give juſt Encomiums to Perſons that are deſerving, if it be their Duty not to liſten to ſuch Encomiums. But they ought to be receiv'd with the following Precautions: Firſt, We ought to give no Attention to thoſe who praiſe without a Capacity of diſtinguiſhing perfectly, that which is truly praiſe-worthy from that which is not. As it is a diſtemper'd and *canine Appetite* that makes us devour every Thing, (*o*) ſo it is an extravagant Thirſt of Glory, that makes us hear with Pleaſure the Praiſes of Fools; and by this more than one half of Mankind are excluded from the Privilege of pleaſing wiſe Men with their Praiſes, which ſuppoſe in them that Praiſe, Wiſdom, Underſtanding, and Diſcernment. (*p*)

WE

(*o*) " Let us deſpiſe this baſe and ſcandalous Thirſt after Honour " and Renown, which makes us court all ſorts of People whatever. " (*Qua eſt iſta Laus quæ poſſit è Macello peti?*) by the moſt abject " Means, and at the vileſt Rate that can be. It is a Diſhonour to be " thus honoured. Let us learn to be covetous of no more Glory " than we are capable of. To be puffed up with every Action that " is innocent and uſeful, it is neceſſary to do it before thoſe who may " eſteem it uncommon and extraordinary. They are willing to make " it anſwer the Price it coſts them. In proportion as a good Action " is glorious, I abate of the Goodneſs of it, by the Suſpicion of its " being done rather on the Account of its being glorious than good: " Expoſing it ſo much, is half ſelling it. Thoſe Actions appear " with much the beſt Grace, that ſlide from the Hand of their Au" thor inſenſibly, and without Noiſe; and which ſome honeſt Man " will, upon the Account of their Merit, take ſome Opportunity of " removing from their Obſcurity into their proper Light. *Mihi* " *quidem laudabiliora videntur omnia, quæ ſine Venditatione, & ſine* " *Populo teſte fiunt.* Mont. Book III. Ch. 10.

(*p*) Nec ideò te prohibuerim hos quoque audire, quibus conſuetudo eſt admittere populum, ac diſſerere: ſi modò hoc propoſito in turbam prodeunt, ut meliores fiant faciantque meliores: Si non ambitionis hoc cauſâ exercent. Quid enim turpius Philoſophiam captante clamores?

WE ought never to have Cauſe to reproach our ſelves, with having rendred our ſelves worthy of the Contempt of any one whomſoever: For we ſhould always love and eſteem human Nature: But if thoſe who do not underſtand Reaſoning think fit to ridicule us, and uſe their utmoſt Endeavours to decry us, we ought to be content to confute them by the Wiſdom of our Conduct and Converſation. We ought to deſpiſe the Injuries of thoſe, whoſe Praiſes would be of no weight: It is ſubmitting our ſelves to an ignorant or malicious Man, to appear ſenſible of the Contempt they ſhew us. Nothing advances us more, than to know how to be above thoſe that are unworthy of our Attention, as nothing abaſes us more than to ſeek Glory in the Praiſes of thoſe who deſerve none themſelves. (*q*) When *Diogenes* was ask'd, *Whether he did not ſee that all the World laugh'd at him: Suppoſe*, replied he, *that ſome Aſſes were to grin at this Company, would you think them worth your Notice? Much leſs do I what theſe Fools ſay of me.*

WHEN once a Man finds a Pleaſure, and makes his Glory conſiſt in ſeeing himſelf admired by the Multitude, he adopts all the Errors of the Vulgar. An open Houſe, Equipages, and a great Name, with him ſupplies the Place of Merit. They that once apply themſelves to pleaſe him, muſt become as much Fools as himſelf; they muſt be Slaves to every Thing which he admires and adores. Superfluities become neceſſary; nor is it any more out of Neceſſity, or even out of Delicacy, but out of Ambition, that our Tables are cover'd with the greateſt Dainties. It is not ſo much to pleaſe our own Eyes, as to dazzle thoſe of others, that we fill our Apartments with fine Tapeſtry and Paintings, make

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Numquid æger laudat medicum ſecantem? Tacete, favete, & præbete vos curationi, etiamſi exclamaveritis, non aliter audiam, quam ſi ad tactum vitiorum veſtrorum ingemiſcatis. - - - - Quanta autem dementia ejus eſt, quem clamores imperitorum hilarem ex Auditorio dimittunt? Quid lætaris, quod hominibus laudaris, quos non poteſ ipſe laudare? *Sen. Ep.* LII.

Boni viri judicent, id eſt maximi momenti & ponderis. *Cic. Or. in Vatin.*

(*q*) Æquo animo audienda ſunt imperitorum convitia, & ad honeſta vadenti contemnendus eſt iſte contemptus. *Ep.* LXXVI.

Quanta Dementia eſt veteri ne infameris ab infamibus. Argumentum recti malis diſplicere. *Alibi.*

Nemo enim non eo, à quo ſe contemptum judicat, minor eſt.

make a whole Street of one Houſe, and encloſe entire Fields and Foreſts in our Gardens. (*r*)

THIS Baſeneſs, with which we ſeek the Applauſes of the ignorant Multitude, has alſo done a prodigious Injury to the Sciences themſelves. We content our ſelves to treat of them ſuperficially, and are in no Pain for Order and Exactneſs. The Vulgar do not expect any Thing further from us. We have given more Attention to Words than Things; Bombaſt paſſes in the room of Sublime; little Turns of Expreſſion are taken for bright Thoughts; and the Length of a Diſcourſe, void of any Meaning, for a Copiouſneſs of Oratory (*s*).

WE muſt conclude therefore, that as it ſhews a Want of a good Taſte, to have no Regard to the Approbation of ſuch as have a good Taſte, (*t*) who think juſtly, and never flatter; ſo is it an Argument of very narrow Views, and of a little Mind, to be pleaſed with being the Object of Admiration of the Ignorant and Illiterate; we muſt have very little Foundation for it in our ſelves to ſeek it in this manner.

WHO would not reſolve to throw off this Thirſt of Praiſe, and be afraid of the Miſchiefs that attend it, when he ſees ſo many People that, after having ſtudied upon this Motive, and not being able to procure the Eſteem of the Learned, have condeſcended to court the Praiſes of the Vulgar, and come at laſt to admire themſelves in a Circle of Coxcombs?

IN the ſecond Place, Praiſe ought to be an Occaſion of examining our ſelves ſtrictly and impartially, if we are ſincerely

(*r*) Inducenda eſt in occupatum locum Virtus: quæ mendacia contra verum placentia extirpet, quæ nos à populo, cui nimis credimus, ſeparet, ac ſinceris opinionibus reddat. - - - -

Quis eam, quam nulli oſtenderet, induit purpuram? Quis poſuit ſecretam in auro dapem? quis ſub alicujus ruſticæ arboris projectus umbrâ, luxuriæ ſuæ pompam ſolus explicuit? Nemo oculis ſuis lautus eſt, ne paucorum quidem & familiarum, ſed apparatum vitiorum ſuorum pro modo turbæ ſpectantis expandit. Itaque irritamentum eſt omnium, in quæ inſanimus, admirator & conſcius. *Sen. Ep.* XCIV.

(*s*) Nihil enim æque & eloquentiam, & omne aliud ſtudium auribus deditum vitiavit, quàm popularis Aſſentio. *Sen. Ep.* CII.

(*t*) Cujus, inquit, bonum eſt claritas, id eſt, laus bono à bonis reddita, utrum laudati an laudantis? Utriuſque: meum qui laudor, quia natura me amantem omnium genuit; & bene feciſſe gaudeo, & gratos me inveniſſe Virtutum interpretes lætor. Hoc plurium bonum eſt, quod grati ſunt, ſed & meum. Ita enim animo compoſitus ſum, ut aliorum bonum, meum judicem: utique eorum, quibus ipſe ſum boni cauſa. *Id. ibid.*

cerely afraid of being made the Tools of thoſe that praiſe us, and who very often make a Jeſt of us. There is nothing we ought to examine more ſcrupulouſly than Praiſes, becauſe there is nothing more equivocal. The moſt modeſt and delicate Praiſes are ſometimes only the Effect of the Vanity of thoſe that beſtow them, whoſe Aim is more to compoſe a fine and ingenious Encomium, than to make the Picture really like.

WE muſt know very little of the World, and have paſs'd our Lives either in a cloſe Retirement, or in a continual Hurry, not to have obſerv'd, that Men praiſe more out of Intereſt than Knowledge; and that few People, when they are at liberty amongſt their Friends, make a Scruple of deſpiſing what they have before appear'd ſo much to admire in the Preſence of thoſe whom they are oblig'd to carreſs. Cuſtom has even ſo far exaggerated the Matter of Praiſe, that the moſt ſincere cannot forbear enlarging a little. An exact Encomium, that ſhould contain only the bare Truth, like a Teſtimony given in a Court of Juſtice upon Oath, would be reckon'd very clowniſh. Good Manners require that the Stile of Praiſing ſhould be ſomething ſwelling. If any be thereby deceiv'd, it is not the Fault of thoſe that uſe this Language, ſince Cuſtom has made it ſufficiently clear, but their own in miſinterpreting, and conſtruing it in their Favour in the full Extent of the Letter, which ought to be always underſtood figuratively, and with proper Allowances.

WE ought to reckon ſo little upon Praiſes, that where we have not ſome other Evidence, all that can be ſafely concluded from a Funeral Oration, is, that the Perſon who is the Subject of it is dead. All that can be learned from a Monument, is, that the Perſon to whoſe Memory it is erected bore ſuch a Name, lived in ſuch an Age, and diſcharged ſuch and ſuch Employs. All the reſt may have been, and often is dictated by Fear and by Intereſt.

THE Cuſtom of the World, when it is accompanied with Reflection, is a great Preſervative againſt Flattery; and we ſhould certainly avoid thoſe Snares, if we did but obſerve how ridiculous they are that ſuffer themſelves to be caught in them. We frequently ſee Men praiſe thoſe whom they hate from the Bottom of their Hearts; we ſee them catching at every little Occaſion, and magnifying it in order to frame an Encomium upon it; but we ſeldom or never ſee any one that praiſes, except it be with a Deſign of ſurpriſing the Credulity of thoſe whom they praiſe, and of impoſing upon them.

IN

IN the third place, we ought to be well aſſured, that what we praiſe is actually Matter of Commendation. There are thoſe that commend all Vice, as well as Virtue. If we be but in a Condition of being ſerviceable to them, that is ſufficient to make us the Objects of their Admiration in all Reſpects, at leaſt in Appearance. A Man has Reaſon to believe himſelf poorly ſtock'd with Merit, when he ſees thoſe that want to praiſe him, reduced to the Neceſſity of diſguiſing his Vices, or of founding his Encomium upon ſomething that is external to him, and which may the next Moment paſs into other Hands. We praiſe in an Horſe his Swiftneſs, Strength, and Proportion of Parts; but who ever reckons amongſt his Excellencies his Bridle, Saddle, Houzing, and other Furniture, that ſerve rather to conceal than ſhew his Beauties *(u)*? Was it not Extravagance in *Alexander* to love to be called the Son of *Jupiter*, and to be worſhip'd like a God? All the Illuſions of Men do more or leſs border upon Folly. Let People account me whom they will, I ſhall always remember what I am my ſelf. *Me hominem eſſe tunc maxime cogitabo, cùm deus undique conſalutabor.* Sen. de Vit. Beat.

WHEN upon examining our ſelves we do not find thoſe Qualities in us, for which we are prais'd, we ought to apply our ſelves inceſſantly to acquire them, if at leaſt we would have the Satisfaction of being truly eſteem'd, and if we think it ridiculous to be content with Dreams and Appearances. Praiſes ought to be the Subjects of Confuſion, when the Voice of our Conſcience cannot join with that of others: But when, after a ſcrupulous Attention to our ſelves, we do really find our ſelves ſuch, or very nearly ſuch, as the Praiſes which we receive make us, yet the Pleaſure of this Diſcovery ought not to be an Occaſion of our applauding our ſelves in the Idea of our own Merit, nor of giving into the Admiration of our ſelves, nor of contenting our ſelves with

(u) Omnium iſtorum perſonata felicitas eſt. Contemnes illos, ſi deſpoliaveris. Equum empturus, ſolvi jubes ſtratum, detrahis veſtimenta, venalibus, ne qua vitia corporis lateant: hominem involutum æſtimas? Mangones, quicquid eſt quod diſpliceat, aliquo lenocinio abſcondunt. Itaque mentibus ornamenta ipſa ſuſpecta ſunt: ſive crus alligatum, ſive brachium adſpiceres, nudari juberes, & ipſum tibi corpus oſtendi. Vides illum ſcythiæ Sarmatiæve regem, inſigni capitis decorum? Si vis illum æſtimare, totumque ſcire qualis ſit, faciam ſolve: multum mali ſubillâ latet. Quid de aliis loquor? Si perpendere te voles, ſepone pecuniam, domum, dignitatem: intus te ipſe conſidera. Nunc qualis ſis, aliis credis. *Sen. Ep.* LXXX.

that Degree of Knowlege and Virtue which we have already acquired. We ceaſe to deſerve Praiſe, when we thus abuſe the Praiſes we receive, and make them ſerve for a Pretence to Idleneſs, which are intended for an Encouragement to our Induſtry. A wiſe Man meaſures what he ought, by what he is able to do; and he judges of what Remains to be done, by what he already has done. There are ſome idle Minds, upon which Vanity will have a ſufficient Influence to make them acquire a certain Degree of Merit: But when once they have obtain'd this, they flatter themſelves that it is time to take their Reſt, and to enjoy their Glory quietly. This is a Miſtake, for it is the ſure Way to have it ſoon extinguiſh'd. He that comes to make a Stand, will ſeem to fall; for the Impreſſion of Objects become weaker in proportion as they grow more familiar; and for this Reaſon it is neceſſary for *Merit* to be always *encreaſing*, in order to be eſteemed the ſame.

ABOVE all, we ought to forbear making Compariſons *betwixt our ſelves and others*: Theſe naturally lead us to regard with Envy thoſe that are ſuperior, and with Contempt thoſe that are inferior to us. There is a great deal of Difference betwixt being agreeably affected to find that we have a Share in the good Opinions of honeſt Men, and taking a Pleaſure to be eſteemed by them in Preference to others. The firſt of theſe Pleaſures is innocent, the other very dangerous. For when once a Man makes part of his Felicity conſiſt in being ſenſible that he has a Superiority over others, of what Nature ſoever this Superiority may be, whether it conſiſts in Reputation, Underſtanding, Knowledge, Dignities, Riches, or laſtly, even in the more liberal Enjoyment of the Pleaſures of the Senſes, he muſt neceſſarily, for the ſame Reaſon, find himſelf leſs happy, when he cannot perceive this ſame Diſproportion betwixt himſelf and others. The good Fortune therefore of others will always extinguiſh his: He will decreaſe in Proportion as others encreaſe; and how can he avoid being mortified at the Sight of that which impairs his own Felicity? how can he prevent conceiving an Averſion to every Thing which eclipſes that in what manner ſoever? The View therefore of the Evils and Wants of others, is a very equivocal Remedy to ſoften the Torment of our own. *Malum ſolatii genus eſt turba miſerorum.*

THOSE who make all their Glory conſiſt in out-ſhining others, do not only hate thoſe that are their Rivals in point of Riches and Dignities: They cannot endure that any body in the World ſhould aſpire to any other Glory, or make their Honour

Honour consist in improving their Understandings, and living conformably to such Improvements: They hate a Merit that is not according to their Taste and Relish: They exert their utmost Endeavours to extinguish it by despising it; and being enraged to find their Contempt not regarded, they proceed to Violence, and persecute Virtue.

A MALIGNITY, which is but too natural to the Heart of Man, is, without doubt, one of the Causes which makes them take so much Pleasure in believing themselves above others: But it is not to be doubted, but that *Education* very much corroborates this Malignity. We are every Moment setting this mischievous Principle at work, because it is one of the most active, and never fails of producing its Effect. Sometimes we make Children ashamed to suffer themselves to be equall'd; sometimes we make them take a Pleasure in leaving others a great Way behind them: And in order to correct them of any Fault, the Argument commonly used, is, That it will confound them with the meanest; whereas they ought to be made sensible of the Ideas of Wisdom and Duty Thus, very often, to cure them of some very slight Imperfections, we confirm in their Hearts one of the greatest Vices, and most incompatible with the Happiness of Mankind: The Habit which we thus contract, often throws us into childish Weaknesses.

THIS Passion might be tolerable, if its bad Effects extended no farther than to make those ridiculous whom it possesses. But what are we not to expect from it, since by this means no body is content with his Lot, but every one is aiming to advance himself upon the Disgrace of others, and seeks to render himself happy, by rendring them miserable? I know of no Method more effectual, to disengage us from an Inclination so fatal, and so deeply ingrafted, than to reflect often and attentively, That the great Master of the Universe has Thought fit to exercise his immense Power and Wisdom in the infinite Variety of his Works: He would have had less Satisfaction in seeing them all of one sort, and his Glory would have been more contracted: But being infinitely good, he loves that each should be content with his Station. It is not the Elevation of it, but the Manner of filling it, that entitles us to his Approbation. In this vast Theatre, each Part is equally esteemed by our Great Master, if it be but well acted and maintained. When therefore we have such an Idea as we ought to have of the Supreme God, and are assured of his Esteem, Approbation, and Favour, can we yet trouble our selves that we are not esteemed by this or that Man preferable

ferably to others? This Uneaſineſs would be the direct Means to make us loſe the Approbation of God; and the Tranquility which is oppoſite to it is the ſure Way to preſerve it. Does the Courtier, who is ſure of the good Opinion of his Maſter, trouble himſelf about what the loweſt of his Fellow-Subjects may think of him?

OUR Advantages, conſider'd in themſelves, do, if we are reaſonable, furniſh us with ſufficient Grounds to be contented, and at the ſame time to be thankful to the great Author of them, as alſo to Men who may have contributed towards them: Nor need we, for this purpoſe, to heighten the Value of theſe Advantages, by comparing our Condition with that of others. The Joy which ariſes from this Compariſon, has always a Mixture of Malice; and this will inevitably make us miſerable. (*w*) How wretched is the Fate of that Man, who has made himſelf a Slave to a Paſſion that will raiſe him up as many Rivals almoſt as there are Men! The Shame of being out-ſtripped throws him into Deſpair, and ſo does almoſt that of being equalled. You aſpire to the firſt Rank, without conſidering that you make all thoſe your Enemies, who will not be content with the ſecond Place. And why ſhould they be content with it any more than you?

I KNOW nothing that ſhews a greater Degeneracy of Mind, than the thinking our ſelves leſs happy, becauſe we ſee other People equally happy. If this depraved Taſte were equal in all his Creatures, God Almighty, with his infinite Power and Goodneſs, would be able to make no more than one of them happy. This one would be without Equal, but all the reſt muſt find themſelves miſerable. (*x*)

A MAN on the contrary, who has cured himſelf of this Prepoſſeſſion, in eſteeming Happineſs only in Proportion as it is ſuperior to that of others, and has freed himſelf from

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(*w*) Relinque Ambitum: tumida res eſt, vana, ventoſa; nullum habet terminum; tam ſollicita eſt ne quem ante ſe videat, quam ne poſt ſe alium; laborat invidiâ, & quidem duplici. Vides autem quàm miſer ſit, ſi is, cui invidetur, & invidet? Intueris illas potentium domos, illa tumultuoſa, rixa ſalutantium, limina? Multum habent contumeliarum, ut intres: plus, quum intraveris. Præteri iſtos gradus divitum, & magno aggeſtu ſuſpenſa veſtibula; non in prærupto tantùm iſtic ſtabis, ſed in lubrico. Hoc potius te ad ſapientiam dirige, tranquilliſſimaſque res, & ſimul ampliſſimas, pete. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXIV.

(*x*) Nulli ad aliena reſpicienti ſua placent; Inde Diis quoque iraſcimur, quòd alii nos antecedant.

from the miſchievous Opinion of admitting nothing for a true Good, but what we can have the Pleaſure of enjoying excluſive of all others; a Man, I ſay, who has diſengaged himſelf from theſe falſe Principles, has found out the Secret of being Happy. He who envies no body any Thing, does almoſt enjoy every Thing; and certainly our Property in any Thing is ſo much the greater, by how much we can enjoy it with leſs Interruption; and for this Reaſon nothing is ſo much our own, as what we enjoy in common with others.(y) What fine Scenes does the whole Univerſe preſent to our Eyes and Underſtanding! A very little will content the reſt of our Senſes!

LET us but love inſtead of envying, and we ſhall have the Pleaſure of enjoying even what belongs to others. We ſhall look upon it as our own, on account of our loving thoſe that poſſeſs of it. *Terras omnes tanquam meas videbo, meas tanquam omnium.* Sen. de Vit. Beat.

WHEN we love Truth and Virtue as we ought, they always give Pleaſure to others; and our Inſtructions and Examples are follow'd with Pleaſure: But when we aim only at Reputation, when we have nothing more in View than to raiſe a great Name, we ſhall always find that the Glory of others will eclipſe that which we want to ſhine with, and continually mortify us.

How can we think our ſelves truly devout, and full of the Love of God, and of Reſignation to his Providence, when we are pleaſed with the Fall, and mortified with the Elevation of others; when we love to diſtinguiſh our ſelves from all others, and to make them ſenſible of our being ſuperior to them? How many *Saints* ought to be ſtruck out of the Catalogue of thoſe that truly deſerve this Name.

WHEN I think of the Humour that reigns amongſt the greateſt part of the learned World, I find nothing greater or more diſtinguiſhing than this Elogium of *M. Caſſini: He communicated, without Reſerve, his Diſcoveries, tho' at the Hazard of having them ſtole from him; and was more deſirous of having them ſerve to advance the Sciences than his own proper Glory. He publiſh'd his Inventions, not to make a Shew, but a publick Uſe of them.* Hiſt. Acad. Sci. Anno 1712. p. 137. Ed. Amſt.

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(y) Sapiens nihil judicat ſuum magis, quam cujus illi cum humano genere conſortium eſt. *Sen. Ep.* LXXIII.

THE celebrated *THALES* being asked what Recompence he had promiſed himſelf for his fine Diſcoveries, anſwer'd, That he propoſed no other than that of making them publick.

M. *COLLIERS* wrote to M. *GREGORY* in the ſame Sentiments: *Non eſt quod metuas cuiquam quicquid miſerim communicare, parum enim ſollicitus ſum utrumne meo an alieno nomine in publicum prodeat.*

IF after having ſtudied with a ſincere Deſire of improving our ſelves, we come to compoſe with no other View but that which ought to be the only one, the *Publick Good*, we ſhall never do like Children, who for having corrected one Word, and ſometimes a ſingle Letter, admire and bleſs themſelves for having become worthy of the firſt Rank. We ſhall never expoſe our ſelves to the Contempt of the reaſonable Part of Mankind, by an Eagerneſs in ſetting too high a Price upon a Diſcovery, which loſes all its Value when once we begin to boaſt of it; but being content to have it of ſome Uſe to the Publick, we ſhall not diſpute with others the Honour of having done it this Service. Would you be ſecure from being ſurpris'd in this Weakneſs, of writing only for your ſelf, and for the ſake of obtaining a Name? Would you avoid being reproach'd with it? Then clear your ſelf of it. Employ your Thoughts upon the good Effect your Inſtructions may produce in others, and don't once ſuffer your ſelf to think of the Honour they may do to your ſelf. (z)

I WOULD fain ask a Man who would have the ſole Glory of knowing any Thing, and who would be ſo weak as to think himſelf undone, if he ſhould ſee himſelf equall'd, what new Misfortune is befallen him, that his Air appears ſo much alter'd and dejected? His Anſwer would be, *That having, with a great deal of Pains and Trouble, at laſt made a conſiderable Diſcovery, he finds another has alſo made the ſame, about the ſame Time as himſelf.* I would reply to him, Never think of that at all, for you have made it nevertheleſs.

WHEN

(z) " It is acting for our Reputation, and particular Profit, not for " the publick Good, when we do in the Market-Place what we " might as well have done in private, and at high Noon-Day, what we " had done the Night before; and are jealous of doing our ſelves, what " others can do as well. Thus ſome Surgeons in *Greece* perform'd their " Operations upon Stages, in the View of the People, to encreaſe " their Practice, and draw Cuſtomers. They imagine that good " Regulations cannot be underſtood, but by Sound of Trumpet." *Mont. Book* III. *Ch.* 10.

WHEN a Man, who is not indolent himſelf, ſees with Pleaſure the Talents of another of the ſame Profeſſion with himſelf, the excellent Uſe he makes of them, and the Fruits he receives from them; this generous Part, which he takes in the Intereſts of another, is in my Opinion, one of the moſt inconteſtable Proofs of the *Greatneſs* of his *Soul*, and of the Purity of his Virtue.

AN eminent Philoſopher of our Days makes the *Greatneſs of Soul*, and true Generoſity, to conſiſt in loving Truth in ſuch a manner, as to receive it with the ſame Pleaſure from the Hand of another as from his own; and he regards this Equity as the moſt certain Character of Wiſdom, and the beſt and moſt valuable Fruit of Philoſophy. (*a*) The Earneſtneſs with which he recom- *M. de Tſchirnhaus.*

(*a*) Si autem hîc omnem prorſus errorem vitare cupimus, in primis neceſſum erit, ut, quod maximè notandum, nullum alium in finem, quàm ob meram delectationem, quæ ab eâ profluit, veritatem acquirere ſtudeamus; ideoque gloriæ cupiditas ſummopere hîc fugienda eſt, nec ulla laus propterea apud homines noſtri ævi aut poſteros aucupanda. Etenim quicunque ejuſmodi cupidine capiuntur, næ ingentes ſibi animi perturbationes atque anxietates conciliant. Veritates enim detectæ, quoniam ab initio non tam utiles apparent, quam reverà aliis rebus applicatæ poſtmodùm cognoſcuntur, dediti illi vanæ gloriæ ſubitò triſtitiâ anguntur, ſi ſuorum inventorum non ſtatim appareat inſignis utilitas, quia vident, ſe propterea eos, quos ſectantur, honores conſecuturos apud alios non eſſe. Imprimis autem ſuprà modum anguntur, ſi in diſquiſitionibus ſuis, in ejuſmodi incidant inventa, quæ licet ſint utiliſſima, interim tamen ab aliis jamdudum fuerunt in lucem edita; atque ita perſpiciunt gloriam quam impenſè ſectantur, ſibi ab aliis eſſe præreptam. Si porrò obſervaverint, alios ad ſimilia ſtudia, quæ ipſi tractant, feliciter promovenda idoneos eſſe, eoſque nactos occaſionem, ea ex voto proſequendi, ſummoperè timent, ne ab illis ſibi gloria præripiatur, & eâ de causâ, quantum poſſunt, (clanculum tamen, ne inſatiabilis gloriæ cupiditas, aliis animadverſa, in turpem ignominiæ pudorem deſinat) iiſdem adverſantur. Denique ſi egregia ingenii aliorum ſpecimina viderint, ac audiverint, ejus auctorem eorum ſummis extolli encomiis, mallent ea non audire, atque invidiâ exeſi orationem aliò deflectentes ægerrimè ferunt, ſe ſolos ſuo Marte iſta non aperuiſſe. E contrà verò, qui veritatem ſolius delectationis, quam præbet, gratiâ detegere ſtudet, ex omnibus hiſce circumſtantiis ſibi voluptatem quærit. Hic ſiquidem uti ob innumeras rationes, ita præprimis propter has, gloriam parvi facit, tum quòd, cùm ipſe ſit ſolius veritatis amans, melius ſe ipſum, quàm quiſquam alius, noſcere, &, quanti ſint dotes ſuæ faciendæ, ſcire queat, ac proinde exiſtimationem, quam apud alios obtinet, ſemper aut juſto majorem, aut juſto minorem eſſe videat; tum, quòd nullo non tempore, & multos fautores, & multos invidos præter inſtitutum

recommends it, would have been yet more effectual, and have done himſelf greater Honour, if he had always been an Example of it. But he was ſometimes carried away with the Torrent, and has propoſed ſome of his Diſcoveries ænigmatically, and alſo given the Solution of ſome Problems, without adding the Demonſtrations;(*b*) and in loſing him,

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inſtitutum ſibi conciliet, qui utrique ipſi multum temporis eripere valent, atque ita efficere, ut eò minùs illâ fruatur delectatione, quam ex veritatis acquiſitione percipit. Quantum ad inventorum utilitatem attinet, licet ea non ſtatim appareat, delectatio tamen, quâ afficitur, ipſi ſufficit. Ad hæc nihil novit utilius eſſe hâc dote, quâ ſemper nova detegit: hâc enim ratione aptior evadit ad utiliſſima quæque producenda. Nec opinandum eſt, eos, qui hominibus utiliſſima aperuerunt, ſtatim ab initio in tam utilia incidiſſe, ſed, tentatis primò multis inutilibus. Licet quoque inventa ſua cum aliorum cogitatis congruant, multum tamen delectationis ex eo capit, ſe tantum Scientiæ nactum eſſe, ut etiam valeat ea detegere, quæ à magnis viris ſummâ cum laude publicæ luci jam pridem expoſita fuerunt. Quoniam verò infinita detegenda ſuperſunt, neque ſolus iis omnibus ex tenebris eruendis par eſt, meritò lætatur, alios etiam ignotarum veriatum indagationi aptos inveniri: ita enim abſque ullo labore ſuo multo in animo poſſunt excitari delectationes ob tot nova, & curioſa, quæ ab aliis inveniri queunt. Et proinde ſi ſui eſſe officii unquam crediderit, aliis inſervire, hoc præcipuè tum ſibi incumbere judicabit, cùm occaſio ſimilium rerum inventoribus grata officia præſtandi ſeſe obtulerit: quando quidem ſic aliis inſerviens ſibi ipſi inſerviet: perinde ut omnes, ſi non niſi ductu Rationis veritatem ambirent, nec quicquam aliud agerent, quàm ut ſibi ipſis hâc in re prodeſſe cogitarent, eo ipſo etiam aliis neceſſario & quàm optimè inſervirent, hoc eſt, & ſibi, & aliis prodeſſe eodem rediret, nec alterum abſque altero exiſteret. Ita omnes ferè generoſi eſſent; cùm è contrario, ſi ſolum, quod é re noſtrâ eſſe videtur; ductu affectuum quæramus, atque hinc mundi gloriam, aut ejuſmodi alia, præter ſolam veritatem, ſectemur, neceſſariò aliis adverſemur. Denique ſolius veritatis cultor aliis nova inventa in lucem publicam edita nullatenus invidet, hinc ſiquidem voluptates aliquas percipit, quibus aliàs caruiſſet, quæque ad difficiliora detegenda, & propterea ad majores ſibi creandas voluptates adjumento eſſe poſſunt. *Medicinæ Mentis.* Part I. p. 14.

" He loved therefore the Sciences with this pure and diſintereſted " Affection, which does ſo much Honour both to the Object which in- " ſpires, and the Heart which is inſpired. The manner in which he " expreſſes himſelf in ſome Places, upon the Extaſies that are cauſed by " the Enjoyment of Truth, is ſo lively, that it would have been inex- " cuſable for him to have propoſed any other Recompence. " It is thus the *Academy of Sciences* has pleas'd to expreſs themſelves on his Account. *Hiſt. An.* 1709. *p.* 149.

(*b*) " *M. de la Hire* diſputed with M. *Tſchirnhaus* a Generation, or De- " ſcription,

him, the Learned World have alſo had the Misfortune to loſe ſome of his Secrets. (*c*) And yet he did not conceal them out of Intereſt; for he had no Regard to that, having no occaſion for it. (*d*)

THE Habit we contract of judging of our Felicity by the Compariſon we make of others, does alſo by degrees become the Rule of eſtimating our own *Merit*. Some will believe themſelves to be very learned, and very honeſt Men, who

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" ſcription, which he gave of the Cauſtick by Reflection to a Quadrant. " *M. Tſchirnhaus*, who concealed the Demonſtration of this Method, " did not ſubmit to *M. de la Hire*, who on his Part perſiſted to " look upon this Generation as very much to be ſuſpected. The " Author himſelf was ſo ſure of the contrary, that he ſent it to the " Publiſher of the *Leipſick Journal*, but without Demonſtration." *Hiſt. Acad. An.* 1709. *p.* 146.

" *M. de la Hire* has ſince demonſtrated, in his *Treatiſe of Epicycloids*, " that this Cauſtick is one of them; that indeed it was of the length de- " termined by *M. Tſchirnhaus*, but that it could not be deſcribed after " the Manner he propoſed." The Diſpute would have been ſoon at an End, if *M. Tſchirnhaus* had perectly explained himſelf at the Beginning. *Ibid. p.* 147.

(*c*) " This Glaſs (ſays *M. Fontenelle*, ſpeaking of the great double " Convex-Glaſs, which performs ſuch wonderful Novelties in natural " Philoſophy) is an Ænigma to the Learned: Whether it was wrought " in Baſons, as the common Teleſcopick Glaſſes? or whether it was " caſt in a Mould? We may divide our ſelves upon this Queſtion, and " ſhall find that both theſe Methods have very great Difficulties. So " that nothing can give us a more noble Idea of the Mechanicks which " *M. Tſchirnhaus* made uſe of. He has declared, but perhaps he had a " Mind to conceal the Secret the more, that he wrought it in Baſons; " and that the Maſs of Glaſs which he wrought it out of weigh- " ed 700 Pounds, which is alſo a wonder in Glaſs-grinding." *Ibid. p.* 152.

(*d*) " He preſented a Glaſs of this Kind to the Emperor *Leopold*, who " in return for his Preſent, and alſo as a Recompence due to his Merit, " would have inveſted him with the Title and Privileges of a Baron; " but he refuſed them with all the Reſpect that ought to accompany " ſuch a Refuſal, and accepted no other Favours of the Emperor, than " a Picture of his imperial Majeſty hanging by a Chain of Gold. To " make this Incident appear leſs fabulous, we ſhall add another of the " like Nature. When King *Auguſtus* would have done him the Ho- " nour to have made him one of his Counſellors of State, he even re- " fuſed it. It may be ſuſpected that one who does not ſeek Honours, " may do it on account of their Difficulty, or perhaps the Fear and " Shame of not ſucceeding; but the moſt witty Malice can find no- " thing to ſay againſt him that refuſes them, even when they offer " themſelves."

who are very far from deſerving thoſe Names; but they claim them by comparing themſelves with others that are more ignorant and vicious than themſelves.

THIS Inclination to judge of our ſelves by Compariſon with others, and to believe our ſelves abſolutely to be what we only are relatively, does ſome times throw us into monſtrous Abſurdities. It would be of Service to take Notice of them, as Opportunity preſents them; becauſe it is natural to avoid thoſe Faults which we obſerve to make others ſo manifeſtly ridiculous. We have already hinted, that the Pleaſure of comparing our ſelves with others is a Source of *Envy*; but this Envy is diſguiſed under the Name of *Emulation*: Nor is this ingenious Diſtinction more juſt, That *a generous Emulation aims only to get before a Rival, Envy to trip up his Heels.* The true Generoſity knows no Rivals. When therefore a Man makes it his Buſineſs to diſcover what is valuable in the Conduct of others, in order to equal, and, if poſſible, to excel it, he is ſaid to be animated with a noble Emulation; a Motive that is very powerful and innocent in it ſelf, but very dangerous on account of the Vice of Envy, upon which it borders very nearly. Man is born imperfect, but is deſign'd for Perfection, and ought to make that his Aim: He ought therefore conſequently to excite himſelf to the Imitation of every Thing which he ſees of that kind in others. Their Examples will inſtruct him too clearly, to leave him any Excuſe for Ignorance or Idleneſs. What one Man has done, why cannot another do? If it coſt him more Pains, he will have ſo much the more Merit. But as we uſually fly Pain, we ſoon take an Antipathy to thoſe whoſe Example invites and ſolicits us to undergo it. We are neither willing to run, nor yet to be out-run; we muſt however reſolve upon the one or the other: But inſtead of breaking through our Idleneſs, we amuſe our ſelves in oppoſing thoſe that have taken Pains; and we ſee with Spite the Succeſs of thoſe whom we cannot follow. All *little Minds!* And theſe make the Majority, recommend Emulation, and fall into Envy.

EMULATION excites us to endeavour to equal others, and encourages us to take Pains: We are pleaſed at the Progreſs they make, and only reproach our ſelf for being behind. But when once we are mortified at their Advances and Improvements, we fall from Emulation into Envy.

ALTHO' this Vice be one of the moſt common, it is however generally condemned. But a great many People flatter themſelves that they are free from it, at the ſame time that

that they are fuller of it than they think for. All thoſe that are envious do not repine at, or ſupplant others; there are ſome that moderate this Paſſion: But all thoſe that have Occaſion to heighten the Sentiment of their own Advantages, by comparing themſelves with thoſe that have fewer, have an Heart turn'd to Envy.

THE Encomiums with which we ſee a fellow Collegian honoured, diſtract an envious Heart, but are very entertaining to the Ears of an honeſt Man. By this Touch-Stone we may diſtinguiſh the Principles with which the Heart is poſſeſs'd. He that cannot hear others praiſed without Pain to himſelf, is always mortified at their Merit, and it is a certain Argument that he has none himſelf.

GOD himſelf did, indeed, in order to ſet off the Value of the Favours which he conferr'd upon his ancient People, bid them conſider that they were very ſingular ones; but whenever the Holy Scriptures invite Men to make *Compariſons*, I am of Opinion that it is only becauſe their exceſſive Obſtinacy demands it; and becauſe there is no other Way but this to make ungrateful People aſhamed; and to rouze them out of their Stupidity, Murmurings, and Complaints, by ſhewing them, that without meriting more, they yet have more than other People. This Argument is particularly full of Weight, and confounding to thoſe that complain of their Condition, when others who are in a worſe, are yet content with it. It is only in this View that we ought to regard the Maxim of the Philoſopher *Phavorin. In order to live eaſy, we ought to caſt our Eyes upon thoſe that labour under the greateſt Misfortunes.* And it is in the ſame Senſe that we ought to take the Advice of *Seneca:* "After "having taken notice *how many* People there are that go be- "fore you, count alſo how many there are that follow you, "if you would live agreeably to your ſelf, and thankfully to "God. But what need is there of comparing your ſelf with "others? Compare your ſelf with your ſelf: You have out- "ſtripp'd your ſelf." SUBINDE *itaque, Lucili, quàm multa ſis conſecutus, recordare: cùm adſpexeris quot te antecedant, cogita quot ſequantur. Si vis gratus eſſe adverſus Deos, & adverſus vitam tuam, cogita quàm multos anteceſſeris. Quid tibi cum cæteris? Te ipſe anteceſſiſti.*

XI. I SHALL recapitulate in few Words, what I have laid down concerning the Inclination of Men for Glory. There is an *Internal Honour* which conſiſts in *Merit*; and this we ought to take Pains to acquire, and make our principal Aim. There is alſo an *External one*, *Recapitulation.*

which consists in the Approbation of the Wise and the Learned; and this we ought to have some Regard to; for this Approbation has also its Use and Value: It animates us to great Undertakings; it supports us in our Endeavours; and, besides this, hinders our giving any Attention to the impertinent Encomiums of the Ignorant. But we ought not to *propose for our Aim* the Approbation of particular Men: (*e*) For this being not sufficiently in our Power, our Happiness would depend too much upon others. Besides, since the Wisest have sometimes their Faults, it is much to be fear'd, that in order to obtain our End, and acquire the Approbation of a Person very much to be valued on a great many Respects, we might have the Weakness to approve even of his Faults. Add to this, that to appear to seek Esteem, is far from a sure Way to obtain it. But when we receive Marks of Esteem without having sought them, it is but just to receive them with Pleasure and Thankfulness. This Sensibility is a necessary Consequence of the Affection and Respect which we owe to Persons of Merit. What those People say who affect to recommend a *Carelessness* of our own proper Interests, and pretend that we ought to neglect and regard only with Indifference the Esteem or Contempt of Men; that a *wise Man is uneasy at being praised*, are nothing but fine Expressions, if any Thing can be finely express'd in a Language that signifies nothing, and is made up of Contradictions. There are some indeed, who, by an excessive Pride, become indifferent to all that may be said or thought of them; and this is the Effect of the profound Contempt they have for other Men. There are also some Debauchees, whose violent Passion for gross Pleasures shuts their Eyes against all other Considerations whatsoever, and by this means set them above regarding what others may say of them. But as to these pretended Sages and perfect *Saints*, whose heavenly Souls, if you believe them, see nothing that is terrestrial but in Miniature, and at a Distance: If you would know how very negligent they are of themselves, and how far they extend this Insensibility, (*f*) do but attend to the holy Zeal with which

(*e*) Si de me benè vir bonus sentit, eodem loco sum, quo, si omnes boni idem sentirent; omnes enim si me cognoverint, idem sentient. Par illis idemque judicium est: æque verò insistitur ab his, qui dissidere non possunt. Ita pro eo est, ac si omnes idem sentiant: quia aliud sentire non possunt. *Sen. Ep.* CII.

(*f*) Requiritur ad humilitatem contemptus negativus sui ipsius, quo quis de se non laboret, se non curet, commoda non sui causâ, non sui con-

which they throw down and trample upon thoſe that appear wanting in Reſpect towards them: The Deference which they affect not to expect on account of their Perſons, they know very well how to exact with Uſury on account of ſome Relations which they bear. I don't know whether they cheat themſelves by theſe Illuſions and frivolous Diſtinctions, but I am ſure they cheat no body elſe but Fools.

The Love of Truth and Virtue regulates our Paſſions.

XII. WE have ſeen that our Inclinations to Pleaſure, to Riches, and to Glory, are the Sources of Illuſions and Errors, and we have laid down ſome Rules to regulate them. Let us therefore propoſe to our ſelves a more ſolid End; an End which we may dare to own both to others, and to our ſelves; and in Purſuit of which we may employ all our Strength and Faculties in the Face and Sight of the whole World, without fearing on its Part any Reproach for the preſent, or Reflection for the future. Theſe Characters are not to be found in Pleaſures, nor in Riches, no more than in Glory. Who is there that dares ſay, I have no other View than only to procure my ſelf Pleaſures, or to heap up Riches, or to ſecure Praiſes, all that I do is purely for theſe Ends. He who acts only upon theſe Views, would be out of his Wits, if others knew it; he conceals it even from himſelf. But he who makes an Advancement in Wiſdom, and Knowledge his principal Aim, is hinder'd by nothing but Modeſty

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contemplatione, ſed ſolius Rationis parans. Amor Dei ac Rationis hoc agit in amante, ut ſe ipſe deſerat, à ſe penitus recedat, nullum ſui rationem ducat. Eſt incuria ſui. Fractus ejus, ſumma, quæ inde cadere poteſt, ſublimitas, celſiſſima, ad quam evehi potes felicitas: Hunc fructum geſtat in pyxide, ſed ne reſeras! Nam id ipſum ſunt, quod ſunt ſi expectes: venena verò ſi affectes. *Geulincx Ethic. Cap.* 2. *Sect.* 2.

" Humility is a perfect Forgetfulneſs, a total Neglect of our ſelves. " We do not quit this Forgetfulneſs and Neglect out of any Regard to " our ſelves, but only out of pure Obedience and Submiſſion, and " conſequently out of Humility. The Fruit of this Forgetfulneſs " and Condeſcention, is the higheſt Perfection, and the moſt ſublime " Felicity. But take care not to think too much upon it; rather be " content to wait for it. This excellent Fruit will be apt to turn " into Poiſon, to thoſe that propoſe to reap it. It is ſufficient to read " this Fuſtian, to ſee the Abſurdity of it. Let us ſee how ſmartly " this good Man, who teaches others ſo perfectly to forget themſelves, " attacks thoſe that miſtake his Sentiment." *Sycophanta tantum apud imperitos, mancipia ſua, valent, ut ſubinde non dicere non ſit integrum niſi ſimul dicas te non dicere.*

Modeſty from owning it; and if others diſcover it without his telling them, he can never bluſh for it. (*g*) The more we think of it, the better we ſhall be convinced, that nothing is more worthy of our Application. We ſee an infinite many ignorant People, that repent themſelves of not having ſtudied; and a very great Number of worldly Men, that blame themſelves for not having ſecured a part in Wiſdom: But there never was a learned Man, that wiſh'd he had liv'd in Ignorance, nor a wiſe Man that was ſorry he did not give into the Follies of the World. Thoſe indeed, who apply themſelves to Study, only as a Means to advance their Fortunes, or for a Subſiſtence, do ſometimes repent that they did not make Choice of ſome other, which might have proved more effectual for that Purpoſe. But we are ſpeaking only of thoſe that make Knowledge their End, and not the Means of making their Fortune, which blinds and ſtupifies them.

THOSE that ſeek their Felicity in Externals, have no Foundation to reckon upon. The Reliſh of their Pleaſures periſhes in proportion as they are enjoy'd; but that of having done our Duty endures: We can never remember the laſt without a ſenſible Satisfaction (*h*)

IT is a Truth of Experience, That one prevailing Paſſion weakens all the reſt; it extinguiſhes them, or at leaſt overpowers them, and makes them ſubſervient to its own Ends. A Man therefore who ardently deſires Wiſdom and Knowledge, he who makes it his ſole Buſineſs to inſtruct and reform himſelf, will either be without Paſſion for any Thing elſe, or will make uſe of every Thing to advance his Knowledge, and confirm his Virtue.

BUT how ſhall we render theſe juſt Inclinations ſo prevailing? This is not ſo difficult; we need only reſolve upon it ſeriouſly and conſtantly, and the Succeſs will be infallible.

(*g*) Ea demum magna voluptas eſt, æqualem ac parem verbis, vitam agere. *Cic in Cr. Saluſt.*

Si honeſta ſunt que facis, omnes ſciant; ſi turpia, quid refert neminem ſcire, cùm tu ſcias? O te miſerum ſi contemnis hunc teſtem! *Sen.*

(*h*) Quomodo, inquis, hoc effici poterit? aſſiduâ intentione: ſi nihil egerimus, niſi ratione ſuadente; hanc, ſi audire volueris, dicet tibi: Relinque iſta jamdudum ad quæ diſcurritur; relinque divitias aut periculum poſſidentium, aut onus; relinque corporis atque animi voluptates: molliunt & enervant; relinque ambitum, tumida res eſt. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXIV.

lible.(*i*) We ſoon contract Habits of, and Paſſions for all thoſe Things which we purſue with ſome Aſſiduity. Games, Walking, Husbandry, Buſineſs, Hunting, Building, Reading, Converſation, *&c.* every one of theſe become preſently the Paſſion of thoſe who beſtow their Time upon them: Wiſdom therefore and Knowledge muſt, for a much ſtronger Reaſon, produce the ſame Effect; becauſe we are born to think juſtly, and to live regularly, and can never be happy but in proportion as we anſwer the End of our Creation.

A THINKING Nature cannot exiſt without Perception; and a willing Nature cannot exiſt without Inclination. Further, we would be happy, and cannot poſſibly diveſt our ſelves of this Will. But there are two Things that contribute towards this Happineſs, ſolid Pleaſures and Amuſements. Our preſent Circumſtances require both the one and the other: We have ſomething too Grand in our Make to be able to live without the firſt, and ſomething too imperfect to do without the laſt: We therefore ſtand in need of them both. But the Misfortune is, that having taſted the more trifling Pleaſures before we are acquainted with the others, we are apt to ſeek in them the Solid which they have not. If we eſteem them only as an Amuſements, and if we reckon upon them for no more than they are truly worth, we ſhall never find our ſelves deceiv'd after obtaining them, and they would always pleaſe us equally. But not finding them ſuch as our miſtaken Repreſentations of them have ſuggeſted, we are ſoon diſguſted with them: From Eſteem we paſs to Contempt, from Love to Hatred; and by this Means we contract an Habit of Unſteadineſs; which coming to extend its Influence upon our Studies, makes them as ſuperficial as our Felicity, and as fluctuating and uncertain as our Pleaſures. We ought therefore to apply our ſelves to the Solid, and make that our Capital, in order to procure a Tranquility and Conſtancy, neceſſary as well for the obtaining of Knowledge as of Happineſs.

TO acquire this End, we need only make a Beginning, and the Pleaſure we ſhall find in ſucceeding in what we undertake, will infallibly engage us to perſiſt in it. In all other Projects, we are frequently diſappointed; but in theſe we

(*i*) Optima vivendi ratio eſt eligendo, eam jucundum conſuetudo reddet. *Cic. ad Heren. Lib.* 4.

Cogita quid honeſtè, quid fortiter feceris: bonas partes tecum ipſe tracta: memoriam in eâ quæ maximè miratus es, ſparge. *Sen. Ep.* LXXVIII.

we advance continually. He who takes Pains, and makes his Felicity conſiſt in doing what he wills to do, by confirming his Will to what he is able to do, is always ſure to do what he propoſes to himſelf. For who can hinder him from doing what is in his Power to do? An Obſtacle which puts it out of our Power to advance, and which ſtops us for ſome Moments, does upon that Score excuſe us, and Wiſdom orders us in this Caſe not to be uneaſy. He who runs after Glory, frets at all Impediments: He who purſues Wiſdom is troubled only at thoſe which he himſelf is the Cauſe of. All that Happineſs which others find in the Variety of their Occupations, the Application to the End which I have here recommended, is ſo far from depriving us of, that it puts us in a Condition of reliſhing it ſtill more deliciouſly. The Love of Truth and Wiſdom does not dull the Senſes, or clog the Imagination; it only regulates the Uſe of them, and teaches us to benefit by external Objects, without Inquietude, Diſguſt, and Repentance. The Multitude loſe a thouſand Pleaſures for want of knowing how to render themſelves attentive to them; they languiſh in their continual Diverſions, which loſe a great Part of their Reliſh by the Habit they make of them. But the wiſe Man, who uſes them only now and then, always finds a Pleaſure in their Novelty; and as he has other Inclinations that call him off, he does not dwell ſo long upon his Diverſions, as to give them time to become troubleſome and inſipid. If they offer themſelves, he taſtes them; and if they do not, he can do very well without them, becauſe he always finds within himſelf, more than without; ſo that he never is at a Loſs either for Pleaſure or Employment. It is in theſe Sentiments, ſo very reaſonable, and juſtly regulated, that we ought to make our Glory conſiſt. He whoſe Riches and Titles inſpire to Pride, does not deſerve them; he is made up of Ignorance, Blindneſs, and Wretchedneſs; and he is ſo far from being in the Enjoyment of the true Goods, that he has not ſo much as a Knowledge of them. A Man who poſſeſſes theſe, and is truly ſenſible of the Value of them, finds every Thing elſe below them; and in whatever Rank he is placed, he can never be acquainted with Vanity: Whatever Relation he ſtands in, he eſteems it lower than it really is. *Sapiens in cœlo impoſitus intelligit, cùm ſellam aut tribunal aſcenderat, quam humili loco ſederit.* Sen. Ep. LXVIII.

XIII. THE

XIII. THE Condition laſt mentioned is ſo happy and glorious, and has ſo much Grandeur in it, that for this very Reaſon, inſtead of being a Remedy, it may become even a Temptation to Vanity. In order to prevent this, I muſt once again adviſe, That we need only avoid comparing our ſelves with others. There certainly can be no harm in being acquainted with our Advantages, and in rejoicing in our good Fortune, becauſe there can be no Virtue founded upon Ignorance and Blindneſs: But to magnify our Happineſs, by comparing it with that of others, and to think our ſelves more happy, becauſe others are leſs ſo, is to eſtabliſh in our Hearts the Throne of Pride, and to ſow in them the Seeds of Envy. For if our Happineſs encreaſes in our Eyes, by the Attention we give to the Misfortunes of others, this ſame Happineſs muſt diminiſh by their Advancement. And how can we ſee, I do not ſay with Joy, but even with Tranquility, that which renders us leſs happy? *Love of Preference always dangerous.*

THERE are but two Caſes where this Compariſon of our ſelves with others can be lawful. 1. When we make this Compariſon *in groſs*; and that it turns only upon the Difference of two Conditions conſidered in themſelves; as, the Condition of Ignorance with that of Knowledge; and the State of Paſſion with that of Tranquility. Thus by comparing Conditions, and not Perſons, we prefer the beſt to the worſt. 2. In the ſecond Place, when we are ſo fooliſh as to become diſcontented with our own Condition, it may be very uſeful to caſt our Eyes upon thoſe who enjoy fewer Advantages than our ſelves, and who, notwithſtanding this, do yet live contented. But the End of this Compariſon is not to make us think our ſelves happier by a View of the Superiority of our Condition to that of others, but to make us ſenſible of our Miſtake, in complaining of our Condition, notwithſtanding we have a great deal more Reaſon to be content, than they who really are ſo. By thus avoiding to compare and prefer our ſelves, we may find Pleaſure in Riches and Praiſes; for that theſe are Advantages, we have already prov'd. But when once we want to be richer, or more praiſed than others, then Envy and Hatred mix with them, and after that Diſorder and Illuſion; for Error follows commonly at the Heels of Vice.

IF we would trace the Source of all the Diſturbances that that happen among Men of Letters, to their great Diſhonour, and which retard their Progreſs in Learning, we ſhould find I have not enlarged too much upon this Head, of the Plea-

ſure we take in ſeeing our ſelves eſteemed in Preference to others, nor will any one be ſurpriſed, that I return to it more than once.

The general Character of the Paſſions.

XIV. I SHALL conclude with a Remark on the Paſſions in general, which is, That when they once poſſeſs themſelves of our Heart and Attention, they confine us to conſider only what is agreeable to them, and what may contribute moſt to their Gratification. They remove all other Conſiderations, and divert our Thoughts from them, and by this Means oppoſe the Enlargement of the Underſtanding. The *Capacities* of the Mind are always greater in proportion to its Tranquility; and if together with this Tranquility, it is active and induſtrious, its Views will extend ſo far that nothing will eſcape them. Experience every Day verifies this Maxim. The Paſſions are like Optick-Glaſſes, and either magnify Objects, or multiply, or diminiſh, or colour them, and in various Manners always modify the Ideas of them. Sadneſs makes every Thing appear diſguſting, and Joy pleaſing.

CHAP. XII.

Of Attention and Diligence.

Attention the Principle of our Knowledge.

I. SUCH is the Nature of the human Underſtanding, that its Ideas ariſe one from another: They ariſe ſo much the more readily, and in a greater Number, more clear, diſtinct, exact, and compleat, in proportion as the Attention is more enlivened and active.

THE Attention depends upon the Will; for when we are attentive, we will to be ſo; and when we reſolve to be attentive, we become ſo in effect. It is true we are not always equally diſpoſed to do what we will, no more than to will always with an equal Reſolution. Some times it is very eaſy, and at other times very hard to obey the Dictates of the Will, that is, to execute what we have reſolved upon. A good many of the Maxims which we have before laid down, tend to make us more ſubmiſſive to the Laws of Reaſon, and to give a greater Activity and Steadineſs to the great Principle of the Fruitfulneſs of our Underſtanding, I mean

mean the *Attention*; but the Importance of the Subject very well deſerves a Chapter by it ſelf.

Obſtacles to Attention, and Means to ſurmount them.

II. IN order to be attentive, we muſt firſt will to be ſo. There is nothing more eaſy than Willing in general; nothing more eaſy than a ſimple Act of the Will; but there is hardly any Thing more difficult than to will, with Perſeverance, that which gives ſome Uneaſineſs. We depend entirely upon our *Habits*; and theſe do principally regulate the Eaſy and the Difficult: We follow theſe with all our Hearts, and it is very difficult to reſiſt them; their Power encreaſes with their Duration; and the longer we live, the harder it is to form new ones: But from our very Infancy we contract two Habits altogether contrary to Attention.

FROM the Moment of our coming to have any Notion at all of our Exiſtence, we have a Will to be happy; and as our Reaſon is not then ſufficiently form'd to comprehend wherein the ſolid Felicity does conſiſt, and to diſcover the Way to it, we ſtop at the firſt Impreſſions that give us any Taſte of it, and bear the leaſt Character of it. We avoid Pain, and apply our ſelves to Pleaſure. (*a*) Our Averſion to Pain makes all Efforts diſagreeable; and our Thirſt after Pleaſure makes us run from Object to Object, in order to make amends, if poſſible, by their Multitude, for the Inſufficiency of each of them. Attention demands Efforts; and we are uſed to look upon Labour as an unfortunate Condition. Attention fixes the Mind upon one Object; whereas we are accuſtomed to be pleaſed only with the Multitude of them, and by running them over haſtily.

WE have already demonſtrated the Error of theſe two Prejudices: We have proved that Labour is the Way to Felicity; that our Happineſs depends upon Attention, becauſe our Learning and Virtue depends upon them; and conſequently to know how to be attentive, is to know how to make our ſelves happy. But to make theſe Truths the more effectual, we ought to repeat them, and frequently to run over the Proofs of them, that we may make them perfectly familiar to us.

2. WE-

(*a*) Fieri enim non poteſt, ut animus Libidini deditus, amore, deſiderio, cupiditate, ſæpè nimiâ copiâ, inopia etiam nonnumquam impeditus, hoc, quicquid eſt, quod nos facimus in dicendo, non modò agendo, verùm etiam cogitando poſſit ſuſtinere. *Cic. pro M. Calio.*

2. WE ought to oppoſe Habit againſt Habit. Habits ariſe and are confirmed by repeated Acts: We need only therefore will frequently, and this Will muſt turn into an Habit. Let us ſay to our ſelves every Moment, I will be attentive. Thus after having will'd very frequently, and with ſome Trouble, we ſhall at laſt come to will always, and without Reluctance.

3. WE ought to excite this Will, and give it room to ariſe by the Pleaſure of its commanding and governing it ſelf, and of being Maſter of it ſelf, and of obeying Reaſon, which only informs and adviſes it, and leaves it free, rather than be under the Slavery of confuſed Sentiments, and of blind and rebellious Inclinations, which tyrannize over, and captivate and compel it. To follow the firſt of theſe Principles, is to live like a Man; to purſue the laſt, is to become a Machine.

4. TO encourage us the better to make Attempts upon our ſelves, and upon our blind Habits, we ought to reflect on the Advantages that ariſe from theſe Attempts; and give our ſelves up to the Pleaſure of reliſhing the Fruits of them. By pleaſing our ſelves with the happy Succeſs of our Attention, we ſhall diſpoſe our ſelves always more and more towards it.

5. AND ſince the Succeſs confirms the Will in its Reſolutions, we ought to make uſe of all Opportunities and Aſſiſtances in order to facilitate them. When we find our ſelves in the Humour for Application, theſe are the precious Moments which muſt not be loſt. An Habit of Attention will ſtrike Root more deeply at ſuch Times in the Space of an Hour, than it will in a great many Days under Diſpoſitions leſs favourable. Health, Tranquility, Solitude, and Morning Hours, will preſent us with theſe happy Opportunities, which we ought to embrace and employ with ſo much Care, and which are of ſuch Importance to be improved.

SOLITUDE, which reduces us to the Neceſſity of being by our ſelves, and of entertaining our ſelves with our own proper Thoughts; the Morning Hours, at which Time the Impreſſions of Objects which amuſe us are in part effaced, or at leaſt weakned, by the preceding Night's Reſt, would diſpoſe us towards Tranquility, and by that means become very great Helps to Attention, if Men did but know what Uſe to make of this Tranquility. (*b*) But to the greateſt

(*b*) Sed non multum ad tranquillitatem locus confert: animus eſt, qui commendat omnia. Vidi ego in villa hilari & amœna mœſtos, vidi in media ſolitudine occupatis ſimiles. *Sen. Ep.* LV.

eſt Part of them it is a very troubleſome Condition, and a Source of continual Uneaſineſs. They muſt perpetually have ſome Amuſement to poſſeſs their Minds and Hearts; and their Spirits flag, if they have not conſtantly ſome Trifle to ſupport them; and at the very Time when they might be moſt by themſelves, and thinking of their Duty, they ſeek moſt eagerly for ſome Diverſion. For want of Objects, they recollect the Ideas of them; and by this Means, they ſeem to do all they are able, to prevent their having any Time left to improve themſelves.

IT is for this Reaſon, that I have placed this Chapter, after thoſe that treat of the Paſſions. We are more or leſs attentive, in proportion as we know how to revive and excite the Paſſions in a proper Manner. When we are once Maſters of theſe, we are Maſters of every Thing. In the greateſt Hurry, and in the thickeſt Crowd, we can think of that which ought to be the Subject of our Thoughts; we ſee no more than what we have a mind to ſee, and we underſtand only that which we would underſtand. Without Tranquility, Solitude is no better than Tumult

(c). *Non multùm locus confert, niſi ſe ſibi præſtet Animus, qui ſecretum & in occupationibus mediis, ſi volet, habebit.* Sen. Ep. CIV.

6. AS we give our Attention without Reluctance to that which is not diſagreeable, and that the Subjects in favour of which we are prepoſſeſſed, engage it of themſelves, it is viſible that in order to form our ſelves towards an Habit of Attention, it is of the utmoſt Importance to begin by employing our Studies upon that which is moſt eaſy, and moſt pleaſing.

7. AFTER we have found ſome Reliſh in our Studies, and are become capable of a ſufficient Attention, then the *Mathematicks* are the moſt proper Studies to confirm and compleat it. For in the practical Part of them, if, through the leaſt Inadvertency, we make but one ſingle Miſtake, we perceive

(c) Omnia licet foris reſonent; dum intus nihil tumultus ſit, dum inter ſe non rixentur Cupiditas & Timor, dum Avaritia Luxuriaque non diſſideant, nec altera alteram vexet. Nam quid prodeſt totius regionis ſilentium, ſi affectus fremunt?

Omnia noctis erant, placidâ compoſta quiete.

Falſum eſt; nulla placida quies eſt: niſi quàm ratio compoſuit; nox exhibet moleſtiam, non tollit, & ſolicitudines mutat. Nam dormientium quoque inſomnia tam turbulenta ſunt, quàm dies. Illa tranquillitas vera eſt, in quàm bona mens explicatur. *Sen. Ep.* LVI.

perceive at the End of the Calculation, that we are miſtaken, but neither know how, nor where; ſo that we are obliged to begin all over again. To ſave therefore the Trouble of repeating the ſame Operation ſo often over again, we are forced to be upon our Guard againſt Miſtakes. We ſee that if we miſtake but in any one ſingle Place, it is ſufficient to deprive us of the Fruit of all the Pains we have taken in every Place beſides; and by this means we accuſtom our ſelves to a continual Attention.

AS to Demonſtrations we are obliged to comprehend them either entirely, or not at all. In Matters of Hiſtory, Morality, or in the Explication of a Phænomenon in Natural Philoſophy, we may comprehend in groſs the Thought of him who is inſtructing us, or whoſe Works we are reading: We may retain Part, without having any regard to the reſt. But here we muſt have all, or nothing; the leaſt Part omitted, leaves us in the Dark; and he that would ſpeak of Part, without comprehending the Whole, muſt ſpeak without knowing what he ſays, and will be very ſenſible himſelf that he does not comprehend what he ſays.

THE Study of the Mathematicks does, beſides all this, occaſion one of the moſt happy Habits that can poſſibly take Root in the Mind of Man. It is that of *loving Truth*, and of finding it worthy our Attention *on the account of its being Truth.* We accuſtom our ſelves to love Knowledge for its own ſake; we love to inſtruct our ſelves, even tho' we know not what Fruit we ſhall reap from our Inſtructions. Mathematicians are every Day charm'd with a thouſand and a thouſand Theorems, whoſe Value is, that they are undoubted Truths, which ariſe one from another. Is not this a Proof that Man is born for Truth, and that his greateſt Satisfaction conſiſts in Knowledge? The Truths of Divinity, Morality, and even of Natural Philoſophy, are more engaging; they have a very near Relation to our Paſſions, and very often to our Fortunes. In the ſacred Doctrines, and in our Duties alſo, and Philoſophical Hypotheſes, we think we love Truth, when we love only our Prejudices; and very often we Study more to cheat our ſelves with what is convenient, than to inform our ſelves of what is true. But in ſtudying the Mathematicks, we learn to ſtudy with Attention, and without Prejudice.

8. WHEN we read other Works with the ſame Application as thoſe that are Mathematical; when in an *Hiſtory*, for Example, we have always preſent all the Intereſts and Characters of the Perſons whoſe Words or Actions we are reading;

ing; when we have always before our Eyes the Situation and Plan of all the Towns and Countries whoſe Revolutions are deſcrib'd; when in a Piece of Oratory, we forget no one Circumſtance, but have a continual Regard to the Propriety of the Terms, the Order of the Arguments, the Chain of Reaſonings, the Juſtneſs of the Thoughts, the Beauty of the Images, the Delicacy of the Turns, the Force of the Expreſſions, the Harmony of the Periods, and to whatever is ſaid, and is capable of being underſtood; we ſhall ſoon diſcover the Value of Attention by the inexpreſſible Pleaſure we ſhall receive from it, on whatſoever Subject we fix: It is never without Recompence, even upon the ſlighteſt and moſt inconſiderable Subjects. If we be at Table, or aſſiſting in a Conſort, the caſting our Eyes upon Pictures, Buildings, Gardens, or Landskips, upon all Occaſions, Wandering and Careleſneſs will diminiſh our Pleaſure, and *Attention will encreaſe it.*

9. FOR fear of falling back into Idleneſs, and giving room to the old Habits to be revived again, we ought to do nothing that has any relation to Study without Application. It happens every Day to People, who amuſe themſelves with reading of Hiſtories, which are Books that require the leaſt Attention of any, that they retain only here and there a Place, which they afterwards connect by ſome Snpplement of the Imagination, or elſe confound them with others which reſemble them in ſome Reſpect. But it is a great deal better to ſit ſtill, than to loſe in this manner in Amuſements the Fruit of our other Studies, which we have been purſuing with Application. The Pleaſure of reading without Application, is a dangerous Pleaſure. Uſeleſs Books we ought to lay aſide; and to make all poſſible Advantage of thoſe, from which we may reap ſome Fruit. If they treat well upon good Subjects, they deſerve our Attention, both for the Matter and Manner of their Performance. But if they contain only ſorry and miſtaken Accounts of their Subjects, which their *Title-Page* promiſes us a compleat Explanation of, the reading of them may vitiate our Taſte, by accuſtoming it to Confuſion and Obſcurity, unleſs we have Judgment enough to diſcover their Defects, and find out the Means to avoid them.

Of Refreſhment.

III. BUT ſince the Attention cannot be ſupported always in the ſame Vigour, what Precautions muſt we take to avoid returning into the dangerous Habit of Inattention, by the Pleaſure we ſhall find in refreſhing our ſelves, and in ceaſing from Action

Action after being fatigued? When the Attention is exhausted by means of the Spirits being exhausted, we ought to seek to recruit them by Nourishment and Rest; but, if we have no Occasion for either of these, we had much better do nothing at all, than to employ our selves carelessly about any Thing. For how little soever we have of natural Activity, we shall never be pleas'd long with doing nothing, and consequently need never fear contracting an Habit of it; Uneasiness, and a sad Weariſomness, will rouze the most Idle from Inaction.

IT is even certain, that an agreeable Employment contributes a great deal more to recruit our Spirits and Faculties, than a simple Repose; and it is upon this Account that human Nature stands in need of Recreation, and of some Amusements which require less Attention, and consequently will not fatigue it: But, if we wou'd reap the full Benefit of these, and expect that they shou'd divert and refresh us for new Applications, we ought to give as much Attention to them, as is necessary to relish the entire Pleasure of them. When therefore our Attention relaxes, not so much by the Exhaustion of the Spirits, as by the Continuance of our Application, which makes it tedious by diminishing the Pleasure which it gave at the Beginning; we may interrupt it, and give a little into the secret Inclination of the Heart for Variety. We may unbend our selves from Meditation by Reading; and a second Reading upon some other Subject will divert the Fatigue of the former, not by the Carelesness of our performing it, but by the Variety of the Subject, which, besides this, must also require a less Degree of Attention. We have Walking, Musick, Conversation, (*d*) and such-like Diversions, to amuse, relax, and refresh our Faculties; and provided it be not entirely exhausted, the Attentention will be reviv'd much sooner than it was weary'd, by being apply'd successively to such Subjects as will require no more of it, than what we can give without Trouble.

I AM not so superstitious to condemn *Games* in themselves: I even acknowledge that they might be of Use to Society. The important Services which Men do for one another, are not what binds them so much together; for, besides that the Instances of these are very rare, they are often uneasy both to the Author, on account of their being expensive,

(*d*) Indulgendum est animo: dandumque subinde otium, quòd Alimenti ac virium loco sit: & in Ambulationibus apertis vagandum, ut Cœlo libero & multo Spiritu augeat attollatque se Animus. *Sen. de Tranq. An. Cap.* 15.

ſive, and to the Receiver, becauſe of their laying him under Obligations. But the Heart is eaſily won by the frequent Returns of pleaſing Amuſements. We at laſt contract a Friendſhip for thoſe who are aſſiſting in our Recreations; we cannot poſſibly avoid it, and when we are requeſted to do them ſome Services that are even troubleſome, we are too much engaged in their Acquaintance to refuſe them. Notwithſtanding all this, I wou'd not recommend *Games* to Men of Learning as uſeful Amuſements, and proper to divert them. They produce this Effect only in thoſe that take a Pleaſure in them. But young People run a very great Hazard in giving into them, and beſtowing part of their Time upon them; becauſe for one that uſes them moderately, there is an hundred that abuſe them. However, if we have not got an Habit of them in our Youth, we ſhall hardly take a Fancy to them in an Age more advanced, and conſequently they will then neither relax nor divert us.

THERE are ſome *Games* which the graver People take a ſort of Pride in, as *Cheſs*, *Back Gammon*, *&c.* but wou'd think it a Diſgrace to them, to amuſe themſelves with *Games* more common and eaſy. But this Notion is the Effect of their Vanity, and of the Pleaſure they take in impoſing upon the ignorant Multitude.

THERE are ſome People, whoſe Lives are ſo taken up in certain *Games*, for their Skill, in which they very much value themſelves, that if it were not for theſe, they wou'd hardly make any uſe at all of their Thought and Attention: But Men of Letters would do much better to apply themſelves to ſome uſeful Compoſition or Study, than to a fatiguing *Game*. Nor can they eſteem as an Amuſement, that which tires, and puts them out of a Condition of making any farther Application till after an Interval of Repoſe. Beſides, they are but too ſubject to contend for the Glory of the firſt Rank, and to be ambitious of out-ſhining one another. This Inclination, to which they are every Moment expoſed, has but too much Influence over them; and they ought rather to oppoſe it inceſſantly, than to encourage it by giving into *Games*, where all the Fruit they reap for their Trouble in learning them, is only the rejoicing at the Mortification and bad Fortune of their Fellows, and the Pleaſure of finding themſelves moſt skilful.

The Influence of Inattention upon our Lives.

IV. SO far therefore ſhou'd we be from reading upon any Subjects careleſly, under the Pretence of diverting our ſelves, that we ought to begin all our *Studies*, by examining the Importance

tance of that which is to be the Subject of them. If it be not worth our Pains, then we ought to lay it aſide; but if we find it very well deſerves our Application, then we ought to give our ſelves entirely up to it, by ſerious and repeated Reflections both upon its own proper Excellency, and upon the Advantages we may make of it. Above all, we ought to take care that our Attention be continu'd and maintain'd uniform from the Beginning to the End. For if by any Neglect we miſtake in the Principles, the farther we purſue the Conſequences, the more we wander in Error; and if, after having well eſtabliſh'd the Principles, we ſuffer our ſelves to be miſled by Precipitation into ſome falſe Conſequences, amongſt a great many true ones, this is alſo loſing the Fruit of all that we have before laid dowh with ſo much Care We ought therefore upon all Occaſions to remind our ſelves of the indiſpenſible Neceſſity of Attention. In Practice, we hardly ever ſin, or commit a Fault, either againſt God or Man, but for want of Application. For we know the general Rules; and in groſs, have a Deſire to pleaſe God, and be eſteem'd of Men. But we apply theſe Principles too precipitately, and by this Means we are not ſenſible that we deviate in particular Circumſtances, from the End we propoſed to our ſelves in general.

THE Impertinence which takes up the greateſt Part of our *Converſations*, thoſe frequent and almoſt perpetual Ramblings from what is or ought to be the Subject of them, and which very often oblige thoſe that are more rational, to cloſe in with ſome *Game*, in order to avoid being drawn into nonſenſical Diſputes, where nothing will ever be underſtood; whence comes all this, but from the Want of Attention? The greateſt Part of Mankind remain Children all their Lives, and being equally aſhamed of being taught, and proud of teaching, they boldly advance whatever happens to riſe uppermoſt in their narrow Minds.

IN *Theory* alſo, there is no body but wou'd avoid Error, and conſequently we fall into it only thro' Inadvertency. For fear, therefore, that the Lightneſs of any Subject ſhou'd give our Attention an Occaſion to relax, we ought to conſider, that there is no Error ſo ſmall, but by its Fruitfulneſs, and Connexion with others, may become fatal. We ſhou'd do well alſo to obſerve, that all we ſhall eſtabliſh will be nothing but Miſtakes, and that the Conſequences will deviate ſo far from Truth, as they are connected with falſe Principles. Not to mention, that the very ſame manner in which

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we reaſon upon a Subject of ſmall Importance, where we fall into ſome ſmall Error, which, for want of our Attention, eſcapes our Correction, will alſo be follow'd in a Subject of greater Importance; and where we cannot commit a Miſtake without Danger. It is demanded, whether Taſte, Whiteneſs, Weight and Motion, *&c.* ought to be conſider'd as ſo many little diſtinct Beings and Realities, which are ſuperadded to corporeal Subſtance? or whether they are only ſome certain Conditions and Manners of the Exiſtence of that Subſtance? Whether the Qualities of any Body, be not the Body it ſelf under ſome certain Conditions, as the Roundneſs of a Ball of Wax, is the Wax it ſelf under a certain Diſpoſition? The Queſtion appears very ſubtile, and of pure Curioſity; and yet, for want of its being formerly determin'd in the manner it has been lately, ſince the Philoſophy of *Deſcartes*, it has given room to a Doctrine, which wou'd otherwiſe have never been thought of, whoſe Conſequences are deplorable in diſcouraging thoſe that might become Converts, and in giving great Advantages to the Enemies of our moſt Holy Religion.

TO run without Scruple the Riſque of being deceiv'd, by deciding without Attention upon a Subject, which ſeems not to be worth the Trouble of being examin'd with Application, ſhews a Narrowneſs of Genius. There is no Miſtake ſo inconſiderable in it ſelf, but may, by being purſued from Conſequence to Conſequence, become the Principle of a great many more, and at laſt become fatal. The Maxim of *Ariſtotle* is applicable to this Purpoſe, *Puerile eſt contemnere parva, unde deduci poſſunt magna.*

THE *Stoicks* maintain'd the *Summum Bonum* to conſiſt in *Virtue*, and the *Summum Malum* in *Vice*. To regard this Sentiment in it ſelf, if it be an Error, it ſtill tends to aggravate the Turpitude of Vice, and to ſet off the Beauty of Virtue. And this may perhaps be rather thought an happy Prepoſſeſſion, than a Miſtake of any bad Conſequence. But from hence it will follow, that a Man truly virtuous is ſupremely happy, and conſequently wants nothing, not even Immortality. The vicious Man, on the contrary, is ſupremely miſerable, and by Conſequence is ſufficiently puniſh'd, there being no Torment to be compared with ſupreme Miſery. After we have once drawn theſe Conſequences, and have by Prepoſſeſſion receiv'd them for true, all the Arguments deduced from the Accidents, Misfortunes, and melancholy Condition of good Men in this Life, in order to eſtabliſh the Hopes of a better, fall immediately to the

Ground: A future State, to make a Retribution, is by no means neceſſary. The Virtuous is ſufficiently recompenſed, ſince he is ſupremely happy; and the Vicious ſufficiently puniſh'd, ſince he is ſupremely miſerable. Hence the *Stoicks*, in order to defend Providence againſt the Objections of the *Epicureans*, inſtead of inſiſting upon a Life to come, when all Accounts were to be made up, which was a very natural and obvious Reply, were obliged to have Recourſe to Subtilities ſuitable to their grand Principle, the Brightneſs of which prevented their diſcovering their Error.

Of Diverſion.

V. DIVERSION is a particular Sort of Obſtacle to the Attention; for all thoſe who thro' Careleſneſs or Unſteadineſs neglect to be attentive, cannot be ſaid to be diverted from Attention. This is meant only of thoſe who are put off and diverted from attending to what is ſaid to them, whether it be out of a natural *Stupidity*, or by an Habit which comes very near it, and makes them incapable of thinking attentively, or whether a continual *Rambling* has made it impoſſible for them to fix; or, laſtly, whether too great an Application to their own proper Thoughts, diverts them commonly from thoſe of others, and hinders them from entring into what is ſaid to them.

THERE are ſome who may be ſaid not to think at all, or to think upon nothing. That is, there are ſome whoſe Ideas are ſo looſe, and their Sentiments ſo weak and confuſed, and who do moreover ſo rarely reflect upon their Ideas and Sentiments, that they have not ſo much as a Memory ſufficient to ſpeak what they have been thinking of, even the Moment they have thought it. They have a very thoughtful Look, and ſeem to be taken up in profound Reflections; but, if you once ask them what they are thinking of, you ſurpriſe them. They ſeem to ſtart as out of a Sleep, and as tho' waked out of a Dream, whoſe Idea preſently vaniſhes with their Sleep; for the Memory of nothing is preſerv'd, but of that which we think of with Reflection.

WHEN young People are inclined to this Fault, if we wou'd prevent the Conſequences of it, we muſt reaſon upon ſuch Subjects as are within their Reach, and are not diſagreeable to them, and upon which we find ſome Means to excite their Curioſity. They ſhou'd be obliged to repeat frequently theſe Reaſonings, and be confined from Solitude, from Fatigue, from Converſations upon Subjects too high for them, and from all ſuch Companies where they cannot be free; and they ſhou'd be kept in Pleaſure, and in Action, and be indulged

indulged in a perfect Liberty of Thought, for fear the Commands we lay upon them to regulate them, ſhou'd diſcourage them from thinking at all. When they make a Miſtake, they ought to be ſhewn it with a great deal of Softneſs and Moderation; and with all poſſible Marks of Friendſhip. We ſhou'd not only not make uſe of Cenſure, nor Surlineſs, nor Raillery, but moreover their Faults ſhou'd be repreſented as Trifles; and what we ſubſtitute in the room of them, ſhou'd be propoſed not ſo much for a Correction, as for ſomething a little better. They ſhou'd be very ſeldom reprimanded.

THOSE who appear diverted by the Effect of too great an Application to their own proper Thoughts, may correct this Fault, by ſtudying to moderate their Deſires, and to govern their Paſſions; by not confining themſelves to the Converſation of their Inferiors or Friends, but by frequenting as much as poſſible the Company of their Superiors, before whom they will be obliged to appear with Submiſſion and Regard. I would adviſe them alſo to paſs every Hour to different Studies, in order to accuſtom themſelves to make room for ſucceeding Ideas, notwithſtanding the ſtrong Impreſſion of the firſt. Laſtly, to correct themſelves more effectually from this Diverſion, whenever they fall into it, they ought to puniſh themſelves for it, and confine themſelves to read over a ſecond, third, or fourth time, that which they have paſs'd over too careleſly, and even oblige themſelves to get by heart thoſe Subjects from which they have been diverted.

A MULTITUDE of Buſineſs ſometimes occaſions a Diverſion in Minds otherwiſe the moſt capable of, and the beſt diſpoſed to Attention. For which Reaſon, we ought to take care to make it an indiſpenſible Duty to burden our ſelves with no more than we can bear, and to regulate always our Undertakings according to our Faculties. Beſides this, we ought to form very clear and exact *Schemes* of all we have to do. All that we foreſee we ſhall have to tranſact for our Day's Work, we ſhou'd begin by laying out every Part in the manner we are to perform it. When we have executed part of a Scheme ſo well regulated, we ſhall never be diverted by any Uneaſineſs from the ſucceeding Parts, being aſſured we ſhall diſcharge it very exactly, becauſe we are already perfectly well prepared for it.

THERE are ſome who are diverted from giving Attention to what we ſay to them, by the ſudden Riſe of ſome Ideas in their Minds, upon which they immediately fix, for

fear they ſhould ſlip away unregarded. But this is an Abuſe of our Faculties; for when the Mind is juſtly form'd, and we once come to know how to think regularly, the ſame Principles that have once given Riſe to any Idea in a proper Manner, will infallibly excite it again, whenever we ſhall think upon the ſame Subject with Attention.

How to engage the Attention.

VI. WHEN we have once diſcover'd the Means to make our ſelves attentive, we ſhall eaſily underſtand what is neceſſary to engage the Attention of others. There muſt be *Perſpicuity*, for fear of diſcouraging and tiring the Attention; *Brevity*, to prevent Tediouſneſs and Impatience; and *Order*, to encourage the Memory: The Arguments ſhould be juſt and *ſolid* to intereſt the Attention, the Turns *lively* and *new* to to employ it with agreeable Sentiments. The Whole muſt be *natural*, becauſe Nature pleaſes, and Affectation diſguſts our Self-love. And it muſt be ſo contrived, that the Hearer may be made ſenſible of his own *proper Genius*, whilſt he liſtens to that of the Orator; and that he penetrates ſo much better into the Senſe and Beauty of the Ideas that are preſented to him, as he has himſelf the better Underſtanding. When the Hearer is entirely ſatisfied, we ought to *conclude*; and, if we have yet ſomething left to ſay, we ſhould ſo order it, that what we have already ſaid may make him *deſirous* of hearing what we have reſolv'd to add farther.

Of Diligence.

VII. THE ſame Unſteadineſs which oppoſes the Attention, does alſo yet farther oppoſe *Diligence*, which is a continued Attention, and is never interrupted any longer than is neceſſary to refreſh our Faculties, and reanimate our Vigour. Every Thing that engages our Attention, diſpoſes us to Diligence; we loſe the Fruit of our preceding Attention, if we neglect to perſevere in it. A Labourer loſes his Pains, if he does not continue them; and, in general, to reap the Fruit of any Work, it is in vain to make an happy Beginning, unleſs we make the ſame Ending. (*e*) The Mind is too much limited, and the Things to the Knowledge of which it ought to apply it ſelf are too numerous, and too much compounded, to ſuppoſe that they can be all comprehended in a little time.

As we have a great deal to do, we ought to labour with Earneſtneſs, and perſevere in the Work. The ſooner we acquire

(*e*) Perdet Agricola quod ſparſit, ſi labores ſuos deſtituit in ſemine, multâ curâ ſata perducuntur ad ſegetem, nihil ad fructum pervenit quod non æqualis cultura à primo ad extremum proſequitur. *Sen.*

acquire any Thing, the longer we enjoy it. If we do but accuſtom our ſelves to it, we ſhall find no more Trouble in it; and even the Pleaſure of working will become one of the Fruits of the Work. (*f*) It is with Learning, as with Snow-Balls roll'd from the Top of an Hill, which gather and grow bigger every Turn they make. To enjoy the Benefit of the Pains we have been at, we muſt perſevere in the Work. If we have begun with a View of Learning, why ſhou'd we ſtop, when we have ſtill ſo many Things to learn? *Tamdiu diſcendum, quamdiu neſcias.*

A MAN that wou'd uſe Diligence, muſt, 1. Set before his Eyes, on the one ſide, the Examples of great Genius's, whoſe Idleneſs and Unſteadineſs have ſtopp'd their Advancement; and, on the other, thoſe of ſuch, as with moderate Talents, and a great Aſſiduity, have not fail'd to arrive at very great Abilities. He ought to remember that Application *enlarges* the Underſtanding, and Idleneſs contracts it. We know not how to ſee any Thing beyond the little we have already acquired, after once we have ſoftly indulged our ſelves in the Habit of making no farther Endeavours to extend our Acquiſitions. The Hopes of a Victory contributes very much towards the gaining it; and in moſt Things, if we fail of Succeſs, it is for want of Courage. (*g*)

IDLENESS is an infallible Source of Vice. When the Love of Knowledge prevails in the Heart, the Way to it is never thought troubleſome: But when once we have little or no Love for it, we ſuffer our ſelves quietly to be led away by our Fancy, and wandring Imagination, we abandon

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(*f*) Perſevera ut cæpiſti, & quantùm potes propera: quo diutiùs frui emendato animo & compoſito poſſis. Frueris quidem etiam dum emendas, etiam dum, componis. *Sen. Ep.* IV.

Philoſophiæ nullum Tempus ſatis magnum eſt, etiamſi à pueritia, uſque ad longiſſimos humani ævi terminos vita protenditur. *Sen. Ep.* LXXII.

(*g*) Imitetur illum, cui ſine dubio ſumma vis dicendi conceditur, Athenienſem Demoſthenem, in quo tantum ſtudium fuiſſe, tantuſque Labor dicitur: ut primum impedimenta naturæ diligentia induſtriaque ſuperaret, cumque ita balbus eſſet, ut ejus ipſius artis, cui ſtuderet, primam literam non poſſet dicere, perfecit meditando, ut nemo planius eo locutus putaretur. Deinde, cum ſpiritus ejus eſſet anguſtior, tantum continenda anima in dicendo eſt aſſecutus, ut una continuatione verborum (id quod ejus ſcripta declarant) binæ ei contentiones vocis & remiſſiones continerentur, qui etiam (ut memoriæ proditum

abandon our ſelves to the Influence of our Senſes and Paſſions.

As Vanity is very conſiſtent with Idleneſs, when we cannot reſolve to take Pains our ſelves, we conceive a ſecret Diſguſt againſt thoſe, who, by a ſuitable Application, advance themſelves to ſuch Abilities as we cannot, in ſpite of our ſelves, forbear acknowledging even at a very great Diſtance. And when by the Credit of the Rank we are in we would ſupply thoſe Abilities which we have not, we expect all ſhould ſubmit to Authority, we ſubſtitute it in the Place of Reaſon, we trample upon thoſe that dare conſult this laſt, and we favour only thoſe who ſhut their Eyes againſt it.

We not only prevent a great Number of Vices by contracting an Habit of Diligence, and of Love for Application, but alſo ſecure our ſelves from the moſt intolerable Condition in the World, the Uneaſineſs and Diſquiet in which thoſe Men live, who neither know how to continue to be in Action, nor to be without it. (*b*)

2. It is good for young People to give an Account of their Labours and Advancement to their Superiors, or at leaſt

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proditum eſt) conjectis in os calculis, ſummâ voce verſus multos uno ſpiritu pronunciare conſueſcebat, neque id conſiſtens in loco, ſed inambulans, atque aſcenſu ingrediens arduo. Hiſce ego cohortationibus, Craſſe, ad Studium & ad Laborem incitandos Juvenes vehementer aſſentior. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* I.

(*b*) Cunctatio Vitæ parùm ſe explicantis, & inter deſtituta vota torpentis animi ſitus. Quæ omnia graviora ſunt, ubi odio infelicitatis operoſæ ad otium profugerunt, & ad ſecreta ſtudia: quæ pati non poteſt animus ad civilia erectus, agendique cupidus, & natura inquietus, parum ſcilicet in ſe ſolatiorum habens; ideòque detractis oblectationibus, quas ipſæ occupationes diſcurrentibus præbent, domum, ſolitudinem, parietes non fert, invitus adſpicit ſe ſibi relictus. Hinc illud eſt tœdium, & diſplicentia ſui, & nuſquam reſidentis animi volutatio, & otii ſui triſtis atque ægra patientia: utique ubi cauſas fateri pudet, & tormenta introrſùs egit verecundia, in anguſto incluſæ cupiditates, ſine exitu, ſe ipſæ ſtrangulant. Inde mœror marcorque, & mille fluctus mentis incertæ, quàm inchoata habent ſuſpenſam, querentiumque nihil ipſos habere quòd agant, & alienis incrementis inimiciſſima invidia. Alit enim livorem infelix inertia; & omnes deſtrui cupiunt, quia ſe non potuerunt provehere: & ex hac deinde averſatione alienorum proceſſuum, & ſuorum deſperatione, obiraſcens fortunæ animus, & de ſæculo querens, & in angulos ſe retrahens, & pœnæ incubans ſuæ, dum tædet ſui, pigetque. *Sen. de Tranq. An. Cap.* 2.

leaſt to make Choice of ſome Friends, whom they may regularly entertain with them. Without this we may eaſily forget our ſelves, and grow remiſs; but theſe frequent and ſtated Entertainments and *Conferences* renew our Diligence, which muſt produce the Subjects for them *(i)*.

3. IF we ſtand in any Awe of our Maker, if we love him, and conſider the Time, as well as the Faculties, which we have receiv'd of him as Preſents and as Talents committed to our Truſt, of which we muſt give him an Account, we ſhall be ſure to examine our ſelves in his Preſence; and every Day, every Week, and every Month, we ſhall compare the Progreſs we have made, with what we have before made in the ſame Space of Time. If we find that we have made as much as we ought, we ſhou'd enjoy the perfect Pleaſure of the Senſe we have of it: We ſhou'd ask our ſelves whether we had rather be ignorant of all that we have acquired; whether we repent our ſelves of the Pains we have taken; whether we ſhou'd have found a greater Advantage, and been better pleas'd with following our Fancies. If, on the contrary, we have made no Advances, we ought to compute what we might have done; we ought to ask our ſelves what we find left of all thoſe Amuſements which we have been taken up with. By obſerving theſe Precautions, ſometimes the Satisfaction of having diſcharged our Duty, will confirm us in it; ſometimes the Confuſion of having forgot it, calls us back to it.

THIS Article does not only contain the Maxims of a Chriſtian Philoſophy; the *Gentile* Philoſophers thought after the ſame manner. They rank'd this Precept, *Husband your Time*, TEMPORI PARCE, together with theſe, *Know your ſelf*, *Carry nothing too far*, *Submit to the Divinity*, and others of this Nature; which, in a few Words, comprehend a very large Meaning, and which were referr'd to God as their Author. Upon this Foundation they are aſtoniſh'd at the Extravagance of Men, who wou'd purchaſe a good Part

(*i*) Aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus eſt, ac ſemper ante oculos habendus, ut ſic tanquam illo ſpectante vivamus, & omnia tanquam illo vidente faciamus.--- O felicem illum, qui non adſpectus tantum, ſed etiam cogitatus emendat! O felicem, qui ſic aliquam vereri poteſt, ut ad memoriam quoque ejus ſe componat, atque ordinet! Qui ſic aliquam vereri poteſt, citò erit verendus. *Sen. Ep.* XI.

Part of their Goods, ſome Months of their Lives, and quietly loſe whole Years without making any Advantage of them. *The greateſt Expence of all, is that of Time* (*k*).

CAN it be call'd Living, to paſs our Lives in doing nothing? Can we be ſaid to make the beſt Improvement of our Time, when we let it ſlip, without reaping any durable Fruit from it, and without procuring any other Satisfactions than ſuch as paſs away together with it? (*l*) What is there, how little ſoever, that remains of a whole Week ſpent in Amuſements? What is done by Day, is like what paſſes in the Mind by Night; all is equally vaniſh'd, as tho' it had been only a Dream. How many are there, who, if they be ask'd at the End of four and twenty Years, what they have done that deſerves to be eſteem'd, can hardly reckon up enough to make a good Week's Work? Tho' theſe People have been a long time upon upon the Earth, it is certain, however, that they have lived but a little while; or if they have lived, it has been no better than a Life of Plants and Brutes. I eſteem thoſe in the Number of the Dead, who do not live like rational Men. But if we have acquired Knowledge, if we have diſcharged our Duty for ſome Days, theſe Days are not loſt; they ſeem to endure yet, and all the Satisfaction you receiv'd as they paſt, does and will ſtill ſubſiſt (*m*).

VIII.

(*k*) Πολυτελὲς, ἀνάλωμα ὁ χρόνος.
Clamat ecce maximus Vates, & velut divino furore inſtinctus ſalutare carmen canit:

Optima quæque Dies miſeris mortalibus ævi.
Primo fugit.

Quid cunctaris, inquit, quid ceſſas? Niſi occupas, fugit: cùm occupaveris, tamen fugiet. Itaque cum celeritate temporis, utendi velocitate certandum eſt; velut ex torrente rapido, nec ſemper caſuro, citò hauriendum eſt. Hoc quoque pulcherrimè ad exprobrandam infinitam cogitationem, quòd non optimam quamque ætatem, ſed diem dicit. Quid ſecurus, & in tantâ temporum fugâ lentus, menſes tibi, & annos, & longam ſeriem, utcunque aviditate tuæ viſum eſt, exporrigis? De die tecum loquitur, & de hoc ipſo fugiente. Non dubium eſt ergò, quin prima quæque optima dies fugiat mortalibus miſeris, id eſt, occupatis: quorum pueriles adhuc animos ſenectus opprimit, ad quam imparati inermeſque veniunt. *Sen. de Brev. Vitæ, Cap.* 9.

(*l*) Anguſtè fructus rerum determinat qui tantùm præſentibus lætus eſt.

(*m*) Longa eſt vita, ſi plena eſt; impletur autem, cum animus ſibi bonum ſuum reddidit, & ad ſe poteſtatem ſui tranſtulit. Quid illum octoginta

VIII. IF we beſtow'd no more Time in taking Pains, than juſt that in which we find our ſelves diſpoſed, and, as it were, invited to it by ſome ſecret Inclination, we ſhou'd very rarely employ our ſelves, at leaſt in the Time of our Youth; and we ſhou'd run the Hazard of contracting one of the moſt troubleſome Habits imaginable, that of not being able to make any Application, but by Fits and Starts; an Habit which wou'd make a great many of our Days paſs without any Fruit. However, it is certain, that if we do not apply our ſelves heartily, and with Pleaſure and Satisfaction, we ſhall never ſucceed in any Thing. We muſt therefore find ſome Means to change our Reluctance into Inclination. In order to this, when we find our ſelves not in an Humour to engage in any Thing, we ought in the firſt place to reflect upon all the Reaſons which urge the undertaking it. If the Heart does not ſubmit to theſe Reaſons, if its Inclinations will not conform, we ought to be aſhamed of its extravagant Humour. We ought to conſider, that Men are *Wiſe* in proportion as Reaſon directs them, and *Fools* in proportion as they are govern'd by Humour: And that neither the one nor the other of theſe Diſpoſitions continues in the Weakneſs of its firſt Condition and Beginning, but is always encreaſing and growing ſtronger and ſtronger. He who oppoſes Humour, prevents Folly.

Means to make our Humour ſubmit to our Reaſon.

THE

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octoginta anni juvant, per inertiam exacti? Non vixit iſte, ſed in vita moratus eſt; nec ſerò mortuus eſt, ſed diu. Octoginta annis vixit. Intereſt, mortem ejus ex quo die numeres. At ille obiit viridis: ſed officia boni Civis, boni Amici, boni Filii executus eſt: in nulla parte ceſſavit; licet ejus ætas imperfecta ſit, vita perfecta eſt. Octoginta annis vixit. Imò octoginta annis fuit: niſi fortè ſic vixiſſe eum dicis, quomodo dicuntur arbores vivere. Obſecro te, mi Lucili, hoc agamus, ut quemadmodum pretioſa rerum, ſic vita noſtra non pateat multùm, ſed multùm pendat. Actu illam metiamur, non tempore. Vis ſcire quid inter hunc interſit vegetum contemptoremque fortunæ, functum omnibus vitæ humanæ ſtipendiis, atque in ſummum bonum ejus evectum, & illum cui multi anni tranſmiſſi ſunt? Alter poſt mortem quoque eſt, alter ante mortem periit. Laudemus itaque, & in numero felicium reponamus eum, cui quantulumcunque temporis contigit, benè collocatum eſt. Vidit enim veram lucem, non fuit unus è multis; & vivit, & vixit, & viguit. *Sen. Ep.* XCIII.

THE Confuſion we ſhall be under to depend thus upon a blind Humour, and conſequently our Reſolution to take Pains to reform and improve our ſelves, will encreaſe, if we do but remember that we are form'd after the Image, and intended for the Imitation of an infinitely wiſe God, who looks upon us and would aſſiſt us like a Father, if we did but ſeriouſly apply to him. Would not his Preſence have as great an Influence over us, as that of a Great Man, to whom we never refuſe the moſt laborious Undertaking that he can ſet us about? Will the Conſideration of our Duty be of leſs Influence upon us than the Idea of a Recompence? A conſiderable Intereſt will prevail with us, and ſurmount all the Obſtacles of our Humour; and what *Intereſt* is ſo great as that of being rational?

SADNESS puts a damp to the Activity of the Mind: We are never capable of undertaking any Thing, or at leaſt of ſucceeding in it, when we are in a gloomy Humour. But when we have met with ſome Loſs or Misfortune, will ſinking under it repair it? Will Sorrow and Diſpair make our Condition better? Why ſhould we add to the Evils which we already feel, thoſe which Inaction draws after it? And why ſhould we plunge our ſelves into mortifying Reflections, inſtead of diverting our ſelves with more agreeable Employments? Adverſity and Misfortune cannot hurt us, if we do not aſſiſt them our ſelves. Let us turn our Thoughts upon the Subjects of Joy which we have, and we ſhall not be ſenſible of the Circumſtances which croſs them.

THERE are ſeveral other Means to rouze us out of Heavineſs, Obſtinacy, and Dullneſs. *Solitude* is of Aſſiſtance to ſome; it makes them look into themſelves, and gives them time to open their Eyes upon their true Intereſts. Exerciſe will reſtore others to Tranquility, Joy, and Good Humour: With ſome, *Muſick* will produce the the ſame Effect. Sometimes we have occaſion for our Friends to converſe with upon the Subject, which we would, but know not how to undertake. In theſe Caſes it is only the Beginning that is troubleſome; we ſhall eaſily go on after we are once got into the way: We ſoon diſcover the Unreaſonableneſs of our Obſtinacy, when once we are got ever ſo little out of it. A quarter of an Hour's Reading will bring thoſe who know how to read with Attention and Pleaſure, into a Reliſh for Study and Contemplation, eſpecially if they make choice of ſuch Books as are moſt agreeable and proper to reanimate their Thirſt of Knowledge.

IT is thus we ought to uſe all poſſible Skill to withſtand theſe ſecret Inclinations, which Reaſon condemns, and by little and little to get the better of them. If we ſhould attack them directly, it would be the way to feel the full Weight of them, and to ſink under it. (*n*) Oppoſing them openly, is raiſing a weak Bank againſt a raging Torrent. We ought to ſteal away from them dextrouſly, and withdraw our Attention from them by ſeeking other Objects to fix it on. Theſe blind and imperious Inclinations will ceaſe to diſturb us, when once we are accuſtomed not to obey them. (*o*) It is more true of the Diſtempers of the Mind, than of thoſe of the Body, that the mildeſt Medicines are often times the moſt effectual; and that with a little Patience we obtain our End, which would be impoſſible to be done by too much Eagerneſs and Haſte. (*p*)

WE can never begin too early, nor uſe too much Precaution, to avoid liſtening to theſe ſeducing Influences, and giving way to theſe blind Inclinations. We can never form our ſelves too ſoon to a conſtant Habit of following only the Laws of Reaſon, which are the only ones that can remedy theſe Diſorders that diſhonour a Life, otherwiſe the moſt perfectly regular. Thoſe who live in Dependance upon others, have not time to follow their own proper Fancies, but are very ſoon accuſtom'd to Submiſſion. But the *Great*, who are continually beſet by thoſe that apply themſelves to ſtudy their Humour, in order to conform all their Diſcourſe to it, and in general their entire Behaviour, being ready either to perſiſt in, or to change their Sentiment, according as their Superior ſhall change or perſiſt in it; the Great, who are ſurrounded with other Men, as with ſo many Looking Glaſſes, which repreſent and reflect their Likeneſs, and in all their various Poſtures, do ſtill conſtantly flatter them, and turn into extraordinary all they do and ſay; the Great, I ſay, ought to be particularly upon their Guard, and if they would keep themſelves rational, they muſt have Recourſe to themſelves for thoſe Helps which others refuſe them, under the flattering Pretence that they have no need of them. It is from the Habit they have contracted of depending upon their Humour, and of following its Varieties and Caprices, that we

(*n*) Quædam non niſi decepta ſanantur.

(*o*) Deſinent ſi intermittendi conſuetudinem fecerimus.

(*p*) Ut corporum, ita & animorum molliter vitia tractanda ſunt. Sæpè quod explicavit mora, pertinaciâ trahentis abruptum eſt. *Sen. de en. Lib.* VII. *cap.* 30.

we ſee them ſo different from themſelves, that the ſhining Parts of their Lives are counterpois'd by others which, like ſo many Spots, take off the Luſtre of them; and that after having been greatly elevated by heroical Exploits, they precipitate themſelves into ſhameful Meanneſſes, and ſometimes into enormous Faults; which give occaſion to thoſe who love them not, to aſcribe their Glory to Chance, or to the Aſſiſtance of others, and to impute to themſelves only all their Shame and Weakneſſes. None have more Intereſt in taking care to ſubmit to the Empire of Reaſon, than thoſe who govern others: (q) It is in proportion as they ſubmit to this, that they are worthy to command, that they command wiſely, and that their Commands and Orders tend to the publick Good. Nothing ſuits better with an high Station than a Greatneſs of Soul, and nothing diſhonours it more than Meanneſſes.

We ought to husband the ſmalleſt Moments.

IX. A MAN who loves Application, and all the Advantages of it, does alſo nevertheleſs love Repoſe and Recreation, if it were but to put him in a condition of continuing his Application with Succeſs: But the Pleaſure he finds in refreſhing and amuſing himſelf, may become a great Obſtacle to his Diligence, by ſtealing away part of the Time which he ſhould employ in Application. This Inconvenience may be prevented, if we make it a Law and a Cuſtom to repoſe our ſelves no longer than we are weary, and to ſeek only to divert our ſelves when we find our Imagination exhauſted, and that we can think no more without Difficulty and Trouble. Repoſe is dangerous upon any other Occaſion: Nature accuſtoms it ſelf to it preſently; we ought to contract an Habit of avoiding it. There are a thouſand little Intervals in Life, which, put together, would make up a conſiderable Space of Time, and might advance us a great Way, if we were to make the beſt of them. The waiting for a late Dinner, the Expectation of a Viſit, the Negligence or Indiſpoſition of a Maſter who fails coming at his appointed Hour, afford Inſtances of theſe little Intervals, whoſe Shortneſs furniſhes Idleneſs with a plauſible Excuſe againſt an Application which ſeems to be of no Uſe. But it is very dangerous to accuſtom our ſelves to loſe our Time without Regret: (r) Young People do but too often count the Hours they

(q) Si vis tibi omnia ſubjicere, te ſubjice rationi. Multos reges, ſi ratio te rexerit. *Sen. Ep.* XXXVII.

(r) Quod fugit occupandum eſt. *Sen.*

they ſpend in Idleneſs, as ſo much clear Gains, without once thinking that they ought to reproach themſelves for it. In my Opinion, they might be employ'd very uſefully in miſcellaneous Readings, which might be continued or interrupted as occaſion required: They might be alſo beſtow'd in learning Words and Sentences by Heart. Books of Letters, miſcellaneous Eſſays, and various Obſervations, are the moſt proper of all in theſe Intervals. We might even run over compleat and connected Treatiſes in them, provided we have read and well underſtood them before; for, without this, it would be dangerous, leaſt the Uneaſineſs of being interrupted in the middle of an Argument or Narration, or the Impatience we might be under to know the Concluſion, might keep our Thoughts from fixing upon thoſe Things of more Importance, from which they were but now called away, and to which they muſt be again preſently applied, and ſo might inſenſibly accuſtom us to Inattention. We ought to avoid every Thing which may give Occaſion to this: But when we are obliged to break off a Subject which we are very fond of, it is extreamly difficult to divert our Thoughts from it all at once: The Mind continues engaged in it, even tho' commanded another Way: Oftentimes that which we have quitted follows us, and hinders us from ſucceeding in that which we leave it for. We do every Thing ill, when we have too much to do.

THE Pleaſure of repoſing our ſelves is what we ought to be upon our Guard againſt, for it will eaſily lead to Idleneſs. The Trouble there is in paſſing from one Employment to another, quite oppoſite to it, makes us favour Repoſe, and hate Action; but this muſt be conquer'd. You are called almoſt every Day into Company; you are taken up with Buſineſs of your own, or of others; you are diverted with Viſits, and if theſe return often, it is poſſible your Diligence and Eagerneſs for Study will by little and little abate. You ought therefore to lay down a Law to husband all the Moments you can meet with between theſe Avocations; and if you can find but a Quarter of an Hour for your ſelf, and for Meditation, that Quarter of an Hour ought to be ſacred.



CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Memory.

The Uſefulneſs of the Memory.

I. THE Force of the Memory depends upon that of the Attention. We very eaſily remember what we have conſider'd with Application, and as ſoon forget what we have haſtily run over. This alſo is one of the Fruits of Attention, and one of the moſt neceſſary too; for in vain do we endeavour to heap Knowledge upon Knowledge, if the ſecond effaces the firſt; in vain do we aim at acquiring it, if it immediately ſlips away, and is not to be retained. Beſides this, we ſhall be able to explain a Difficulty, and to ſolve a complicated Queſtion ſo much the eaſier, as the Memory more readily furniſhes us with the Principles and Theorems upon which the Truth which we ſeek is eſtabliſhed. And we ſhall deliberate upon an Enterprize with ſo much more Succeſs, as the Memory, making uſe of the paſt to illuſtrate the future, preſents a greater Number of Caſes, a greater Number of Advantages to weigh againſt the Diſadvantages, and of Expedients to balance the Obſtacles.

Whether the Memory hurts the Judgment.

II. IN attributing to the Memory a great Influence over the Judgment, I am ſenſible I appear to contradict an Opinion very generally receiv'd, and, moreover, confirm'd by Experience, That a very happy Memory, a ready Genius, and an exact Judgment, are very rarely found together. But this ariſes from the wrong Method of forming our Studies. Thoſe who find themſelves able and ready to make Diſcoveries of themſelves, being rich in their own Wealth, ſcorn to furniſh their Memory from any other Fund; and they who have a quick Apprehenſion, and a perfect good Memory, being content to benefit by the Labours of others, ſpare themſelves the Pains and Trouble of ſeeking and examining Things themſelves. By this means it happens, that they inconſiderately fall into Sentiments oppoſite one to another,

another, which puts them afterwards into Uncertainty and Confuſion. The Precipitation with which they read and apprehend, accuſtoms them alſo to take up with Words which they underſtand not, and afterwards to ſpeak without Underſtanding what they ſay. But they would avoid this Inconvenience, if they admitted of nothing without having firſt examined, and diſtinctly underſtood it; if they purſued their Studies in Order; if they conſider'd that the Memory is both of Credit and Service, when full of Truths, and not of Errors and Uncertainties; and if they took Pains to enrich themſelves with Ideas, as well as with Words.

ON the one Side, therefore, Men of great Penetration and Judgment ſometimes are deficient in Memory, which is only for want of having cultivated it; for in ſhort, the ſame Vigour of the Attention which furniſhes the Mind with Penetration and Judgment, is at the ſame Time one of the principal Cauſes of improving the Memory. On the other ſide, if we meet with ſome whoſe Memories are filled with a great Stock of Learning, and yet want a ſuitable Delicacy and Judgment, it is not becauſe theſe excellent Qualities are inconſiſtent with a good Memory, but becauſe he who apprehends and remembers with Eaſe, contents himſelf generally with apprehending and remembring, and neglects to perfect his other Faculties by Exerciſe, and to improve them ſo far as they are capable.

BESIDES, when Men of great Parts complain of their Memories, there is ſometimes reaſon to doubt the Truth of it, and we ought not always to take their Words for it. Some of them indeed, whilſt they they complain of the want of an Advantage, which they really have, do yet ſpeak what they think, becauſe their Ardour for Knowledge is ſo great, that however rich their Memory may be, yet they immediately cry out upon its Weakneſs, if the leaſt Thing eſcapes it; and becauſe it does not contain every Thing they would have it, their Diſcontent makes them think they have no Memory at all.

THERE are ſome, however, who with leſs Sincerity, deſire to be thought to have bad Memories, that they may be ſuppoſed to have ſo much the better Genius. We have indeed ſome reaſon to have a better Eſteem for thoſe who are Authors of their own Knowledge, than thoſe who borrow it from others; but it cannot but be look'd upon as a moſt unreaſonable Vanity in thoſe who would be thought to have meditated little, and to have read leſs, in order that all they ſay may be look'd upon as the Fruit of ſo happy a Genius

Genius as to need no Cultivation in the leaſt. Suppoſe that it really were as they would have it believ'd; the happier they are, the leſs they deſerve to be commended. Yet this is what they aim at; but what does it import? Their Vanity blinds them, and does not allow them to look near enough upon Things, to make themſelves truly deſerve Admiration and Eſteem; it is enough if they can diſtinguiſh themſelves from others, and have few Equals, whatever be the Cauſe of this *Diſtinction* for which they ſo much applaud themſelves.

THE Memory is a Faculty abſolutely neceſſary, but it is one of the moſt imperfect in it ſelf, and has moſt occaſion for Aſſiſtance. It is not only rich in borrow'd Wealth, but does alſo continually grow weaker and weaker, and is not to be preſerv'd or improv'd without continual Art. It is loſt for want of Exerciſe, and wears out if it be not made good uſe of. Oftentimes we impoveriſh it in proportion as we endeavour to enrich it; and the new additions we make to it, thruſt out what was there before. (*a*)

Means to ſtrengthen it.

III. IF we would not loſe the Fruit of our Studies, we ought firſt to read with Attention. We have already laid down the Neceſſity of this Precaution. We ought ſecondly to read with Reflection. This is alſo a very neceſſary Condition, but very much neglected. When we read an Hiſtory, for Example, we comprehend it clearly, nothing being more eaſy to comprehend. We think we ſhall not forget it, and yet the haſty reading of a hundred Leaves is no ſooner finiſhed, but we perceive half of them are already eſcaped. We ought therefore to reflect upon what we have read, to repeat it in our Minds, and to ſay to one's ſelf, *I will remember it.* This Method and Reſolution will certainly be of very great Service. (*b*)

3. The Memory of what we have read, or thought of, will be ſtill leſs effaced, if we make it the *Subject of Converſation with others.* This Method has more than one Uſe, and cannot be ſufficiently recommended. When young People have eſtabliſhed a Society amongſt themſelves to give an Account of their Studies, their Diligence is quicken'd, as we

(*a*) In primis fragilis eſt memoria, & rerum turbæ non ſufficit; neceſſe eſt quantum recipit, emittat, & antiquiſſima recentiſſimus obruat. *Sen. de Ben. Lib.* VII. *cap.* 28.

(*b*) *The* Latin *Expreſſion ſeems founded upon this Truth; for in the Stile of that Language, to learn, is* mandare memoriæ.

we have obſerv'd in the preceding Chapter; their Stile is improv'd, that being the Effect of Uſe and Exerciſe; their Ideas are rectified; for oftentimes we imagine we comprehend a Thing, but when we come to talk upon it, the Confuſion we find our ſelves under, makes us ſenſible that we have not ſufficiently ſtudied it. Laſtly, The ſame Ideas are repeated; and that which enter'd in at the Eyes, the Mind receives again by the Ears; and this double Impreſſion always engraves Things deeper upon the Memory. We are never ſo well aſſured of our underſtanding any Thing, as when we are able to teach it; and even in teaching it we apprehend it better than before. *Homines dum docent, diſcunt*, ſays *Seneca*.

4. WE ought to take care to connect what we have newly learned with what we knew already. We ſhall by this means confirm the Memory of former Acquiſitions; and theſe, in their Turn, will aſſiſt us in recollecting the new ones which have ſucceeded them. Thus we connect a ſecond Chapter to the firſt, a third to the ſecond, we run over again the entire Section, and then recollecting all the Sections of the whole Work, we review it all ſucceſſively. And that we may not conſider all this Pains as a Loſs of Time, it is almoſt the only Means not to loſe the leaſt Part of it, and to prevent taking Pains to no purpoſe. I confeſs, that by this Method, we ſhall not finiſh an hundred Pages in the time that we might without it have finiſhed a thouſand, but we retain theſe hundred entirely; whereas out of the thouſand there would ſcarce remain fifty. We therefore have made double the Progreſs, if we judge by the Knowledge acquired, rather than by the Number of Pages we have read, and by the Fruit we reap from our Studies, rather than by the Number of Hours we beſtow upon them.

5. WHEN we recollect an Idea in our Memory, we excite it a ſecond time. This ſecond Production is made very like the firſt, from which it differs only in its Readineſs. We ſhall therefore remember any Conſequence ſo much the more eaſily, as it is more cloſely connected with its Principle; for the more proper this Principle is to give Birth to it, the more proper is it alſo to revive the Memory of it. We ſhall farther alſo retain much better what we learn from others, if we enter into their Ideas in the ſame Order in which they entred into them themſelves, and if, in order to benefit by their Diſcoveries, we follow the ſame Method they did in making them. For by ſtudying in this Method, each Truth will not only of it ſelf lead to the Diſcovery of others, but will alſo help to make it ſelf remembred. By this

means we ſhall form our Judgments, and confirm our Memories.

BUT before we give our ſelves the Trouble of remembring what we have read, we ought to be well aſſured of its being worth the while, and that it is rational, and well approved. When we neglect this Precaution, we run the Hazard of charging our Memories with ſo many Nothings, or Words void of Senſe, and, farther, of incumbring it with Errors much worſe than Ignorance. But if we ſhould even be ſo happy as to meet only with Truths, yet if we neglect the Examination of them, we may heap up a great Number, without knowing one of them; for to ſpeak truly, we *know nothing but what is demonſtrated to us*, and what we have made our own by ſearching and examining it *(c)*. If we have not a great Care in ranging what we learn in the moſt exact Order, we accuſtom our ſelves to Confuſion; and by contracting an Habit of it, become at laſt incapable of ſtating Queſtions rightly, in order to diſcover their true Principles, and to proceed from Conſequence to Conſequence, and from Knowledge to Knowledge, to the Concluſion which we propoſe to eſtabliſh. Thoſe who have ſtudied without Method, always reaſon confuſedly. Heaping up a Medley of Knowledge without Order, weakens our Reaſon, and contributes only to make the Mind fruitful in Abſurdities.

IF our Love of Knowledge were greater; if we had Learning more at Heart; if we took a greater Pleaſure in Application; if we were careful to make a greater Uſe of our

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(c) Turpe eſt enim ſeni aut proſpicienti ſenectutem ex commentario ſapere. Hoc Zeno dixit: Tu quid? Hoc Cleanthes: Tu quid? Quouſque ſub alio moveris? Et impera, & dic, quod memoriæ tradatur: aliquid & de tuo profer. Omnes itaque iſtos nunquam auctores, ſemper interpretes, ſub alienâ umbrâ latentes nihil habere exiſtimo generoſi, nunquam auſos aliquando facere, quod diu didicerant. Memoriam in alienis exercuerunt. Aliud autem eſt, meminiſſe: aliud, ſcire. Meminiſſe, eſt rem commiſſam memoriæ cuſtodire. At contra ſcire, eſt & ſua facere quæque, nec ab exemplari pendere, & toties ad magiſtrum reſpicere. Hoc dixit Zeno, hoc Cleanthes. Aliquid interſit inter te, & librum. Quouſque diſces? Jam & præcipe. Quid eſt, quare audiam, quod dicere poſſum? Multum, inquit, viva vox facit; non quidem hæc, quæ alienis verbis commodatur, & actuarii vice fungitur. Adjice nunc, quòd iſti qui nunquam tutelæ ſuæ fiunt, primùm in ea re ſequuntur priores, in quâ nemo non à priore deſcivit: deinde in eâ re ſequuntur, quæ adhuc quæritur; nunquam autem invenietur, ſi contenti fuerimus inventis. Prætereà qui alium ſequitur, nihil invenit, imò nec quærit. *Sen. Ep.* XXXIII.

our Judgment than of our Memory, or at leaſt to enrich this laſt Faculty with new Supplies of Knowledge, inſtead of being content with having made a moderate Collection once for all: Laſtly, if we did but reflect every Day upon what we ſay and do, and upon the reſpective Reaſons we have for ſo doing, we ſhould avoid one of the moſt common Faults, and not weary others with a Repetition of Stories an hundred Times over, which pleaſe the Teller as much, as they torment thoſe that are condemned to be the Hearers. Theſe perpetual Repeaters of the ſame Things, muſt either have contracted a ſtrange Habit of looking upon themſelves as Oracles, or of ſpeaking without Attention, and having no other View beſides amuſing themſelves, without being in any Pain for other People, or for the Uneaſineſs they give them (*d*).

The Method of making Collections.

IV. IT is good to minute down the Heads of what we read, and it is very neceſſary to make at leaſt Abridgments of what we have diſcovered our ſelves amidſt our Studies, without which they will ſoon be forgotten; but we ought to take particular Care to examine them well, and to conceive them clearly before we ſit down to write.

WE oftentimes happen to overcharge our ſelves with too great a Number of Collections. For a Multitude produces Confuſion, unleſs prevented by Exactneſs of Order. It would therefore be very ſerviceable, in my Opinion, whenever we would make our ſelves Maſters of any Science, to make choice of ſome Author, who has treated of all the Parts of it in the moſt ſimple and natural Method, and to a moderate Extent. We ought immediately to read him thro' with Circumſpection, and not to let the leaſt Paſſage ſlip without Examination. We ought carefully to diſtinguiſh what we meet with that is evident and clear, from what is obſcure and uncertain. After having made this Work very familiar, when we read others upon the ſame Subject, we need not ſtop at the ſame Thoughts we have before ſufficiently entred

(*d*) "Repetition is every where troubleſome, even in *Homer* himſelf: But it is intolerable in ſuperficial and tranſient Subjects. I am diſguſted with frequent Inculcation, even in uſeful Things, as in *Seneca*. Nor do I like the Cuſtom of his Stoical School, to repeat upon each Head the Principles and *Poſtulata* at large, which ſerve them all in general; and always to urge over again the Arguments and Reaſons that are common and univerſal. *Mont. Book* III. *Ch.* 9.

into, nor at the Proofs we have already weigh'd with Care in our former Reading; we have only occaſion to examine the new Arguments, and the new Hypotheſes, as they preſent; and after having examined and abridged all that we find new, to make ſo many Notes of them, wherewith to enrich the former Syſtem. Laſtly, We ought to read from time to time all theſe Additions, in order to make one entire Body of them in our Memories; which will not be difficult, becauſe of their being ranged in an Order, which has been made long ſince very familiar to us, and by which our new Acquiſitions have been continually connected with the old.

UPON every Part of Learning, we ſhall have ſo many diſtinct *Syſtems*. I do not by this Term underſtand a Work ſo compleat, that you cannot overturn any one Part of it without diſtroying the Whole, and which, by a ſmall Number of Principles, gives a perfect Light to all Queſtions that relate to it, and ſolves all Difficulties which may be oppoſed to it. We endeavour at ſuch Syſtems as theſe; we approach them by Degrees; but we muſt not raſhly conclude that we have brought them to this Perfection. In the mean time we may make uſe of a Work, which at leaſt mentions with tolerable Exactneſs all the Subjects that belong to any Science, and ranges them in an Order eaſy to be remembred, by avoiding Repetitions, by aſſigning different Places to different Things, and by paſſing gradually from the moſt ſimple to the moſt compounded, from the moſt eaſy to the moſt difficult.

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A NEW

A NEW TREATISE OF THE ART of *THINKING.*

PART I.

SECT. II.

Of the Variety of Ideas, which ariſes from their Objects.

CHAP. I.

Of the different Objects of our Ideas, as thoſe Objects are conſider'd in themſelves.

I. OUR Ideas muſt needs vary according to the Difference of thoſe Things we deſire to know; and our *Miſtakes* ariſe only from applying ſome Ideas to ſeveral Objects, which they do not belong to. Logic muſt therefore enable us to make our Ideas

Subſtances and Modes.

Ideas agreeable to their Objects. Some Maxims may be of use to that End.

WHEN I consider a Piece of Wax, I see it is a real Thing; and I perceive likewise that its *Figure* (its Roundness, for instance) is something *real*; but I find a very great Difference between those two Realities. The Wax has its *own Existences* a *separate* Existence, which is *not the same* with the Existence of the Bodies that surround it; 'tis the Existence of that Wax, and *not of any other* Thing whatsoever. The same cannot be said of its *Roundness*; for it *does not exist separately* from the Wax: That Roundness is the Wax it self terminated after a certain Manner; 'tis the State of the Wax: And the State of a Thing is the Thing it self, existing after a certain Manner.

WE learn from thence to distinguish two Ideas, which arise from two Sorts of Beings: Those that have their *own Existence*, a *separate Existence*, are call'd *Substances*; and we call *Modes* those Realities, which have not a separate Existence, and the Existence whereof is the same with the Existence of the Reality, of which they are Modes.

EACH Substance is in a certain State, and consequently has its own Modes, and exists after a certain Manner: Destroy a Substance, all its Modes will vanish away; for, they have no Existence of their own. As soon as a Thing ceases to exist, none of its States remain, since they were that Thing it self. But the Destruction of a Mode does not imply the Destruction of the Substance, since the Substance has an Existence of its own, which is not the Existence of the Mode. Though there happens a Change in the Substance, yet it preserves its own Existence, it subsists still, and always remains a Substance. If the Wax be annihilated, its Figures and Colours are also annihilated; but, if you alter its Figure never so much, if you alter its Colours, it will always be Wax, or always extended.

THOUGH the Ideas of *Substance* and *Mode* be simple Ideas, yet I dwell upon their Explication, I enlarge upon it; and in order to raise those Ideas, I use synonymous Expressions and many Phrases, which signify the same Thing. Such Repetitions are not always useless, and ought not to be look'd upon as a vain Tautology, when they happen to be necessary, in order to keep the Mind attentive to the same Subject. This is particularly of use with respect to simple Ideas, and to make them clearly understood; for, because they are simple, they are generally neglected, and slightly passed over; and what does nor belong to those Ideas, is frequently

quently added to them; ſo that they are conceived either too weakly, or too confuſedly, and ſometimes both Ways together.

I HAVE not uſed the Definition of the Schools, That a Subſtance is *what ſubſiſts by it ſelf*. This Definition is equivocal; for *to ſubſiſt by it ſelf*, is either *to have a ſeparate Exiſtence*, which is the ſame with what I have juſt now ſaid, or *to exiſt inaepedently*, and to owe its Exiſtence to no other Thing; which is falſe as to all created Subſtances, and occaſions metaphyſical Queſtions about the Independency of Creatures, too much perplex'd to make the Underſtanding of one of the ſimpleſt Notions depend upon them.

Impropriety of the Word Accident.

II. WHAT we call *Mode*, has been alſo ſtiled *Accident*; but that Word does not appear to me proper. It gives occaſion to fancy that Accidents befall a Subſtance, and tend towards it. And indeed they have been repreſented in the Schools, as certain Realities different from the Subſtance; but at the ſame time ſo imperfect, and wanting ſo much Reality, that in order to ſubſiſt they muſt have ſome Help, and be ſupported by a Subject which receives them. But ſuch Words afford no clear Idea. Whatever has an Exiſtence of its own, is for that very Reaſon determined to ſubſiſt; and though a Being be united to other Beings, yet each of the Parts, thus united, has an Exiſtence of its own, a ſeparate Exiſtence, and conſequently ſeparate from the Exiſtence of its neighbouring Parts. To talk of a Reality ſo weak, that it will be annihilated, unleſs it be ſupported by a Subject, is to ſpeak unintelligibly. Thoſe Words are metaphorical, and ſignify that a Reality, which has *an Exiſtence of its own*, will be annihilated, unleſs it be joined to another: Which is plainly falſe; for, ſince it is a Reality, it is already determined to continue in its Exiſtence.

THIS Suppoſition, That there are Beings of ſuch a weak Reality, that they will come to nothing, unleſs they be preſerved by ſome other Beings; this Suppoſition, I ſay, is only grounded upon Prejudices, and the Habit of judging of the Reality of Things from the Report of our Senſes. What eſcapes our Eyes, is accounted to be nothing, and no longer reckon'd among Beings by thoſe whoſe Underſtanding reaches no farther than their Eyes; but we ought to be undeceived by Reaſon. If a very thin Surface, a very ſmall Skin, does not meet a Body upon which it may reſt, it will indeed vaniſh away; but its Parts will be ſeparated without being annihilated.

THE wrong Notion of Subſtance, and its Accidents, as two Sorts of Entities really diſtinct, gave occaſion to this impertinent Queſtion: Whether Matter acts by its Accidents? or whether Accidents act by Matter? What a vaſt Field for wrangling did ſuch an unintelligible Queſtion afford?

WE can have no Notion of a Subſtance, but in ſome State; and in whatever State we conceive it to be, its Idea, as a Subſtance, remains the ſame.

The Characters of Modes.

III. A MODE being nothing elſe but the Subſtance it ſelf (of which it is a Mode) in a certain State, and having no other Exiſtence, as ſoon as I ſuppoſe the Subſtance to be deſtroy'd, I cannot preſerve the Idea of the Mode. Can I, for inſtance, deny Extenſion, and yet conceive that Figure or Motion remain? Beſides, a Mode being only the Subſtance in a certain State, the Idea of the Subſtance makes the Idea of the Mode clearer and more compleat. When I think of a particular Body, a Piece of Lead, for inſtance, ſquare, and in Motion, I have clearer and more compleat Ideas, than if I ſpoke of Motion and Figure in general.

THOSE Principles are evident, and teach us that the Soul is a Subſtance diſtinct from the Body, ſince *Thought* is not a Mode of Extenſion and material Subſtance; for though I ſhould doubt of the Exiſtence of all Bodies, and even deny it, yet the Ideas of my Thought, and of my ſeveral Ways of Thinking, would never be the leſs clear. The Idea of Matter, far from making them clearer, makes them obſcure. A thinking Body is a Chimera: A Figure and a Motion, that perceives, is an Extravagance; and I never conceive Thought better, than when I don't think of Matter. Since we admit of Extenſion without Thought, why ſhould we not admit of Thought without Extenſion? The Idea of the one is not the Idea of the other: They have nothing common, and do not clear one another,

WHAT ſhould we think of the Extravagance of a Man, who ſhould believe that a Stone can learn Arithmetick? It is no more in my Power to combine together the Ideas of Thought and Extenſion in general, than to imagine the Knowledge of Arithmetick in a Stone. The Ideas of a Stone and Arithmetick, the Ideas of Extenſion and Thought, do equally exclude one another.

EVERY Quality, which does not reſide in the Parts of a certain Subſtance, which is not one of their Manners of Being, or does not reſult from their Union, belongs to another Subſtance.

NEITHER

NEITHER can Motion be a Thought, no more than Blue and Red can be a ſharp and ſweet Savour. Ideas quite different have quite different Objects. We cannot think otherwiſe.

IV. THE Diviſion of Subſtances into *Thinking* and *extended* Subſtances, is grounded upon the foregoing Obſervations. Subſtance is alſo divided into *Finite* and *Infinite*. We eaſily conceive a finite Being; but it is more difficult to think of an infinite one. *Diviſion of Subſtances.*

BY a finite Being we mean a limited Being, and a Being which has only a certain Degree of Reality: But when we ſpeak of an *infinite* Being, we think firſt of the Reality. It is a poſitive Idea: We underſtand very well what that Word ſignifies; and then we forbear aſſigning any Limits to that Reality. This latter Act is a negative one; ſo that the Idea of Infinity, is the Idea of Reality, and even the Idea of the abſolute Being, that is, the Idea of the *Being*, to which we forbear joining the Idea of any Limits.

THAT Idea is very different from the *general Idea* of *Being*, which agrees equally to all Creatures, and is indifferently apply'd to each Being in particular, in the ſame manner as the general Idea of a Triangle is apply'd to each Triangle. But the Idea of the unlimited Being, the Idea of *ſimple and abſolute Reality*, is determined in its Application, and *can only belong to one Being*. When I ſuppoſe an unlimited Being, I ſuppoſe a Being of which I can deny no Reality without contradicting my ſelf; for, when I have ſaid that this Being is Reality it ſelf, did I conceive a Reality which does not belong to it, I ſhould deny that Reality it ſelf is all the Reality; and after having ſuppoſed that it is unlimited, I ſhould confine it, by ſaying it has not the Reality I deny.

NO one can ſay it implies Contradiction, that there ſhould not be many Infinites. An infinite Being may certainly exiſt alone; and therefore if there were many Infinites, they would be contingent Beings, and conſequently they would not neceſſarily exiſt; they would not be infinitely perfect; and whatever may exiſt, or not exiſt, if it exiſts, is an Effect of ſome Cauſe, which has determined its Exiſtence rather than its Nonexiſtence.

I EXCLUDE from the perfect Being imperfect Realities, Realities neceſſarily attended with Nonreality, ſuch as Matter, which is not ſelf-conſcious, which breaks, which receives a thouſand Impreſſions, which is ſubjected to the Beings

Beings that ſurround it, and depends upon a thouſand external Cauſes. The perfect Being is ſo much a Reality, that no Defect or Nonreality can be aſcribed to it in any Senſe whatſoever; but I exclude no perfect Reality from it. Wherefore, it is a Contradiction to ſuppoſe two Beings abſolutely perfect, one of which ſhould poſſeſs nothing, but what is likewiſe to be found in the other; for if the Reality of the one was not without the Reality of the other, they would be but one Being. If each of them had a ſeparate Reality, but like that of the other, thoſe Realities would not be unlimited. We conceive them to be great, and call them infinite, (which is quickly ſaid;) but if we mind it, we ſhall ſee we contradict our ſelves. Whoever ſays *Infinite*, forms an Idea of Being, and forbears denying of it not only ſome Reality, but abſolutely any perfect Reality; and yet, in this Caſe, becauſe the firſt Being would not be the ſecond, it muſt be ſaid that the Reality of the firſt is not the Reality of the ſecond. The firſt would be conſcious of his own Knowledge; but he would not be conſcious of the Knowledge of the other; and the more Reality there would be in the one, the more Reality would be deny'd of the other. The Infinite does not include all that is imperfect with all that is perfect; but it comprehends all that is perfect; and out of it there is no Perfection to be found.

Diviſion of Modes.

V. BULK, Figure, Reſt, Motion, and Situation, are Modes of Matter; we have clear Ideas of them. The Soul either *perceives* only, or beſides *acquieſces* and *willeth*: Its Perceptions are either *Senſations*, or *Ideas*. When it *acquieſces* in the Compariſon of its Ideas, it *judges*: When it acquieſces in the Compariſon of its Judgments, it *reaſons*: When it *is willing* to acquire ſome Good, it has *Inclinations* or *Paſſions* according to the Vehemency of its *Will*.

What an Idea is.

VI. PHILOSOPHERS are at a Loſs to know what an Idea is; Several Hypotheſes have been formed upon that Subject; and the Defenders of each of them do mutually overthrow the Defenders of the others, without laying down their own Opinion. Perhaps they are all in the ſame Error: They ſuppoſe an Idea to be a certain internal Object, different from Thought, and to the Contemplation of which the Thought does immediately apply it ſelf. Do they not judge of the Underſtanding, as they judge of the Senſes, and fancy that becauſe, when we ſee, there is always an Object of our Sight, which is different

different from the Perception, whereby it is repreſented and known to us, in the ſame manner, the Underſtanding has its Eyes and its Objects? Whereas it is more natural to conceive that Thoughts proceed one from another; that our Thought varies and goes ſucceſſively through ſeveral States; and that according to the Variety of its States and Manners of being or thinking, (for, with reſpect to Thought, to think and to be are the ſame Thing,) it attains to the Knowledge ſometimes of one Thing, and ſometimes of another. It is Self-conſcious, it is its own immediate Object; and by that Self-conſciouſneſs it repreſents to it ſelf at the ſame time Things different from it ſelf.

THOUGH we ſhould ſuppoſe internal Objects in the Underſtanding, and I know not what ſpiritual Pictures called *Ideas*, of a Tree, for inſtance, or a Circle, *&c.* yet, 1. That Picture muſt raiſe a Thought; and then, 2. That Thought would be ſelf-conſcious, and thereby it would be its immediate Object. 3. By that Self-conſciouſneſs it would know what it thinks of; it would know that pretended internal Picture, or Idea of the Tree; and, laſtly, with the Help of that intelligible Tree, it would know the material Tree.

BUT why ſo many Circuits? Is it not more natural, as well as ſhorter, to conceive that the Thought is ſelf-conſcious, and that by ſuch a Conſciouſneſs of its Way of thinking, it learns to know what a Tree is, and ſo with other Objects?

Of innate Ideas.

VII. IT remains to ſhew how Thoughts ariſe one from another; but ſuch a Diſcuſſion does not belong to Logic, and I have treated that Subject elſewhere *. I ſhall only add, That, according to this Suppoſition, the famous Controverſy about *innate Ideas* will be more eaſily determined. We are not born with a great many Thoughts; for we never have but one Thought at once; ſometimes indeed more ſimple, and ſometimes more compounded: And it is very likely, that in our firſt Age we did not proceed very quickly from one Thought to another; that our Thoughts were not much compounded, and ran moſt of them upon Senſations; and that they hardly were any thing elſe. But I am alſo of Opinion, it might be demonſtrated that Men are born with a Diſpoſition to form regular Thoughts, and to repreſent to themſelves the ſame Objects in the ſame manner; and that all the Variety to be obſerved in them, in this reſpect, proceeds from a greater or leſſer

* *In a publick Theſis.*

leſſer Vivacity and Attention, and moſt Times from Education, which excites or blunts the natural Diſpoſitions. We are born, for inſtance, with a Diſpoſition to be ſelf-conſcious, and to know ſomething; to take Delight in that Conſciouſneſs and Knowledge; to deſire the Continuation and Increaſe of that Pleaſure; and conſequently to deſire more delightful Sentiments, and a more extenſive Knowledge. We have a Diſpoſition to proceed from thence to the Idea of an Intelligence that knows every Thing: It is equally natural to riſe by the ſame Means to the Idea of an Intelligence, which is omnipotent, and infinitely happy, in a word, to the Idea of the perfect Being. Some attain to it ſooner, and others later, according as they are more or leſs uſed to reflect, or more or leſs fond of corporeal Senſations; and that Idea is more or leſs pure and free from Error, or more or leſs obſcured by Mixtures, according to the Prejudices of Education.

Attributes.

VIII. I KNOW no Subſtance ſo ſimple as to include but one Reality. A Collection of many Realities is looked upon as one Thing, and goes only by one Name. Bulk, Figure, Mobility, Length, Breadth, Depth, *&c.* are Realities, the Collection whereof is called *Body*, and they are called *Attributes:* An Expreſſion, which *is not convenient*; for it ſeems to intimate that there is a Subject to which thoſe Attributes belong, in which they reſide, and which is different from them all. What is attributed to the Body, if we are willing to ſpeak exactly, ought to be different from the Body to which it is attributed. Hence it is that Men have imagined a *corporeal Subſtance*, whereof all the Things juſt now mentioned, and Extenſion it ſelf, are Attributes; and for the ſame Reaſon they ſuppoſe a Subſtance ſtill unknown, to which they aſcribe Thinking, which they conceive to be different from it.

BUT herein they ſeem to be no leſs miſtaken, than if, after having called the Soul and the Body *the Attributes of Man*, and *three Lines, and the Space* included by them, the *Attributes* of the *Triangle*, they ſhould enquire which is the *common Subject* that receives the two Attributes of the Soul and Body, and which is that *Figure* different from the Space and the three Lines that include it, and whereof that Space and thoſe Lines are Attributes.

AMONG the many Realities of which a Thing is compoſed, that which is the Baſe and Ground of all the others, is called *Eſſence*. Thoſe that are inſeparably united to it, are called *eſſential Properties*, or only *Properties*; and thoſe that are ſometimes

ſometimes in it, and ſometimes out of it, go by the Name of *accidental Properties*, or *Accidents*. To be included by three Lines is the Eſſence of the Triangle; and the Union of the Soul and Body conſtitutes the *Eſſence* of Man. That two Sides of a Triangle taken together are always greater than the Third, is an *eſſential Property*, as Self-conſciouſneſs in Man; and whether the Triangle be red or black, whether Man be ſorrowful or well pleaſed, fully perſwaded or doubtful, 'tis an *Accident*.

Wrong Expreſſions about Nonentity.

IX. MEN are not only miſtaken about the Words *Accident* and *Attribute*, but alſo ſpeak confuſedly of moſt Objects. They ſpeak of Things which do not exiſt, in the ſame Stile as they diſcourſe of thoſe that exiſt; nay, unwary Men ridiculouſly endeavour to repreſent to themſelves Nonentity as a ſort of Being. They ſpeak ſometimes of Things which cannot exiſt, for inſtance, of a material Thought, or a thinking Body; of a ſingle Body in many Places; of a perfect Being, infinitely good, wiſe, and holy, who preſcribes Laws to Men, in order to execute his eternal Decree of damning them, and for the ſake of which he has created them. In ſuch Caſes they do not form a Collection of Ideas; for ſuch a Collection is impoſſible: But at firſt they conceive ſeparate Ideas, and then ſuppoſe them to be connected, and connect their Names together. This they do whenever they are miſtaken, by ſuppoſing what is impoſſible to be poſſible.

BUT when they conſider what is impoſſible as impoſſible, and ſay, for inſtance, *An Aſcent without a Deſcent, a Valley without Mountains, is an impoſſible Thing*, they don't ſpeak exactly. One would think they have an Idea of Impoſſibility, an Idea of what cannot exiſt, which they compare with that of a Valley without Mountains; but they neither have, nor can have ſuch Ideas. They would ſpeak more properly, if they ſhould ſay: He who undertakes to ſeparate the Idea of Mountains from the Idea of a Valley, undertakes to ſeparate what is inſeparable: Or, *A Valley cannot be conceived without Mountains. Whoever takes away one of thoſe Ideas, takes away the other.*

WHEN the Diſcourſe runs upon what *may exiſt*, but does not, and even *will not exiſt*, and Men ſay, for inſtance, *A Mountain of Gold, a Man a thouſand Feet high, may exiſt*, it is a Query, how the Power of Exiſting is aſcribed to that Mountain, or to that Man, if they are a mere Nonentity? For, why ſhould any Thing be aſcribed to Nonentity?

The

The next Query is, What that Man, and that Mountain are above Nonentity? All those Questions are grounded upon an Impropriety of Speech. It should have been said: *I have an Idea of such a Man, and such a Mountain; and there is a Being, who is able to produce, whenever he pleases, Creatures answerable to those Ideas.* All the Reality, supposed in those Words, is partly in my Thoughts, and partly in a Power, which actually exists.

LASTLY, When Men say of a Thing, which does not exist, that *it will exist*, for instance, that *Flowers will grow the next Spring*, they speak still of a Nonentity, to which they seem to ascribe a sort of Existence: But those Words signify that *some Causes do actually exist; that they are determined to continue; and* that *from such a Determination, and its Effects, there will* arise *an Effect answerable to our Ideas.*

SOME Men complain, that though they have used their utmost Endeavours to conceive Nonentity, yet they cannot do it. What is it that preceded the Creation of the World? What is it that supply'd its Place? Nothing. But how can one have an Idea of it? It is more easy to fancy an eternal Matter. Those Men use needless Endeavours; which is the Reason of their Perplexity. They would have an Idea of Nonentity; but because every Idea is real, what is represented to them by it is also real. When we speak of Nonentity, we must *forbear fancying any Thing whatsoever*, that our Thoughts may be answerable to our Words. Before the Creation of the World, God did exist. But what is it, that supply'd the Place of the World? Nothing, no Place: The Place was made with the Universe, which is its own Place; for it is in it self, and not out of it self. Was there nothing at all? But how can one conceive it? You must conceive nothing. Whoever says *Nothing*, declares by that Word that he lays aside all Reality: He must therefore lay aside all Ideas. 'Tis true, we never abstain from thinking at all: We always think; but, in such Cases, *to think* is only *to be self-conscious*, to be conscious that we abstain from forming to our selves any Representation.

Negative Terms. X. 'TIS not therefore an Idea, but a Negation, an Absence of an Idea, which answers in our Mind the Word *Nothing*; so that all those Terms which denote a Nonreality should be *negative*.

BUT they are most of them positive; and, on the other hand, negative Terms are used to denote real Things. We have

have plain Inſtances of it in the Words *Mortal* and *Immortal*, *Finite* and *Infinite*, *Corruptible* and *Incorruptible*, and many others, which make us apt, by degrees, to have a very wrong Notion both of what is poſitive and negative. When Men ſay, God cannot do contradictory Things, they ſeem by that negative Expreſſion to confine the Power of God within certain Bounds; but (*a*) 'tis the quite contrary. They affirm by thoſe Words, that God is infinitely perfect; for he who cannot contradict himſelf, does perfectly agree with himſelf, as he who cannot be miſtaken, is omniſcient and perfectly attentive; and he, who cannot die, does neceſſarily exiſt.

ON the contrary, the Power of erring, and the Power of committing Sins, are Negations expreſſed by poſitive Words. Men, for want of due Attention, involve themſelves into Difficulties about Creation and Providence: They ask, how far the moſt Holy *God is concerned* in the Errors and *Vices* of Mankind? He is not at all concerned in them. Every Thing Man has received from his Creator, is good. He might have given it in a higher Degree; he has not done it: 'Tis a mere Negation. He was under no Obligation to do it. The Degree was ſufficient, if Man had been willing to make a right Uſe of it. 'Tis therefore his Fault; it cannot be imputed to God, who gave him the Power of Willing. We ought to take great Care that we be not impoſed upon by fallacious Expreſſions.

I THINK it is a very probable Conjecture, that the *Confuſion*, which prevails in poſitive and negative Terms, was introduced, becauſe Names were at firſt beſtow'd by Men upon the moſt obvious Things; but when they came to find out in Proceſs of Time that there were Things quite oppoſite to thoſe which they knew before, inſtead of inventing new Words for new Ideas, they were contented to add a Negation to thoſe Words, that were already in uſe. Hence it is, that the thinking Subſtance was called *Immaterial*;

(*a*) "I have always been of Opinion, that theſe Expreſſions, *God* "*cannot die, God cannot retract himſelf, God cannot do this or* "*that*, are full of Indiſcretion and Irreverence; I don't approve that "the Divine Power ſhould be thus confined within the Laws of our "Speech: The Import of thoſe Propoſitions ſhould be repreſented "more reverently and religiouſly. Our Speech has its Weakneſſes "and Imperfections, like all other Things." *Montagne, Book* II. *Chap.* 12.

terial; a negative Word, which makes one apt to believe that Thinking is leſs real than Extenſion.

AT firſt, Men were only taken up with few Things: Their Thoughts ran only upon the Neceſſaries of Life. When (*b*) Plenty came in by degrees, thoſe who lived an eaſy Life, ſurvey'd a greater Number of Objects, and formed new Ideas; but they did not invent a new Word for every new Idea; they confined themſelves to the old Words. This we may obſerve in the *Hebrew* Tongue, which is one of the moſt antient Languages. The ſame *Hebrew* Word, to give an Inſtance of it, ſignifies *to inſtruct*, *to correct*, *to chaſtiſe*, *to bind*. There is ſome Relation between Inſtruction and Correction. Chaſtiſements are frequently uſed in order to correct. Inſtruction, and the Fear of being puniſhed, work the ſame Effect as Bonds, by reſtraining Men from evil. The Works of Nature were known before the Works of Art; which is the Reaſon why the latter have their Names taken from

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(*b*) "As poor People wear the ſame Cloaths every Day, and have "but few Utenſils; in like manner, thoſe Men whoſe Knowledge "is very narrow, want only few Words to expreſs their Thoughts, "and uſe them for every Thing. Ignorant People ſeldom or never "reflect. They are not nice enough to diſtinguiſh different Things; "and therefore thoſe Things appear to them alike, and they expreſs "them by the ſame Words; which appears by the Language of "the *Barbarians*, who live like Beaſts, and mind nothing but eating "and drinking. They have no other Terms, but ſuch as denote "thoſe Actions. Men, who are not skilled in Botanicks, look upon "moſt Simples to be alike, and are contented with the general "Words *Herb*, *Plant*, and *Simple*. Phyſicians, having a diſtinct "Notion of each Simple, went farther, and look'd out for Names "ſuitable to each Kind of Plants. Wherefore, according as Things "have been more attentively conſider'd by the ſeveral Nations of the "World, their Words are attended with more diſtinct Ideas, and in "greater Number. The ſame Thing is ſuſceptible of many De-"grees." *Father* Lamy's Rhetorick, *Book* I. *Chap.* 7. *p.* 29. *Amſterdam Edition*, 1712.

"The *Mogul-Tartars* have but one Conjugation. All their Verbs "have only two Tenſes, *viz.* the Time paſt, and the Time to come, "which they diſtinguiſh by two Particles." *Chap.* 10. *p.* 47.

"The Language called *Lingua-Franca*, is underſtood upon all the "Coaſts of the *Mediterranean* Sea. It conſiſts only of a few *Italian* "and *French* Words, which are neceſſary to expreſs one's Self in "Things relating to Trade. Thoſe Words have no Gender, no "Number, no Caſe, no Declenſions, no Conjugations, no Con-"ſtruction; and therefore that Language is quickly learned." *p.* 49.

from the former. We ſay, for inſtance, the Foot of a Bed, of a Table, of a Wall, as we ſay the Foot of an Animal: Whatever ſupports any Thing, goes by that Name.

XI. SOME Words have no Meaning; and ſuppoſing they have ſome Signification, yet they are the Cauſe of a thouſand Errors. A Man (for inſtance) games; and becauſe he will not own the Faults he has committed, or does not remember his Inadvertencies, or, becauſe he has no Idea of all the Motions of the Cards or Dice, occaſioned by the Agitation of the Hands, inſtead of aſcribing his Loſs to one of thoſe three Cauſes, or to all of them together, he aſcribes it to an imaginary Cauſe, which he calls *Chance*. He has no Notion of Chance; but that Word grows familiar to him, and is apply'd no leſs improperly to other Caſes. Some will have it to be a particular Object of the Divine Providence, and give it a venerable Character. Others, on the contrary, make uſe of that Word to deny Providence, and aſcribe to Chance the Diſpoſition of the Univerſe. *Words that ſignify nothing.*

THE Obſcurity of the Word *Fortune*, a Term wrongly defined, has occaſioned the moſt equivocal Applications. She is ſometimes vindicated as a *wiſe Cauſe*, which does nothing but what ſhe ought to do; and ſometimes ſhe is repreſented as a *fantaſtical Power*, making Sport with Order, and deſpiſing Equity. *Seneca*, in one and the ſame Page, juſtifies her, and ſpeaks of her reſpectfully, as of Divine Providence, though he had repreſented her, a little before, as an odious Power, which may be inſulted to eaſe one's Grief for the Harm ſhe has done. *We are in the wrong*, ſays he, *to think our ſelves no longer beholden to Fortune, for all the good Things ſhe has beſtow'd upon us, as ſoon as ſhe withdraws any of them; for ſhe only takes away what ſhe has given; and if it be an Injuſtice, it has been already made up by a great many Favours, and will be ſo again by new Ones* (c). But he had ſaid a little before, *Let no Body wonder at her Injuſtice and Cruelty: we ought to be uſed to it. Can ſhe have any Regard*

(c) Quod ad ipſam fortunam pertinet, etiamſi nunc agi apud te cauſſa ejus non poteſt: omnia enim illa quæ nobis dedit, ob hoc ipſum quod aliquid eripuit, inviſa ſunt: tunc tamen erit agenda, cum primum æquiorem te illi judicem dies fecerit: tunc enim poteris in gratiam cum illa redire. Nam multa providit, quibus hanc emendaret injuriam: multa etiam nunc dabit quibus redimat: denique ipſum quod abſtulit, ipſa dederat tibi. *De Conſolat. ad Polyb. Cap.* 37.

Regard for Juſtice, and uſe Men with Moderation, ſince ſhe has no Reſpect for the Gods, and brings Death into their ſacred Beds? Let all Men join in upbraiding her, ſhe will nevertheleſs go on; ſhe will be above all Prayers and Complaints. Such has Fortune *been at all Times, and ſuch will ſhe always be. She thinks ſhe may do any Thing: She will grow more violent: She has been ſo bold, as to enter the Porches of the Temples to do Miſchief, and to bring Affliction and Mourning into Palaces, the Gates whereof were covered with Laurel* (*d*).

MEN fancy they may be allowed to ſay any Thing againſt Fortune, becauſe they have no clear Idea of that Word. In the mean time, by reaſon of that Obſcurity, they uſe themſelves by degrees to entertain a wrong Notion of the Management of the Univerſe, and to find fault with the Governor of the World.

SENECA goes on in the ſame Strain, in his Letter of Conſolation to *Marcia*. *When we were born, we experienced the hard and inflexible Power of* Fortune, *in order to receive good Things, or Evils, at her Diſcretion. She is an inconſtant and humourſome Miſtreſs; and under Pretence of Love for her Slaves, ſhe beſtows upon them Favours and ſtrikes them at random* (*e*).

XII.

(*d*) Nemo itaque miretur, aliquid ab illa aut crudeliter fieri, aut iniquè. Poteſt enim hæc adverſus privatas domos ullam æquitatem noſſe, aut ullam modeſtiam: cujus implacabilis ſævitia totiens ipſa funeſtavit pulvinaria? Faciamus licet illi convicium, non noſtro tantùm ore, ſed etiam publico: non tamen mutabitur: adverſus omnes ſe preces, omneſque querimonias erigit. Hoc fuit in rebus humanis fortuna, hoc erit; nihil inauſum ſibi reliquit: nihil intactum relinquet. Ibit violentior per omnia, ſicut ſemper eſt ſolita, eas quoque domos auſa injuriæ cauſa intrare, in quas per templa aditur, & atram laureatis foribus inducet veſtem. *Id. ibid. Cap.* 35.

(*e*) Hoc fatum ab utero ſtatim proſequebatur. In regnum fortunæ, & quidem durum atque invictum pervenimus, illius arbitrio, digna atque indigna paſſuri; corporibus noſtris impotenter, contumelioſè, crudeliter abutetur: alios ignibus peruret, vel in pœnam admotis, vel in remedium: alios vinciet; id nunc hoſti licebit, nunc civi: alios per incerta nudos maria jactabit, & luctatos cum fluctibus, ne in arenam quidem aut littus explodet, ſed in alicujus ventrem immenſæ belluæ detrudet: alios morborum variis generibus emaceratos, diu inter vitam mortemque medios detinebit. Ut varia & libidinoſa, mancipiorumque ſuorum negligens domina, & pœnis & muneribus errabit. Quid opus eſt partes deflere? tota vita flebilis eſt. Urgebunt nova incommoda, priuſquam veteribus ſatisfeceris. Moderandum eſt itaque, vobis maximè, quæ immoderatè fertis: & in metus, & in dolores humanum pectus diſpenſandum. *Cap.* 10.

XII. SOME Words are not void of Senſe, but they expreſs only Ideas, without any actual Objects anſwering thoſe Words. Such are the general Words *Subſtance*, *Figure*, *Number*, *&c.* For, there is no Figure, that is Figure in general; nor any Number, but what is a certain determinate Number: Yet, Men are ſometimes miſtaken about thoſe Terms, and ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of certain Objects which they know not, and which ought to anſwer thoſe Words. Thus, for inſtance, after having defined Matter, *an extended Subſtance*, and the Soul *a thinking Subſtance*, they are at a Loſs to know what is that Subſtance, whereof Extenſion is an Attribute; and what is that Subſtance, whereof Thinking is a Modification. Their Notions would be clearer, did they conſider that there is *Thought* and *Extenſion* in us; that the general Idea of Subſtance agrees to both of them; and as we ſay of the *Triangle*, that it is a *Figure*, we ſay likewiſe that *Thinking* and *Extenſion* are *Subſtances*; becauſe, the general Idea of Subſtance is apply'd to both. *General Ideas.*

SPINOSA having conſider'd that Word, which in its general *Acception* is only the Name of an *indeterminate Idea*, *applicable* to many Subjects; *Spinoſa*, I ſay, having conſider'd that Word as the Name of a ſingle Thing actually exiſting, concluded from thence, that there is but one Subſtance, and his whole Syſtem is built upon ſuch a groſs Error. *We have* (ſays he) *but one Idea of Subſtance; for we can make but one Definition of it.* Therefore, there is but one Subſtance, which he is pleaſed to call God. As for us, and other Things, which the Vulgar calls *Creatures*; we are either the Divine Subſtance, or Attributes and Modes of that Divine Subſtance. Certainly, a Man, who yields to ſuch a wretched Sophiſm, muſt needs have a great Inclination to Atheiſm. One might as well ſay, There is but one Definition of Figure, and but one Definition of Number; therefore, a *Triangle* is a *Circle*; therefore 22 and 24 are not particular Numbers; a Triangle and a Circle are but Modes of the only Figure that exiſts; 22 and 24 are but Modes of the only Number exiſting. If I conſult my determinate Ideas, and expreſs them by Words, that are Names of external Objects actually exiſting, and if I ſay: *I have the Ideas of many Subſtances, and define them differently, Water, for inſtance, Wood, Stones, the Sun,* &c. *therefore there are many Subſtances; otherwiſe my Ideas and my Definitions would be falſe:* I overthrow *Spinoſa* by imitating him, and argue

better, because I judge of external Things, not by general, but determinate Ideas, and such as are most proper to represent to me those Objects, which actually exist as I conceive them.

GENERAL Words are not *fallacious*, whilst they are consider'd as Names of general Ideas; but they *become* fallacious, when apply'd to determinate Objects, and when we fancy that we know determinately what has only a general Name bestow'd upon it. Such was the constant Illusion of the Schoolmen. It is well known, that there can be no Effect without a Cause. They had, therefore, like all other Men, a general Idea of Causes, to which they only gave different Names as occasion offer'd. Fire is hotter in the Winter than in the Summer: 'tis an *Antiperistasis*. A Stone falls as soon as the Hand ceases to hold it: 'tis by a *centripete Quality* of the Earth. A Pail, that is still in a Well, may easily be raised: 'tis because the Pail is in its *Element*. A Load-Stone draws another: 'tis a *Sympathy*. The opposite Pole makes it fly back: 'tis an *Antipathy*. The Schoolmen were like Children, who asking about a Thing unknown to them, What is it? are contented with the bare Name of it. Their Curiosity goes no farther; they want to know the Name of that Thing, in order to discourse about it, or to ask for it whenever they please. Thus Men from their early Years use themselves to be satisfied with Words without minding their Signification.

A Parallel between what exists, and what does not exist.

XIII. THERE are some Cases about which we cannot argue right, if we are more attentive to those Things that exist, than to those which do not exist: But we cannot so easily think of what we do not perceive, as we do of what we perceive: Hence it is that Men are frequently mistaken about Questions, which require an equal Attention to such unequal Objects. Those who are so weak as to give Credit to Predictions, and who rely upon the Presages of Stars or Dreams, are very willing to remember some few Facts, which have answer'd groundless Predictions; but they keep no Register of a great many false Presages and Dreams. Should any one in Company discourse of these latter Dreams, he would be look'd upon as a raving Man: But give an Account of a Dream attended with its true Consequences, and do it with an Air of Admiration, the most rational Persons will hear you with great Attention, and be almost convinced of the Truth

of

of that Dream. But what Strength can there be in a Fact contradicted by a thouſand others? (*f*)

MEN being extremely deſirous to know future Things, have been impoſed upon by the leaſt Probability; and one would think they were unwilling to uſe their own Reaſon, for fear of being undeceived. There was a Time when *Homer* and *Virgil* were conſulted about Things to come, and they were ſo often conſulted, that they did at laſt afford ſomething that look'd like a Preſage. The Bible has been made uſe of to the ſame Purpoſe; and it was a religious Practice.

The Names of Subſtance and Modes are ſometimes confounded.

XIV. I HAVE ſaid in the beginning of this Chapter, that there are *Things*, and that thoſe Things are in a certain *State*. And therefore every Word, that is *ſignificative*, and ſignifies more than a mere *general Idea*, denotes a *Thing*, or that Thing *in its State*, or the *State* of that Thing. If a Language was perfectly exact, every ſort of Things would have a ſort of Names peculiar to it, whereby one might preſently know what ſort of Beings is ſpoken of; but a great Confuſion has been introduced by too great an Eagerneſs of beſtowing Names upon what was unknown. 'Tis true, that *Things* are denoted by *Subſtantive* Nouns, a Man, a Horſe, a Tree; that Things *modified*, that is, conſidered in their State, are expreſſed by *Adjective* Nouns, White, Wiſe, Learned, Strong, High, Heavy; and laſtly, that in order to denote the State in it ſelf, and by a ſeparate Idea, Men have *deduced* from Adjective Nouns certain Words called *abſtracted* Terms, which are *Subſtantives derived* from *Adjectives*, Whiteneſs, Science, Wiſdom, Height, *&c.* But this being not univerſal, occaſions the more Miſtakes, as it is more frequent, becauſe the Exceptions are leſs minded. We ſay that a Man is dreſſed; and yet his Cloaths are not a Mode, but a Subſtance. 'Tis

(*f*) At mors inſecuta Gracchum eſt; cauſſa quidem, credo, aliqua morbi gravioris, non emiſſione ſerpentis: neque enim tanta eſt infelicitas aruſpicum, ut ne caſu quidem unquam fiat, quod futurum illi eſſe dixerint. *Cic. de Div. Lib.* II.

Vitioſum eſt, in comparandis rebus alteram rem efferre, de alterâ mentionem non facere, aut negligentius diſputare; ut ſi comparetur, utrum ſatius ſit populum frumentum accipere, an non accipere: quæ commoda ſint in altera re, curet enumerare; quæ in altera re incommoda ſint, & quanta, velut depreſſa prætereat, aut ea, quæ minima ſunt, dicat. *Cic. ad Heren. Lib.* II.

true, that Example occaſions no Miſtake; it would be too groſs. But, when we ſay that Man is a thinking Being, and that Matter is extended, ſuch Expreſſions make us apt to look upon Thinking as an Accident of Man, and upon Extenſion as a Mode of Matter; whereas it is Matter it ſelf. Thus, again, after having called *Matter* that wherein all Bodies are alike, and *Form* that wherein they differ, Men have imagined two Principles, and two Subſtances, which are united to compoſe a Body. The former is the ſame every where; it is (in their Opinion) *neither this, nor that*; it has neither Bigneſs nor Smallneſs, neither an occult nor a manifeſt Quality: They don't know what it is (*g*). The *Form* is ſtill more incomprehenſible: 'Tis an unknown Subſtance, which does not exiſt before its Generation, and yet is not created: It is not known in it ſelf, and is only manifeſted by the Qualities with which it is inveſted. Men labour in vain to form a Notion of a Chimera, which has a Name beſtowed upon it. Thus again, after having called *a vegetative Soul* what makes Plants ſpring, grow, and bring forth Fruit, they look for I know not what Subſtance, diſtinct from the Wood, Fibres and Juices, in a Word, different from every Thing that is or may be known. That Word, beſtowed at a venture, in Expectation of a fuller Knowledge, is afterwards looked upon as a Word wiſely invented; and they fancy every Thing depends upon the right Explication of it.

Relations are confounded with Modes.

XV. SOMETIMES we ſpeak of a Mode, as of a Subſtance, to which we aſcribe other Modes. Thus we ſay that a Whiteneſs is lively: This Word expreſſes the Degree of the Whiteneſs. We ſay that a Colour is rough: This Term denotes the Effect of the Colour: For Relations are alſo confounded with Modes, by reaſon of the Unexactneſs of the Language. When we ſay, Exerciſe is wholeſome, we ſeem to repreſent Health as a Mode of Exerciſe, which would be the Subſtance. *Exerciſe* would be the *Thing*, and *Health* would be the *State* of the Thing: Whereas Exerciſe is a State of Man, an active Mode; and Health, another Mode, is an Effect of that Mode (*h*). But, that

(*g*) *Neque quid, neque quantum, neque quale.*

(*h*) " Our Spittle cleans and dries our Wounds: It kills Serpents. " What Quality ſhall we aſcribe to it with reſpect to Us, or with re-
" ſpect

that Inſtance offers at leaſt a real Relation. There is a Connexion between the State of Exerciſe and the State of Health; whereas ſometimes Men repreſent as Modes ſome Relations ſo external, that they make no Alteration in the Subject, to which they are aſcribed, and do not modify it. To be Praiſed, to be Famous, Rich, all thoſe Things leave us ſuch as we were, as much as to be firſt and ſecond, if a Man ſhould place himſelf ſucceſſively to our right Hand, and then to our left. Whilſt I am aſleep, a Man makes me his Heir: Does that new Relation make me different from what I was? Not in the leaſt; and I riſe ſuch as I was, when I went to Bed. I may be ſo fooliſh as to grow Vain upon Account of that Inheritance, or ſo Wiſe as to live a comfortable Life by the Uſe I ſhall make of it; but I ſhall be the Cauſe of thoſe Effects, and that Inheritance will only be the Occaſion of them: It is not a Mode of my Soul, nor of my Body. The Vanity of Man, always ready to take Advantage of the leaſt Pretences, moves him to conſider himſelf as being united to his Wealth and Titles: He appropriates to himſelf thoſe external Things, no leſs than his moſt real Qualities. To be Sick, to be Wiſe, are like Expreſſions: One would think that the Things, denoted by them, are equally internal. That Conformity of Names keeps the Vulgar in their Error: They ſeldom go beyond Words. Beſides, they are far from looking upon Riches as ſomething leſs belonging to rich Men, than Wiſdom to the Wiſe. But, whoever thinks above the Vulgar, makes a great Difference between what belongs to a Man, and what is not altogether in his Power. Though he be told that his Riches raiſe him above other Men, he does not believe it. *Illas circumfuſas ſibi multum diuque miratus, quod ad ſe venerint, ridet, ſuaſque audit magis eſſe quam ſentit.* Let the Vulgar value Men only for thoſe Things which ſurround them, and are quite diffe-

Sen. Ep. XX.

"ſpect to Serpents? By which of the two Senſes ſhall we find out "its true Nature? *Pliny* ſays, *There are Sea-Hares in* India, *which "poiſon Men; and that Men poiſon them with their mere Touch.* Where "does the Poiſon truly lie, in Man, or in that Fiſh? Whom ſhall "we believe, that Fiſh with reſpect to Man, or Man with reſpect "to that Fiſh? - - - - - -

"When we preſs our Eyes, the Bodies we look upon, appear to "us longer. The Eyes of many Animals are thus preſſed. That "length is therefore by chance the true Form of thoſe Bodies, "and not that which our Eyes in their natural Situation aſcribe to "it". *Mont, Book* II. *Chap.* 12.

rent from them. Though you be raiſed to the firſt Rank, if you have no Merit, I look upon you as a Dwarf placed upon a Mountain: Your Elevation will only make me more ſenſible of your Littleneſs.

BUT that Error, though never ſo groſs, is one of the moſt common. Moſt Men judge of themſelves by *external Relations*, as if they were real and internal Attributes. Such a one fancies himſelf to be a great Man, becauſe he makes a great Figure; and yet nothing can be more contemptible than his Genius, unleſs it be his Soul. Such a one fancies himſelf to be a very holy Man, becauſe he has an Employment which requires a great Holineſs. If that Man, after a due Examination of himſelf, finds that he is only above others by a certain Knowledge, and by a Zeal to force upon the Belief of other Men what he thinks to be true, he will place the eſſential Part of Religion in ſome Theories.

MEN not only fancy that mere Relations are Modes of a Subject, though they make no Alteration in it; though they may ceaſe, or come again, without taking away, or reſtoring any Quality; but beſides, they look upon a *mere Beginning*, an imperfect Progreſs, as a *perfect*, compleat, and abſolute Quality. All thoſe Miſtakes ariſe from the ſame Cauſe. Men mind only Words. *Wealth* and *Learning* * being Terms of the ſame Gender, the Things, ſignified by them, are alſo looked upon as being of the ſame Claſs. Learning is a real Quality, which modifies the Man in whom it is to be found: 'Tis a Perfection which raiſes him above an ignorant Man. Riches are alſo accounted a Merit. He who knows ſomething, is called a learned Man, as well as he who knows every Thing he ought to know. 'Tis therefore an equivocal Term; but that Equivocation is not minded. When a Man happens to be honoured with that Title, he cannot bear being ſuſpected of Ignorance in any Thing whatſoever. 'Tis with the Titles of Learned, Honeſt, Sober, and Brave, as 'tis with thoſe of Rich, Powerful, Great Lord. A Man is ſo in the Opinion of ſome, and not in the Opinion of others. According to the Age, or the Nation, you lived in, notwithſtanding the ſame Quantity of Land and Money, and the ſame Degree of Knowledge and Probity, Men will give, or deny you, the Titles of Rich, Learned, and Virtuous (*i*).

* *In the French*, la Richeſſe & la Science.

(*i*) " If Languages had been made by Philoſophers, they might " certainly be more eaſily learned. Philoſophers would have eſtab- " liſhed

THE *Stoicks* were deluded by a groſs Sophiſm, in ſuppoſing the Senſe of a Word to be Abſolute, though its Signification was altogether Relative. 'Tis a Happineſs to be Wiſe: Therefore, a *wiſe Man is moſt Happy*. If he is moſt Happy, nothing can be wanting to his Felicity: It cannot be encreaſed: *Quis beato beatior?* It has been a Query in our Days, Whether any Man can be ſure of ſeeing the *abſolute Magnitude* of Bodies, as if there could be an abſolute Magnitude, and the words *Great* and *Small* were not neceſſarily relative Words? (*k*)

"liſhed every where an Uniformity, and Relations, which would "have proved a ſafe and infallible Guide; and the manner of form-"ing a Word, would have implied its Signification by vertue of cer-"tain Principles laid down at firſt. The uncivilized Nations, who "are the firſt Authors of Languages, fell naturally into that No-"tion, with reſpect to certain Terminations, all of which have "ſome common Property and Virtue; but that Advantage, un-"known to thoſe, who had it in their Hands, was not carried far "enough". *Hiſtory of the Royal Academy of Sciences*, 1701. *pag.* 174. *Amſterdam Edition.*

(*k*) *Magnitudo non habet certum modum: comparatio illam aut tollit, aut deprimit.* Sen. Ep. XLIII.

CHAP. II.

Of the Relations of Objects with reſpect to us.

I. AMONGST all the Operations of the Mind, there are none ſo frequent as Compariſons. Men compare Subſtances with Modes: They compare Subſtances one with another, and Modes among themſelves: They diſtinguiſh what is common to them from their Differences, and their Connexion from their Diſagreement: They examine their mutual Dependencies: They conſider their Force, and determine their Power. It is highly neceſſary to

The Frequency of Compariſons.

to lay down Rules for the Direction of our Thoughts in our different Compariſons.

Relations of Objects with reſpect to us, already treated of in a great Meaſure.

II. BUT, before I give a particular Account of the Relations that are found out, when Objects are compared one with another, it will not be improper to examine their Relations with reſpect to us.

'TIS true, that Subject has been already treated of in the foregoing Chapters. Our Temper, Habits, Inclinations, and Paſſions, make Objects work upon us with a Force they would not have in themſelves, were they not ſupported by thoſe Diſpoſitions. Objects are pleaſing or tedious, and raiſe or tire our Attention according as we are prepoſſeſſed by thoſe Principles. So that he, who ſtands upon his Guard againſt his Temper and his Habits, and knows how to regulate his Inclinations, will not ſuffer himſelf to be impoſed upon by the Relations of Objects to thoſe Diſpoſitions, nor by the Force they get from them. Thus we have already laid down ſuch Principles as may direct and preſerve us from Miſtakes in the different Relations of Objects to us.

The Power of Novelty and Antiquity.

III. HOWEVER, there are ſome ſtill, which deſerve to be taken Notice of in this Chapter.

REAL or pretended Truths, offered to the Mind, are either *newly* diſcovered, or have been known *long ago*. Each of theſe two Relations has a Power of its own. Some Men are only fond of *Antiquity*, and others of *Novelty*; and between thoſe two Extremes Men are divided a thouſand different Ways. Sometimes they are pleaſed with Antiquity, and ſometimes with Novelty. I ſhall not deſcribe their Humours and Oddneſſes in that Reſpect.

Why Novelty pleaſes.

IV. NEW Objects occaſion a Surprize: They raiſe Attention, Curioſity, and Admiration: In a word, they make a more lively Impreſſion; and by that means we are better pleaſed with them. We need not wonder at it: I have accounted for it before: Thoſe Sentiments are innocent, as long as we don't make an ill Uſe of them.

MAN being born to enjoy a great many comfortable Things, and to perceive an infinite Variety of Objects, 'tis no wonder, if he takes delight in proceeding from one to another: It may be ſaid that he was created partly for that Purpoſe.

BESIDES

BESIDES, by proceeding from Knowledge to Knowledge, and to that end, from one Novelty to another, he knows his own Strength; he is pleaſed with enriching his Mind; and thoſe Sentiments are too agreeable not to endear to us the Objects which occaſion them. Hence it comes to paſs, that Variety ſets off the Value and Charms of Novelty: Becauſe what is new, flatters Ambition and allures Self-love; a new Propoſition is eagerly taken up. By this means the Taſte is ſpoiled by Degrees; for, by yielding to Novelty in ſuch a manner, an Homage is paid to it which is only due to Evidence, and it becomes the Character of Truth. A Man has ſome new Thoughts; 'tis no matter whether they be Conjectures or Demonſtrations, certain or probable: They are New; he thinks he muſt make the beſt of them.

VANITY and Moroſeneſs are the two great Springs of a contradicting Humour; and that Humour makes alſo a Man extremely fond of Novelty: He feeds himſelf with the Pleaſure of preferring himſelf to all others: He is well pleaſed with oppoſing the common Notions, and making others Uneaſy: He laughs in private at their Trouble, and applauds himſelf for being the Occaſion of it.

SOME Men, extremely deſirous of diſtinguiſhing themſelves by ſomething new and extraordinary, neglect to learn the moſt common Principles, in order to publiſh ſome *Paradoxes*. He, who can't ſo much as ſpeak *Latin* correctly, preſumes to judge from the Stile of a Book, whether it was written by the Author, whoſe Name it bears.

PRAGMATICAL and factious Men will neceſſarily be fond of Novelty: New Opinions muſt needs pleaſe them, as well as new Maxims and Settlements. One Habit begits another: A reſtleſs Man contradicts every Thing; and he muſt needs lay down ſomething in the room of what he oppoſes.

IT frequently happens that Men, being vexed, becauſe they have not ſucceeded in a certain Courſe of Life, condemn it abſolutely, and take up a new one. This appears to them more eaſy than to mend thoſe Faults, which have been the Occaſion of their Miſcarriage. Men love to lay their ill Succeſs upon others. 'Tis ſome Comfort to find fault with the Circumſtances, whereby they were engaged in a certain Party; but 'tis very hard to accuſe one's ſelf, and to acknowledge the wrong Uſe of thoſe Circumſtances.

HENCE it is that a Man, who has not been able to improve in Learning, by reaſon of his Idleneſs, inſtead of mending that Fault, looks for a better Fortune in the Profeſſion

feſſion of War; and a Soldier, who has ruined himſelf by his Debauchery, abhorring the Trade of War, much more than his own Intemperance, embraces a monaſtical Life.

'TIS by a like Mechaniſm that ſome Men, who have lived a vicious Life, inſtead of acknowledging, that it is for want of minding the Precepts in which they were inſtructed from their early Years, being well pleaſed to think their Vices proceed only from want of good Inſtruction, find fault with their Religion, and heartily take up the Novelties of any *Viſionary*, who knows how to take Advantage of their Diſpoſition.

MEN are therefore naturally diſpoſed to Novelty; and that Inclination is afterwards ſtrengthen'd by their Inconſtancy. When a Man cannot fix his Mind, and ſettle his Attention upon any Thing whatſoever, he muſt needs continually proceed from one Amuſement to another, and conſequently hunt about after Novelties. Thoſe two Cauſes of Men's Fondneſs of Novelty, are attended with others, *viz.* Vanity, a contradicting Humour, a Spirit of Faction, and, laſtly, *Superſtition*, which, in ſome Caſes, likes Novelty, and finds its Account in it.

THOSE, who by a long Habit happen to be ſubjected to the Power and falſe Glimmering of Novelty, *are to be pitied.* It is no eaſy Thing to be cured of that ill Habit; for the Power of new Objects ariſes from a Surpriſe; and Reaſon is never leſs powerful than in a Surpriſe. Care ſhould be taken that Children ſhould avoid all Examples and Diſcourſes proper to beget in them an ill Habit, which, by making us the continual Sport of Error, diſables us from enjoying any ſolid and laſting Satisfaction.

INCONSTANCY hinders Men from knowing the Value of Things, and dwelling upon them. They are not fond of any Thing a long time; they are always for new ones; and at laſt they grow weary of Life it ſelf (*a*).

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(*a*) Jam flectamus curſum ad urbem; nimis diu à plauſu & fragore aures vacaverunt: juvat jam & humano ſanguine frui. Aliud ex alio iter ſuſcipitur, & ſpectacula ſpectaculis mutantur, ut ait Lucretius,

Hoc ſe quiſque modo ſemper fugit.

Sid

A MAN, who can ſtand upon his own Bottom, and does not much concern himſelf in the good Senſe of others, has no ſmall Diverſion, when he ſees a new Comer take the Place of another Perſon. "What a lovely Man! no body "can be more Polite: He underſtands the World in Per- "fection: He has a great deal of Wit: He is a Man of a "charming Converſation." Novelty occaſions all theſe Praiſes; and a great many People, by ſuch Expreſſions, commend only an unknown Perſon.

CERTAINLY we ought to be very much indebted to thoſe, over whom Novelty has ſo great a Power, when they continue to have an Eſteem for us.

From whence proceeds the Fondneſs of Antiquity.

V. THOSE Men of Letters, who have got an early Habit of meditating much, make frequent Diſcoveries, and allow others to do the ſame: They are well pleaſed with new Diſcoveries, though they are not the Authors of them. But dull Men, uncapable of any Production, or whoſe Productions are an Effect of a great Labour, and thoſe whoſe Learning conſiſts only in a good Memory, don't love Novelties. They think it hard to have new Tasks laid upon them, and to be obliged to ſtudy new Propoſitions: They hate to have their Labour encreaſed, and are ſorry to ſee others poſſeſſed of Talents of which they are deſtitute: They would have no Maſters: They wiſh they might ſay, they know every Thing, and that no body can teach them any Thing.

'TIS no ſmall Mortification for them to ſee every Day new Maſters ſtart up: They can bear with thoſe antient Maſters, to whom every body ſubmitted, when they came into the World. They have learned a Syſtem with great Labour; and now ſome new Comers would have them to begin again. In order to know whether they are in the right, they muſt enter upon an Examination; a Thing they are not uſed to. The ſhorteſt way is to reject them with Indignation, and to condemn them without Hearing. A Man, who

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Sid quid prodeſt, ſi non effugit? ſequitur ſe ipſe, & urget graviſſimus comes. Itaque ſcire debemus, non locorum vitium eſſe quo laboramus, ſed noſtrum. Infirmi ſumus ad omne tolerandum, nec laboris patientes, nec voluptatis, nec noſtræ, nec ullius rei diutius. Hoc quoſdam egit ad mortem, quod propoſita ſæpè mutando, in eadem revolvebantur, & non reliquerant novitati locum. Faſtidio illis eſſe cœpit vita & ipſe mundus: & ſubit illud rabidarum deliciarum. Quouſque eadem? *Sen. de Tranq. An. cap.* 2.

who is only for Repeating, will eaſily envy the Pleaſure of Inventing.

WHEN Dulneſs, and the Incapacity of producing any Thing, happen to be ſupported by Obſtinacy, the Averſion to Novelty, and the Fondneſs of Antiquity encreaſe. Vanity, which has a hand in every Thing, does not fail to come in for her Share, and will be concerned for Antiquity, as ſhe is ſometimes for Novelties. The latter become particularly intolerable, when they are propoſed by Men inferior in Birth, Age, or Employments. What! ſhall a Doctor, applauded like an Oracle, who is grown old in inſtructing others, and receiving their Homage, ſtoop to learn of a Scholar? Whoever is ſo preſumptuous as to offer to Teach him, is, in his Judgment, an extravagant Man, who deſerves to be puniſhed rather than heard (*b*). If we muſt learn every Thing, let us learn of the Antients: We are all Diſciples of thoſe Maſters. But, if the Moderns can invent any valuable Thing, we muſt then reſolve to reckon our Contemporaries among our Teachers. Men, out of Malignity, make it their Buſineſs to magnify the Dead, in order to depreſs the Living, whoſe Brightneſs offends their Sight (*c*).

THE Spirit of Party does alſo engage Men to adhere to the common Notions, and to reject whatever is ſaid by the contrary Party. In point of *Religion*, eſpecially, Novelty is very much ſuſpected, and Antiquity is of great Weight. Men know in general, that the moſt antient Religion is the beſt; which is very true; for, that Religion is the neareſt to the fountain Head, the Divine Revelation. But, without taking care to go to the fountain Head, a Man looks upon the Belief of his Grandfather to be the moſt antient Religion. Antiquity reaches no farther than ſome Years: From that time, every thing is a Repetition; and three or four Men draw after them a crowd of Admirers.

BESIDES, Men are bred up from their Infancy in a profound Reſpect for the common Doctrines; and when they are grown, they can hardly reſolve to examine without Prejudices thoſe Objects of the publick Veneration. Moreover, Men are very lazy; and if they were more active

(*b*) Naturaliter audita viſis laudamus libentius, & præſentia convivia, præteritâ veneratione proſequimur: & his nos obrui, illis inſtrui credimus. *Velleius.*

(*c*) Vitio malignitatis humanæ vetera ſemper in laude, præſentia in faſtidio. In laudem Vetuſtorum invidia non obſtat. *Sen.*

active, they would not be much taken up with religious Doctrines. They are very willing to diſpenſe themſelves with ſuch a painful Examination, and to rely upon the Judgment of others; which is very convenient. Such a general Diſpoſition has produced a general Effect. The Religion of the *Heathens* was built upon no other Foundation. We have been taught ſo by our Anceſtors, ſaid they: This was their only Proof (*d*). The *Mahometans* make no Enquiries into their Religion: it would be a great Sin. We are told the *Muſcovites* rely upon the Knowledge of the Czar; and every Body knows the *Latin* Church argues upon the ſame Principle. It falls out unluckily, that the ſame Diſpoſitions are not altogether extinct in thoſe Chriſtian Societies, which have ſeparated from the Church of *Rome*. The Preſumption of the Doctors on the one hand, and the Indolence of the Laiety on the other; their Backwardneſs to inſtruct themſelves, and their Inclination to rely upon the Judgment of others; are like to make from time to time, and here and there, ſome petty Popes. We can hardly forbear countenancing in the Practice, what we condemn in the Theory.

POLITICIANS do alſo very much ſuſpect Novelty; and this Suſpicion is not groundleſs. 'Tis certain the Peace of the State depends upon the Obſervation of the Laws. It is no leſs certain, that if the Bulk of Mankind ſubmit to thoſe Laws, their Submiſſion does not proceed from their apprehending

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(*d*) Quæ eſt autem gens, aut quæ civitas, quæ non aut extis pecudum, aut monſtra, aut fulgura interpretantium, aut augurum, aut aſtrologorum, aut ſortium, (ea enim ferè artis ſunt) aut ſomniorum, aut vaticinationum (hæc enim duo naturalia putantur) prædictione moveatur? Quarum quidem rerum eventa magis arbitror quàm cauſſas quæri opportere. *Cic. de Divin. Lib.* I.

Nec me ex ea opinione, quam à majoribus accepi de cultu Deorum immortalium, ullius unquam oratio aut docti aut indocti movebit. Sed cum de Religione agitur, T. Coruncanium, P. Scipionem, P. Scævolam Pontifices maximos, non Zenonem aut Cleanthem, aut Chryſippum ſequor, habeoque C. Lælium augurem, eundemque ſapientem, quem potiùs audiam de religione dicentem in iliâ oratione nobili, quàm quenquam principem Stoicorum. Cumque omnis Populi Rom. religio in ſacra, & in auſpicia diviſa ſit, tertium adjunctum ſit, ſi quid prædictionis cauſſa ex portentis & monſtris Sibyllæ interpretes, haruſpiceſve monuerunt: harum ego religionum nullam unquam contemnendam putavi: mihique ita perſuaſi Romulum auſpiciis, Numam ſacris conſtitutis, fundamenta jeciſſe noſtræ Civitatis, quæ nunquam profecto ſine ſumma placatione Deorum immortalium tanta eſſe potuiſſet. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib.* III.

hending their Wiſdom and Uſefulneſs. Moſt Men never reflected upon that Subject, and indeed they are not capable of it: But from their early Years they have been taught to pay a due Reſpect to the preſent Eſtabliſhments. *Cuſtom* therefore is to them inſtead of Knowledge. Make any Alteration, you accuſtom them to ſlight the Object of their Reſpect; and becauſe every Thing they are uſed to, appears to them of equal Importance, nothing appears to them eſſential, when they ſee that the moſt authorized Cuſtoms are altered. They look no longer upon the Laws, but as a Yoke laid upon them by cunning Men.

HENCE it is, that ſome wiſe Magiſtrates, being reduced to the Neceſſity of parting with ſome Laws, went about it with ſo much Dexterity, that the People were ſenſible of the Reſpect paid to them, and hardly perceived that they were altered. The *Lacedemonians* finding the Inconveniency of a Law, which did not allow the ſame Perſon to be made an Admiral twice, raiſed to that Dignity a Man who was not qualified for it, and appointed *Lyſander* Superintendant of the Marine. It was not lawful at *Athens* to take away a Table, upon which a Law had been inſcribed: The Intereſt of the State requiring that a certain Law ſhould be altered, *Pericles* bethought himſelf of turning the Table inſtead of removing it.

I ADD, that Men are ſenſible of all the Inconveniences of a Law, but do not always perceive all the Advantages ariſing from it; for Evil makes a greater Impreſſion than Good. On the contrary, they eaſily foreſee the Advantages of a new Eſtabliſhment, ſince thoſe Advantages have occaſioned the Thoughts of it; but they do not perceive its Inconveniences. Experience does frequently diſcover a great many, which had not been foreſeen at all. Wherefore it is highly neceſſary to make no Alteration in a State, without very plain and weighty Reaſons. But to oppoſe all Novelty under that Pretence, leſt a Novelty in one Thing ſhould reach all other Things, and the Government it ſelf, is to lay down Barbarouſneſs as the Foundation of Society. At this rate, it might very well be ſaid, That thoſe Princes who did not oppoſe Chriſtianity and the Reformation, ought to be looked upon as ſorry Politicians. Were it true, that the Arts and Sciences are the Ruin of a State, the Publick Peace would be eſtabliſh'd upon a better and more laſting Foundation, if Men lived ſtill in Caves, and had no other Food but Acorns.

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ONE muſt have very little Wit to entertain any Suſpicion about thoſe, who apply themſelves to the Improvement of Arts and Sciences. No one ought to be leſs ſuſpected by the Government, ſince no one is ſo much concern'd in the Publick Peace as they are. Peace, and its happy Conſequences, make Arts and Sciences flouriſh (*e*). Thoſe ſhould rather be miſtruſted, who affect a more blind Dependence, a more abſolute Submiſſion, and ſeem to be moſt pleaſed with Slavery. Men will not make themſelves Slaves for nothing: They have ſomething elſe in view; they are truly Slaves to Fortune and their own Intereſt: Theſe are their true Maſters, to whom they are always ready to ſacrifice all other Men.

A Parallel between Novelty and Antiquity.

VI. IT appears by the foregoing Reflections, that ſomething may be ſaid for and againſt Novelty and Antiquity. A Man of a ſhallow Wit is continually enquiring about new Things: He admires and greedily takes up whatever comes to his Knowledge, and every Thing he never heard before. Such a Character is ſo contemptible, that it prepoſſeſſes us againſt Novelty. We are aſhamed of an Inclination, which makes a Man childiſh.

ON the other hand, thoſe are certainly ridiculous, who take nothing to be true but what was ſaid by their Predeceſſors;

(*e*) Errare mihi videntur, qui exiſtimant, Philoſophiæ fideliter deditos, contumaces eſſe ac refractarios, & contemptores Magiſtratuum ac Regum, eorumve per quos publica adminiſtrantur. E contrario enim, nulli adverſus illos gratiores ſunt: nec immerito; nullis enim plus præſtant, quam quibus frui tranquillo otio licet. Itaque hi, quibus ad propoſitum benè vivendi aditum confert ſecuritas publica, neceſſe eſt auctorem hujus boni, ut parentem colant: multò quidem magis, quam illi inquieti, & in medio poſiti; qui multa principibus debent, ſed multa & imputant; quibus nunquàm tam plenè occurrere ulla liberalitas poteſt, ut cupiditates illorum quæ creſcunt, dum implentur, exſatiet. Quiſquis autem de accipiendo cogitat, oblitus accepti eſt; nec ullum habet malum cupiditas majus, quàm quod ingrata eſt. Adjice nunc, quòd nemo eorum qui in Republicâ verſantur, quos vincat, ſed à quibus vincatur, adſpicit: & illis non tam jucundum eſt, multos poſt ſe videre, quàm grave, aliquem ante ſe. Habet hoc vitium omnis ambitio: non reſpicit. Nec ambitio tantùm inſtabilis eſt, verum cupiditas omnis: quia incipit ſemper à fine. At ille vir ſincerus ac purus, qui reliquit & curiam, & forum, & omnem adminiſtrationem Reipublicæ, ut ad ampliora ſecederet, diligit eos per quos hoc ei facere tutò licet, ſoluſque illis gratuitum teſtimonium reddit, & magnam rem neſcientibus debet. *Sen. Ep.* LXXIII.

ſors; who being deluded by the Word *Antients*, look upon them, as Children look upon grown Men and old People; and who in their ripe Years, fancy they are ſtill Children, and have the ſame Credulity. Such a ridiculous Character makes us ſide again with Novelty, and look upon the ſtubborn Followers of Antiquity as doating Men.

THERE has been a warm Diſpute in our Days about the Merit of the Moderns, compared with the Merit of the Antients. That Diſpute is famous by the Reputation and Ability of the Diſputants, and has produced ſeveral Works full of Wit and Learning. But, after this ſincere Acknowledgment, I ſhould be willing to add, that it was a very uſeleſs Diſpute, were I not perſuaded that Men want many Amuſements to take up their leiſure Hours. We have not a ſufficient Number of Monuments to judge of the whole Merit of the Antients. Beſides, 'tis well known, that in order to make juſt Compariſons, Things of the ſame Nature ought to be compared together, Morals with Morals, Hiſtory with Hiſtory, a Poem with a Poem; and not only natural Philoſophy with natural Philoſophy in general, but an Explication of a Phænomenon by the Antients with an Explication of the ſame Phænomenon by the Moderns. Every Thing muſt be calculated and ſummed up, and right Subſtractions made from the total Sums.

I GRANT the Moderns may exceed the Antients, ſince they have the Help of their Knowledge. Standing upon their Shoulders, we ſee farther than they; nay, we are the Antients in one Senſe; for the World was formerly younger.

ONE Day adds to another Day; and Learning encreaſes by that Means. The wrong Notions of the Antients are mended; their good Thoughts are made uſe of and improved: The Antients themſelves did ſo with reſpect to their Predeceſſors (*f*). But we are diſcouraged by our Lazineſs: We fancy we want Strength, becauſe we will not uſe it. Are we Men of a different Kind? Do we inhabit another Earth? Are we enlighten'd by another Sun (*g*)? Can we give

(*f*) Recentiſſima quæque ſunt correcta & emendata maximè. *Cic. Tuſc. Queſt.*

Optima conditio eſt ultimi. *Sen. Ep.* LXXIX.

(*g*) Nos quoque aliquid ipſi faciamus animoſe: ſimus inter exempla. Quare deficimus? quare deſperamus? quicquid fieri potuit, poteſt. Nos modò purgemus animum, ſequamurque naturam, à quâ aberranti cupiendum timendumque eſt, & fortuitis ſerviendum. Licet reverti in viam, licet in integrum reſtitui. *Sen. Ep.* XCVIII.

give no Example to thoſe, who ſhall come after us? Are we neceſſitated to tranſcribe thoſe, who lived before us, and to follow their Steps in a ſervile Manner? I grant they began the Race; but certainly they did not go through it; and their Diſcoveries ought rather help than hinder us from making new ones (*h*).

ON the other hand, the Antients lived longer than we: They were leſs prepoſſeſs'd than we are; for Prejudices encreaſe more and more in Proceſs of Time. The Spirit of Party, and a factious Zeal did not ſo much prevail in their Days as in ours: The Zeal for Religion has reached all human Sciences. Perhaps the Antients, not clogged with ſo much Reading as we are, had a ſtronger and more lively Genius. They were not obliged to learn a thouſand Fooleries, which we muſt learn, or be diſparaged by thoſe, who diſpoſe of Rewards, or are conſulted for the Diſtribution of them. Laſtly, the Antients were able to beſtow upon Things the Time we loſe in learning Words.

THE Diſpute about the Preference of the Antients to the Moderns has proved much like the Vineyard in the Fable. Thoſe who manured it, in hopes of finding a Treaſure, were diſappointed; but they grew rich by the Fruits of their indefatigable Labour. The Queſt of the Philoſopher's Stone has, in like manner, enrich'd Chymiſtry and Phyſick with a great many uſeful Diſcoveries. The Controverſy about the Antients and the Moderns is not yet determined, and in all likelihood will never be decided, or only after ſome Ages. Both Parties acknowledge the ſupreme Tribunal of Reaſon; and each of them make her diſcourſe differently, and bring her on their Side. But that Diſpute has produced excellent Fruits. The Partiſans of the Moderns have endeavoured to exceed the Antients, and, as ſome think, made uſe of their Aſſiſtance to go farther than they. The Admirers of the Antients have explained their Precepts, illuſtrated their Works, and ſet their Beauties in a full Light.

WE are prepoſſeſs'd in favour of the Time paſt by the uſual Complaints of old Men, whom we have heard with great Reſpect from our Childhood. *Things grow worſe every Day:* Such is their uſual Language. But Men have been Men at all Times; and Things did always go much at the ſame

(*h*) Nullum ſæculum magnis ingeniis cluſum eſt. *Sen. Ep.* CII. Qui præceſſerunt non præripuiſſe mihi videntur quæ dici poterant, ſed aperuiſſe. Inventuris inventa non obſtant. *Ep.* LXXIX.

ſame rate. Manners are a little altered; the Corruption of the Heart remains conſtantly the ſame. (*i*)

WE are born in a Dependence upon thoſe, who are older than we. We have ſeen from our early Years old Men poſſeſſed of the firſt Places: By that Means, we have been induced to honour and imitate them; and that Cuſtom extends to every Thing, that goes by the Name of Antiquity. We have a Reſpect for the Works of the Antients, becauſe we look upon them as venerable old Men.

WE are indebted to the Antients; and out of Gratitude we ought to make a good Uſe of their Knowledge. But, we ought alſo to mind Poſterity; and in order to imitate the Antients, we muſt go farther than they, and leave ſomething of our own to thoſe, who ſhall come after us. We muſt improve the Stock our Fathers have left us, and tranſmit it to our Deſcendants.

THE reading of the antient Authors is doubtleſs agreeable and uſeful; for, not to ſay that a Man, who loves to learn, reads no good Book without Pleaſure, and ſome Benefit, it is very pleaſant to find, by the reading of the Antients, the Agreement of Reaſon and Religion. It is very pleaſant to obſerve that they have had a Glimpſe of what we ſee now more clearly. What a Pleaſure for the Modern Philoſophers to read theſe Words in *Seneca*? *Muſt we wonder that the Periodical Times of Comets, which appear ſo ſeldom, have not been yet determined*? *'Tis not yet fifteen hundred Years, ſince the* Grecians *gave Names to the Stars. Many Nations in our Days know nothing in the Heavens, but what may be ſeen at the firſt Glance: They are ſtill ignorant of the Cauſes of* Eclipſes, *and of the* Phaſes *of the Moon; and 'tis not long ſince we have learned them. There will be a Time, when*

(*i*) Sic finiamus, ne in noſtro ſæculo culpa ſubſidat. Hoc majores noſtri queſti ſunt, hoc nos querimur; hoc poſteri noſtri querentur; everſos eſſe mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas & in omne nefas labi. At iſta ſtant loco eodem, ſtabuntque, paululum dumtaxat ultro aut citro mota, ut fluctus, quos æſtus accedens longiùs extulit, recedens interiore littorum veſtigio tenuit. *Sen. de Benef. Lib.* I. *Cap.* 10.

Expectant ii qui audiunt exempla in veterum memoriâ & monimentis ac literis, plena dignitatis, plena antiquitatis. Hæc plurimum ſolent & auctoritatis habere ad probandum & jucunditatis ad audiendum. *Cic. Act.* V. *in Verrem.*

when more attentive and laborious Men will diſcover what is not now well known to us (*k*).

GOOD Senſe, which ſupplied the want of Art among the Antients, did alſo frequently enable them to make Reflections, wherein one may obſerve a ſurpriſing Application of ſome general Maxims, which they followed, though perhaps they never had a diſtinct Notion of them.

IF it ſhould be acknowledged that Eloquence has not attained yet to the Degree it was in among the *Grecians* and *Romans*, ſuch a Confeſſion would not prove the Superiority of the Antients in point of Wit and Knowledge. One might eaſily find out the Reaſon of their Superiority, as to Eloquence, in certain Circumſtances, which would ſtill produce the ſame Effect, if they had not ceaſed. Among the *Grecians* and *Romans* Eloquence was the Way to Dignities; and the beſt Speakers had generally the greateſt Share in the Government. The Eloquence of *Cicero* raiſed him to the firſt Dignity of the World, though his Name was perfectly new in the Commonwealth. To that Reaſon others may be added, which are more eſſential, and more peculiar to Eloquence it ſelf. Eloquence requires an important Subject, Hearers of a good Taſte, and a numerous Audience. An Orator would be ridiculous, if he ſhould make a very earneſt Speech about an inconſiderable Subject, or even if he ſhould diſplay the niceſt and the moſt lively Strokes of Eloquence about a noble Subject, in an Aſſembly of twelve or twenty People. Every thing, that may give occaſion to the moſt perfect Eloquence, is now to be found in the Parliament of *England*. We ſee now and then ſome admirable Paſſages out of Speeches made in that Aſſembly.

THE Pulpits of our Churches ſeem to afford the moſt magnificent Theatre for Eloquence that ever was. But,

(*k*) Quid ergò miramur Cometas, tam rarum mundi ſpectaculum, nondum teneri legibus certis: nec initia illorum fineſque noteſcere, quorum ex ingentibus intervallis recurſus eſt? Nondum ſunt anni mille quingenti ex quo Græcia

---- *ſtellis numeros & nomina fecit.*

Multæque hodie ſunt gentes, quæ tantùm facie noverint cœlum, quæ nondum ſciant cur Luna deficiat, quare obumbretur. Hoc apud nos quoque nuper ratio ad certum perduxit. Veniet tempus, quo iſta quæ nunc latent, in lucem dies extrahat, & longioris ævi diligentia. *Sen. Natur. Quæſt. Lib.* VII. *cap.* 25.

how can a Clergyman preach well, when he is obliged to aſcend the Pulpit ſo often? Thoſe, who are not ſenſible of this Truth, don't know what a good Sermon is: They never heard a good Sermon, or if they have heard ſome, it may be ſaid they were not worthy to hear them, ſince they could not judge of their Excellency.

BESIDES, our Preachers explain, or endeavour to explain Theological matters; but the Thorns, with which thoſe matters are beſet, do not ſuit with Eloquence. A Preacher, in order to be an Eloquent Man, ought to underſtand very well what he ſays; but, it frequently happens that the matters treated of in the Pulpit, by the very Confeſſion of our Preachers, are unintelligible. I add, that Preachers are generally conſtrained by a certain Method, with which they muſt comply, to avoid the Cenſures of thoſe, who are not willing they ſhould have a greater Merit than themſelves. A Preacher muſt have a full Liberty, in order to make a Sermon, that may be worth Hearing. The Method of Preaching, ſuch as it is preſcribed by many Divines, is an Art, which teaches to explain unintelligible Things, and to compoſe without much Labour, and in a very ſhort time, a long and tedious Diſcourſe. But, to go farther ſtill: At the very time when Eloquence was in its Height, the Rhetoricians, who profeſſed to teach it, were moſt of them very great Sophiſts. Ever ſince the firſt Emperors, good Taſte decayed, and Eloquence became more and more falſe. The moſt Eloquent Fathers of the Church had no excellent Maſters. When we read them without Partiality, we find many poor Things under great Words, Queſtions wrongly ſtated, weak Arguments, Quibbles and Exaggerations. And yet they are recommended to us as Models: We are adviſed to conform to their Taſte, to quote them frequently, and write in their Style.

Maxims.

VII. IN order to know whether the Antients have been ſo happy as their Admirers will have it, or, whether the Moderns had a better Succeſs, we muſt enter upon an Examination, and do it impartially, for fear of being miſtaken in the Enquiry. We muſt examine an antient and common Opinion, in the ſame manner as if it was now propoſed the firſt time; and we muſt conſider a new Opinion, as we would have done in the firſt Age of the World, when every Thing was new.

WHAT is now True, ſhould always have been acknowledged to be ſo; and what was not True from the beginning, will never be True. A new Truth is a Truth: An old Er-

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ror is an Error. The Antients might, and have been ſometimes miſtaken: We are more clear-ſighted in ſome Things than they were: This is undeniable. Whoever has Eyes, ought to uſe them; and thoſe, who are miſtaken, ought not to be believed without Proof. Let us therefore examine Things in themſelves, without minding the words *Novelty* and *Antiquity*, which may hinder us from diſcovering Truth. After all, if we have ſo great a Veneration for the Antients, let us ſtudy their Works, and endeavour to imitate them. As they have invented, let us invent in our Turn (*l*). A rational Man ought to be no leſs fond of Knowledge, than a covetous Man of Riches. The latter, not contented with the Riches he has inherited, makes it his Buſineſs to encreaſe them every Day. Let us, in like manner, encreaſe the Stock which the Antients, and in general all our Predeceſſors have left us (*m*). Why ſhould we not apply to many Subjects, what the illuſtrious Marquis *de l'Hôpital* ſays concerning Geometry, in order to draw up a Parallel between the Effects of a blind Admiration, and the Effects of a noble Boldneſs (*n*)?

LET

(*l*) Aliquid & de tuo profer; omnes iſtos nunquàm auctores, ſemper interpretes, ſub aliena umbra latentes, nihil habere exiſtimo generoſi, nunquam auſos aliquando facere quod diu didicerant. *Sen. Ep.* XXXIII.

(*m*) Agamus bonum patremfamiliæ: faciamus ampliora, quæ accepimus; major iſta hereditas à me ad poſteros tranſeat. Multum adhuc reſtat operis, multumque reſtabit: nec ulli nato poſt mille ſæcula præcludetur occaſio aliquid adhuc adjiciendi. Sed etiamſi omnia à veteribus inventa ſunt: hoc ſemper novum erit, uſus, & inventorum ab aliis ſcientia & diſpoſitio. *Sen. Ep.* LXIV.

(*n*) "What we have of the Antients concerning thoſe Matters, "eſpecially of *Archimedes*, does certainly deſerve our Admiration. "But, beſides that they only touched upon very few Curbs, and even "ſlightly; we hardly find any Thing in them but particular Propoſitions, which diſcover no regular and continued Method. However, this can be no Reflection upon them. They muſt have had "a very great Genius to break through ſo great an Obſcurity, and "to enter into a Country altogether unknown before. If they did "not go far, at leaſt, whatever *Vieta* may ſay, they did not loſe "their Way; and the more difficult it was, the more are they to "be admired for not miſſing it. In a word, it does not appear that "the Antients could do more for the Time they lived in. They did "what our beſt Wits would have done in their room; and if they were "now in our room, one may very well believe they would have

LET us therefore examine each Propoſition and each Proof, without minding from whence it comes (*o*). If we are convinced of a Truth, after a ſtrict Examination, let us take hold of it: We may lay claim to it, whoever be the Author (*p*). Let us be afraid of being impoſed upon by Antiquity: Let us miſtruſt Novelty: Let us admit nothing merely becauſe the Antients believed it, nor reject any Thing, only becauſe they were ignorant of it: When we read a Book, we muſt lay aſide the Author's Name, and examine in themſelves the Matters treated of by him. Let us fancy the Title Page is loſt.

Uſeful or Uſeleſs Enquiries.

VIII. THE Knowledge of thoſe Things, to the ſtudy of which we apply our ſelves, is either Uſeful, or of no Uſe. It is highly neceſſary to make a very great Difference between thoſe two Relations.

OUR Lives are too ſhort to beſtow our Time upon uſeleſs Things, and our Faculties too much limited to exhauſt them by *Superfluities* (*q*). Perhaps there is nothing, that has ſo

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" the ſame Notions we have. This is a Conſequence of the natural " Equality of Mens Minds, and of the neceſſary Succeſſion of Diſ- " coveries.

" Wherefore, it is no ſurpriſing Thing that the Antients went no " farther; but one cannot ſufficiently wonder that great Men, that " the Moderns, ſhould have ſtop'd ſo long there, and that through a " ſuperſtitious Admiration of the Works of the Antients, they ſhould " have been contented to read and comment upon them, without al- " lowing themſelves any other Uſe of their Knowledge, but what " was neceſſary to follow them; without daring to be guilty of Think- " ing ſometimes without Book, and of making Diſcoveries of their " own. Such was the Method of many People: They did write: " Books were multiplied; and all the while nothing went forward. " All the Labour of many Ages has only filled the World with re- " ſpected Commentaries and Tranſlations of Originals, which were " often deſpicable.

" Such was the State of the Mathematicks, and eſpecially of Phi- " loſophy, till M. *Deſcartes* appeared. That great Man, animated by " the Superiority of his Genius, left the Antients, in order to follow " no other Guides, but that ſame Reaſon which the Antients fol- " lowed. That noble Boldneſs, which was called a Rebellion, has " occaſioned a great many new and uſeful Diſcoveries. Men began " then to open their Eyes, and to think."

(*o*) Æſtimandum quid dicatur, non à quo. *Sen.*

(*p*) Quod verum eſt, noſtrum eſt. *Sen. Ep.* XII.

(*q*) Quæ dementia eſt ſupervacua diſcere in tanta temporis egeſtate?

ſo much contributed to prepoſſeſs the polite World againſt Learning, than to ſee Men of Letters grow warm about Fooleries, and tell Trifles and impertinent Things with a grave Tone, as if there was ſome Senſe in every Thing a Man ſays, when he wears a long Beard, and a Diſcourſe changed its Nature by being made with a frowning Countenance (*r*).

Why Men are fond of thoſe Things, that are above their Capacity.

IX. THERE are many Degrees in the Uſefulneſs and Unprofitableneſs of our Knowledge. In the firſt place it is to no purpoſe to go about to learn what cannot be underſtood; for, to attempt an Impoſſibility is to loſe one's Time.

THOUGH this Maxim be very evident, yet there are many People, who boldly diſpute about the Nature of the Divine Perfections, the Trinity, God's Decrees, and Providence; a Raſhneſs the more intolerable, becauſe, by their own Confeſſion, thoſe Subjects are incomprehenſible, and becauſe by endeavouring to know them, one runs the Hazard of falling into Errors of a very dangerous Conſequence.

A MAN, who undertakes to meditate upon Things, that are above his Reach, may eaſily fancy he underſtands what he does not underſtand; and then he pitches upon ſome Words, whereby he pretends to expreſs Things of which he has no Idea. That Language grows familiar and dear to him; for 'tis an Effect of his moſt ſublime Meditations: And that ſacred Style is as much reſpected by him, as the Subject to which he applies it.

ANOTHER Man meditates likewiſe upon the ſame Subject, and falls into other Deluſions. But fancying, as well as the former, that he underſtands what he ſays, he alſo pitches upon ſome Words to expreſs his pretended Ideas, and grows fond of them. That Difference of Language kindles a War between thoſe two Zealots: They accuſe one another of Erring, even in Matters of the greateſt Importance. And yet they have the ſame Thoughts, but ſpeak differently. The Caſes of thoſe Men are alike: They have no Ideas: They don't underſtand what they ſay: They are in Ignorance, but not in an Error; or, if they are miſtaken, their Miſtake conſiſts in confounding Words with Things, and reſolving to maintain vain Sounds. Had ſome Queſtions,

(*r*) O pueriles ineptias! In hoc ſupercilia ſubduximus. In hoc barbam demiſimus. Hoc eſt quod triſtes docemus & pallidi.

ons, which made a very great Noiſe, been examined peaceably, they would have been brought to this Query, not whether it be lawful to Think, but whether it be lawful to Speak differently from other Men.

THE *Eaſtern* Churches grew warm (and from Diſputing they proceeded to Perſecution) about this Queſtion, all the Terms whereof are great: Whether there are two Natures and one Perſon in JESUS CHRIST: Whether there is but one Perſon and one Nature: or, Whether there are two Perſons and two Natures. If they had asked one another what they meant by the words *Perſon*, *Nature*, *Union*; ſome would have been ſilent, and perhaps ſenſible, that they fought about Words, of which they had no Ideas. Others would have apprehended that they did not think differently, though they uſed different Terms. And yet, the Emperor *Theodoſius* ordered that the *Neſtorians* ſhould be called *Simonians*, from *Simon Magus*. They might as well have been called *Slipperians* *; for, their Error had no more relation to *Simon Magus* than to a *Slipper* †.

* *In the French* Pantoufliens.

† *In the French* Pantouſle.

ST. *HILARY* uſed this Expreſſion, *Trina Deïtas*. *Hincmar* of *Reims* condemned it: Others vindicated it. They ſpoke differently; but their Thoughts were the ſame; or rather they had no Thoughts about a Subject, of which they had no Idea.

IT frequently happens that the leſs Men underſtand what they ſay, the more obſtinately they maintain it, becauſe it would be a ſhameful Thing for them to own that they grew warm about Words void of Senſe. Beſides, they fancy they underſtand ſomething in a Subject, that is incomprehenſible; and the more others complain that they have no Notion of that Subject, the more they think themſelves to be above them.

IF Doctors are ſo eaſily miſtaken, what can we expect from the People? Moſt Men are mere Parrots in many Things. Would to God they were not more Parrots about Religion, than about any Thing elſe! They piouſly ſubmit to Words conſecrated by their Leaders. And indeed, how can they believe that a venerable Man, whoſe Age and Dignity they reſpect, whoſe Learning and Uprightneſs they value, ſhould ſpeak without knowing what he ſays, and boldly determine what he does not underſtand? The leſs they underſtand him, the more learned they think him to be; the leſs they apprehend what he ſays, the more they

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are perſuaded he delivers fine Things (*s*). This has been the Cauſe of the moſt ſhameful Diviſions among Chriſtians in all Ages. 'Tis a Diſgrace upon human Nature. A profound Reſpect for Religion, and for God who is the Object of it, ſhould put an End to many Queſtions, which are above us, and the Ignorance whereof is not prejudicial to our Salvation. (*t*) (*u*)

X. WHEN a Man is thus peremptory about Things that are beyond our Reach, we ſhould imitate his Weakneſs, did we ſeriouſly diſpute with him; for how can one diſpute about a Subject, that is not underſtood? Where can we find Arguments to convince an obſtinate Antagoniſt? *A Method of diſputing about thoſe Matters.*

(*s*) Nam auditor, cum eum, quem adverſarii perturbatum putant oratione, videt animo firmiſſimo contradicere paratum; plerumque ſe potius temerè aſſenſiſſe, quàm illum ſine cauſſâ confidere arbitratur. *Cic. de Inv. Lib.* I.

(*t*) "Some hold that the World was made to give a Body, as a "Puniſhment, to each of thoſe Spirits, which fell by their own Fault "from the Purity, in which they had been created; the firſt Crea"tion having been only incorporeal; and that according as they de"parted more or leſs from their Spirituality, they were embodied "more or leſs dully. From thence proceeds the Variety of ſo much "created Matter. But the Spirit, which was inveſted with the "Body of the Sun for his Puniſhment, muſt have had a very un"common Alteration. All the Extremities of our Enquiry vaniſh "away. As *Plutarch* ſays of the Beginning of Hiſtories, that in "the ſame manner as in Maps, the Borders of known Lands are full "of Moraſſes, large Foreſts, Deſarts and uninhabitable Places. Hence "it is, that the groſſeſt and moſt childiſh Conceits are to be found "in thoſe, who handle the ſublimeſt Things, and dive farther into "them, ſinking themſelves in their Curioſity and Preſumption. The "End and Beginning of Knowledge are alike. See how *Plato* ſoars "up in his Poetical Clouds. See in his Works the Jargon of the "Gods." *Montagne, Book* II. *Chap.* 12.

(*u*) Veteres autem parciſſimè de rebus divinis philoſophabantur, neque quicquam audebant de his pronunciare, quod non eſſet apertè proditum his literis, quarum auctoritas nobis eſt ſacroſancta. Sed huc primum perpulit Joannem Evangeliſtam, Cerinthianorum & Ebionitarum impia temeritas, ut arcana quædam de Chriſti divinâ naturâ literis mandaret: poſt Arianorum curioſa ſubtilitas ad majorem neceſſitatem adegit orthodoxos, videlicet ut de protenſione naturæ divinæ, de ſupercreatione filii, de adoptione in nomen Dei, tum autem, περὶ τοῦ ὁμουσίου, καὶ τοῦ ὁμοιουσίου, magnis contentionibus diſſererent, ac denique definirent. Subinde neceſſitatem hanc deplorat ſanctiſſimus vir Hilarius, haud quaque ignarus quàm periculi plenum ſit, quàm parùm religioſum, de rebus ineffabilibus eloqui, incomprehenſibilia

Antagoniſt? How can we ſhew him that he is miſtaken, and that he aſcribes to the Subject in hand what does not belong to it, ſince that Subject is not ſufficiently known, and we are ignorant of what he aſcribes to it? IN

ſibilia ſcrutari, de longè ſemotis à captu noſtro pronunciare. Sed in hoc pelagus longius etiam provectus eſt divus Auguſtinus, videlicet felix hominis ingenium, quærendi voluptate, velut aura ſecundiore, aliunde aliò proliciente.

At ea quæ nos ſcrutamur, quæ definimus, interdum nec ſacris literis prodita ſunt, ut ſi comprehendi non poſſint, certè credi debeant: nec ullis rationibus idoneis probari, nec cogitatione concipi, nec ſimilibus adhibitis adumbrari, ut ſunt, poſſunt. In quibus veſtigandis, quum à feliciſſimis ingeniis ſummâ vi diu deſudatum fuerit, hic demum eſt extremus profectus, ut intelligant ſe nihil ſcire: & adeò ad vitæ pietatem nihil faciunt, ut nuſquam magis habeat locum illud Pauli, *Scientia inflat, charitas ædificat.* Quod ſupercilium, quas contentiones, quos tumultus, quæ mundi diſſidia videmus ex hujus generis inſcita ſcientia ſcatere. Quumque tam fugax ſit vita noſtra, interim ea negligimus, ſine quibus nulla ſpes eſt cuiquam aſſequendæ ſalutis. *Niſi condonâro fratri, quod in me peccavit, mihi non condonabit Deus, quod in ipſum admiſi. Niſi mundum cor habuero, non videbo Deum.* Hoc igitur totis ſtudiis agendum erat; hoc meditandum, hoc urgendum, ut livore, ut invidia, ut odio, ut ſuperbiâ, ut avaritiâ, ut libidine purgem animum. Non damnaberis ſi neſcias, utrùm ſpiritus à patre & filio proficiſcentis, unicum ſit principium, an duo: ſed non effugies exitium, niſi curaris interim habere fructus ſpiritûs, qui ſunt, charitas, gaudium, pax, patientia, benignitas, bonitas, longanimitas, manſuetudo, fides, modeſtia, continentia, caſtitas. Ad hæc igitur vertenda eſt, huc intendenda præcipua ſtudii noſtri cura. Summa noſtræ religionis pax eſt & unanimitas. Ea vix conſtare poterit, niſi de quàm poteſt pauciſſimis definiamus, & in multis liberum relinquamus ſuum cuique judicium: propterea, quod ingens ſit rerum plurimarum obſcuritas: & hoc morbi ferè innatum ſit hominum ingeniis, ut cedere neſciant, ſimul atque res in contentionem vocata eſt, quæ poſtquàm incaluit, hoc cuique videtur veriſſimum, quod temerè tuendum ſuſceperit. Atque hâc in re adeò modum neſciere quidam, ut poſteà quàm nihil non definierant de rebus divinis, novam etiam in his, qui nihil aliud ſunt quàm homines, θεότητα commenti ſint: quæ quidem plus quæſtionum, & atrociores tumultus excitavit orbi, quam olim Arianorum temeritas.

Olim fides erat in vitâ magis quâm in articulorum profeſſione. Mox neceſſitas admonuit, ut articuli præſcriberentur, ſed pauci & apoſtolicæ ſobrietatis. Deinde hæreticorum improbitas adegit ad exactiorem divinorum voluminum excuſſionem, pervicacia compulit, ut quædam ex auctoritate Synodorum definirentur. Tandem fidei ſymbolum in ſcriptis potius quàm in animis eſſe cœpit, ac penè tot erant fides, quot homines. Creverunt articuli, ſed decrevit ſinceritas; efferbuit contentio, refrixit charitas. Doctrina Chriſti, quæ priùs neſcie-

bat

IN order to avoid being impoſed upon by thoſe Men, and to bring them off from their Deluſions, they muſt be deſired to explain themſelves. If they refuſe to do it, they bear Witneſs againſt their own Darkneſs and Ignorance; and if they venture upon it, they will quickly be ſenſible that they cannot explain their Meaning. Urge them never ſo little, they

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bat λογομαχίαν, cœpit à philoſophiæ præſidiis pendere: hic erat primus gradus Eccleſiæ ad deteriora prolabentis. Accreverunt opes, & acceſſit vis. Porrò admixta huic negotio Cæſarum auctoritas, non multum promovit fidei ſinceritatem. Tandem res deducta eſt ad ſophiſticas contentiones, articulorum myriades proruperunt. Hinc deventum eſt ad terrores ac minas. Quumque vita nos deſtituat: quum fides ſit in ore magis quàm in animo: quum ſolida illa ſacrarum literarum cognitio nos deficiat, tamen terroribus huc adigimus homines, ut credant quod non credunt, ut ament quod non amant, & intelligant quod non intelligunt. Non poteſt eſſe ſincerum, quod coactum eſt: nec Chriſto gratum eſt niſi quod voluntarium. *Eraſmus, Præfatio in Hilarium.*

Here follows the Subſtance of thoſe Quotations.

" Men were formerly very cautious in ſpeaking of God, and of his " Nature and Attributes, being contented with what the Scripture " ſays of them in expreſs Words. A raſh Curioſity broke through " thoſe Bounds inſenſibly, and made Men forget how dangerous it " was, as well as contrary to the Spirit of Religion, to venture to " explain what is unſpeakable, and to ſearch what is incomprehen- " ſible. Though God has confined our Life within a very ſhort " Space, yet, inſtead of minding only what is neceſſary, we perplex " our ſelves with Subtilties, of which one may be ignorant without " any danger. Peace is the Perfection of Chriſtianity; but without " conſidering that a Multitude of Articles is not a very proper Means " to preſerve that Peace, many Queſtions have been debated; and in " order to determine them, Men have at laſt eſtabliſhed a human " Authority in the Church, and made a kind of a Deity of a Man. " The Wealth and Splendor of Eccleſiaſtical Dignities, the Haughti- " neſs of thoſe who were poſſeſſed of them, the Authority of the " Emperors too indulgent to the Clergy, Subtilties and Sophiſtry, " Threatnings and Puniſhments, have at length brought Men to pre- " tend to believe, or to fancy they believe, what they do not believe " at all, becauſe they have no Idea of it, and to profeſs to love what " they do not love, becauſe they do not underſtand it. Such is the " Faith of a great many Chriſtians, and even of thoſe, who ſhould " be moſt knowing. Nothing can be more oppoſite to the Light " of the Goſpel than the Darkneſs of Ignorance; nothing can be " more inconſiſtent with the Sincerity eſſential to a Chriſtian than " Force and Conſtraint. And yet thoſe, who blindly ſubmit to " the Yoke of Authority, are well beloved."

they will have recourſe to Incomprehenſibility, about which a *reſpectful Silence* is the only Way, that can be reaſonably taken.

ANOTHER Method may alſo be uſed to reclaim them from their Illuſions, or to convince them that thoſe Illuſions are paſt remedy. 'Tis but asking them now and then ſome Queſtions, as it were to inſtruct one ſelf, in order to give them Occaſion to heap up Nonſenſe upon Nonſenſe. By much talking without Ideas, they will not fail to contradict themſelves; and thoſe Contradictions will afford ſome Reaſons to enlighten their Minds, if they will reflect; or to give them over to their Infatuation, if they will not hear.

Every Thing, that ſeems to be above our Reach, is not abſolutely ſo.

XI. SOME Things are altogether above the Reach of Mens Minds; and ſome are above the Capacity of ſome Men, but not above the Capacity of others. How many People, for inſtance, who cannot diſtinguiſh the thinking Subſtance from the extended Subſtance? How many, who are not able to follow a Geometrical Demonſtration ſomewhat compounded? And how many indifferent Geometricians are ſtopp'd by *Algebraical* Calculations? The ſame may be obſerved in Practice, as well as in Speculation. Extraordinary Inſtances of Fortitude, Courage, and Diſintereſtedneſs, are looked upon as idle Stories by Men of a ſhallow Wit, who judge of others by themſelves, and fancy that nothing is poſſible but what they can do, or have been Witneſſes of (*x*). To avoid the Shame of owning themſelves to be inferiour to any Body, they endeavour to believe that no Body is really poſſeſſed of what is wanting to them (*y*).

A MAN continually taken up with the Thoughts of growing rich; a Man, whoſe Breaſt is full of ambitious Projects; who is not ſenſible of their Injuſtice; who commends, applauds, and congratulates others, only to deceive them, and make them ſubſervient to his Deſigns; who loves nothing but Intrigue, and delights in ſeeing others overthrown, that he may raiſe himſelf by their Fall; I ſay, Men of that Character

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(*x*) Non putant fieri quicquid facere non poſſunt; ex infirmitate ſua de virtute ferunt ſententiam. *Sen. Ep.* LXXI.

Aiunt nos loqui majora quam quæ humana natura ſuſtineat.

(*y*) Expedit nobis neminem videri bonum, quaſi aliena virtus exprobratio delictorum veſtrorum ſit. *Sen. de Vit. Beat.*

Ipſi quoque hoc facere poſſunt, ſed nolunt. *Ep.* CIV.

racter cannot apprehend that any Body else should act by other Motives and Principles. Notions of Virtue, Disinterestedness, and Generosity, appear to them mere Chimera's, which may be made use of to good Purpose, in order to impose upon weak People, who have a Respect for great Shadows. To commend and urge those Motives, is not a proper Means to get into the Confidence of those Men. The more your Discourse upon that Subject proceeds from your Heart, and appears to be free from any Dissimulation, the more they will believe you are a perfect Hypocrite. What can those Men give, that will make amends for the Loss of one's Time, and the Danger one runs by waiting upon them?

THERE are Men, whose Designs, and even Conjectures, do not reach beyond their Senses. All the Wonders of Nature, that are unknown to them, all the Discoveries and Reasonings, which cannot be made plain to their weak Understanding, are accounted by them mere Delusions. Many, after having contrived a very shallow System, will not believe the Mind of Man can go farther. Their Vanity does not allow them to value what they are not possessed of, and cannot expect to possess, because the Length and Difficulty of the Work hinders them from going about it. Contempt is a shorter Way than Study: their Laziness and Vanity find their Account in it. (z)

THE famous Chancellor *Bacon* says of those Men, if I am not mistaken, That they fancy themselves to be the Mirror of the World, and so exact and perfect a Mirror, that nothing can escape it. And therefore they will not reckon among things that exist, any thing of which they do not find an Image in themselves, that is, any Thing which they do not clearly apprehend. 'Tis the quite contrary. That Mirror is a false one. (a)

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(z) "What a Man does not know, he is willing to call a useless "Thing; 'tis a sort of Revenge. And because Mathematicks and "Natural Philosophy are not commonly understood, they are com-"monly accounted useless. The Cause of their Misfortune is very "obvious; they are hard, wild, and of a difficult Access." *Hist. of the Royal Academy of Sciences*, 1699. *Preface.*

(a) Estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inæqualis ad radios rerum; qui suam naturam naturæ rerum immiscet, eamque distorquet & inficit. *Nov. Org. Lib.* I. 59.

"We must not judge of what is possible or impossible, by what "appears to us credible or incredible, as I have said elsewhere. And "it

THE moſt ſhallow Men are moſt apt to look upon themſelves as Models of Perfection. The Inhabitants of the Iſles of the *Ladrones*, who are the moſt ignorant People in the World, deſpiſe the reſt of Mankind to the higheſt Degree. They could not bear to hear of a Paradiſe common to them with the Vulgar.

A SHALLOW Wit is quickly filled up: No new Thing can get into it. If a Style be clear, and conſequently different from the Jargon of a ſhallow Man, 'tis a ſufficient Reaſon for him to tax it with Obſcurity.

THE Ridiculouſneſs of all thoſe Prejudices, if it be well minded, will be a powerful Means to avoid them. But beſides, a Man ought to conſider that he will never underſtand thoſe Things, which he fancies cannot be attained to; for, he will not go forward, if he believes all his Steps will be uſeleſs. One may underſtand and believe what at firſt appears to be incredible, becauſe it is not underſtood: 'Tis but inſtructing one ſelf, by proceeding from Principles to Conſequences, and from what is Simple to what is Compounded. The Strength of the Mind will encreaſe with its Knowledge. But, as I have juſt now ſaid, a Man muſt inſtruct himſelf *methodically*: Every body does not do it: Men do not dwell long enough upon Principles: Their Impatience and Vanity raiſe them immediately to difficult Things: Their Curioſity hurries them to what is wonderful: They deſire to be admired by others, and believe the moſt ſublime Knowledge will anſwer that Deſign.

WHEN

" it is a great Fault, into which, however, moſt Men fall, not " to believe that others can do what we cannot or will not do. " Every Man fancies the Principal Form of human Nature is in " him, and that all other Men are to be regulated by it. If he be " told of any Action or Faculty of another Man, the firſt Thing he " conſults, is his own Example. The World muſt go, as Things " go with him. What a dangerous and intolerable Impertinence! " As for me, I look upon ſome Men to be much above me, eſpeci- " ally among the Antients. And though I am very ſenſible, I can- " not follow them at the diſtance of a thouſand Paces, yet I follow " them at Sight, and judge of the Springs whereby they are thus " exalted, of which I perceive ſome Seeds in my ſelf. I judge like- " wiſe of the great Shallowneſs of Mens Minds, which I neither " wonder at, nor disbelieve, *&c.*" *Montagne, Book* II. *Chap.* 32

Non me fugit vetera exempla pro fictis fabulis jam audiri atque haberi. Sen.

WHEN Men are acted by ſuch Principles, they quickly find themſelves in an unknown Country; and then, ſome have no Hopes of going forward, and fall into Scepticiſm: Others fancy they go on, and walking in Darkneſs, take Shadows to be Realities; and pompous Words are to them inſtead of noble Ideas. I have known ſome Men, who having uſed themſelves to prefer the *Wonderful* to Evidence, had ſo much ſpoiled their Taſte for any Thing that could be clearly demonſtrated, that they would hear and believe nothing, but what was incredible. Men love Amazement: Were they enlightened, their Admiration would ceaſe; and therefore they avoid the Light and Information.

WHEN a Man is uſed to neglect Evidence, he has no other Principle of his Opinions but a Fondneſs for Cuſtom or Singularity; and being thus equally diſpoſed to admit a great many Propoſitions, if he confines himſelf to ſome, 'tis out of Lazineſs, or by Chance.

The Uſefulneſs of our Knowledge.

XII MAN, being only ſuſceptible of Ideas, Senſations, and Motions, his Knowledge, which conſiſts in Ideas, ought to make him wiſer by regulating his Motions, or more happy by freeing him from painful or diſagreeable Senſations, and raiſing him above thoſe, which are too ſhort, in order to procure him more ſolid and laſting Sentiments. (*b*)

MORALS, which teach us to diſtinguiſh what is juſt from what is unjuſt, in perplexed Caſes, which diſcover to us the Excellency of Virtue, and the Heinouſneſs of Vice, and enable us to perform our Duty, carry the Proof of their Worth in their Definition; and if any one ſhould want many Arguments to be convinced of it, he is too much depraved to be reclaimed by reaſoning.

THE Knowledge of Man, which in it ſelf deſerves our Attention, is alſo the great *Foundation* of Logic and Morals. Their Force and Perfection are grounded upon that Principle. The better we know our ſelves, the more we ſhall be ſenſible of the Importance of Precepts laid down for the Conduct of our Lives. Beſides, the Obſervation of thoſe Precepts will by that Means grow more eaſy to us.

WITHOUT the Knowledge of God, our Creator, we are in a dark Abyſs; and all the Knowledge we can get about our Duty, will not make ſufficient Amends for ſo many En-

(*b*) Omnis auctoritas Philoſophiæ conſiſtit in beatâ vitâ comparandâ. *Cic. de Fin. Lib.* V.

deavours to know and perform it, and for ſo many Misfortunes, which attend even the moſt virtuous Life. But, if God commands Virtue, there is an infinite Difference between the Practice and the Neglect of it.

WE depend upon ſo many Things, and all the Parts of the Univerſe are ſo linked together, that the Knowledge of our ſelves will always be very imperfect, whilſt we are ignorant of the Nature and Powers of the Bodies, that ſurround us. This Conſideration would be ſufficient to recommend *Natural Philoſophy*. But, we ſhall be more convinced of its Uſefulneſs, if we conſider the great Helps it affords for the Preſervation of Health, the Cure of Diſeaſes, and the Allaying of Pain. Moreover, the Creator has been pleaſed to make himſelf known by his Works; and each Diſcovery in Nature makes us more and more ſenſible of his Power, and raiſes a greater Admiration for his Wiſdom and Goodneſs. I cannot believe that the ſupreme Intelligence, from which we have received our Being, and our Underſtanding, deſigned to confine us, like Brutes, to the Exerciſe of our Senſes. I cannot believe that God has confined us to the Out-ſide of Nature, and concealed from us the Inſide of his Works.

SOME idle People, who are without doubt ſome of the moſt uſeleſs in the Society, go up and down the World to raiſe in others an Admiration for a certain Skill, which is deſpiſed when known, and which the Vulgar pay for, to have the Pleaſure of being deluded by it. If any one ſhould be afraid that the Works of Nature would be leſs admired, if their Cauſes were known, ſuch a Fear would be injurious to the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the ſupreme Being, who governs the World. The Idea of the Greatneſs of God does not proceed from our Ignorance: He is more worthily glorified by an Admiration grounded upon Knowledge. And indeed the great Satisfaction we enjoy in being acquainted with his Works, and unfolding their admirable Structure, plainly ſhews that we were made, at leaſt in part, to draw our Happineſs from that Study. Beſides, that Knowledge enables us to deſpiſe the Allurements of the Senſes, and to raiſe our ſelves above thoſe Pleaſures, which ſo frequently induce Men to Sin: This Conſideration ought to convince us of the Obligation we lie under to improve ſuch a Help.

A MAN, charmed with thoſe ſpiritual Delights, will be far from indulging bodily Pleaſures. Being ſenſible of his ſolid Elevation, he looks upon thoſe, who give themſelves up

up to Riches and Honours, as Men who run after Shadows. He does not envy them, and will not leave his Way to croſs them in their Purſuit.

ALL thoſe Truths will convince us, that the Univerſe is the Temple of God, who created it; that Men are the Miniſters of that Temple; and that they are guilty of a ſhameful Neglect, if they do not apply themſelves to know its Parts, and admire its Beauties (*c*).

MONTAGNE * has a wrong Notion about this Matter. *The Knowledge of Cauſes* (ſays he) *concerns only that Being, which governs the World, and not Men, who have a full Uſe of Things, according to their Wants, without penetrating into their Origin and Eſſence. Wine is not more pleaſant to him, who knows its primitive Faculties. And the Soul and Body alter their Right to the Uſe of the World and of themſelves, by mixing Knowledge with it. We are concerned in the Effects, not in the Means. Determination and Diſtribution belong to Maſterſhip and Government, as Receiving belongs to Subjection and Dependence.* Perhaps *Montagne* would have ſpoken otherwiſe, if Natural Philoſophy had been in his Time ſuch as it is at preſent; but it was not then very proper to pleaſe a Man of Parts and of a good Taſte.

* Book III. Ch. 11.

'TIS therefore true, that the Study of Phyſicks is very uſeful and entertaining. It raiſes us to God: It affords Plea-

(*c*) Curioſum nobis natura ingenium dedit; & artis ſibi ac pulchritudinis ſuæ conſcia, ſpectatores nos tantis rerum ſpectaculis genuit, perditura fructum ſui, ſi tam magna, tam clara, tam ſubtiliter ducta, tam nitida, & non uno genere formoſa, ſolitudini oſtenderet. Ut ſcias illam ſpectari voluiſſe, non tantùm aſpici, vide quem nobis locum dederit. In media nos ſui parte conſtituit, & circumſpectum omnium nobis dedit: nec erexit tantummodò hominem, ſed etiam ad contemplationem factum, ut ab ortu ſidera in occaſum labentia proſequi poſſet, & vultum ſuum circumferre cum toto, ſublime fecit illi caput, & collo flexibili impoſuit. Deinde ſena per diem, ſena per noctem ſigna produxit, nullam nou partem ſui explicuit, ut per hæc quæ obtulerat ejus oculis, cupiditatem faceret etiam cæterorum. *Sen. de Otio Sap. cap.* 32.

Hæc qui contemplatur, quid Deo præſtat? ne tanta ejus opera ſine teſte ſint. Solemus dicere, ſummum bonum eſſe, ſecundum naturam vivere: natura nos ad utrumque genuit & contemplationi rerum, & actioni. *Id. ibid. cap.* 31.

Ineſt in eâdem explicatione naturæ inſatiabilis quædam è cognoſcendis rebus voluptas: in quâ una, confectis rebus neceſſariis, vacui negotiis, honeſtè ac liberaliter poſſumus vivere. *Cic. de Fin. Lib.* IV.

ſures, whereby we grow leſs fond of thoſe Things, which corrupt moſt Men, and hurry them into Vice. The ſame Study enables us not only to perform our Duties more eaſily, but alſo to diſcover them; and it may be ſaid to open the true *Sources of Morality*. Can a Man, who does not know himſelf, nor the Relations he has to the Objects, with which he is ſurrounded; can ſuch a Man know how he ought to live, that his Life may be ſuitable to his Nature and Deſtination (*d*)?

A MAN, who is skilled in Opticks, and underſtands the Structure of the Ear, and the Theory of Sounds, is lively affected with the Wiſdom of the Creator, who has combined an infinite Number of Motions, to make us hear agreeable Sounds and Symphonies, and to adorn Objects by offering them to our Sight, terminated by different Figures, and painted with an infinite Variety of Colours. A Man endowed with ſuch a Knowledge, and full of a juſt Admiration, will not fall into the ridiculous and ſuperſtitious Opinions of ignorant People, who fancy they honour and pleaſe their Maker by refuſing to enjoy the Gifts of his infinite Wiſdom and Goodneſs (*e*); for, nothing leſs than infinite Knowledge could have united ſo many Things, which muſt concur together to pleaſe our Eyes and our Ears.

THE Knowledge of Natural Philoſophy is a ſure Preſervative againſt Superſtition. How great was the panick Terror of whole Nations, in former Times, at the Sight of an Eclipſe and a Comet! If Men had been as well skilled in Phyſicks

(*d*) Phyſicæ quoque non ſine cauſſa tributus idem eſt honos; propterea quòd qui convenienter naturæ victurus ſit, ei & proficiſcendum eſt ab omni mundo, & ab ejus procuratione. Nec verò poteſt quiſquam de bonis, & malis verè judicare, niſi omni cognita ratione naturæ & vitæ, etiam Deorum, & utrum conveniat, necne, natura hominis cum univerſa: quæque ſunt vetera præcepta ſapientium, qui jubent tempori parere, & ſequi Deum, & ſe noſcere, & nihil nimis: hæc ſine phyſicis quam vim habeant (& habent maximam) videre nemo poteſt. Atque etiam ad juſtitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias, & reliquas caritates quid natura valeat, hæc una cognitio poteſt tradere. Nec verò pietas adverſus Deos, nec quanta his gratia debeatur, ſinè explicatione Naturæ intelligi poteſt. *Cic. de Fin. Lib.* III.

(*e*) Uno autem modo in virtute ſola ſummum bonum rectè poneretur, ſi quod eſſet animal, quod totum ex mente conſtaret, id ipſum tamen ſic, ut ea mens nihil haberet in ſe, quod eſſet ſecundum naturam: ut valetudo eſt. Sed id ne cogitari quidem poteſt quale ſit, ut non repugnet ipſum ſibi. *Cic. de Fin. Lib.* IV.

Phyſicks two hundred Years ago, as they are now, the wiſe *Melanchthon* would never have been fond of judicial Aſtrology.

MATHEMATICKS are the Key of true Phyſicks, and of great Uſe to human Life. How many Helps have they not afforded to the Sight and Hearing? We are indebted for Engines, Architecture, and Chronology, to thoſe who have cultivated that Science.

WITH the Help of Hiſtory we travel, without going out of our Cloſets, not only into the remoteſt Countries, but even into former Ages; ſo that it enables us to learn preſent and paſt Tranſactions for our Improvement. Experience makes us prudent; Converſation makes us wary; Hiſtory ſupplies the room of both. The Wiles and Devices it mentions, teach us to ſtand upon our Guard; the Examples of Virtue and Merit are Models for our Imitation; the Examples of Vice deter us from it. Laſtly, as Experiments are the Ground of Natural Philoſophy, in like manner Hiſtory is the Foundation of Morals and Politicks. It affords ſeveral Phænomena, which unfold the Heart of Man, and let us into it.

THE Knowledge of Languages is neceſſary to underſtand Hiſtory, and all ſorts of Books. We learn Languages to read Authors; we read for our Inſtruction; and we inſtruct our ſelves to reap ſome Benefit from our Knowledge. Hiſtory is uſeful when it teaches us to know our ſelves and regulate our Lives. Phyſicks are uſeful, not only when we make that Science an innocent Amuſement, but eſpecially when it raiſes us to the ſupreme Author of the Wonders of Nature, and affords ſome Helps, as well as Mathematicks, to ſupply our Wants, and encreaſe the Sweets of Life. Speculation tends therefore to Practice; and Practice ought to tend to the Glory of God.

THOSE, who have ſuch an Aim in the Courſe of their Studies, and in order to attain to it, follow ſuch a Method, will make no uſeleſs Steps. But, Men have ſtrangely wandered from that great Aim, and the Way that leads to it. They have, out of Conceitedneſs or Vanity, and frequently by thoſe two Principles, clogged Arts and Sciences with painful and wretched Fooleries.

Fooleries introduced into the Sciences.

XIII. I SHOULD fright my Reader, ſhould I give him a Liſt of the barbarous Terms, invented by Logicians to expreſs the Phantoms and Chimeras, with which they have filled Logic, inſtead of thoſe Rules which they promiſed to lay down; their *Categories*, their *Univerſalia*, their *Barbara*, th:

their *Baroco*, their *Categorems*, and *Syncategorems*, &c. Books ſtuffed with ſuch Fooleries, are read, and Profeſſors paid to infatuate with them the Youth committed to their Care. Moraliſts, making an ill Uſe of the Subtilty of their Wit, have invented ridiculous and extravagant Caſes, which will never happen, to have the Pleaſure and vain Satisfaction of debating extraordinary, perplexed, and ſcandalous Queſtions. By their nice Enquiries into Motives, and by pretending to refine Virtue, what Nonſenſe have they not publiſhed about Self-love? They have filled their Books with Chimeras; they have undertaken to ſeparate what is inſeparable; they have beſet the Way with Thorns, and given free Scope to Viſionaries.

MORALISTS, and Logicians more ſtill, being over fond of uſeleſs Things, have ſo much neglected what is neceſſary, that they ſeem to have loſt the Taſte of it. Their Patience, great Endeavours, and Subtilties, ſhew they might have made themſelves uſeful. 'Tis pity they ſhould have exhauſted their Wit about inſignificant Things (*f*).

SOME

(*f*) Inveniſſent forſitan neceſſaria, niſi & ſuperflua quæſiſſent. Multum illis temporibus verborum cavillatio eripuit, & captioſæ diſputationes, quæ acumen irritum exercent. Nectimus nodos, & ambiguam ſignificationem verbis illigamus, deinde diſſolvimus. ---Quid mihi vocum ſimilitudines diſtinguis, quibus nemo unquam niſi dum diſputat, captus eſt? res fallunt; illas diſcerne. Pro bonis mala amplectimur.--

Venit ad me pro amico blandus inimicus: vitia nobis ſub virtutum nomine obrepunt: temeritas ſub titulo fortitudinis latet: moderatio vocatur ignavia: pro cauto timidus accipitur. In his magno periculo erratur: his certas notas imprime. Cæterum qui interrogatur, an cornua habeat, non eſt tam ſtultus, ut frontem ſuam tentet: nec rurſùs tam ineptus aut hebes, ut non habere ſe neſciat, quod tu illi ſubtiliſſimâ collectione perſuaſeris. ---Quid ergò? non eo potiùs curam transferes, ut oſtendas omnibus, magno temporis impendio quæri ſupervacua: & multos tranſiſſe vitam, dum vitæ inſtrumenta conquirunt? *Sen. Ep.* XLV.

"Do you think that Phlegmatick, Eye-blear'd, Dirty Man, whom "you ſee come out of his Study after Midnight, looks out among "his Books, how he can make himſelf a better Man, more con- "tented and wiſer? Not in the leaſt. He will die in his Study, or "teach Poſterity the Meaſure of *Plautus*'s Verſes, and the true Or- "thography of a *Latin* Word. Who would not willingly prefer "Health, Quietneſs, and Life, to Reputation and Glory, the moſt uſe- "leſs, vain and falſe Coin, that is current amongſt us?" *Montague Book* I. *Chap.* 38.

SOME Books concerning *Paſſions*, and the *Knowledge* of Men, written by celebrated Authors, were formerly read with great Applauſe; and yet no Benefit could be reaped from them, becauſe they were only full of vain Antitheſes, pompous Quibbles, and childiſh Declamations of Rhetoricians, who teach their Scholars to ſpeak their Jargon.

IT is well known, that inſtead of the Knowledge of Nature, what went formerly by the Name of *Phyſicks*, contained nothing but *Trifles*, *metaphyſical* Cavils, and a Mixture of undeterminate Notions, falſe Ideas, and ſenſible Qualities, diſguiſed under Names partly pompous, and partly barbarous, which were only proper to ſtun ignorant People, and ſwell with Vanity fooliſh Men, who fell into that Snare.

AND ſince Experience has been conſulted, and Philoſophers have undertaken to verify all Reaſonings by Matters of Fact, it had been better to proceed therein more orderly, to be more willing to convince one's ſelf by ſimple Experiments, than to ſatisfy one's Curioſity by Experiments more compounded and more ſurpriſing, and always to prefer uſeful Things to thoſe that are *wonderful*.

BESIDES, under Pretence that we grope in the Diſcovery of Nature, Men have allowed themſelves the Liberty to make all ſorts of Conjectures, and vented all their Imaginations, when they could be adapted to ſome Experiments. They did not mind whether a Conjecture was probable, and have not ſcrupled to advance Principles, which they did not underſtand, provided they could draw probable Conſequences from them.

THUS a Man may be an Author at a cheap Rate: He amuſes himſelf agreeably, and continues in Scepticiſm, with which he is pleaſed, becauſe it juſtifies his Repugnancy to make ſtrict and repeated Enquiries, and favours in all Reſpects the Corruption of the Heart.

I SHALL go on with my Account of the vain Labour, which attends Sciences, and of the uſeleſs Things they have been clogged with. A Man does plainly forget the Deſign of Hiſtory, who makes it his main Buſineſs to mend ſome Letters, to correct ſome Dates, and to publiſh, by much conjecturing, ſome Names, about which however he has nothing to ſay, that is worth reading (*g*).

(*g*) Non ſunt otioſi, quorum voluptates multum negotii habent. Nam de illis nemo dubitavit, quin operoſe nihil agant, qui in literarum inutilium ſtudiis detinentur: quæ jam apud Romanos quoque magna

LET *my Guide remember the Deſign of his Imployment,* (ſays *Montagne*, ſpeaking of an Author;) *let him rather fix the Characters of* Hannibal *and* Scipio *in the Mind of his Pupil, than the Date of the Deſtruction of* Carthage (*b*).

THE Study of Medals is now highly valued, and there is more Glory to be got by it, than by any other Study. I don't pretend to find fault with the Encomiums beſtow'd upon it, and will not diſpute with any body about that Subject. I ſhall only obſerve, that the Difficulty of that Study does perhaps ſet off the Value of it, in the Opinion of many People: I mean a Difficulty altogether external. Medals are dear, and few Learned Men are able to enrich their Libraries with them. When Princes make them an Ornament of their Palaces, a private Man gives himſelf an Air of Grandeur by an indifferent Cabinet of Medals. Beſides, Princes want Learned Men to collect and put thoſe Medals in order, and to explain them; ſo that this Knowledge is a Sign, the Antiquary has an Acceſs to great Men, and may ſet up for a Learned Perſon of no ſmall Diſtinction. Part of the Worth of Medals ariſes from their Scarcity; for ſome of the moſt uſeleſs, but hardly to be found, are more valued, and bear a greater Price, becauſe their Number is very ſmall. I muſt add, that if thoſe, whoſe Buſineſs it was formerly to get Medals ſtamp'd, had the ſame Taſte as thoſe, who are now entruſted with that Care, Medals are no leſs deceitful than Hiſtory. Some have been ſtamp'd in our Days, which will afford Matter of diſpute to future Ages; nor can the Antients be altogether depended upon in this Matter.

SOME Points of Hiſtory, and even of Chronology, have been controverted long ago; and that Diſpute cannot be determinated

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magna manus eſt. Græcorum iſte morbus fuit, quærere quem numerum remigum Uliſſes habuiſſet: prior ſcripta eſſet Ilias, an Odyſſea: præterea an ejuſdem eſſet auctoris. Alia deinceps hujus notæ: quæ ſive contineas, nihil tacitam conſcientiam juvant; ſive proferas, non doctior videberis, ſed moleſtior. Ecce Romanos quoque invaſit inane ſtudium ſupervacua diſcendi. His diebus audivi quemdam ſapientem referentem, quæ primus quiſque ex Romanis ducibus feciſſet. Primus navali prælio Duillius vicit, primus Curius Dentatus in triumpho duxit elephantos. Etiamnum iſta, & ſi ad veram gloriam non tendunt, circa civilium tamen operum exempla verſantur. —— Hoc quoque quærentibus remittamus, quis Romanis primus perſuaſit navem conſcendere? *Sen. de Brev. Vit. Cap.* 13.

(*b*) Tranſmutemus ſolertiſſimas nugas, & ad illa, quæ aliquam operam ſunt nobis latura, properemus.

termined by Medals. *Martin* V. is repreſented in ſome Medals opening the Holy Door; and yet that Ceremony began only under the Pontificate of *Alexander* VI. How can we be ſure that no antient Medals have been engraved after the Event? *Gallienus* is always *fortunate* in his Medals, and always worſted in Hiſtory.

IN a Medal ſtamp'd by Order of the Senate, *Commodus* is called *Father of the People.*

CARACALLA and *Elagabalus* are called *Optimus Maximus. Commodus* is ſtyled *Germanicus & Pius. Verus* is call'd *Armeniacus*, though the *Armenians* were only beat by his Generals.

IT is well known, that *Maximinus* had a very mean and cruel Soul in a huge Body, ſo far as to ſay, that he wiſh'd he might ſwallow the whole Empire; and yet, upon the Reverſe of ſome of his Medals we ſee *Minerva* holding a Branch of an Olive-Tree, as if that Prince had only delighted in making Peace and Plenty flouriſh.

SOME Learned Men have given themſelves the Trouble to penetrate into the remoteſt Ages, with ſo much Courage and Patience, that they have made us almoſt as well acquainted with the Antients, as if we had ſeen them. They have not only informed us of their Manners, Cuſtoms, and Faſhions in general, but alſo deſcribed their Cloaths, and all their Ornaments, their Collars, Rings, and Claſps, their Locks, and the Hinges, and Bolts of their Doors. If thoſe Learned Men were able to ſucceed in better Things, we are very much indebted to them for teaching us, in a few Days, what they could not learn but in many Years; and if they had not a Genius for other Subjects, if they were not qualified for Reaſoning, we are ſtill more obliged to them for laying aſide Matters, which they would have perplexed more than they were before. So that, in whatever Capacity they be conſider'd, we ought to thank them. It were only to be wiſh'd, out of Gratitude and Concern for them, that they would be contented to deliver, as Trifles, Things that are only Trifles; by which Means they would give no Occaſion to ſuſpect, that Self-Love makes their Labours appear to them more valuable than they really are.

IT would be very wrong to call the *Hebrew Antiquities* trifling Things; they are certainly of great Uſe, ſince they enable us to clear ſeveral Paſſages in the Holy Scripture. But thoſe, who will only read in the Original Authors, though never ſo obſcure and confuſed, what Learned and Laborious Men have already extracted out of them, do certainly

value

value themſelves for loſing their Time. Experience teaches us, that a Man grows by degrees like thoſe, with whom he converſes, and that he aſſumes the Character of thoſe Authors whom he ſtudies with great Application. Can we therefore expect any Thing judicious and well expreſſed from a Man, who reads chiefly the *Rabbins*, a ſort of Writers without Clearneſs, without Elegance, and beſides full of idle and impertinent Things? I deſire no other Proof of the Narrowneſs of Mind contracted by that Reading, than the Quotations with which ſome Learned Men of that kind adorn their Diſcourſes, their Letters, and other Compoſitions. *A Rabbin ſaid very ingeniouſly; a Rabbin ſaid very wiſely*; but what did he ſay? One of the moſt trivial Proverbs, or a Truth as well known, as Two and Two make Four. This would be tolerable, if an elegant Turn ſhould make a common Thought look like a ſingular Maxim; but generally nothing can be more vulgar and inſipid. An Admiration for what is mean and groſs, makes one loſe the Taſte of what is nice and ſublime; he is no longer ſenſible of it.

SOME Things are ſo uſeleſs, that they would be of no worth, if their Diſcovery did not require a great deal of Time. But does not a Time, ſo ill ſpent, make the Works of an Author and himſelf equally contemptible (*i*)? An Emendation of an obſcure Paſſage, which would have been read a hundred Times without any Attention and Benefit, if it had never been corrupted, puffs up a Learned Man more than a fine Explication of one of the nobleſt Phænomena of Nature, or the clearing of an important Point of Morality. Men are moſt fond of thoſe Things, which are of no other Value but what they ſet upon them.

THE

(*i*) Quid dicitis difficile? utrum laborioſum, an artificioſum? ſi laborioſum, non ſtatim præclarum; ſunt enim multa laborioſa, quæ ſi faciatis, non continuò gloriemini: niſi forte etiam, ſi veſtrâ manu fabulas, aut orationes totas tranſcripſiſſetis, glorioſum putaretis: ſin autem iſtud artificium egregium dicitis, videte, ne inſueti rerum majorum videamini, ſi vos parva res, ſicuti magna, delectat. *Cic. ad Heren. Lib.* IV.

Omnium autem ineptiarum, quæ ſunt innumerabiles, haud ſcio an ulla ſit major quàm illorum, qui ſolent quocunque in loco, quoſcunque inter homines viſum eſt, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non neceſſariis argutiſſimè diſputare. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* II.

THE Knowledge of *Languages* is only *valuable*, as it ſerves to improve one's Mind by reading. But do thoſe Men, who ſpend their Lives in learning many Languages, make ſuch a Uſe of them? The fooliſh Vanity and proud Meanneſs of that Sort of Men of Letters are like thoſe of a covetous Man, who continually heaping up what is of no Value, but by its Uſe, yet never uſes it: Death overtakes him, before he has any Thoughts of enjoying his Labour.

LET no Body ſay that I wrong them, ſince by learning Languages they read the Authors; for there is ſome Difference between reading and inſtructing one's ſelf. To fill one's Head with Opinions without any Choice and Examination: I don't call it *to improve*. To clog one's Memory with a monſtrous Heap of what Men have dreamed or ſeen, is to confound Dreams and Realities together. Such is the Caſe of moſt of thoſe unmerciful Readers: They are too haſty in heaping up to give themſelves the Time of weighing and chuſing.

TO be ſenſible of the Delicacies of an Author; to take his Character; to obſerve the Clearneſs, Strength, and Turns of every Language, in order to convey them into one's own; to uſe one ſelf to think and expreſs one's Thoughts with greater Juſtneſs and Beauty; this I call to improve by Reading. But, on the contrary, there are many Men, who after their long Labours, have only the pitiful Advantage of knowing how to repeat a poor Thing in many more Words (*k*), and always ill; for they underſtand many Languages, but can ſpeak none. And their Eloquence, if they can make any Shew of it, conſiſts only in borrowing the Thoughts of other Men, patching them up together, and ſometimes venturing their own Notions, diſguiſed under foreign Expreſſions. Some, in order to excite the Diligence of their Scholars, borrow from ſome Author the Words made uſe of by a General to animate the Courage of his Soldiers. Some, (which is a very antient (*l*) Fault) affect to

(*k*) Tandiu enim iſtis immorandum eſt, quandiu nihil animus agere majus poteſt; rudimenta ſunt noſtra, non opera. - - - Unum ſtudium verè liberale eſt, quod liberum facit, hoc ſapientiæ, ſublime, forte, magnanimum: cætera puſilla & puerilia ſunt. An tu quidquam in iſtis eſſe credis boni quorum profeſſores turpiſſimos omnium ac flagitioſiſſimos cernis? *Sen. Ep.* LXXXVIII.

(*l*) Eſt autem vitium quod nonnulli de induſtria conſectantur: Ruſtica vox & agreſtis quoſdam delectat, quo magis antiquitatem, ſi ita ſonet,

to ſpeak ill, at leaſt, if a Man may be ſaid to ſpeak ill, when he ſpeaks obſcurely. They would be very ſorry to be eaſily underſtood: If you ſay, you can hardly underſtand them, they take it as a Commendation. Lofty Phraſes, though ill placed, great Words, though very obſcure, pleaſe them wonderfully, and hinder them from being ſenſible of the Barrenneſs of their Genius, grown heavy by continual Efforts. To mind only the Outſide of Things, is to confound the Means with the End.

ONE may very well wonder, that Men of ſuch an ill Turn of Mind, ſhould ſometimes hold the firſt Place in the Commonwealth of Learning, to which they are rather a Diſgrace than an Ornament; for would any Man of Senſe be a Scholar, if he was afraid of being like them?

I THINK I have found out the Reaſon of the undeſerved Eſteem they are in. Moſt Men reaſon little; and much leſs do they examine the Reaſonings of other Men. Such an Examination appears to them too painful; and they are frequently incapable of it. When a Man expreſſes himſelf with great *Clearneſs*, in order to be eaſily Underſtood, they fancy they could do the ſame without much Labour. They judge of the *Facility* of inventing and placing the Things they are taught, by their eaſily underſtanding them; and they do not *much value* what ſeems to them to be ſo eaſy. Beſides, thoſe who reaſon little, believe they can reaſon well, whenever they pleaſe; but every body is convinced that he is ignorant of a Language, which he does not underſtand, and he knows he is inferior to him, who ſpeaks it eaſily. Every body is ſenſible that a Language cannot be learned without Pains; and moſt People judge of the Worth of a Thing by the Difficulty it is attended with. Labour, when obvious, is a Proof of Learning adapted to the Ignorance of Men. I add, that a great many People hardly learned any thing but Words in their Youth: They have no Notion of any other Science: They fancy a Man of Letters is only a Pilferer of Books; and he, who reads moſt, has, in their Opinion, the Key of more Treaſures.

LASTLY,

ſonet, eorum ſermo retinere videatur, ut tuus, Catule, ſodalis L. Cotta gaudere mihi videtur gravitate linguæ ſonoque vocis agreſti; & illud, quod loquitur, priſcum viſum iri putat, ſi plane fuerit ruſticanum. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* III.

Some Men affect to be clowniſh and unpolite, in order to be commended for having ſtill the Taſte of the Antients, that is, of their Fathers or Grandfathers.

LASTLY, the *Pedants* uſe their utmoſt Endeavours to keep Men under thoſe Deluſions: They do it very ſincerely, being themſelves deluded in the ſame Manner: And there are very underſtanding Men, who, inſtead of judging by their own Eyes, being taken up with other Buſineſs, rely altogether upon the Judgment of the Pedants.

THE *Latin Tongue* has been the common Language for a long Time, becauſe it was the Language of the Empire, having ſpread it ſelf from *Rome* and *Italy* into all the Provinces. It was alſo for the ſame Reaſon the Language of the Church. Prayers and Sermons were made in *Latin*. And when the *Latin* Tongue became a dead Language, and the Invaſion of the Barbarians had altered the Face of the Empire, that Language continued ſtill to be the Language of the Church and Courts of Judicature. Prayers were in *Latin*: No Alteration was made in them, becauſe the Neceſſity of ſuch a Change came only by Degrees. The Laws were in *Latin*: They were not tranſlated: The publick Inſtruments continued to be written in the ſame Language; and in the barbarous Ages to ſpeak and write *Latin* was an uncommon Ability.

WHEN the Taſte for Learning was revived, and Men reſolved to get out of that profound Ignorance, which had prevailed for ſome Ages, there were only two Ways of doing it; either by inventing every Thing anew, or improving one ſelf by the Knowledge of the Antients, and finding out what had been written in the learned Ages. This laſt Method was pitched upon: The Libraries were ſearched, and Manuſcripts collected: Men not contented with the *Latin*, ſtudied alſo *Greek*; and becauſe the Study of Languages was then extremely difficult, for want of Helps, none but Men of a great Genius, and animated by an eager Deſire of Knowledge, were able to ſucceed in it. At that time, to underſtand Languages was no equivocal Sign of Merit and Ability: Nothing but a predominant Inclination for the Knowledge of Things could have ſupported a Man in a Labour, wherein thoſe of an indifferent Genius never failed to miſcarry.

IN Proceſs of Time, the Study of Languages became one of the moſt eaſy Studies: It hardly requires an indifferent Genius. With a ſtrong Body, a tolerable Memory, and ſome Labour, a Man will always ſucceed in it. Nevertheleſs thoſe, who underſtand Languages, have been eſteemed ever ſince; and a great many People in our Age value as much that Knowledge, as when it was abſolutely neceſſary,

and

and always attended with the Knowledge of Things. However, 'tis certain, if we conſult Experience, that Study may be accounted a *dangerous* one. The words, with which many People fill their Heads, occaſion, as it were, a Flood, which drowns Modeſty, Politeneſs, good Taſte, and even frequently common Senſe.

ONE muſt have ſome Courage, and a ſort of Raſhneſs, to attack the Learned Men of that Claſs; for they will by no means bear it. And indeed ſuch a painful and barren Study muſt needs ſower their Mind. Can any Thing but Vanity ſupport them in a Labour ſo diſagreeable, and ſo little becoming a Man? To deprive them of thoſe Praiſes, they are ſo fond of, is to take from them a Prize, for which they frequently ſacrifice their Duty, their Parts, their Health, and their Lives.

THERE are ſome Things, which may be accounted uſeful, even before one ſtudies them; but, there are others, of the Uſefulneſs whereof one cannot judge, unleſs they be known. Before a Man learns any Rule of Arithmetick, and even before he knows how to write any Arithmetical Figure, he apprehends that a compendious Method, with the Help of which one may eaſily caſt up great Sums, muſt needs be of great Uſe. He apprehends alſo that an Art, which teaches how to Meaſure great Diſtances, and to know the Extent of Surfaces, though never ſo irregular, is worthy of his Application. But how can one give an Idea of the Uſefulneſs of Algebra, anſwerable to the Attention and Time it requires, to thoſe, who do not underſtand it at all? Moſt Beginners are amazed, and almoſt frighted at a new Language, of which they cannot foreſee any Benefit. They know not whether they are taught a Science of ſome Uſe, or only exerciſed with an Amuſement, upon which Vanity ſets ſome Value, becauſe few People are able to ſucceed in it.

MEN being ignorant of a great many Things, the Knowledge whereof would be beneficial to them, one cannot but commend the Niceneſs of thoſe, who ſcruple to beſtow ſome Part of their Time upon inſignificant Things. But, we cannot charge thoſe with loſing a precious Time, who ſpend it in Enquiries, the Uſe whereof is unknown to them; and it would be too great a Preſumption to draw this Inference: I don't ſee the Uſe of a certain Theory: Therefore it is of no Uſe at all.

BUT, when a Man has acquired a certain Knowledge, without apprehending what Uſe it may be of, and when the

farther

farther he carries it, the leſs he perceives the Uſe of it, may he go on with it? This Objection was made to me againſt thoſe Things, which Mathematicians look upon as the moſt ſubtil Part of their Science. In order to prove that ſubtil Speculations ought not to be given over, under pretence that their Uſe is not immediately perceived, the Cycloid has been alledged, which at firſt was only a Subject to exerciſe the Attention and Sagacity of the Mathematicians of the firſt Rank; but at laſt Mr. *Huygens* made uſe of it for the Improvement of Clocks. After ſuch an Application of a Theory, which had been minded for a long Time only to have the Pleaſure of inventing, trying one's Strength, and perhaps diſplaying it before others, Mathematicians thought they might very well indulge themſelves in the moſt refined Theories. Though a Speculation was never ſo unlikely to be of any uſe, yet they hoped that in Proceſs of Time Mankind would reap a wonderful Benefit from it. Many Curbs were invented, without conſidering that if ſome Property of Uſe ſhould be found in their Nature, ſuch a Diſcovery would prove uſeleſs, becauſe it would be impoſſible to deſcribe them exactly, by reaſon of their exceſſive Compoſition.

MATHEMATICIANS being well pleaſed, that a Curb, which they had ſtudied ſo long, only to have the Pleaſure of knowing it, ſhould prove very uſeful for Clocks, and then for Navigation, concluded immediately that there would be an extreme Difference between Clocks wherein it ſhould be uſed, and thoſe wherein it ſhould be neglected. Some Time was requiſite to be undeceived, and to make bold to conſult Experience upon that Subject. At laſt, it appeared that Pendulum-Clocks might be as exact and regular without the Cycloid, as with the Cycloid. It was no difficult Thing to apprehend the Reaſon of it; and the above-mentioned Anſwer can no longer be made to thoſe, who exclaim againſt the Uſeleſſneſs of painful Theories.

PERHAPS they might be anſwered, That Men were born not only for an active Life, but alſo for Contemplation. If Mankind had liv'd in a State of Innocence, the Pleaſure of proceeding from Knowledge to Knowledge would have taken up the greateſt part of their Time. Suppoſe the Cycloid does not afford the Benefit, which Mr. *Huygens* expected from that Curb; yet it offers ſome Theories, that deſerve our Attention, about certain Properties of Motion. There are many Men, who believe their noble Birth, or great Riches, are ſufficient Reaſons for them not to trouble themſelves with any Thing. They live for themſelves; they live to

paſs

pass away the Time pleasantly. They make Use of the Labours of other People, without doing any Thing that can be beneficial to others. It is a Privilege about which no body makes them uneasy: They are allowed to indulge themselves in a soft Life. Why should the same Privilege be denied to an extraordinary Genius? Are Birth and Riches the only Things that can allow a Man to chuse a Course of Life, and to taste certain Pleasures, without crossing the Pleasures of other Men?

THOSE Mathematicians, who indulge their Speculations, might return to those, who blame them for it, the same Answer that *Cicero* returned to those, who found fault with his great Application to Philosophy. *Excellent Things ought to be known, in order to apprehend how difficult it would be to bestow only a small Part of one's Time upon them.*

CICERO affords me again another Thought, which may serve to justify the great Application of some Mathematicians to their Science, an Application, which appears excessive to many People. That Great Man had bestowed the greatest Part of his Time upon his Country, whilst he could be of some Use to his Fellow-Citizens; But, as soon as Violence succeeded Reason, and *Rome* was only governed by the Fancies of an unjust Master, instead of indulging his Grief to no purpose, or spending the remaining Part of his Life in an Idleness unworthy of him, he looked for some Comfort in Philosophy. *Ego autem, quamdiu Resp. per eos regebatur, quibus se ipsa commiserat, omnes meas curas, cogitationesque in eam conferebam. Cum autem dominatu unius omnia tenerentur: neque esset usquam consilio, aut auctoritati locus. - - - Nec me angoribus dedidi, quibus essem confectus, nisi iis restitissem: nec rursum indignis homine docto voluptatibus. - - - Nihil autem agere cùm animus non posset, in iis studiis ab initio versatus ætatis, existimavi honestissimè molestias deponi posse, si me ad Philosophiam retulissem.*

Off. Lib. II. cap. 1.

IF a Man desires to live a quiet Life, he is obliged, in Point of Divinity and Morality, to enquire what other Men think, rather than think for himself; and he is almost necessitated in some Countries to fetch all his Ideas from the Head of one single Man. But there are also some supercilious Divines, who extend their Jurisdiction to Logic and Natural Philosophy. Their Opinions must not be examined according to the Rules of good Sense; but on the contrary, the Rules of good Sense must be tried by their Opinions. A Man draws also their Indignation upon himself, if he observes

ſerves in the Univerſe ſome Principle or ſome Contrivance different from that, which they have imagined. A Philoſopher will find a Refuge in the Labyrinth of ſublime Mathematicks againſt thoſe cruel ambitious Men, who take upon themſelves to captivate the Reaſon of Mankind. Retire into thoſe delightful Windings: Thoſe Divines are too dull and too lazy to follow you thither. You may be there ſecure from their Perſecution, and allowed to think freely, and to live, without any danger, like a rational Man.

IF, by much Reaſoning, and after many Experiments, a Man ſhould at laſt make the Ground more fruitful by a new Way of manuring it, he would not be taxed with loſing his Time in inſignificant Things. Why then ſhould a Man be charged with the ſame Fault, becauſe he encreaſes every Day the Penetration, Strength, Capacity and Fecundity of his Mind? Is this Culture leſs valuable than that of Land? Is it lawful to prefer what concerns animal Life, to what concerns the Underſtanding (*m*).

'TIS true, thoſe who make it their only Buſineſs to encreaſe the Strength and Sagacity of their Mind, will be asked again, what Uſe they deſign to make of that Strength and Sagacity, which they think they never carry far enough. If they anſwer, That their Deſign is to acquire a Strength, whereby they may be enabled to raiſe themſelves to new Subtilties, by which Means they will get again a new Strength in order to unfold more perplexed Subtilties; perhaps few People will be ſatisfied with that Anſwer. But they would ſtop the Mouth of the Gainſayers, and bring their favourite Study into Repute, if they would be pleaſed to try their Strength upon other Subjects (*n*), and prove by their Succeſs that what they ſay in favour of their beloved Art, is not a vain Excuſe, whereby they impoſe upon themſelves, and endeavour to impoſe upon others, by juſtifying a ſort of Study, wherein many People fancy that Humour, Chance, and perhaps Vanity, have a greater Share than Reaſon.

(*m*) "Whatever enables us to make Reflections, which, though "merely Speculative, are Great and Noble, is of a Uſe, that may be "called Spiritual and Philoſophical." *Preface to the Hiſtory of the Royal Academy of Sciences*, 1699.

(*n*) "The Geometrical Genius is not ſo confined to Geometry, but "that it may be conveyed into other Sciences. A Book relating to "Morality, Politicks, or Criticiſm, and perhaps a Book of Eloquence, "will be finer ſtill, *cæteris paribus*, if it be written by a Geometri-"cian." *Ibid.*

CHAP. III.

Of the Relations of Things between themselves, and first, of the Relations of Conformity.

Origin of Relations.

I. IN order to find out the Relations of Things between themselves, those Things must be compared together. Every Comparison runs at least upon two Objects; and, 1. 'Tis necessary that the Things compared one with another should exist, or may exist; for what is impossible, cannot be apprehended; and if it was apprehended, it would not be impossible. 2. One must have the Ideas of both Things; otherwise the Mind could not compare them. 3. Those two Ideas ought to be perceived at once, and be present to the Mind at one and the same Time.

WHEN a Man compares, for instance, two Coins, he looks upon both at once, or preserves the Idea of the first which he has seen, and consults it, when he casts his Eyes upon the second; for if he had lost the Idea of the first, he could not determine whether it be equal to, or different from the second.

MEN can hardly believe that we can think of many Things at once; and yet there is nothing more common. He who thinks of a Number, thinks of many Units; and if it be a great Number, he thinks of many Tens, and of the Units which make up the Tens. He that looks upon a Tree, or a House, has at one and the same Time the Ideas of many Parts; and when he remembers that he has seen one of them, at the same Time that he looks upon another, he has the Ideas of both at once. But most People fancy, they never think of many Things, but when they reflect upon different Subjects all

all at once (*a*); and therefore to think of many Things at one and the ſame Time, appears to them a ſtrange Paradox; for, in their Opinion, 'tis aſcribing to one ſingle Act of the Mind many Reaſonings, and many Reflections.

TWO Ideas may be preſent to the Mind at one and the ſame Time, without comparing them. Wherefore, there is a certain Act of the Mind, which makes the Compariſon; and that Act conſtitutes the Eſſence of what is called *Relation*, which conſequently is altogether in us, and belongs to us.

OBJECTS, and their Attributes, are out of our Minds. We compare Objects together: Their Attributes may be alſo compared. But ſuppoſe the Number of Objects and Attributes was a thouſand Times greater than it is; if they were not compared by any Mind, there would be neither Compariſon nor Relation among them; for a Relation is nothing elſe but two Attributes, or two Objects compared together: And that Compariſon muſt be made by a Mind.

WE give a Name to that Act of the Mind, which forms Compariſons: We call the Compariſon it makes a *Relation*; and we beſtow that Name, which is the Name of one of the Acts of our Mind, upon the Objects themſelves: We aſcribe to them what paſſes within us, when we think of them; and then we ſeek in them, to no purpoſe, ſomething anſwerable to that Name, which does not agree to them. This is what perplexes that Matter, which would be otherwiſe very eaſy; for it is only what paſſes within us, and may clearly be known by conſulting our ſelves. Let us ſuppoſe for a while, that there is but one Circle in the World: It cannot be compared with other Circles, and cannot be ſaid to have a Relation to them. That Circle has its Magnitude, its Figure, and Properties. All thoſe Things are really in it, and belong to it: They are not compared with the Magnitude, Figure, and Properties of another Circle; but that Compariſon is poſſible. Let us ſuppoſe now,

(*a*) *The Latin Word* Cogitatio, *which anſwers the Word* Thought, *is uſed in that Senſe by* Cicero, *de Invent. Lib.* II. Cauſſa diſtribuitur in impulſionem, & in ratiocinationem. Impulſio eſt, quæ ſine cogitatione perquandam affectionem animi facere aliquid hortatur: ut amor, iracundia, ægritudo, vinolentia, & omnino omnia, in quibus animus ita videtur affectus fuiſſe, ut rem perſpicere cum conſilio & cura non potuerit: & id quod fecit, impetu quodam animi potiùs quàm cogitatione fecerit. Ratiocinatio autem eſt diligens, & conſiderata faciendi aliquid, aut non faciendi excogitatio.

that there ariſes a ſecond Circle at a hundred Leagues diſtance from the firſt. Does any Thing new happen to the firſt Circle by the Riſe of the other? Does it grow larger or leſſer? Is its Figure altered, or become more perfect? Does it acquire ſome Property it had not before? And becauſe there is no Object in the World, but what may be compared, either in one Reſpect, or in another, or even a thouſand different Ways, with that new Circle, ſhall we ſay that this Circle has produced new Realities on all Sides, and that a ſingle Stroke of a Pair of Compaſſes has filled the Univerſe with Properties, that did not exiſt before? The old and new Circles continue therefore to be in themſelves what they would be, if each of them exiſted alone. If ſome Thing new happens by the Riſe of the ſecond Circle, it does not happen to the firſt Circle, but to the Mind, which compares them together, and thinks of them otherwiſe than it would do, if it did not compare them.

IF the Language of Men was exact, a Relation would always be expreſſed by a Term, which would offer the Idea of the two Things compared together to form that Relation; whereas the Names of Relations are frequently abſolute; and therefore we are miſtaken by ſuppoſing what is only Relative to be Abſolute. Hot, Cold, Savoury, Agreeable, are relative Terms. No one Body is abſolutely Hot, or abſolutely Odoriferous, Savoury, *&c.*

Likeneſs, Equality, Proportion.

II. WHEN the Idea of an Object agrees exactly to another Object, thoſe two Objects are ſaid to be *alike*. That new Name beſtowed upon them, does not denote any Thing new in them: It ſignifies only that the Idea, which repreſents the one, does alſo repreſent the other. They have indeed thoſe Attributes, which the Mind perceives in each of them; but the Attention of the Mind upon the Unity of the Image, which repreſents them both, and wherein conſiſts the Relation of Likeneſs, is in the Mind, and not in the Objects.

WHEN the Mind, meaſuring two Objects, finds that the ſame Idea, which diſcovers to him the Degrees of the Quantity of one of thoſe Objects, diſcovers alſo the ſame Degrees of Quantity in the other, that Conformity of Ideas occaſions their being called *Equal*; ſo that it may be ſaid that *Equality* is a *Likeneſs of Quantity*. When the Mind, thinking of two Objects, perceives a Relation between them, and diſcovers the ſame Relation between two other Objects, that Conformity of Relations is called *Proportion*.

III.

III. MAN, being naturally Lazy, is well pleaſed to find in an Idea, already familiar to him, the Image of a new Object; and therefore he loves thoſe Compariſons that run upon Reſemblances; and becauſe he loves them, he does not examine them, but is immediately perſwaded they are very juſt and exact. *Compariſons are deceitful.*

WE are alſo pleaſed with Compariſons upon another Account; and conſequently they deceive us again in that Reſpect, becauſe we yield too eaſily to every Thing that pleaſes us. Uniformity tires the Mind; for it loves Variety; but it grows alſo weary of Variety: So that Men love all at once Uniformity and Variety. They find thoſe two Things in Compariſons, which offer two like Objects; for thoſe Objects, notwithſtanding their Likeneſs, have always ſome ſmall Difference. Though they be different, a ſingle Idea, is almoſt ſufficient for both; and we proceed, without any Trouble, from the Knowledge of the one, to the Knowledge of the other. Hence it is that we are better pleaſed with Compariſons fetched from a very remote Subject, when they are juſt, becauſe, though they offer two very different Objects, they diſcover a Relation of Likeneſs, which was not expected. *Virgil* in his *Georgics*, fetches his Compariſons from the moſt lofty Subjects, and in his *Æneid* from the moſt common Things; for according to the Matter he treats, he thinks fit to raiſe or unbend the Mind of his Reader; and the Variety he uſes, ſerves to thoſe two Ends. We love what is ſurpriſing; we love what is ingenious; and it ſeems to us that there is more Wit in diſcovering a Reſemblance between two very remote Subjects, than between thoſe that are leſs remote. A Metaphor, which offers a Relation that was not expected, pleaſes in proportion to the Surpriſe it occaſions. We love a judicious Vivacity; and it pleaſes the more, becauſe it is uncommon *(b)*.

(b) Atque hoc ingenere perſæpè mihi admirandum videtur, quid ſit, quod omnes tranſlatis & alienis magis delectantur verbis, quam propriis & ſuis: nam ſi res ſuum nomen & proprium vocabulum non habet, ut pes in navi, ut nexum, quod per libram agitur, ut in uxore divortium; neceſſitas cogit, quod non habeas, aliunde ſumere: ſed in ſuorum verborum maxima copia, tamen homines aliena multò magis, ſi ſunt ratione tranſlata, delectant. Id accidere credo, vel quod ingenii ſpecimen eſt quoddam tranſilire ante pedes poſita, & alia longè repetita ſumere: vel quod is, qui audit, aliò ducitur cogitatione, neque tamen aberrat, quæ maxima eſt delectatio. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* III.

WE are therefore naturally diſpoſed to be pleaſed with Similitudes; and becauſe 'tis a difficult Thing not to approve what pleaſes us, we yield too eaſily to Compariſons. This is the Spring of many Miſtakes; for to be miſtaken, is to confound Objects, to take Two for One, to fancy that Objects, which have no Reſemblance, are perfectly alike; and laſtly to look upon thoſe, which have a very imperfect Likeneſs, as being little different.

RASHNESS is confounded with Valour, and Meanneſs with Modeſty. A liberal Man is confounded with a prodigal one; and a wiſe Man, whoſe Expences are ſuited to his Income, is taxed with Avarice. A *prodigal Man*, who laviſhes away his Money to indulge his Pleaſures, though he does not pay his Creditors, nor requite the Services done to him, is accounted a liberal Man: No one can be more generous than he, in the Opinion of thoſe, who get ſomething by his expenſive Fits. On the contrary, a Man, who minds his Buſineſs, is look'd upon as a Miſer. A *ſuperſtitious* Man is honoured with the Name of a true Chriſtian, notwithſtanding his Vices; and a true Chriſtian, who minds only the eſſential Part of Chriſtianity, will be very happy, if he is not placed among profane Men, and is only charged with too much Indifference for Religion. Cruelty is accounted a *Veil*, and Moderation a Cowardice (*c*).

AS we are apt to fancy that thoſe Things, which have a great Reſemblance, are perfectly alike, we judge frequently of others by our ſelves. Good Men are credulous, and Knaves believe every Body is a Cheat. Some profane Men look upon true Chriſtians as ſo many Hypocrites. We are ſurpriſed to ſee Men of a different Taſte from ours, and that they ſhould be diſpleaſed with what we love. Becauſe other Men have two Legs, two Arms, a Noſe, a Mouth, we ſuppoſe their Souls to be like ours. A Man has ſome Features of

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(*c*) Unicuique virtuti finitimum vitium reperietur, aut certo jam nomine appellatum, ut audacia, quæ fidentiæ: pertinacia, quæ perſeverantiæ finitima eſt: ſuperſtitio, quæ religioni propinqua eſt, aut ſine ullo certo nomine. *Cic. de Invent. Lib.* II.

Quam is, qui contradicet, juſtitiam vocarit, nos demonſtrabimus ignaviam eſſe, & inertiam, ac parvam libertatem. Quam prudentiam appellarit, ineptam, & garrulam, & odioſam ſcientiam eſſe dicemus. Quam ille modeſtiam dicet eſſe, eam nos inertiam, & diſſolutam negligentiam dicemus. Quam ille fortitudinem nominarit, eam nos gladiatoriam, & inconſideratam appellabimus temeritatem. *Ad Heren. Lib.* III.

of another Man, who pleaſes us, or who has offended us; thoſe Features are ſufficient for us to love or hate him. Great Men are more liable to that Deluſion, becauſe they have got an Habit of ſticking to their firſt Thoughts, without mending them; and not being obliged to be very cautious in their Judgments, for fear of a Cenſure, they peremptorily judge of the Merit of other Men, and their Eſteem or Contempt for them are grounded upon their firſt Notions. Thoſe great Men, whoſe Succeſs is owing to their Diſſimulation, look upon others, who cannot comply with a baſe Thing, as Men of a narrow Genius, who will never ſucceed in any Attempt.

FOR the ſame Reaſon, every Man is never weary of talking of himſelf; for, he thinks that what pleaſes him, cannot fail to pleaſe others. He would argue much better, if he drew from that Principle a quite contrary Inference, by ſaying, other Men are like me. But they tire me, when they talk of nothing elſe but themſelves, and their Concerns: Therefore I tire them, when I talk only of my ſelf, and thoſe Things, wherein I am concerned. If a Man remembers this Reflection, he will never talk of himſelf but when he is obliged to do it.

A LOOSE Man judges of all Women by thoſe whom he has debauched. Wit is confounded with Malice. A crafty Knave is accounted a Man of greater Wit than an honeſt Man. 'Tis a groſs Error, but very common. Want of Conſcience does frequently more contribute to the Reputation of being well skilled in Affairs, than the Penetration and Extent of the Mind. The Vulgar, and others, who take only a ſuperficial View of Things, admire the great Abilities of a Man, who has raiſed himſelf to Places, and is grown rich. *It muſt be confeſt*, ſay they, *that he is a Man of Parts*. Let us enquire more narrowly into the Matter, and we ſhall ſee that any body might have done the ſame, without having more Wit than is neceſſary not to be a Fool. Muſt one have more Wit to ſay that White is Black, than to ſay that White is White. No certainly; one muſt have only more Impudence. Is Lying at every Turn a Proof of good Parts? Muſt one have a great Penetration to weigh Merit to the higheſt Bidder? An honeſt Man cannot well bear a Repulſe; 'tis for this Reaſon he does not venture to ask, and not becauſe he has not Wit enough to know how to ask. But a baſe Man is not concerned with Honour: Whether he obtains his Deſires by his Merit, or Importunity, or by ſomething worſe, he is ſatisfied. Beſides, an

honeſt Man rejects thoſe Projects, with which the other complies heartily: They do not ſo much as come into his Mind; for as melancholick Notions do not riſe in a joyful Heart, nor merry Thoughts in an afflicted Mind, in like manner, mean Projects and unjuſt Deſigns do not offer themſelves to a noble and honeſt Soul.

WHAT is beautiful, is admired. Men admire alſo what is rare; and therefore what is uncommon, appears to them beautiful. Some Authors are juſtly eſteemed, becauſe they oppoſe and ridicule general Errors with lively, bold, and ingenious Strokes. But when a Man with the ſame Strokes writes Paradoxes and Sophiſms againſt Religion and Morality, he is accounted a great Genius: Men are impoſed upon by the Boldneſs of his Objections, and the Novelty of his Sentiments.

A MAN finds ſome Relation between a new Propoſition and an old one, by reducing them to general Ideas; this is ſufficient for him to conclude, that the new Propoſition is only new in Appearance, and that whatever can be known, was already known before. Whereupon he confines himſelf to Reading; and if he aſpires to the Glory of Novelty, he is contented to offer, under a new Turn, what he has taken out of a Book: He makes a Paraphraſe upon it; and that Paraphraſe does frequently ſpoil it. A new Proof in favour of the Antients; for generally a Thought is never better expreſſed than by its original Author.

THOSE, who being full of Admiration for the Antients, make it their only Buſineſs to tread in their Steps, are followed by a Sort of Men, who deſire to imitate them; but have an ill Succeſs. Some, in order to get a Name, pitch upon an antient Author: They compile upon each Word of that Writer, all the Paſſages of the other Authors where that ſame Word is to be found; and by ſuch a Diſplay of their Collections, they contrive the Matter ſo, that the Reader loſes the Sight of the Text, which they propoſed to explain. A Man fancies he is an admirable Man, becauſe he thinks he is like thoſe who are admired, though he only does ſomething like what they have done.

2 *Cor.* vi. 15. ST *Paul* affirms there can be no Agreement between *Chriſt* and *Belial*; and that a Man cannot be a Member of the Chriſtian Church, whilſt he practiſes the Idolatry of the Heathens. Therefore, ſay ſome People, in order to a Reunion, there ought to be no Error on either Side; every Body muſt have, or pretend to have, the ſame Thoughts about every Thing. But why do they not further

ther ſay, every Body ought to be free from Vice, and have the ſame Degree of Virtue? Practical Faults are excuſed; but ſpeculative Errors muſt not be forgiven. What is the Reaſon of this? It would be too difficult to be an honeſt Man; and it is alſo difficult to love thoſe, who believe they have truer Notions than we.

NOTHING can be more eaſy than to diſguiſe Matters under Compariſons. Men love a flattering Glaſs, a flattering Painter; they are pleaſed with Compariſons, wherein they find their Vices diſguiſed under Images of Virtue. A Flatterer compares to Lions and Eagles thoſe great Men who delight in doing Miſchief. As for me, I place them among Scorpions, Serpents, Toads, and ſometimes among *Tarantula's*, which deprive a Man of his good Senſe, before they deprive him of his Life. When a Man is turn'd a Knave and a Libertine to pleaſe them, he muſt get himſelf knock'd on the Head to preſerve their Favour.

AS ſoon as a Principle has been of great Uſe to explain a Phænomenon, it is apply'd to all other *Phænomena*. The *Pythagoreans* aſcribed to the Power of Numbers many Effects, which certainly do not depend upon thoſe general Ideas. Some find every where a magnetick Virtue; and ſome Learned Men have pretended to diſcover in Light and Colours the Undulations of Sounds, their Conſonances and Diſſonances. Some, finding three Things in a Subject, either Attributes, or Relations, *&c.* make it an Image, and ſometimes a Proof of the Trinity. Mechaniſm has had a good Succeſs for the Explication of material *Phænomena's*; it is apply'd to the Mind, to deprive it of its Liberty. The Principles of good Senſe go by the Name of common Notions, becauſe every Body acknowledges them; but every Body follows the Maxims of Cuſtom. *Whatever is out of the Hinges of Cuſtom, is thought to be out of the Hinges of Reaſon.* Montagne, *Book* I. *Chap.* 21.

A PLAIN Style is confounded with a low one, and a ſwelled Style with the ſublime. A nice Thought, which, under a modeſt Turn, ſays a great deal, though it ſeems to ſay little, is confounded with a Sublimity, that vaniſhes away upon Examination. Ridicule is accounted Humour (*d*), and

(*d*) Atque hoc etiam animadvertendum eſt, non eſſe omnia ridicula faceta. Quid enim poteſt eſſe tam ridiculum, quam Sannio eſt? ſed ore, vultu, imitandis moribus, voce, denique corpore ridetur ipſo. Salſum hunc poſſum dicere, atque ita non ut ejuſmodi Oratorem eſſe velim, ſed ut Mimum. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* II.

and Nonſenſe, a profound Learning. 'Tis but ſpeaking boldly; Impudence appears to the Vulgar a Proof of a great Merit. An agreeable Voice, a bold Delivery, a correct Language, a rallying Humour, ſome Vivacity, and a Quickneſs of Reparee, are ſufficient for many People to honour with the Title of *Wit*, a Man, who is far from being a Wit, and wants many eſſential Things to deſerve that Title.

AN Orator makes a great Impreſſion by his Characters. An injudicious *Imitator* flatters himſelf with the ſame Succeſs, without conſidering that his Characters are, at moſt, amuſing, whereas the others are inſtructive. Some Characters edify, others are ſcandalous. The Spirit of Satire makes ſome of thoſe Characters, as well as the Spirit of Zeal.

WHEN Subjects, compared together, are not well known, a Man does eaſily loſe himſelf in Analogies. *As Nonentity is to Space, ſo is the Point to God.* The Infinity of God and Space, when known, may occaſion Analogies; but Analogies cannot diſcover it. This Remark reaches all ſorts of Subjects.

WHEN a Compariſon ſeizes the Imagination by the Pomp of its Images, it will alſo poſſeſs the Mind with the Help of Imagination; and if it contains ſome ſacred Terms, it is received with a religious Reſpect, even when it tends to the Overthrow of Religion. *As Rivers are ſwallowed by the Sea; in like manner Souls are reunited to the Source of Spirits; they will ſink in it, and ſubſiſt only in that Principle of Life.* This pompous Language ſignifies nothing at all. One would think by it, that human Souls are looſe Parts, which will be reunited to their Whole.

THE Scripture mentions the terreſtrial Paradiſe. Mythology mentions the Garden of the *Heſperides*. Therefore this laſt Garden is the ſame with the Garden of *Eden*, ſomewhat diſguiſed by Fables. Thus *Bacchus* is ſaid to be *Noah*. Is a common Thing, a proper and determinate Character?

MOSES and *Aaron* were Brothers; that's enough to prove them to be *Minos* and *Rhadamanthus*. *Moſes* made uſe of a miraculous Wand; 'tis plain he is *Mercury*.

ISIS, and *Oſiris*, her Brother and Husband, are *Adam* and *Eve* diſguiſed under other Names. Their Enemy *Typhon* is *Pride*. *Aſo*, Queen of *Ethiopia*, who favoured *Typhon*, is the *Serpent*; for *Aſo* ſignifies *Serpent*. A Hodge-podge of Etymologies, derived from ſeveral Languages, impoſes upon the Reader by its Erudition.

THUS

THUS it has been found out, that the *Satyrs* were the People of *Iſrael* concealed in the Wilderneſs, as the Satyrs concealed themſelves in Foreſts; and to make that Compariſon more probable, their Name is derived from the *Hebrew*, and its Etymology is ſaid to ſignify *Retirement*.

A PROOF may be far fetched, and require a great deal of Learning, without being the more convincing for it. One may be miſtaken in all Sorts of Languages; and a Man, after having peruſed many Dictionaries, may be as unſucceſsful in the Reſemblance he has imagined, as that Monk, who would have *Æneas*, coming out of *Troy*, to be an Image of St. *Peter*, leaving the See of *Antioch*, and *Romulus* and *Remus* to be Images of St. *Peter* and St. *Paul*.

SO many Miſtakes ſhew us, how neceſſary it is to be extremely cautious with reſpect to Compariſons.

IV. LET us find out the Precautions, which ought to be uſed to preſerve our ſelves from Error, when we make or hear a Compariſon. *Rules.*

Two Things are ſometimes compared together, in order to know exactly how far they are alike, and in what Reſpects they differ. One may compare together, for inſtance, the Impulſion of hard Bodies and that of ſoft Bodies, Chriſtian Virtue and the Virtue of the Heathens. One may compare the Notions of Chriſtians about the Soul with thoſe of the antient Philoſophers, to ſhew wherein they agree, and wherein they differ (*e*).

IN ſuch Caſes, each of the Subjects compared together ought to be examined by it ſelf, and thoroughly underſtood; and then it will be very eaſy to find out their Likeneſs and their Difference. The Knowledge of the Subjects ought therefore to be the Ground of their Compariſon, without which it could hardly be exact.

IF any one, for inſtance, would draw up a Parallel between *Deſcartes* and *Gaſſenaus*, in order to know how far their Syſtems agree, it would be much better to learn at once the Sentiments of each of thoſe Philoſophers, by reading all their Works, than to read the Opinions of the former, and then the Opinions of the latter, upon each Subject. This Compariſon ought to be put off, till he has a Notion of all their Principles, and the Conſequences they draw from them.

AGAIN,

(*e*) "That Parallel may be ſeen in Mr. *Le Clerc*'s *Bibliotheque* "*Choiſie*," *Tom.* VIII. *p.* 65.

AGAIN, if any one desires to know exactly wherein the Divines of the different Christian Societies agree, and wherein they differ, he must study each System by it self, and with the same Attention as if he was born in the Society of the Author whose Book he reads, or rather, as if he was not born in any of those Societies, and disliking *Paganism* and the *Alcoran*, study'd the Doctrine of the Christians only to embrace that which should appear to him most agreeable to the Gospel. He will be able to make a just Comparison, when he has got very clear Notions of all those Things which he designs to compare.

How we ought to proceed from the Knowledge of a Subject, to the Knowledge of another.

V. BUT sometimes we are also willing, with the Help of a Comparison, to make the Knowledge of an Object subservient to the Discovery of another. After we have supposed them to be alike, we conclude, that what we find in the one, is also to be found in the other. Thus from the Heat, which arises by the rubbing of one's Hands, we infer that in other Bodies Heat is occasioned by an Agitation. Thus again, from the Heat and Light of Fire we draw this Consequence, that the Sun is a Flame, and apply to it the Ideas of our Fire.

'TIS plain, that those Resemblances may be carried too far. Man is naturally inclined to strain them, and to find a perfect Equality wherever he discovers some slight Appearances of it. His Laziness makes him confound those Things, which are somewhat alike, and suppose that they are perfectly alike. It would require too great a Labour to know all the Relations, and to distinguish the Relations of Likeness from those of Diversity; and when Laziness is attended with some Passion, Resemblances become a Source of Delusions, in which Men grow obstinate. That Fault is committed in Practice, as well as in Speculation; and perhaps I have given but too many Instances of it.

WHEREFORE, I believe that in order to proceed safely from the Knowledge of one Subject, to the Knowledge of another, we ought in the first Place to be well informed of the first Subject; and when it is well known, either because it is less compounded, or because we are more able to examine it, or lastly, because some happy Circumstance has discovered it to us; I say, when we are well informed of it, all its known Attributes ought to be placed in order, and then we must look for them one after another in the new Subject we study. The first Subject therefore does not immediately discover

diſcover the ſecond: It ſerves only to find out the Way that leads to it.

WHEN therefore two things appear to us to be alike, being conſidered in general, it does not follow that they are alike in every Particular. But in order to know how far that Reſemblance goes, and to proceed from the Knowledge of one of thoſe Things to the Knowledge of the other we begin with that which may be more eaſily examined, and we ſtudy it thoroughly. Afterwards we ſeek the Attributes of the Thing already known, in that which is not ſo well known, but is like the firſt, at leaſt in ſome meaſure. I know in general that our common Fire is like that of the Sun. I examine it; and then I find in the Sun a very ſwift and confuſed Motion, Whirlings, and a Matter bubbling up, and ruſhing from the Center to the Circumference; but I diſcover in it no Fuel, no Aſhes, no Nitre, no Sulphur, *&c.*

WHEN a Man deſigns to make us grant a Conſequence about a Subject not well known to us, he makes us draw a like Conſequence from a Principle we are well acquainted with: By that means, the Method of arguing we are put upon, grows more eaſy and familiar to us. That Method is particularly uſeful, when the Concluſion, to which we are to be brought, will be againſt us, make us uneaſy, and oppoſe ſome of our Prejudices or Inclinations: For if a Man ſhould begin with that, we would diſpute, ſhift, and endeavour to elude the cleareſt Argument. A Man therefore pitches upon a Subject, which does not confine our Reaſon: He teaches us how to argue about that Subject, and requires from us that we ſhould continue to acknowledge the Juſtneſs of the Argument. It was by ſuch a Method that *Nathan* made *David* ſenſible of his Fault. In order to bring a Man to own and condemn his Faults, they muſt be repreſented to him in another Object under Colours, that is, under Names which diſguiſe them: If it be a lively Picture, he will condemn himſelf before he perceives that it agrees to him, and that he is the Original of it.

A MAN muſt argue about like Subjects in the ſame manner, or elſe he falls into Contradiction; which happens to thoſe who judge of Things out of Paſſion: For generally Paſſions contradict themſelves. He who commends *Ammianus Marcellinus*, a Heathen Hiſtorian, for ſpeaking of the Chriſtians as he does, will call a Prevarication the Sincerity of a Chriſtian Hiſtorian, who mentions the

the Faults of his Party, and does not paſs over in Silence what appears to him commendable in the Party of his Adverſaries.

WHEN we make ſuch Compariſons as we are now ſpeaking of, we chuſe for the Subject of the Compariſon, the moſt familiar Ideas of the Perſon we deſign to convince, that he may draw the Conſequence more eaſily, and be more ſenſible of its Juſtneſs and Neceſſity.

IT matters little whether the Subject of the Compariſon be real, or imaginary: The only Deſign of it is to make one ſenſible of the Neceſſity of a Conſequence, and teach him how to draw it. But Conſequences may be drawn from a falſe Suppoſition, as well as from a true one. When I ſay of a living Man, that if he was dead, he would not ſpeak, the Conſequence is no leſs undeniable, than if I ſhould ſay of a dead Man, he is no longer alive; therefore he does not ſpeak.

GREAT Care ought to be taken that the ſecond Concluſion be as neceſſary a Conſequence from its Principles, as the firſt is from its own, otherwiſe it would be wrong to judge of the one by the other. If I ſay, for Inſtance, "What ſignifies it, whether you be reported to be ſick, if "you are well? You do but laugh at it. Why then ſhould "you vex yourſelf, becauſe they would make the World "believe that you are an ignorant or a vicious Man, ſince "you are neither the one, nor the other?" That Compariſon is not juſt; it draws up a Parallel between very different Caſes. For 1. A Man's Reputation does not ſuffer at all, even though he be really ſick. 2. When he is well, he can convince every body that he is in Health. It is not ſo with Learning and Probity; one may ſometimes loſe very real Advantages by being ſuſpected of wanting either the one or the other. A Man would be very ſorry to be reported to be ſick, if that Report was to be attended with ſome Prejudice. 'Tis true, in ſuch a Caſe, the real Pleaſure of enjoying a perfect Health might make amends for the ill Conſequences of that Report. The comfortable Senſe of Knowledge and Virtue may in like manner make amends for the Charge of Ignorance and Vice. In that Senſe the Compariſon is juſt; but, as I propoſed it firſt from ſome Authors, it went too far.

WHEN we go about to prove that a certain Effect will enſue by our comparing it with another Effect, it is neceſſary that the Cauſe which produces the one, ſhould act in the ſame manner as that which produces the other; for without

without this Suppoſition, a Compariſon cannot have the Source of a Proof. Some Effects may be like in ſome Reſpects; and yet their Cauſes are not alike, and conſequently no Conſequence can be drawn from the Cauſe of the one to the Cauſe of the other.

THE Velocities of Water, running out through Holes made in Ponds of an unequal Height, are as the Square Roots of thoſe Heights. The Velocities of Bodies falling by their Gravity are alſo as the Square Roots of the Heights from which they fall. The Cauſe of this laſt Property had been diſcovered before the Cauſe of the other was inquired into. That Conformity of Proportions in thoſe two Effects, created a Belief that they proceeded from the ſame Cauſe, and prevented for ſome time the Diſcovery of the true Cauſe of the firſt, though more ſimple than that of the ſecond.

TO account for the Reflexion and Refraction of Light, the Rays that are incident, reflected or refracted, have been look'd upon as having among them a certain common Point, like the Centre of Gravity of two Bodies, whoſe Weight is equal; and this has been the Principle of Reaſoning on this Head. But to give an Aſſurance that this Reaſoning is good, it is neceſſary to have the ſame Foundation for the Suppoſition, and drawing the Conſequences of one, as the other, that is, a Centre of the Rays of Light operating like that of Weight or Gravity. Till this be clearly evidenc'd, it is a Way of arguing that may be thought ingenious, and agreeably turn'd; but then it only diverts, it proves nothing.

BUT, ſuppoſing the Condition juſt now mentioned, a Compariſon is juſt; and 'tis in vain, in order to elude its Strength, to object the Differences that are to be found between the two Things compared together. This is indeed a Precept of the *Rhetoricians* (*f*); but herein, as well as in moſt other things, their Deſign is rather to teach how to ſpeak eaſily, and a great deal, than to teach how to think well. Provided a ſecond Concluſion ariſes from its Principle in the ſame manner, and by virtue of the ſame Cauſes, as the firſt ariſes from its own Principle, the Compariſon is juſt, whatever

(*f*) Contra autem qui dicet, ſimilitudinem infirmare debebit; quod faciet, ſi demonſtrabit illud, quod conferatur, ab eo, cui conferatur, diverſum eſſe genere, naturâ, vi, magnitudine, tempore, loco, perſona, opinione. *Cic. de Invent. Lib.* II.

whatever Difference there may be between the Things compared together.

One of the moſt celebrated Politicians of the laſt Age (*g*) compares the State to a *Pyramid*, either ſtanding *upon its Baſe*, and ſettled by that Situation, or *inverted*, being hardly able to ſtand, and falling by the leaſt Impulſion: If that Compariſon was carried farther, one might ſay, A Sovereign ſupports the State; he is the Baſe and Foundation of it: But, if that Baſe is very ſmall, in compariſon of the Weight it bears, and the vaſt Surface above it, how can it be ſteady? Thoſe Images make a ſtrong Impreſſion: The Words *To bear*, *Baſe*, and *Foundation*, impoſe upon the Mind. Perhaps that Compariſon thus expreſſed might be true in ſome Senſe; but certainly it is falſe in other Senſes; and nothing could be more eaſy than to make a wrong Application of it. But, the ſame Subject might afford a Compariſon quite oppoſite, which appears to me more exact. Thoſe, who govern the State, are above thoſe, who live under their Conduct; ſo that when too many People have a hand in the Government, the upper Surface is too vaſt, and the Pyramid is overthrown.

BUT, in order to judge of the Exactneſs of thoſe Compariſons, by the Rule juſt now mentioned, let us ſee, on the

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(*g*) "The Safety and Firmneſs of any Frame of Government "may be beſt judged by the Rules of Architecture, which teach us "that the *Pyramid* is of all Figures the firmeſt, and leaſt ſubject "to be ſhaken or overthrown by any Concuſſions or Accidents "from the Earth or Air; and it grows ſtill ſo much the firmer, "by how much broader the bottom, and ſharper the top. - - -

"On the contrary, Government, which by alienating the Affe-"ctions, loſing the Opinions, and croſſing the Intereſts of the Peo-"ple, leaves out of its Compaſs the greateſt Part of their Conſent, "may juſtly be ſaid, in the ſame Degrees, it thus loſes Ground, to "narrow its Bottom; and if this be done to ſerve the Ambition, "humour the Paſſion, ſatisfy the Appetites, or advance the Power "and Intereſts not only of one Man, but of two, or more, or ma-"ny that come to ſhare in the Government: By this Means the "Top may juſtly be ſaid to grow broader, as the Bottom narrower "by the other. Now by the ſame Degrees that either of theſe "happen, the Stability of the Figure is by the ſame leſſened and "impaired; ſo as at certain Degrees it begins to grow ſubject to "Accidents of Wind and of Weather; and at certain others, it is "ſure to fall of it ſelf, or by the leaſt Shake that happens, to the "Ground." *Sir* William Temple's *Eſſay upon the Original and Nature of Government.*

the one hand, what makes a Solid ſteady upon its Baſe; and on the other, what ſettles a State. The larger the Baſis, if compared to what is above it, the leſs each Part of that Baſe is loaded with the upper Weight; which is the Reaſon why a Pyramid is more ſteady upon its Baſe, than a Cylinder upon its own. I add, that the larger the Baſe is, the more eaſily the *Æquilibrium* will be preſerved, and reſtored, if it be altered.

NOW I ask, whether Subjects are leſs ſenſible of the Weight of the Government, as they have more Maſters and Governors, or whether it be quite otherwiſe? Beſides, as the Number of thoſe who have a hand in the Government encreaſes, Parties may be formed powerful enough to overthrow the others; and then what happens to a Pyramid overthrown, happens to a State: That Part, which ſeems at firſt to be uppermoſt, falls upon the next; and the Fall of the one occaſions the Fall of the other.

WHAT is it that makes People ſenſible of the Sweets of the Government, without feeling the Weight of it? or, to uſe metaphorical Words, what is it that keeps the Pyramid from being overthrown? 'Tis the Equity, Moderation, and Mildneſs of their Governors. What is it that preſerved the *Æquilibrium*, ſo that each Part ſtrives to keep its Place, and reſume it; as it happens to a Pyramid, that is ſomewhat inclined? 'Tis Equity, Moderation, Politeneſs, good Order, Plenty, and a good Trade, whereby Money circulates, and every body relies upon the Wealth of others, as upon his own. And indeed, the ſame Politician acknowledges, "It might alſo be ſaid, that thoſe Governments "are the beſt, which have the beſt Governors; and that "the Difference is not ſo much in Magiſtracy it ſelf, as in "the Perſons of the Magiſtrates. Which was perhaps the "Deſign and Meaning of that antient Saying, taking alſo "Men endowed with Probity and Wiſdom to be the ſame "with Philoſophers; That the *beſt Governments were "thoſe in which Kings were Philoſophers, or Philoſophers "Kings.*"

MATERIAL Things being more familiar to us than Spiritual Things, afford the moſt uſual Subject of Compariſons (*h*). But becauſe 'tis neceſſary to proceed eaſily and

(*h*) Omnis tranſlatio, quæ quidem ſumpta ratione eſt, ad ſenſus ipſos admovetur, maximè oculorum, qui eſt ſenſus acerrimus. Nam

and naturally from one Member of the Compariſon to the other, that it may have its Effect, it ſeems that the Nature and Properties of Matter are not very proper to manifeſt to us the Nature and Properties of the Soul. The more the Ideas of Matter diſappear, the more clearly we perceive the others: The Images of Matter perplex the Notions of the Mind: Imagination ought to be ſilenced, to uſe a pure Underſtanding. I have often obſerved, that an eminent Author, who has otherwiſe very clear Thoughts, perplexes the Readers, when he borrows material Images to explain the Nature and Properties of the Soul. His Parallels, though well drawn up, and his Compariſons, though very ingenious, occaſion that very Perplexity which he endeavours to remove; and I know many People, who not being able to extricate themſelves out of the firſt Paſſages in that excellent Book, gave over the reading of it, thinking it was too difficult for them.

SINCE Compariſons are made uſe of to enlighten the Mind, it is not ſufficient that they ſhould be juſt in ſome Reſpects, and that the Subjects compared together be like in ſome Things: It is alſo neceſſary that thoſe Things ſhould offer themſelves almoſt alone. If ſome others offer themſelves as naturally, and give falſe Ideas, the Compariſon is wrong, and contrary to the Deſign of the Author; and in general, ſince a Compariſon ought to enlighten the Mind, thoſe that give the greateſt Light are the moſt valuable. One may juſtly complain of a Compariſon, which offers only a vain Shadow. Such is perhaps the following Compariſon. *As we love to ſee the Banks of the Water, when we walk upon the Land; in like manner we love Verſes bordering upon Proſe, without being proſaick.* A Compariſon loſes its Gracefulneſs, if it wants a Commentary.

EVERY Compariſon offers one Thing under the Image of another; and therefore, if an Author brings in *too many* Similitudes, he tires the Reader, who loſes the Sight of the main Subject. *Seneca* is admirable in his Compariſons; but ſometimes he heaps up ſo many together, that inſtead of inſtructing and convincing us, he only amuſes us and diverts

& odor urbanitatis & mollitudo humanitatis, & murmur maris, & dulcedo orationis ſunt ducta à cæteris ſenſibus. Illa verò oculorum multò acriora, quæ ponunt penè in conſpectu animi, quæ cernere & videre non poſſumus. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* III.

verrs our Attention. In his ſecond Letter (*i*), he juſtly blames thoſe, who ſtudy without any Method; but if you read his Compariſons, you will be apt to forget the principal Subject of them. *A Man is no where, who is every where. Thoſe, who ſpend their Lives in travelling, have many Hoſts, and no Friends. Meat affords no Nouriſhment, if it be immediately thrown up. A great Variety of Remedies is an Obſtacle to the Cure of Diſeaſes. A Wound too often handled, will not be conſolidated. A Tree frequently tranſplanted, will die. Seneca* dazzles the Mind by thoſe Heaps of Compariſons: The Reader yields without being truly convinced. In order to prove that old Age is the moſt lovely Part of a Man's Life, that Philoſopher ſays, *Fruits are never more acceptable, than when they are near their End. Youth appears in its greateſt Luſtre, when it is almoſt gone. Drunkards are beſt pleaſed with that Glaſs, that throws them upon the Ground. The Pleaſure of Life is like other Pleaſures: It is never more lively, than when Life is far advanced* (*k*).

HERE follows another Compariſon of the ſame Author, who is always lively, but his Expreſſions are ſometimes overſtrained: *A ſick Perſon*, ſays he, *does not deſire a Phyſician, who ſpeaks well, but who can cure Diſeaſes.* QUÆRIT æger Medicum non eloquentem, ſed ſanantem. *Ep.* LXXV.

Bodily

(*i*) Illud autem vide, ne iſta lectio multorum Auctorum, & omnis generis voluminum, habeat aliquid vagum & inſtabile. Certis ingeniis immorari & innutriri oportet, ſi velis aliquid trahere, quod in animo fideliter ſedeat. Nuſquam eſt, qui ubique eſt. In peregrinatione vitam agentibus hoc evenit, ut multa hoſpitia habeant, nullas amicitias. Idem accidat neceſſe eſt iis qui nullius ſe ingenio familiariter applicant, ſed omnia curſim & properanter tranſmittunt. Non prodeſt cibus, nec corpori accedit, qui ſtatim ſumptus emittitur. Nihil æquè ſanitatem impedit, quàm remediorum crebra mutatio. Non venit vulnus ad cicatricem, in quo crebrò medicamenta tentantur. Non convaleſcit planta, quæ ſæpè transfertur; nihil tàm utile eſt quod in tranſitu proſit. Diſtrahit animum librorum multitudo.

(*k*) Gratiſſima ſunt poma, cum fugiunt: pueritiæ maximus in exitu decor eſt: Deditos vino potatio extrema delectat, illa quæ mergit, quæ ebrietati ſummam manum imponit. Quod in ſe jucundiſſimum omnis voluptas habet, in finem ſui differt. Jucundiſſima eſt ætas devexa jam, non tamen præceps: Et illam quoque in extrema tegula ſtantem, judico habere ſuas voluptates: Aut hoc ipſum ſuccedit in locum voluptatum, nullis egere. Quàm dulce eſt, cupiditates fugaſſe ac reliquiſſe? *Ep.* XII.

Bodily Diſeaſes are not cured with Words: They are not cured by inſtructing a ſick Perſon, raiſing his Attention, and maſtering his Paſſions; and if ſometimes a Phyſician can contribute to his Cure by that Means, his Eloquence will be one of his Remedies.

THE ſame Author, in the Book he writes to *Polybius*, makes uſe of a Compariſon, which runs only upon a Quibble. "It is ſome "Comfort to divide one's Grief among many People; for "Grief being thus divided, you will be better able to bear that "ſmall Part of it, which remains in you." *Eſt autem hoc ipſum ſolati loco inter multos dolorem ſuum dividere, qui quia diſpenſatus; inter plures, exigua debet apud te parte ſubſidere.* Grief is not thus divided, as it were, with a Weight. The Concern of others leſſens the Senſe of it, becauſe turning our Attention upon the Pleaſure of being loved by them, it makes us leſs attentive to our Sorrow.

Ch. XXXI.

WHEREFORE the Succeſs of a Compariſon does frequently depend even upon its want of Exactneſs: It offers one Thing for another; and by that means it diverts our Attion from the Subject about which the Author of the Compariſon deſigns to impoſe upon us. *A Man after a good Meal, riſes from Table without any Uneaſineſs. He ſat down with Pleaſure; he goes away ſatisfied, and takes his Leave handſomely. We ſhould depart this Life in the ſame manner, after we have enjoyed it.*

Cur non ut plenus vitæ, conviva recedis?

But there is an infinite Difference betwixt Death and a Pleaſure, which is only interrupted, and may be renewed at any Time. Death is not a mere Interruption, but a total Extinction of Life. Would it be an unhandſome Thing for a Man to ſhed Tears in taking Leave of his Friends, when he knows he will never ſee them again, and that he is going to remove into another Continent? But the Philoſophers, and the Stoicks themſelves, who would not yield to any Body in Fortitude, ſhook off the Fear of Death, as much as they could; and to appear more ſteady, they were not contented to ground the Contempt of it upon the Hope of an immortal Life.

HERE follow ſome other Metaphors too different one from another. I have found them ſomewhere. *Tinſel has ſometimes a greater Luſtre than true Gold; and empty Casks make a greater Noiſe, when ſtruck, than if they were full.*

SOME Compariſons are accounted ingenious, and pleaſe us by the Turn, Vivacity, and Delicacy of the Expreſſions,

ſions, &c. But they may be compared to thoſe Pictures in Miniature, with which we are pleaſed by Reaſon of the Luſtre of the Colours, and the Beauty of the Painting, though they are not very like the Originals. A Compariſon is inconſiſtent with the Deſign of it, and conſequently has an eſſential Defect, when it makes us loſe the Sight of its Object. If that Fault be excuſable, 'tis only when a Man may be allowed to conceal ſome Defect of the Subject upon which his Diſcourſe runs.

COMPARISONS are made uſe of to place the Mind of a Man in that Point of Sight, where he ought to be, that he may ſee a Thing as it is repreſented to him. *Cicero* being willing to expoſe the Affectation of the Stoicks, in diſguiſing, under pompous Expreſſions, what other Philoſophers had already ſaid before them, concerning the Excellency of Virtue, makes uſe of this Compariſon; *As Thieves change the Marks of thoſe Things which they ſteal, in like manner the Stoicks, in order to aſcribe to themſelves the Thoughts of other Philoſophers, and be accounted the Authors of them, have changed the Terms of thoſe Philoſophers, whereby they would have been diſcovered* (*l*).

ONE of the moſt uſeful Rules concerning the Relation, which makes the Subject of this Chapter, is, that about like Caſes one ought to argue in the ſame Manner. A Man, who contradicts himſelf, pronounces his own Condemnation: Which generally happens to thoſe, who judge of Things out of Paſſion and Humour.

A third Uſe of Compariſons.

VI. THE only Uſe of ſome Compariſons conſiſts in adorning the Diſcourſe; and they are never employed but with ſuch a Deſign. We may ſay in general of Compariſons, what *Cicero* ſays of Metaphors, That the Uſe of them was at firſt introduced out of Neceſſity (*m*). But becauſe an

(*l*) Aliquot reliqui fures earum rerum quas ceperunt ſigna computant: Sic illi, ut ſententiis noſtris pro ſuis uterentur, nomina tanquam rerum notas mutaverunt. *De Fin. Lib.* V.

(*m*) Tertius ille modus transferendi verbi latè patet, quem neceſſitas genuit inopiâ coacta & anguſtiis; poſt autem delectatio jucunditaſque celebravit: Nam ut veſtis frigoris depellendi cauſâ reperta primò, poſt adhiberi cœpta eſt ad ornatum etiam corporis & dignitatem; ſic verbi tranſlatio inſtituta eſt inopiæ cauſâ, frequentata delectationis; nam gemmare vites, luxuriem eſſe in herbis, lætas ſegetes etiam ruſtici dicunt: quod enim declarari vix verbo proprio poteſt,

an *Ornament* does no longer deſerve that Name, when it is needleſs and wrongly placed, it ought not to be uſed every where, and upon all ſorts of Subjects; and ſome Compariſons would have an ill Effect, though they ſhould be expreſſed with great Eloquence. When a Subject deſerves to be enlarged upon; when the Orator has ſome Reaſon to believe that his Hearers will be pleaſed, if he dwells upon it, and that they would be unwilling to loſe the Sight of it ſo ſoon; after he has ſhewed it ſuch as it is, and under its true Form, it will not be improper to offer it again under ſome reſembling Pictures. The Hearer has the Pleaſure of dwelling upon the ſame Object as long as the Orator deſires it, without being tired with the ſame Words, nor with the ſame Images. It is very agreeable to ſee the Strokes that ſet off the Beauty of ſeveral Subjects, reunited in that which appears to deſerve the greateſt Attention.

PREACHERS, being perſwaded that a ſerious Diſcourſe ought not to be deſtitute of Ornaments and Amplifications, do not fail to uſe Compariſons; and they do it the more willingly, becauſe of all the Ornaments of Speech, Compariſons are beſt adapted to the Capacity of the common People, whoſe Inſtruction they ought not to neglect. But I wiſh that in ſuch important Matters as thoſe of Religion and Morality, they would advance nothing but what is very ſolid. When a grave Divine ſays, That *in the Authority of thoſe,*

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teſt, id tranſlato eſt dictum; illuſtrat id, quod intelligi volumus ejus rei, quam alieno verbo poſuimus, ſimilitudo. Ergò hæ tranſlationes quaſi mutationes ſunt, cùm quod non habeas, aliunde ſumas. Illæ paulò audaciores, quæ non inopiam indicant, ſed orationi ſplendoris aliquid accerſunt, quarum ego quid vobis aut inveniendi rationem aut genera ponam? Similitudinis eſt ad verbum unum contracta brevitas, quod verbum in alieno loco tanquam in ſuo poſitum, ſi agnoſcitur, delectat, ſi ſimile nihil habet, repudiatur. Sed ea transferri oportet, quæ aut clariorem faciunt, ut illa omnia:

- - - - - - - - - - - - Inhorreſcit mare.
Tenebræ conduplicantur, noctiſque & nimbum occœcat nigror,
Flamma inter nubes coruſcat, cœlum tonitru contremit:
Grando miſta imbri largifluo ſubita præcipitans cadit,
Undique omnes venti erumpunt, ſævi exiſtunt turbines,
Fervet æſtu pelagus:

Omnia ferè, quo eſſent clariora, tranſlatis per ſimilitudinem verbis dicta ſunt. *De Orat. Lib.* III.

thoſe, who govern us upon Earth, we ſee an Image of the Authority of the Creator of Heaven and Earth; when he ſays, That *the ſame Creator adorns the Clouds of Heaven with admirable Colours, that we may cry out, If the Porch is ſo wonderful, what will the Sanctuary be*? I would not have him to add, *The Brightneſs of Dignities is like that of the Clouds: The Colours we ſee in them, are an Effect of ſome Vapours, that will quickly vaniſh away: The Luſtre of Dignities paſſes away in the ſame manner.* It is not enough to have a right Aim: One muſt go to it the right Way.

A fourth Uſe.

VII. LASTLY, Compariſons are uſed to move, and to affect. This is a Matter of Fact confirmed by long Experience; and 'tis no difficult Thing to apprehend the Reaſon of it. Compariſons take in many Ideas, and we are more lively affected with a Multitude, than with a ſmall Number. Beſides, they are fetched from material Things, the Ideas whereof ſtir the Imagination, agitate the Spirits, and by that means raiſe the Paſſions. Laſtly, an Orator, who deſigns to move, gives the Images he uſes the moſt lively and affecting Turn he can poſſibly give them.

WHEN a Man is moved, and willing to convey the ſame Emotions into the Minds of others, he excites himſelf to find out Expreſſions anſwerable to the Vivacity of his Sentiments. The Imagination offers ſome; he takes hold of them without enquiring into their Exactneſs: He is contented with their Strength.

WHEN Compariſons have no other Aim, they ought not to be looked upon as Arguments: They are not ſo much as Explanations. It is not required that they ſhould be Clear, provided they be Strong, and the Sentiments occaſioned by them be grounded upon Reaſon. With thoſe two Conditions, a Compariſon may be admitted, and cannot be juſtly condemned.

THUS the Holy Scripture aſcribes to God an Eye, that ſees every Thing, an omnipotent Arm, a dreadful Anger: It ſays that God is a conſuming Fire: Attention, Conſtancy, Reſpect, a Fear of offending God, are the Effects of thoſe Images: They are deſigned to move, and not to enlighten the Mind. Thoſe who know how to uſe their Underſtanding, will not make a wrong Uſe of them, nor miſtake their true Meaning; and if ſome Men are not able to uſe that Faculty, it were in vain to endeavour to bring them to pure Ideas: 'Tis better to move them as well as one can, than to

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give them up to Vice and Ignorance. If their Ideas are confuſed, their Inclinations will be good.

WHEN a Man has any Doubt about the Lawfulneſs of the Sentiments occaſioned by Images, he muſt examine them without any Prejudices, and conſequently ſtrip the Image of its dazzling Power, conſider the Sentiment in it ſelf, and judge of it by the undeniable Principles of Equity and perfect Evidence.

HE muſt therefore enquire, in the firſt place, whether thoſe Sentiments be reaſonable, and whether it be his Duty to be affected with them; and if he finds it ſo, he may give up himſelf to the Images by which thoſe Sentiments are to be raiſed.

A Man born a Heathen, for inſtance, is convinced of the Truth of Chriſtianity; but being ready to profeſs it, he perceives that his Father will die of Grief upon that Account: He is told he will be a Parricide. This is a moving Image; but without any Regard to the Heinouſneſs of that Word, he muſt examine this Queſtion: Whether it be lawful to perſiſt in the Worſhip of Idols, in order to preſerve the Life of a Father.

WHENEVER a Man is urged to do ſomething, or inſtructed about any Subject in figurative Words, he muſt, to prevent being deluded by that Language, change metaphyſical Expreſſions into ſimple and literal ones: The Ideas will then be clearer, and the Judgment he makes of them eaſier and truer.

GOD is indiviſible: The Soul and Truth are alſo indiviſible. The Light is not without Heat: Therefore one cannot have the one without the other; and conſequently Truth is not to be found among unregenerated Men. If you expreſs that figurative Language in proper Words, there will be no Senſe in that Argument, which has been made by ſome Men very ſeriouſly.

A METAPHORICAL Word includes a Compariſon: It expreſſes more than one Idea: It affirms that one Thing is like another. But, becauſe it does not determine how far that Reſemblance goes, in order to know it, 'tis neceſſary to have a clear Notion of the Thing, and of the Image under which it is offered; and in order to underſtand the Senſe, which an Author puts upon thoſe Words, he muſt be conſulted in thoſe Places, where he expreſſes himſelf with more Simplicity.

SOME Men, to baniſh Eloquence from the Pulpit, argue thus: *The Preachers of the Goſpel are Fiſhermen, and their Bait*

Bait is not a Ruby; *'tis only a Worm.* But as a Fiſherman uſes the beſt Method he can think of to obtain his End, in like manner a Preacher ſpeaks elegantly, that he may the better inſtruct and move his Audience. A Worm is made uſe of to catch Fiſh, not becauſe it is a contemptible Inſect, but becauſe Fiſh love that Food. In like manner, a Preacher ought to conform himſelf to the Capacity of his Hearers. If you inſiſt upon that Compariſon, you will find that a Fiſherman deceives Fiſh, and kills them under Pretence of feeding them.

HERE follows another Argument of the ſame Nature. *A Paſtor is the Father of his Flock*; *but any Man of Senſe would think it very ridiculous, that a Father, ſpeaking to his Children, ſhould uſe all the Ornaments of Oratory.* I ſhall ſay nothing of ſome Imperfections of that Argument, whereby Study, the Uſe of Cloaths, and the Ringing of Bells, might be as well forbidden as Eloquence. I ſhall only examine the Juſtneſs of the Compariſon, which appears at firſt ſomewhat plauſible. In a proper Senſe, a Father has given Life to his Children: He is their Maſter, and may oblige them to obey his Commands. From their Childhood they have been uſed to ſubmit to his Orders: It is their Intereſt, as well as his, that he ſhould preſerve that Authority; laſtly, his Family does always conſiſt of few People. None of thoſe Characters agree to a Paſtor, with reſpect to his Flock. Thoſe Perſons, who make up his Flock, are no further obliged to have a Fatherly Reſpect for him, than as they are convinced of his Care to teach them the Truth: It is upon that Account he deſerves the metaphorical Title of Father. But though he has as much Love and Zeal for his Flock, as a Father for his Children, yet it does not follow that he has the ſame Right. That very Thing, wherein he is like a Father, requires from him that he ſhould uſe his utmoſt Endeavours to preach with a good Succeſs, and conſequently not to neglect Eloquence.

IF we enquire alſo into the Reaſons, why Children ought to obey their Parents, even in the moſt indifferent Things, we ſhall ſee that the ſame Reaſons do not oblige a Flock to have the ſame Complaiſance for their Paſtor. The Education of Children, the Quiet of Families, and the Peace of the Society, require the Submiſſion of Children to the Will of a Father. But the Beauty of a Religious Society conſiſts in having no other Rule but the Will of God; in *examining every Thing, to retain only what is Good*; and not being ſo blind, as to fancy that we *obey the Commands of God, when we only*

obey

obey the Commands of Men. Whenever an Eccleſiaſtical Superior uſurps the Rights and *Authority* of Reaſon over thoſe who are committed to his Care, Superſtition riſes upon the Ruins of true Piety, and Prejudices are confounded with Religion.

THE Queſtion, ſo warmly debated about the *Flight of the Paſtors* *, would have been more eaſily determined, if it had not been clogged with Metaphors. A General, who forſakes his Army: A Shepherd, who leaves his Sheep to the Mercy of the Wolves, as ſoon as he ſees them: Thoſe Images make an Impreſſion upon the Mind: The Army is loſt: The Sheep are deſtroyed: 'Tis an unavoidable Thing. Beſides, we are uſed to the Metaphor of *Paſtor* and *Flock*, and not unwilling that the Head of a Church, which is a ſmall Spiritual Army, ſhould be compared to a General. But laying aſide the figurative Style, the Queſtion comes to this; Whether a certain Number of Men will be given up to Error and Vice, as ſoon as a certain Orator is no longer at their Head. Books can be no longer of any Uſe to them to learn their Duty: They cannot love God and his Laws: They muſt be inſtructed by a Man, who has a Title. If Men cannot avoid being impoſed upon by Sophiſms, without the Help of a General, who reſolves them, an Aſſembly of Chriſtians will turn Mahometan, if their Head is not ſo eloquent, bold, and ſubtil, as a General or an Orator of the Sect of *Mahomet*.

* *That is, about the* French *Miniſters retiring into Foreign Countries in the late Perſecution.*

THE Advice I have juſt now given, ſeems at firſt to take away all the Benefit of metaphorical Inſtructions; for, it will be ſaid, that if in order to underſtand them, the Nature of the Thing in queſtion muſt be the Rule of its Explication, it follows, that to reap ſome Benefit from thoſe Inſtructions, it is already neceſſary to apprehend what they are deſigned to teach, and conſequently that they are uſeleſs. I anſwer, 1. That it would be loſt Labour to inſtruct us about a Subject altogether unknown to us: It were in vain to name it; its Name would not be attended with any Idea. When we are Inſtructed, we are always led from a general Knowledge to a more determinate one; and what we learn about a Thing, can never be inconſiſtent with what we knew of it before. 2. Metaphorical Inſtructions enable us to encreaſe our Knowledge, becauſe, as I have already ſaid, they afford us an occaſion of proceeding to the Diſcovery of a new

new Subject, by ſeeking in it orderly, and one after another, the Attributes of a like Subject, which is already known to us.

Many Sorts of Compariſons.

VII. I HAVE ſaid that a Metaphor is a ſort of Compariſon; for there are Compariſons of many Kinds. A *Parable* is fetched from what has, or may be done; but the Image of an *Apologue* or *Fable* is plainly fictitious In both of them, all the Strokes of the Image are not minded: They are not all ſignificant. Some, like the Frame of a Picture, do not contribute to the Reſemblance, but are only an Ornament: 'Tis enough that the Application in general be Juſt; the Deſign is only to be minded. An *Emblem* requires more Exactneſs: Every Stroke ought to be ſignificant: 'Tis an Image, which offers a Thing under many Views; and each Part of that Image muſt have a Relation to ſome Circumſtance of the Thing ſignified. Some *Alluſion* is commonly added to it, that is, ſome remarkable Words, ſpoken the firſt Time for another Subject, but applicable to this, by reaſon of ſome Reſemblance.

THE Rules of Morality have been neceſſary to Men at all Times; but no Syſtem of Morality was compoſed, or even thought of till after many Ages. The Laws have always appeared hard to Mankind, becauſe they lay a Conſtraint upon their Liberty; and ſometimes the Lawgivers themſelves had their own Intereſt more at Heart than the Good of Men. The Laws were more favourably received, when propoſed as mere Counſels. Sometimes their Luſtre has been ſet off with bright Expreſſions: It was thought grave Sentences would contribute to make Men ſenſible of their Importance. It was alſo believed that the Sweetneſs of Verſes would inſinuate them more eaſily into the Mind. But of all the Methods that have been uſed to inſtruct Men in their Duty, I queſtion whether there has been any more ingenious and more effectual than Fables; and indeed that Method is very antient (*n*). A Man may ſee the Enormity, or the Ridiculouſneſs (*o*) of Vice, not only in other Men, but

(*n*) *In the ninth Chapter of the* Judges, Jotham *does lively repreſent his Right under the cover of a Fable.*

In the moſt antient Times of the Republick of Rome, Menenius *put an End to a popular Tumult with the Help of an Apologue.*

(*o*) *What* Cicero *ſays of Comick Poets, ought to be ſaid of Fables.* Hæc conficta arbitror à Poëtis, ut effictos noſtros mores in aliis perſonis

but alſo in another ſort of Beings, and by that Means he is the more willing to condemn it, becauſe he is not ſo ſenſible that he condems himſelf. Beſides, the Images offered in a Fable are very juſt. The Light of Reaſon and the Rules of Morality differ only in Name; and when a Man departs from his Duty, he diſhonours his Nature, to act like Beaſts, which are only governed by their Senſes and Paſſions. When a Man is not prepoſſeſſed by ſome Intereſt, which blinds his Mind, he is ſenſible of what is Good, and diſcerns by Inſtinct what is Juſt, from what is Unjuſt. A Fable works upon that Inſtinct, and places Man in that Point of Sight where he ought to be, in order to perceive the Turpitude of Vice.

A *RIDDLE* is a Series of Compariſons, which denote the particulars of a Thing by Names taken from many different Subjects, but reſembling that of the Riddles, each in its own way. Sometimes to make the Solution of a Riddle more difficult, it is perplexed with a Mixture of plain and figurative Style.

THERE was a Time when the Eaſtern Kings glory'd in writing, and reſolving Riddles. The Taſte of a Prince, illuſtrious by his Wit or Power, was ſufficient to introduce the Uſe of them. It may be alſo, that the Style of the antient wiſe Men in their Inſtructions did contribute to it. They writ them obſcurely, perhaps that Men might always want their Help to underſtand them; perhaps alſo with a Deſign to make their Knowledge the more valuable, becauſe it would be leſs common; and laſtly, perhaps they expreſſed themſelves obſcurely about thoſe Things, which they underſtood very well, only to conceal their Ignorance of thoſe, which were not ſo well known to them, and about which they could not expreſs their Thoughts more clearly.

I ADD, that Nature being a Riddle, and becauſe 'tis extremely difficult to diſcover the Cauſes of thoſe Things, which ſtrike upon our Senſes, and we cannot pretend to have found out the true Cauſe of a Phænomenon, but when it may be apply'd

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ſonis, expreſſamque imaginem vitæ quotidianæ videremus. *Orat. pro P. Quint.*

Illi qui ſimpliciter, & demonſtrandæ rei cauſſâ eloquebantur, parabolis referti ſunt: quas exiſtimo neceſſarias, non ex eâdem cauſſa qua poëtis, ſed ut imbecillitatis noſtræ adminicula ſint, & ut diſcentem & audientem in rem præſentem adducant. *Sen. Ep.* LIX.

apply'd with an equal Facility to all its Parts and Circumſtances; the Riddles of Words afford the Mind an Exerciſe, whereby it learns to unfold the Riddles of Things themſelves.

THERE is a Time for every Thing. Riddles were in Vogue about the End of the laſt Century; and perhaps they are none of the moſt glorious Things of that Age. At leaſt it ſeems to me, that if I had been ſo weak as to comply with that Humour, and follow the Stream, I ſhould be now perfectly aſhamed to read my Name in a long Liſt of idle People, and to ſee that there was a Time, when I took a Pride in letting all *France*, and almoſt all *Europe* know, that I, an Inhabitant of ſuch a Town, had been ſo witty as to gueſs that the Deſign of a certain Heap of Words was to expreſs a Flute, an Arrow, a Fan.

SOME Men of a very ſuperior Rank exerciſe themſelves now, and haraſs one another with Riddles of a different Kind. They are Problems, the Solution whereof requires an uncommon Sagacity, and a great Skill in Calculation and Geometrical Theorems. Thoſe Learned Riddles are like thoſe juſt now mentioned, in this Reſpect, that 'tis more eaſy to invent than to reſolve them. It frequently happens, whilſt a Man is in ſearch of a Truth, that another Truth offers it ſelf, which he did not look for. He finds all of a ſudden, and by chance, what he would not otherwiſe have found, but after many Attempts. As he goes along, he happens to be in a certain Point of Sight, from whence he eaſily diſcovers what others cannot obſerve without great Difficulty, for want of placing themſelves in that ſame Point of Sight, which is not to be attained but after many Eſſays, or by a happy Chance. In his Enquiries, he takes Care to make his Way eaſy, and to ſee it at every Step; but when he puts others upon the Search, inſtead of paving their Way, he often ſtops it, and makes it as dark as he can. He joins together ſeveral Parts one after another; but he offers them to others under one ſingle Idea, or Expreſſion, in which they are involved; and then *Analyſis* is much more difficult than *Compoſition*.

THERE are ſtill many Things to be learned, that Men of Letters, inſtead of obſtructing their Way mutually, ſhould all unite, and lend one another a helping Hand, to make a greater and quicker Progreſs. If a Man diſcovers ſomething, without knowing what Uſe it may be of, let him only diſcourſe about it with his Friends, or publiſh it as a mere Curioſity. Nay, if a Diſcovery does not appear uſeful, I think

think it would be more glorious to publiſh it as a Trifle found out in one's Way, than as a ſublime Theory, which required a great deal of Time. As for thoſe Things that are of ſome Uſe, they cannot be imparted to the Publick too ſoon, nor too clearly: A Man ought to make ſuch a Preſent to others, becauſe he is a Man.

"BUT (ſay thoſe Geometricians) we are willing the "Learned ſhould have the Pleaſure of reſolving a Problem; "it is certainly a much greater Pleaſure than that of reading "it reſolved." Perhaps, one may very well doubt of it. Are they not willing, on the contrary, to make others pay dear for the Knowledge imparted to them, and to make them ſenſible it has not been acquired without a very great Labour? Would they be heartily ſorry, if inſtead of procuring to the Learned the Pleaſure of reſolving a Problem, and being thereby convinced that they are as able Geometricians as he who propoſed it, they ſhould engage them to take great Pains to no Purpoſe, and to acknowledge their Inferiority? After all, a Man, who will have the Pleaſure of trying his Strength, may do ſo ſtill. When he has read the Title of a Problem, he may look for the Solution without reading it; and becauſe all Men have not the ſame Strength of Mind, ſome will reſolve it without any Help, and others after the Reading of ſome Lines.

WHEN a Series of Metaphors is clearly underſtood, it goes by the Name of *Allegory*; and if an Allegory is full of Metaphors too far fetch'd, or if their Number is too great, eſpecially when they are inconſiſtent, thoſe Metaphors become a Riddle (*p*). In religious Matters an Allegory ſignifies

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(*p*) Quo in genere primùm fugienda eſt diſſimilitudo:

——— Cœli ingentes fornices.

Quamvis ſphæram in ſcenam (ut dicitur) attulerit Ennius, tamen in ſphæra fornicis ſimilitudo non poteſt ineſſe.

——— Vive, Ulyſſes, dum licet:
Oculis poſtremum lumen radiatum rape.

Non dixit cape, non pete; haberet enim moram ſperantis diutius eſſe ſeſe victurum: ſed rape, hoc verbum eſt ad id aptatum quod ante dixerat, *dum licet*. Deinde videndum eſt, ne longè ſimile ſit ductum, Syrtim patrimonii, ſcopulum libentiùs dixerim, Charybdim bonorum, voraginem potiùs: faciliùs enim ad ea quæ viſa, quàm ad illa quæ audita ſunt, mentis oculi feruntur. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* III.

"It

nifies the Expreſſion of a Spiritual Thing, under the Cover of a material one.

A TYPE is a Repreſentation of a future Event, as a *Monument* is a Repreſentation or *Memorial* of a Thing paſt. The Words, which expreſs thoſe Images, agree ſometimes equally to the Image and the Thing repreſented by it. Sometimes they are only true with Reſpect to the *Body* of the Image; and at other Times they are only meant of the Thing ſignified. *What a fine Air it has! It was made by a very able Hand! What an admirable Man!* Thoſe Things are ſaid of a Picture.

THE Uſe of Allegories is very antient. Men admire what is obſcure. What they eaſily apprehend, ſeems to them to be ſmall; and on the contrary, what they do not underſtand, appears to them great and ſublime. Thoſe who profeſs'd to teach the Sciences, thought fit to comply with that Humour, and found their Account in it, as I have already ſaid. Men could not be without their Help; and their Writings were not the leſs valued, becauſe they wanted to be cleared by Word of Mouth. People grew fond of Riddles and Hieroglyphicks. Under the Cover of one Thing, another Thing was meant. The Heathen Philoſophers took Advantage of that Cuſtom to juſtify the Abſurdities of their Religion. The Hiſtories of *Jupiter*, *Juno*, *Mars*, *Venus*, *&c.* contained, in their Opinion, Phyſical and Moral Truths. It were to be wiſh'd the antient Fathers of the Church had been more free from that ill Taſte. They have, without any ill Intention, ſported with the Scripture, and left to their Succeſſors an Example the more dangerous, becauſe it is grounded upon their Authority. Whoever has any Reſpect for common Senſe, muſt needs wonder at the Multitude of poor Things that came from the Pen of thoſe good Men; they might be reckon'd by Thouſands. Here follow ſome of them.

THEODORET pretends that one of the Goats, mentioned in *Leviticus*, repreſented the Human Nature, and the other

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" It has been objected againſt *Cicero*, that he tranſgreſſes his own " Rule, and uſes inconſiſtent Metaphors, one after another. He re- " joices becauſe the City of *Rome* has vomited *Catiline*; and he adds, " that this Monſter comes out againſt its Will, and ſhews by its Looks " and Motions that it would devour the City. One cannot have " in his Body, and much leſs throw out of his Mouth a Monſter, " which may devour him.

other the Divine Nature of Christ. St. *Irenæus* will have it, that the Ass of *Balaam* represents the Body of Christ loaded with our Sins; but *Origen* is of Opinion, that the Ass bearing *Balaam* represented the Church bearing Christ. The Love of Types made St. *Irenæus* fancy three Spies instead of two, to make them a Type of the Trinity. St. *Jerome*, otherwise a judicious Man, fancy'd that the seven Sons of *Job* represented the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, and his Three Daughters the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospel. He might as well have found in them the seven Tunes, and the three principal Keys of our Musick.

IT were to be wished, some judicious Divines would be so courageous as to lay down clear Rules for Typical and Allegorical Explications; otherwise there will be no End of running into extravagant Notions; and that Method of explaining the Scripture will be a Source of inextricable Absurdities and Contradictions.

IT is a sad Thing, that in an Age so learned as ours is, and when Divines are more concerned than ever, not to expose Religion to the Jests of Libertines, whose Number was never so great, and who never disputed with so much Boldness and Subtilty, some Men should indulge their Imagination so far, as to make the Scripture say whatever they please, and frequently with as little Reason, as Children make Bells say whatever comes into their Minds. 'Tis opening a Way to become a Visionary. Mystical Men and Visionaries are less timorous than mere Allegorical Divines: They have quicker Flights, and those Flights go farther; but 'tis the same Genius at the Bottom: And if it be once lawful to leave the Way of common Sense, why may not one depart from it four Steps, as well as two?

I DESIGN to ask some Favours of the LORD, or express my Acknowledgment to him for those I have received, or I design to celebrate his Greatness and Perfections. To that End, I borrow the Words of *David*, and I think I understand them. But it seems, that whilst I am only taken up with the Performance of the Duty of Prayer, I utter Prophecies, without knowing it; I foretell the Calling of the *Gentiles*, the Conversion of the *Jews*, the Reformation of the Church, the Destruction of Antichrist, the Wars of *Germany*, and the Victories of *Gustavus Adolphus*; I repeat some Dialogues between the Father and the Son, and some Treaties stipulated according to all the Formalities of Civilians.

WITHOUT

WITHOUT giving ſo great a Scope to my Fancy, I ſhall eaſily find the greateſt Myſteries of Theology in the *Odes* of *Horace*. I ſhall find them in every Part of Nature; and, if I pleaſe, I ſhall ſee in the different Kinds of Birds, in the Variety of their Singing and Feathers, very plain Types of all Religious Orders.

SOME will have it, that the Ark, an Image of the Church, toſſed by the Waters without Sails, without Oars and a Helm, is a Type, which teaches us, that the Preſervation of the Church is only owing to Providence, and that the Art of Men has no Hand in it. Others will tell us, That the Tabernacle, another Image of the Church, about which the *Levites* encamped, is a Type of the Aſſiſtance which the Church receives from the Arms and Power of Princes.

A MAN, who has ſome Wit and ſome Vivacity of Imagination, thinks all thoſe Compariſons are too mean, and too eaſy to glory in them; but a ſhallow Wit, a Man of a dull Imagination, admires them: He knows not how he comes to have ſuch refined Thoughts, and gives Glory to God for thoſe ſubtil Diſcoveries, which he aſcribes to the Divine Goodneſs.

A PREACHER is overjoy'd to inform his Audience, that he and his Collegues are mention'd, under Types, in every Page of the Old Teſtament; and the Reſpect of the Hearers encreaſes for an Orator, whom GOD has been pleaſed to repreſent under ſo many Figures. But a Preacher, inſtead of pretending to be where he is not to be found, ſhould make it his main Buſineſs to teach ſolid and eſſential Duties, and enforce the Practice of them.

A PREDICTION is a Proof of the Divinity of what is propoſed to be believed. But a Proof ought to be convincing; and every Paſſage, that is capable of a very natural Senſe, without any prophetical Thing in it, cannot be accounted a Prediction. Beſides, what is the Deſign of Prophecies? To make us believe. And what is the Deſign of Faith? To make us live a good Life, and glorify GOD by our Sanctification (*q*). This being laid down, is it reaſonable to look for a prophetical Senſe under the Cover of Words, which certainly contain a moral Senſe? Were it ſo, the Outſide would offer a more uſeful Inſtruction than the

(*q*) *Matt.* v. 16. vii. 21. & ſeq. xii. 50. xxii. 37–39. xxv. 34. & ſeq.

the Inside, and the literal Sense would deserve our Attention more than the spiritual Sense.

AN Example contains also a Similitude. If it be good, it ought to be imitated; if it be a bad one, every Thing that is like it, ought to be avoided.

EXAMPLES must not be confounded with Proofs. An Example clears a Proposition, but does not prove it. It clears a Proposition, because it offers the Sense of it under more affecting Ideas, as being more determinate. That new Light pleases: Men are contented with it, and look upon it as a Proof, though it be no Proof at all. When I have said, *One has the same Product by changing the Multiplicand into the Multiplier, provided one changes at the same Time the Multiplier into the Multiplicand*; I clear that Proposition, which is obscure, as consisting of general and somewhat uncommon Terms, by saying, When after having multiply'd Three by Two, I have the Product Six; if I multiply Two by Three, I shall have again Six; and it is all one to say Two times Three, or, Three times Two, make Six. The Sense of the Proposition is understood: The Truth of it is acknowledged in that Example, to which some others are added, and the same Proposition is still verified; and, lastly, we rather chuse to suppose that it will be so in all other Examples, than to go on with them *in infinitum*.

BUT, that an Example may prove the Truth of an universal Proposition, one must be sure that whatever is laid down in that Example, and by vertue of which one concludes, will necessarily be found in all others. Thus, after having drawn in a Circle a Line through the Center, and another Line which does not pass through the Center, I plainly see 'tis impossible there should ever be any Circle, in which I cannot do the same; at least in Thought. I see with the same Evidence, that in each of those Circles, one may always draw two *Radius's* from the Center to the Extremities of the Line different from the Diameter; from whence it plainly appears, that all the Inferences from those Principles will also prove true in all Circles.

A great Quantity of Comparisons is frequently a Sign of a superficial Wit.

IX. WHEN a Man does easily find out Comparisons, 'tis sometimes a Sign of a great *Extent* of Mind. Besides, some Vivacity and *Penetration* are requisite to discover in one Subject some Attributes like those of another Subject, which, at first, seems to be quite different from it. Moreover, one must have a *Justness* of Thought to borrow from the one, something

that

that may clear the other. But a great Quantity of Comparisons is also frequently a Sign of a *superficial* Wit. For, because the same Idea may be apply'd to Subjects so much the more different, as it is more indeterminate, those, who consider Things only in general, confusedly and lightly, those whose Ideas are neither exact nor determinate, do not perceive the Differences of Things, being only affected with their Equality. And those superficial Wits dwell the more upon Comparisons, and make them the more frequently, because they are amusing, and afford Pleasure, without tiring the Mind, and requiring any great Attention.

It is very dangerous to be too fond of Comparisons and Figures: Such an Inclination makes a false Wit. A Man too eager in the Search of Resemblances is apt to see in Objects whatever is in his Imagination. There are but too many Men, who, when they venture to Reason, are like those who fancy they see any Thing in the Clouds. That Illusion, carried to the highest Degree, makes mad Men. He, who takes the Trunk of a Tree for a Man, and embraces it as an intimate Friend, is certainly out of his Senses: Wherefore a Man departs from Reason and Wisdom, when he admits of false Resemblances. Which being so, may not one fear to spoil the Taste of young People, by requiring from them Exercises, the greatest Part of which runs upon *Similitudes*, before they have got a sufficient Knowledge to make them just? Thus Masters put off teaching the Youth how to think well, till they have spoiled them, by using them to speak and write, without understanding frequently what they say, or what they write down. They fancy they do wonderful Things by discovering to them great Truths, both Physical and Moral, concealed under the Cover of Metamorphoses and Fables, written by a loose Poet to indulge his Imagination. Afterwards young People bring the same Notions into Religion; they give out groundless Conjectures for venerable Mysteries. They admire their own Dreams, and cry out: O Wonders! O Depth! Some People are surprised that among Men of Letters some should have so little Sense: They should rather wonder how they come to have any Sense at all, having had an Education so contrary to common Sense.

Argumenta à Simili.

Concluſions from more to leſs, or from leſs to more.

X. WHEN a Compariſon runs upon *more* or *leſs*, the Argument goes either from more to leſs, or from leſs to more. In ſome Caſes thoſe Arguments are true; but in other Caſes they have no Strength. Here follow the Rules: I look upon *Leſs* as a *Part*, and upon *More* as a *Whole*. If the Whole is not ſufficient, a Part will be inſufficient; but a Part may want a Force, to be found in the Whole. Reciprocally, if a Part is ſufficient, much more the Whole; though one cannot conclude from the Sufficiency of the Whole to that of a Part. Thus in *denying*, I go from more to leſs; and in *affirming*, I go from leſs to more.

BUT thoſe Concluſions have no Place in thoſe Effects, which do not depend upon the ſole Quantity, but upon the *Doſe*, that is, upon the Quantity reduced to a certain Proportion. Moſt Effects in Nature depend upon a certain Proportion between the Cauſes which produce them, and the Diſpoſition of the Subjects which receive them. When that Proportion is altered, the Effect ceaſes, or does extremely vary (*r*). The moſt uſeful Cauſes become pernicious, when they are not confined within a certain Medium. Too great a Heat, and too much Rain, are equally prejudicial to Plants and their Fruits: Too much, as well as too little Nouriſhment ſpoils the Health: He, who eats too much, oppreſſes his Strength; and he, who does not eat ſufficiently, ſuffers it to be exhauſted. A wiſe Man governs himſelf by fixed Proportions from which he does not depart; but ſuch a Wiſdom is uncommon. Moſt Men run always into ſome Extreme: The avoiding of two Extremes requires too great an Attention: Every Body almoſt indulges his Humour, and Humour over-does every Thing (*s*). One Man is liberal, and

(*r*) "The Quantity ought frequently to be ſo preciſe, that if it "be miſſed never ſo little, the Operation will be quite different from "that which was intended." *Mem. of the Acad. of Sciences, for the Year* 1699. p. 69. *See alſo the Hiſtory for the Year* 1700, p. 61. "The Virtue of the *Ypecacuanha* muſt needs conſiſt not in the Quan"tity of its active Principles, but in a certain Doſe; for the Brown "has fewer ſaline and reſinous Particles than the Gray, and yet it "works more violently."

(*s*) "To that Purpoſe the Antients ſay, *Ne quid nimis*: And *So*"*lomon, There is a Time to laugh, and a Time to weep; a Time to be* "*ſilent, and a Time to ſpeak; a Time to get, and a Time to loſe.*" Eccl. *Chap.* iii. "A Man would have often pleaſed others, if he had not "been ſo fond of pleaſing them; and a Diſcourſe would have ap"peared more beautiful, if the Author had not beautified it too much."

and being well pleaſed with the Notion of his Generoſity, ſquanders away his Eſtate. Another is hard, or timorous; he loves to keep what he has, and minds nothing but getting and denying. The Pleaſures of this World, violent Paſſions, and a continual Hurry, draw Men from the Way to Heaven. Whereupon, in order to avoid the Allurements of Pleaſures, and the Violence of Paſſions, ſome fancy their Life can never be too auſtere, nor too remote from the Commerce of Men: Others, to whom ſuch a Retirement appears neither neceſſary nor reaſonable, launch into the World, and live in it, as if a Man was ſo much the more rational, as he is more worldly.

MEDITATION encreaſes the Juſtneſs, Strength, and Capacity of the Mind. Some are only for meditating, and will read nothing; and yet Reading enriches the Memory, and affords a great many Things, which would not be diſcover'd without much Labour; it enlarges the Imagination, and by offering various Characters, it may hinder a Man from growing too fond of his own. Some, on the contrary, will not meditate: They are only for reading; whereby their Minds become weak and barren, and often uncapable of any Diſcernment. Every Body might do what he does, if he did ſomething elſe.

A neceſſary Caution, when a Compariſon runs upon more or leſs.

XI. WHENEVER two Things are to be compared together, and their Compariſon ought to run upon more or leſs, it is neceſſary that thoſe two Things ſhould be of the ſame Kind, and as like as poſſible, and ſo that they ſhould only differ in Degrees. Otherwiſe it will be difficult to find a common Meaſure to determine the more, or the leſs; and there will ariſe Diſputes, whereby the Queſtion will only be more and more perplex'd. Nothing can be more neceſſary than that Rule; and nothing can be more neglected than its Obſervation. It is not only ridiculous to diſpute about the ſeveral Degrees of quite different Subjects, as, for inſtance, whether *Cæſar* was a greater Captain, than *Cicero* a great Orator (*t*); but, in like Caſes, when

(*t*) "Father *Vavaſſeur* did very much exclaim againſt a Thought "of Father *Rapin*, who ſeemed to raiſe the Genius of a great Poet "above that of a General of an Army, and of a Miniſter of State. "That Thought was cenſured with a great Vivacity; and Mr. *Ber-*"*nard* obſerves very judiciouſly upon that Quarrel, that *any Body*

when they are compounded, (and indeed they are all ſo,) it is neceſſary to compare a Part with another Part, and not a Whole with a Whole. I ſhall therefore compare, when the Queſtion is about two Orators, the Strength of the Voice of the one, with the Strength of the Voice of the other: Afterwards, I ſhall compare the Purity of the Diction of the firſt, with the Purity of the Diction of the ſecond; and ſo I ſhall ſucceſſively run over the ſeveral Characters, which contribute to make an Orator eſteem'd (*u*).

PERHAPS that Rule is never more groſly tranſgreſſed, than when a Man compares himſelf with others. He ſees in others ſome Qualities, which he has not, or which he has only in a very inferior Degree; and he finds alſo in himſelf ſome Qualities, which are not eminent in others. But it is very difficult to make a right Eſtimation and an exact Compariſon of Qualities of a different Nature. Men do not trouble

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" *will be at firſt offended at a Parallel between a great Poet and a great*
" *General of an Army, or a great Miniſter of State,*
Nouv. de la Rep. des Lett. Febr. 1710. *p.* 131. " *becauſe the Genius of both of them is grounded upon*
" *quite different Qualities.* A Hero may have a
" ſufficient Extent of Mind to form great Deſigns,
" and a ſufficient Courage to execute them, with-
" out being able to repreſent them well, for want of a happy Ex-
" preſſion, and a copious Imagination."

(*u*) Et auribus multa percipimus, quæ etſi nos vocibus delectant, tamen ita ſunt varia ſæpè, ut id, quod proximum audias, jucundiſſimum eſſe videatur, & oculis colliguntur penè innumerabiles voluptates, quæ non ita capiunt, ut unum ſenſum diſſimili genere delectent, & reliquos ſenſus voluptates oblectent diſpares, ut ſit difficile judicium excellentis maximè ſuavitatis. At hoc idem, quod eſt in naturis rerum, transferri etiam poteſt ad artes. Una fingendi eſt ars, in quâ præſtantes fuerunt Myro, Polycletus, Lyſippus, qui omnes inter ſe diſſimiles fuerunt, ſed ita tamen, ut neminem ſui velis eſſe diſſimilem. Una eſt ars ratioque picturæ, diſſimillimique tamen inter ſe Zeuxis, Aglaophon, Apelles: neque eorum quiſquam eſt, cui quicquam in arte ſuâ deeſſe videatur: & ſi hoc in his, quaſi mutis artibus, eſt mirandum, & tamen verum; quantò admirabilius in oratione atque in linguâ, quæ cum in iiſdem ſententiis verbiſque verſetur, ſummas habet diſſimilitudines, non ſic, ut alii vituperandi ſint, ſed ut ii, quos conſtet eſſe laudandos, in diſpari tamen genere laudentur. ------ Suavitatem Iſocrates, ſubtilitatem Lyſias, acumen Hyperides, ſonitum Æſchines, vim Demoſthenes habuit, quis eorum non egregius? tamen quis cujuſquam niſi ſui ſimilis? Gravitatem Africanus, lenitatem Lælius, aſperitatem Galba, profluens quiddam habuit Corbo, & canorum, quis horum non princeps temporibus illis fuit, & ſuo tamen quiſque in genere princeps?

trouble themſelves with it; and without any Heſitation, they decide in favour of themſelves.

CONVERSATIONS frequently run upon Compariſons; and becauſe the Rule I have juſt now mentioned is commonly neglected, 'tis no wonder if Miſunderſtandings prevail in Converſations, and if the latter, generally ſpeaking, ſerve only to amuſe idle People. Men are weary of Diſputing, before they perceive that they ſpoke all the while without Underſtanding one another.

A COMPARISON cannot run upon more different Subjects than when Finite is compared with Infinite; and therein conſiſts the following Sophiſm. 'Tis ſuppoſed that *Achilles* can go a hundred Feet, whilſt a Tortoiſe goes one Foot. This being laid down, 'tis ſaid that *Achilles* will never overtake the Tortoiſe; for during a time *Achilles* will go a hundred Feet, and the Tortoiſe one. During the hundredth Part of a Time *Achilles* will go one Foot, and the Tortoiſe only the hundredth Part of one Foot. During the hundredth Part of that hundredth Part, *Achilles* will go the hundredth Part of one Foot, and the Tortoiſe the ten thouſandth Part. They go on with that Progreſſion, and *Achilles* is always found behind the Tortoiſe.

THE Sophiſm of that Argument proceeds exactly from hence, that in a Compariſon, which runs upon more and leſs, two Things are compared together, which are the moſt improper to be compared in that Senſe, *viz.* Finite with Infinite. A part of Extenſion is Finite in one Senſe; for it has, on the right Hand, for inſtance, a Surface, beyond which it does not reach, and it is likewiſe terminated by another Surface on the left. But, between thoſe two Extremities, it may be divided into two equal Parts, one of which may be alſo divided into two others, and ſo on. That Diviſion may be continued without any End; and in that Reſpect a Part of Extenſion is infinite, that is, a laſt Term cannot be aſſigned to it. The ſame ought to be ſaid of Time. A Minute begins and ends. Its Beginning follows immediately and without any interruption the End of a foregoing Minute; and its end is in like manner followed, immediately and without Interruption, by the Beginning of the next Minute. That Minute, being thus placed between two Terms, is divided into equal Times; one of which is alſo divided into two others; and a laſt Term cannot be aſſigned to that Diviſion. Time runs continually; and between the Beginning and End of each Part of it there is a Middle.

A FINITE Space of Extenſion is run over during a Time, which is alſo Finite; and that Part of Extenſion, which is divided without End, is run over during a Time; which is alſo divided without End, and proportionally. Thus without any Sophiſm, Finite may be compared with Finite, and alſo Infinite with Infinite.

BUT when the Queſtion is to compare a Body in Motion with another Body, the Motion whereof is ten Times, or a hundred Times ſlower; when the Queſtion is to know where the one will overtake the other; thoſe Queſtions run upon Finite. Infinite ought not come into them.

SINCE the Tortoiſe goes one Foot, whilſt *Achilles* goes a hundred Feet, the Tortoiſe will go $\frac{100}{99}$ Parts of a Foot, whilſt *Achilles* goes a hundred Feet and $\frac{100}{92}$ of a Foot. For $100 . 1 . : : 100 \times \frac{100}{99} = \frac{10000}{99} . \frac{100}{99}$. Wherefore *Achilles*, at the End of a certain Moment, overtakes the Tortoiſe, and will begin to out-run it. Now if *Achilles* goes a hundred Feet in one Minute, he will go a hundred Feet and $\frac{100}{99}$ of a Foot in one Minute, and the ninety ninth Part of one Minute; ſo that at the End of that Time, that is, at the End of one Minute, and the ninety ninth Part of one Minute, the two Bodies in Motion happen to be upon the ſame Line. They will not ſtop there; for the End of a Time has no Duration. Between the Moment of their Arrival at that Line, and the Moment of their Departure from it, there will be no Interval; but one of them will leave its Line or Surface a hundred Times more ſwiftly than the other; and at the End of one Minute, *Achilles* will be ninety nine Feet diſtant from the Tortoiſe.

Identity.

XII. WHEN I ſay, that the ſame Idea, which diſcovers to us one of two like Things, diſcovers alſo the other, it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe that Ideas are Pictures, and that one of thoſe Pictures repreſent many like Objects. 'Tis enough that the ſame Form, the ſame State of the Thought may be applied indifferently to any of ſeveral like Objects, and that the Mind continuing in the ſame Way of Thinking may ſucceſſively know many Attributes, repreſented by that conſtant Manner of perceiving.

THE Reader will apprehend more diſtinctly what to continue in the ſame Way of Thinking is, if I explain the Force of that Term, and the Nature of *Identity*. 'Tis a Subject proper for this Chapter. We frequently ſay of *like* Things, that they are the *ſame*; and Identity is a kind of Relation, which reſults from the Compariſon of a Thing with it ſelf.

We

We ſay, it remains the ſame, when at different Times we always find it like, and conceive it a ſecond Time ſuch as it was known to us the firſt Time.

WANT of Exactneſs in the Language of Men leads us continually into Error, when we make it the Rule of our Ideas. Sometimes Things are multiplied, becauſe they have different Names; and at other Times, very different Things are confounded together, becauſe they have but one Name: This is what happens with reſpect to Identity.

SOMETIMES *to remain the ſame*, ſignifies to continue to exiſt. In that Senſe, I ſay the Univerſe is now the ſame, as it was two thouſand Years ago, that is, the Univerſe, which did exiſt two thouſand Years ago, has not been annihilated, and another created in the room of it. I, who did exiſt twenty Years ago, do ſtill exiſt. I was a Being, and I have continued to be a Being to this Day. I was a ſelf-concious Being twenty Years ago, and I am ſtill a ſelf-conſcious Being; I know that my Self-conſciouſneſs remains ſtill among a great Variety of other Sentiments, which lead me to the Knowledge of outward Objects.

THOSE Ideas are ſimple: They ought not to be perplexed. The ſame ought to be ſaid of Modes. The Roundneſs of a Wax-Ball, which has not been altered, remains the ſame: That round Wax is ſtill round Wax. The Subſtance remains ſtill the ſame, whilſt it is a Subſtance, that is, whilſt it has a ſeparate Exiſtence, whilſt its Exiſtence is not the Exiſtence of any other Thing, or, which comes to the ſame, whilſt it is what it is, and not ſomething different from it ſelf: And conſequently a Subſtance remains the ſame, whilſt it does exiſt; for it would ceaſe to exiſt, if it ſhould ceaſe to be a Subſtance. And a Mode remains the ſame, whilſt its Subſtance exiſts in the ſame State.

THIS leads us to the ſecond Senſe of the Word *Identity*. A Thing is ſaid to be no longer the ſame, becauſe it has undergone ſome Alteration, though it continues to exiſt, and be ſtill a Subſtance; and reciprocally it is accounted the ſame, becauſe it has preſerved its Modes without any Alteration. But it ought to be obſerved that a Subſtance, having many Modes, may loſe ſome and preſerve others; and therefore it is affirmed or denied to be ſtill the ſame, according as it is conſidered with reſpect to thoſe it has loſt, or to thoſe it retains ſtill.

SENECA makes a Sophiſtical Argument (*x*), by compoſing it of the different Significations of the Word, the Ambiguity whereof I have juſt now removed. To eaſe a Man's Grief for the Loſs of his Friends, he repreſents to him that other Friends may be got. *But they will not be the ſame. You are not the ſame neither*, ſays he; *You change continually*. When a Man complains that new Friends do not ſucceed thoſe, whom he has loſt, it is not becauſe they are not of the ſame Humour and the ſame Age, and have not the ſame Degree of Health: Theſe are the Changes we undergo. But we do not become other individual Men, as new Friends are individual Men different from the old ones.

WHEN the Alterations of a Thing are not ſenſible, it is thought to remain the ſame, becauſe thoſe Alterations are not obſerved; which happens, when they are made by Degrees. Thus a Boat, mended every Year, is accounted the ſame Boat that was launched a hundred Years ago; and a River is ſaid to be ſame, becauſe its Chanel is not altered, and becauſe the new Water makes continually the like Impreſſion upon the Senſes, as that which did run before. A Senate is always accounted the ſame, becauſe we forget the Changes made in it by degrees, and becauſe we continually perceive that the Senators have the ſame Rights, and the ſame Authority.

CHAP.

(*x*) Quemadmodum frondium jactura facilis eſt, quia renaſcuntur: ſic iſtorum quos amas, quoſque oblectamenta vitæ putas eſſe, damnum: quia reparantur, etiam ſi non renaſcantur. Sed non erunt iidem. Ne tu quidem idem eris; omnis dies, omnis hora te mutat: ſed in aliis rapina facilius apparet: hic latet, quia non ex aperto fit. Alii auferuntur: at ipſi nobis furto ſubducimur. *Sen. Ep.* CIV.

What we read in Montagne, *Book* II. *Chap.* 12. *is alſo a Heap of Equivocations, and conſequently of falſe Thoughts.* "He, who borrowed ſome Money heretofore, does not owe it now; and he, who was invited laſt Night to come to Dinner this Morning, comes to Day uninvited; for, they are no longer the ſame, but other Men. - - - Yeſterday dies in this preſent Day; and this preſent Day will die in the next: And there is nothing that remains ſtill the ſame. - - - It is not likely that we ſhould have new Paſſions without a Change; and what undergoes a Change, does not remain the ſame, and conſequently does not exiſt. Wherefore the Senſes are miſtaken, and deceive us, taking what appears for what exiſts. - - - The ſame happens to Nature, which is meaſured by Time, as to Time, that meaſures it; for there is nothing in it that remains and ſubſiſts; but every Thing is either born, or really to be born, or dying".

CHAP. IV.

Of the Relations of Diverſity.

I. WHEN the Idea we form of an Object, cannot diſcover to us another Object, which we compare with it, thoſe two Objects are ſaid to be *different*, or *unlike*. Each of them is repreſented by its Idea; and the Idea of the one, cannot be the Idea of the other. *Wherein Diverſity conſiſts.*

II. WHEN two Things, notwithſtanding their Difference, are found in one and the ſame Subject, they are only called *diverſe*, *different*, *unlike*, and retain the general Name. Thus in one and the ſame Perſon there is Learning and Probity; in one and the ſame Body there is Figure and Motion: But when the Difference goes as far as Inconſiſtency; when two Attributes cannot ſubſiſt together in one and the ſame Subject, but exclude one another; when one of them does neceſſarily ſuppoſe the Abſence of the other; we conceive between them a Relation of *Oppoſition* and *Contrariety*. *There are different ſorts of Diverſity.*

III. SOMETIMES Diverſity is over-ſtretched, and carried as far as Oppoſition; and ſometimes Contrariety is only called *Unlikeneſs*. Philoſophers are divided in their Explications of a Phœnomenon; and it frequently happens that each of them thinks well, without thinking of every Thing; and that he ſees part of the Truth, and not the whole Truth. They ſhould therefore agree, inſtead of oppoſing one another: Their Miſtake conſiſts in this, That each of them believes he is the only one who has hit upon the Truth (*a*). One ſays, That *Heat* is occaſioned by a confuſed Motion: Another *Which are confounded together.*

(*a*) "When the Matter is narrowly examined, the two Opinions "are found to be True, unleſs they ſhould pretend to exclude one "another." *Hiſtory of the Academy of Sciences, for the Year 1700, pag.* 37.

Another pretends it consists in the Rotation of the small Corpuscles, which compose the large Masses, or are scattered in them. Each of those Causes may contribute to Heat; for those Motions are different; but they are not opposite. Saline and Sulphurous Particles may chiefly contribute to Savour and Smell; and all the other Particles, which are neither Saline nor Sulphurous, may also produce such Effects. There has been a warm Dispute about this Question; Whether *Digestion* is performed by a mere Trituration, or by Fermentation, or by the Activity of the Spirits. Each of the Disputants proves his Opinion well enough, without destroying the Opinion of the other. They may be united; and it seems to me that Digestion is owing to those different Causes.

ONE ascribes to Acids, and another to fiery Particles, the Power of making Drunk, and Rotting. Those two Causes may produce those Effects. A red-hot Iron, put into Oil, at several Times, loses its fiery Particles as well as its Acids. The same ought to be said of the other Preparations, whereby it is soften'd.

IN the Conduct of Life, and the Judgments made of other Men, we commit a thousand like Mistakes. A Man is Polite; 'tis inferred from thence that he wants Sincerity. He is Gay and Complaisant; and therefore he is accounted a worldly Man. Because he is cautious, he is charged with want of Zeal and Courage. Laziness goes by the Name of Modesty; and a careful Examination is looked upon as Presumption and Uneasiness. Men go generally from *one Extreme to another*. Every thing appears to them Great or Small, highly Valuable, or very Contemptible. A Man does not shew all the Probity, that was expected from him; he is therefore an ill Man, a Man of no Principles, no Conscience. He has not cleared a certain Point to our Satisfaction: He is an ignorant Man *(b)*.

THIS is one of the main Causes of *Superstition*. Indifferent Actions are not so bright as Virtues; and therefore they are placed among Vices. To spend Part of one's Time in Recreations, to love the Pleasures of the Senses, even when the Use of our Senses is necessary, is, in the Judgment of some, to be *a carnal Man*, and not *a spiritual Man*, to live like a Beast, and not like a Christian, and consequently to depart from God and the Happiness of Eternal Life.

(b) Non statim pusillum est, si quid maximo minus est. *Sen.*

Life. But can a rational Man think that a good and wiſe God is diſpleaſed with us, when we live agreeably to the Nature he has given us; and that our Actions are not acceptable to him, unleſs they be attended with painful Duties? Difference is confounded with Inconſiſtency; which is very wrong. A Man may be a Philoſopher, and eat at a good Table; he may be a Philoſopher and a Father; unleſs we ſuppoſe that Wiſdom deſtroys human Nature in this Life, and changes it into the Nature of Angels. According to that Hypotheſis, (I deſire the Readers to mind this Obſervation,) what would Juſtice and Charity come to, which God does ſo much recommend to us? They would procure or preſerve good Things, which it would not be lawful to enjoy. A good Man deſires that his looſe Son ſhould be reclaimed from his Vices. His Son, at laſt, not only gives over his Miſtreſſes, and leaves off Drinking, but grows inſenſible to every Thing. He has no Pleaſure at his Father's Table, no Fondneſs for his Wife and Children. Muſt a Man, in order to pleaſe God, take a Courſe of Life, which a rational Man cannot approve?

IN Point of Religion, if inſtead of dooming and condemning unmercifully one's Neighbour to everlaſting Puniſhments, Men would be ſo charitable as to believe that others may think upon ſome Articles otherwiſe than themſelves, without being undone by it, their Opinions would be more quietly examined; and it would frequently appear that the Notions of Chriſtians are different without being contrary; that there is a greater Oppoſition between their Words than between their Ideas; and conſequently that their Diviſions proceed chiefly from the ill Humour of the leading Men, whoſe Authority draws the Multitude after them.

VIRTUE is preferrable to Riches, Honours, and Pleaſures; and therefore Pleaſures, Honours, and Riches, are ſet in Oppoſition to it. To make that Oppoſition greater, 'tis affirmed that thoſe Advantages have no manner of Affinity with Virtue. We are told that Virtue is the only Good. Nothing elſe deſerves that Name. But if it be ſo, when a Man is ſtripp'd, ſince what is taken from him is, properly ſpeaking, of no Value, and he only loſes what is neither good nor bad, what Harm does he ſuffer? What Reaſon can he have to complain?

THE Stoicks made it their Buſineſs to ſtrain that Oppoſition. *I don't complain*, ſays *Seneca*, *becauſe Pleaſures are preferred to Virtue: I complain, becauſe they are ſet on the ſame Level: 'Tis an Indignity which I cannot bear. Virtue*

is an irreconcileable Enemy to Pleaſures: It deſpiſes them; it cannot bear them (c).

ON the contrary, Men undertake ſometimes to reconcile thoſe Things, that are the moſt inconſiſtent; which is the Cauſe of ſo many Contradictions they fall into. They aſcribe to material Beings, Inclinations and Reluctancies inconſiſtent with their Inſenſibility and Want of Knowledge. One Man aſcribes to a blind Cauſe the wiſeſt Order and Contrivance: Another entertains ſuch Ideas of God, as overthrow his Goodneſs, his Equity, or ſome other of his Perfections: And a great many People fancy they are in the right Way, notwithſtanding their Indulgence for ſeveral Habits quite contrary to the Purity and Uprightneſs of the Heart. Intereſt and other Paſſions do not allow Men to perceive the Force of an Oppoſition; and they are contented to look upon it as an inconſiderable Difference.

A Remedy.

IV. ALL thoſe Miſtakes proceed from the ſame Cauſe. Men do not take a ſufficient Care to have right Notions of Things. Inſtead of dwelling upon thoſe which they deſire to know as long as they ſhould do, to be able to judge of them, they are contented to take a curſory View of them; and then they ſuppoſe they are only what they would have them to be; either oppoſite, if they like it ſo; or conſiſtent, and only different, if it ſuits beſt with their Inclination: And after they have given them a Name, they reſt ſatisfied with it, as if it was a certain and infallible Mark. From that Time, Things are what they have thought fit to call them.

WHEREFORE we ought, in the firſt Place, to form clear and right Notions; and then by comparing them attentively, it will not be difficult to know whether one of them implies the Excluſion of the other. If they do not exclude one another, the Attributes which they offer, may be united in one and the ſame Subject; but if one excludes the other, they are oppoſite; they cannot be reconciled. An *Angle* does not imply *Motion*; but it does not exclude it: Therefore one and the ſame Subject may be pointed, and in Motion.

(c) Non indignor, quòd poſt voluptatem ponitur virtus, ſed quòd omninò cum voluptate confertur. Contemptrix ejus & hoſtis eſt, & longiſſimè ab illa reſiliens, labori ac dolori familiarior, virilibus incommodis, quàm iſti effœminato bono inſerenda. *Sen. de Brnef. Lib.* IV. *cap.* 3.

Motion. An *Angle* excludes *Roundneſs*: Therefore a Circle has no Angles. *Thought* is neceſſarily ſelf-conſcious; for, it would not be Thought, if it was not ſelf-conſcious. Therefore Thought can be nothing, That is not ſelf-conſcious: Its Idea excludes every Thing that does not perceive it ſelf; and conſequently it is no *extended* Thing; for, Extenſion can be perceived by Thought, but it does not perceive and know it ſelf. If Thought was a Mode and a State of Extenſion, Extenſion, which is not ſelf-conſcious, would be in a perceiving State: Its Mode or its State would be ſelf-conſcious, but Extenſion would not be ſelf-conſcious; and yet the Mode and State of a Thing, is the Thing it ſelf. The State is the Thing it ſelf; the State knows it ſelf; and the Thing, whereof it is the State, does not know it ſelf. This implies an Excluſion, and a Contrariety. The Union of Thought, with Extenſion, is therefore chimerical.

IF we are willing to ſpeak accurately, we ought not to ſay that Men join together inconſiſtent Ideas; for then ſuch a Conjunction would be poſſible. Thoſe Ideas therefore would not be inconſiſtent, and one of them would not neceſſarily exclude the other. But Men ſuppoſe ſuch a Conjunction without apprehending it; and then they give a *Name* to that pretended Conjunction; and after they have given it, eſpecially when it is grown familiar to them, they rely upon it with the ſame Aſſurance as upon common Notions. That Name, upon which they dwell, is the pretended *Knot*, which they ſuppoſe to join together Notions that cannot be united.

MEN eaſily fall into thoſe Contradictions about Matters, which they do not underſtand ſufficiently, or about which they expreſs themſelves in an extraordinary Language; for then they ſuppoſe that certain Words agree in the Senſe, though the Signification of the one overthrows the Signification of the other. For inſtance, when a Man ſays that Accidents are real Entities, which have a ſeparate Exiſtence from that of the Subſtance, but cannot ſubſiſt without being ſupported by it, the Contradiction of that obſcure Language is not obvious; and a Man frequently rather chuſes to grant the Thing, than to give himſelf the Trouble to examine it.

FOLLY conſiſts in making ſuch chimerical Conjunctions, and *Wiſdom* in avoiding it. A Man is ſo much the more affected with Folly, as the Things he joins together in his Brain, are more remote. When the Error of thoſe Conjunctions

junctions is obvious to the Senſes, thoſe who make them are accounted mad Men. Such would be the Extravagance of a Man, who ſhould ſpeak to Trees, and believe they anſwer him. But when the Miſtake is not ſo plain, thoſe who fall into it, are only accounted *Viſionaries*. There are many ſorts of them, according as the Folly of their Suppoſition may be diſcovered with more or leſs Difficulty; and whoever is miſtaken, may be ſaid to be a Viſionary in ſome meaſure, ſince he fancies to ſee what he does not ſee.

THE Imagination of young People is often ſpoiled, and they are prepared for *Fanaticiſm*, when their Maſters affect to appear ingenious, and to ſhew their Abilities by diſcovering in thoſe Authors whom they explain a Senſe, which ſurpriſes by its Novelty, or its Sublimity, or its Delicacy, and in general, becauſe it is very remote from the literal Senſe, and the Subject of the Author. It is a dangerous Thing for a Man to be fond of his Thoughts, when he believes he ſees what he does not ſee, and pretends to find out Reſemblances and Connexions, without any Ground for it.

FOLLY is contagious; and that Contagion is the more dangerous, becauſe a Man does not believe he is ſick, if he is not more ſick than others. When an Opinion is once taken up, out of Deference to thoſe who propoſe it, though it be never ſo chimerical, it will be reſpectfully entertained, to avoid a painful Examination, or out of Fear of bringing ones ſelf into Trouble. *Time juſtifies* it every Day; and the Number of thoſe who believe it, ſupplies its want of Evidence, and the Weakneſs of the Proofs it is grounded upon. At length, one dares not ſo much as doubt of it, for fear of being accounted a ridiculous Man; for Wiſdom appears an Extravagance to thoſe who have a ſettled Folly. If all the Inhabitants of a Country ſhould fancy that they are become Negroes, or that their Heads are like thoſe of Birds; and if a Stranger ſhould come and tell them that they are White, and have human Heads; they would look upon him as a mad Man: In like manner, when an Opinion, though never ſo extravagant, is conveyed from the Head of a Man of Letters, who has a great Intereſt, into the Heads of great Men, and of the Multitude, it can be no longer attack'd, without being accounted a raſh Diſputant, and frequently an Infidel; and being expoſed to the dreadful Conſequences of that reproachful Language.

MEN are only miſtaken in their Arguments, becauſe they ground them upon falſe Suppoſitions, which they take to be Principles

Principles of an undeniable Truth; and those Suppositions run upon a pretended Conjunction of inconsistent Ideas, which destroy one another, and are only a Heap of Contradictions. It is therefore highly necessary to mind carefully the Relations of Opposition, and to have right Notions of them.

Contradiction.

V. OPPOSITION is never more sensible, than when the Affirmation of one Term is compared with the Negation of that same Term: Being, not Being; Luminous, not Luminous; Thinking, not Thinking; Extended, not Extended: This is called a *contradictory Opposition.*

'TIS plain, it admits of no Medium, and that every Thing, which does not belong to the first Term, ought to be placed in the Class of the second. What exists, and *is not extended*, is a *Being without Extension*; and reciprocally, every Thing, which *is not without Extension*, is an *extended Being*. Whilst we go no farther, we cannot be mistaken.

BUT because the *Negative* Term affords no Idea by it self, and shews only what the second Member of the Opposition is not, without teaching what it is; after we have made a Division, which takes in every Thing, and leaves no Medium, we seek what ought to be placed in the Class of the Negative Term; and then we begin to use other Words. In the room of the Negation we put a *positive* Term, to which we annex a positive Idea; but in doing this, it may easily happen, that this new Term will have a lesser Extent, than that in the room of which it has been put; and consequently we shall forget something in the Change of the Division, and limit its Extent.

WHEN I divide the Line into *Strait* and *Not Strait*, and call the Line not strait a *Curve*, I preserve the whole Extent of my Division. But after I have divided the Curve into *Regular* and *Not Regular*, if I place under the Regular the *Circle*, the *Ellipsis*, the *Hyperbola*, and the *Parabola*, and under the Irregular all the others, I may forget some Members, and I do so. Thus again, when I say that *Substance* is *extended*, or *not extended*, I leave out nothing; but if I add that the Substance not extended is *God*, the *human Soul*, and the *Intelligences* like our Souls, perhaps the Substances, not extended, may, and ought to be placed under a greater Number of Classes. I think all the Actions of *Animals* are easily explained by supposing they have a *Soul* capable of *some Ideas* of material Things, of *Sensations* and *Passions*, without *Reflection*. Because they do not reflect,

nor proceed, at their own Choice, from one Idea to another, they are not liable to Distractions; but they do not improve themselves by Reasoning. Being wholly taken up with one Idea, they follow it immediately; for they cannot be diverted from it. A Bee, a Castor, are necessitated to follow a small Number of Ideas, with which they are entirely taken up.

A MAN is necessarily Generous, or not Generous: But if I am contented to call the Man not Generous a covetous Man, I confine to one Vice a Name which implies many other Vices. In like manner, there is a Difference between not learned and ignorant, between zealous and indifferent, between not laborious and lazy. Men *strain* Things continually: When they indulge their Humour, they make a positive Term as extensive as a Negative one.

THERE is nothing more easy than to be mistaken in making contradictory Oppositions; and there is nothing more common than those Mistakes, when the Terms, by which those Oppositions are expressed, happen to be *equivocal*, because their Signification is sometimes extended, and sometimes restrained. Such are the contradictory Oppositions between the Words Piety and Not Piety, Honest Man and Dishonest Man, Commendable and Not Commendable. There are some Men, to whom the Contempt of some trifling Things, for which they have a Respect, appears a Piece of Ungodliness: Others, on the contrary, will do, without any Scruple, whatever is not contrary to the imperfect Notion they have of an Honest Man. Lastly, others fancy that a Man disapproves and condemns whatever he does not think fit to commend.

WHILST the Division proceeds by contradictory Parts, it is *full*, and leaves out nothing. The Omission and Mistake happen only, when the negative Term is changed into a positive one; and consequently a Man ought to be cautious in making that Change; and if he will omit nothing, he must carry contradictory Divisions and Subdivisions as far as he can.

The Usefulness of those Oppositions.

VI. SINCE a contradictory Opposition is the most obvious of all Oppositions, in order to know whether two Terms, both of them positive, are truly inconsistent, one must see whether one of them can be changed into a negative one; for when two Ideas cannot be united, one of them does always exclude the other; and that which is excluded, may be expressed negatively. *Angular* and *Round* is

is *Angular* and *Not Angular*: *Reſt* and *Motion*, is *Reſt* and *No Motion*: *Thought* and *Extenſion* is what is *Self-conſcious*, and what is *Not Self-conſcious*. By this Method, a Man uſes himſelf to ſee a Contrariety, and is no longer miſtaken about it, by ſuppoſing a Conjunction of contrary Things.

WHEN Ideas are not thus expreſſed, as we do not ſo well perceive their Oppoſition, we are more apt to ſuppoſe that their Objects may agree; and therefore we invent Words to join them together, and we build upon thoſe Suppoſitions. This is a great Cauſe of our Errors. We admit of a Contradiction, without being ſenſible of it, and upon the firſt Contradiction we build a great many more.

Whether we ought to aſcribe to God a Power of doing contradictory Things.

VII. I SHALL give an Inſtance of it, taken from the very Subject I am upon. It is a Query, whether *God can do contradictory Things*. He, who propoſes that Queſtion, does already contradict himſelf, and ſpeaks without knowing what he ſays. I omit that in God *to act* is *to will*. Though his Power were diſtinct from his Will, yet 'tis certain it would only do what he wills; ſo that if God did a contradictory Thing he muſt will it, that is, he muſt will a Thing, and at the ſame Time will what is inconſiſtent with it, or, which comes to the ſame, he muſt not will it. To make, for inſtance, a Stick without two Ends, he muſt will a Thing with two Ends, and he muſt will the contrary. If he ſhould command the Exiſtence of a Stick, he muſt command the Exiſtence of two Ends, and at the ſame Time he muſt not will it. To contradict ones ſelf, is not an Effect of a Power: 'Tis an Imperfection infinitely remote from God, who is eſſentially wiſe, and does always perfectly agree with himſelf (*d*).

HERE I cannot but wonder that Men ſhould be ſo apt to follow blindly the Authority and Footſteps of a celebrated Author, and Head of a Sect. *Deſcartes*, to get off from the Objections of ſome People, anſwered, that he would not deny but God can do contradictory Things. His Followers

(*d*) "The Almighty Power of God can never confound, nor "change the Eſſences of his Creatures. It cannot cauſe the ſame "Creature to exiſt, and not to exiſt, at the ſame Time; a Mountain "to be a Valley, whilſt it is a Mountain; and a Circle to be a Circle "and a Triangle. It cannot likewiſe leave the Free-Will of Man, "and take it from him, nor beſtow a Grace, which neceſſitates, and "is not a neceſſitating Grace". *Archbiſhop of* Cambray. *Paſt. Inſtr. Letter* XIII.

made an Aphoriſm of that equivocal Shift, and building upon a Principle that has no Senſe in it, launched into metaphyſical Enquiries about the Ideas of God, their Original, and the Poſſibility of the Exiſtence of Things with a Nature, not only quite different from, but alſo quite oppoſite to what they have now. Thoſe Men are *Carteſians* in the *Peripatetick* Way; they think it their Duty to admire *Deſcartes*, and to believe he was a wiſe and judicious Man in every Thing. Thus old Errors are revived, as well as old Faſhions.

SOME Men have, by Degrees, entertained Opinions contrary to Nature and Reaſon. They have confirmed themſelves in thoſe monſtrous Opinions, either by falſe Principles, with which they have been deluded, and for which they have a great Reſpect, or by a Spirit of Party. Being reduced to disbelieve what has been ſacred to them from their early Years, or to maintain what they cannot free from Contradiction, they ſuſpect at laſt, and then poſſitively affirm, That the Divine Power may reconcile contradictory Things; that the eternal Being was ſo free in the Choice and Creation of Ideas, that if he had been willing, 6 and 9 would not make 15, and the three Angles of a Right-lined Triangle would not be equal to two Right ones. If they mean that God might have made no Triangle, and that if he had not been willing to produce the Idea of that Figure, it had never been true, that the three Angles of a Right-lined Triangle are equal to two Right ones, ſince a Right-lined Triangle would never have exiſted, not ſo much as in Thought; I am willing to grant it. I will alſo grant that God might have cauſed 6 and 9, added together, to go by the Name of 20, ſince Men themſelves, who are Maſters of Names and Signs, may make that Change whenever they pleaſe. But to ſay that the Idea of 6 Units and 9 Units, added together, might have been different from that which we expreſs now by the Word 15, is to ſpeak without minding what one ſays: 'Tis to ſay, that the Idea of 9 and 6 might have been different from the Idea of 9 and 6, ſince the Idea of 9 Units, added to 6 Units, differ from the Idea of 15 only in Name, and 'tis the ſame Thing at the bottom; for the Attributes of a Thing do not differ from the Thing it ſelf, whereof they are Attributes. When I ſay that a Right-lined Triangle has the Property of containing three Angles equal to two Right ones, I ſay that *a Right-lined Triangle is exactly three Angles equal to two Right ones*; ſo that to pretend that thoſe three Angles might have been greater or leſſer than two Right ones, is to pretend

that

that a Triangle, being what it is, might be what it is not, unleſs it be ſaid that God might have created a Nature different from a Triangle, which nevertheleſs would have been called a Triangle. But this would be a childiſh Thing under the Cover of a ſurpriſing Paradox.

Seeming Contradictions.

VIII. WE ought not to be too haſty in judging of the contradictory Oppoſition of Things; for, in order to infer ſuch an Oppoſition, the Idea of the one muſt exclude the Idea of the other. We ought therefore carefully to compare thoſe Ideas; and in order to do it exactly, they muſt be very clear and exact. We ought never to judge peremptorily of thoſe Things that are unknown to us. Heat melts the Ice, and hardens the Dirt, two very contrary Effects. In order to know whether it be contradictory, that one and the ſame Cauſe ſhould produce them, we ought to know the Nature of that Cauſe, and the Nature of the Subjects upon which it acts ſo differently. The celebrated Mr. *Locke* relates, very much to the purpoſe, a pleaſant Story upon a like Subject. An *Aſiatick* King fell into a Paſſion againſt a *Dutch* Ambaſſador, thinking he laughed at him, becauſe he told him, that in our Climates cold hardens Rivers to ſuch a Degree, that they can bear Waggons. The Imagination calls every Thing abſurd, that eſcapes its Knowledge; but there is nothing truly abſurd, but thoſe Things in which the Underſtanding perceives a Repugnancy, when it compares together the clear Ideas of Words, the Conjunction whereof appears to it ridiculous.

WHILST the Objects we reflect upon, are not ſufficiently known, the Contradiction we obſerve between them, may be only a ſeeming one; and we ſhould run the Hazard of being miſtaken, ſhould we take it for a real Contradiction. We cannot affirm that it is ſuch as it appears to be, before we know the Nature of the Things ſet in Oppoſition, that we may clearly ſee that one of them is excluded by the Idea of the other. It would be as great a Raſhneſs to ſuppoſe Contradictions in unknown Subjects, as Folly to reject no Contradiction at all, under pretence that our Minds are limited.

FOR fear of ſpeaking of God indecently, and aſcribing Contradictions to him, we ought to be very cautious about Queſtions importing, whether ſuch and ſuch a Thing be an Object of his Almighty Power; and we muſt know thoſe Things, before we anſwer thoſe Queſtions; otherwiſe, any Abſurdity will appear poſſible by ſuch a Method. It is there-

fore a *Sophiſm* to ſay, *There may be Atoms, there may be a Vacuum; for God can do both. His infinite Power can make Machines, that will perfectly imitate whatever Choice and Liberty can do.* I have no Idea of it; and I ſhall take care not to affirm it.

ONE ought to be the more cautious upon that Head, becauſe the Power aſcribed to God, about contradictory Things, affords the Atheiſts a Pretence to deny his Omnipotency, and call it a Chimera.

Diverſity and Oppoſition are of Uſe to clear a Subject.

IX. IN order to clear a Subject, we frequently begin with the Expoſition of its Contrary. The Knowledge of Reſt leads to the Knowledge of Motion: The Calamities of War ſet off the ſweets of Peace. The Light, which one of the Contraries receives from the other, is grounded upon two Things: 1. Variety raiſes the Attention; for we are generally leſs ſenſible of thoſe Things we are uſed to. 'Tis for this Reaſon we ought to reflect upon the Inconveniencies of Anarchy, in order to know the Uſefulneſs of the Laws. 2. In the ſame Order that the Attributes of one of the Contraries are known, in that ſame Order the Attributes of the other are conſidered, by ſeeking in them oppoſite Characters. The Manner of that Enquiry makes the Succeſs of it more eaſy.

BUT becauſe two Things may be oppoſite, without being contrary in all Reſpects, great Care ought to be taken not to multiply Contrarieties without any Reaſon. *Health*, for inſtance, *is contrary to Sickneſs: Health is of ſome Uſe; therefore Sickneſs is of no Uſe.* It does not follow. Each of them is a real State, and a Subject proper for Reflections: They are alike in that Reſpect, notwithſtanding their Oppoſition. We ought to know exactly wherein conſiſts the Contrariety of two Subjects, in order to draw about one of them, Inferences contrary to what has been diſcovered in the other; and we muſt aſcribe to them neither oppoſite Cauſes, nor oppoſite Effects, but in that Senſe wherein they are contrary.

IT appears from thence, that the famous *Canon of Contraries* is a uſeleſs Rule. Two Things are ſuppoſed to be contrary: A certain Attribute is obſerved in one of them; therefore, by the Rule of Contraries, the other has an Attribute quite oppoſite. But, to be ſure of the Juſtneſs of that Concluſion, one ſhould be ſure that the two Objects, ſuppoſed to be contrary, are really ſo in that Senſe, wherein a Concluſion is drawn from the Attribute of the one to the oppoſite Attribute of the other. In order to know

it,

it, both of them ought to be well examined; and when they are well known, the Argument, taken from the Rule of Contraries, to make them known, becomes needleſs; and 'tis no longer neceſſary to argue, in order to know what is already well known. An exceſſive Cold is the Cauſe of Death: Therefore an exceſſive Heat would reſtore Life. This is not a true Conſequence, becauſe Heat, merely as Heat, does not give Life, but as it is confined within certain Bounds and a certain Sphere of Activity. Wherefore to judge of that Concluſion, one muſt know wherein Life conſiſts; in what manner Heat contributes to Life, and how far Cold is contrary to it. But when thoſe Things are known, there is no need of arguing any more.

MATTER *is a condenſed Extenſion: Therefore the Mind is a rarified Extenſion.* Thoſe two Subſtances ought to be known, in order to be compared together; and when they are known, perhaps a Man will not make that Argument, which is, beſides, unintelligible.

WHEN two Things are ſet in Oppoſition to raiſe the Excellency of the one above the other, it frequently happens that Men look upon what is only *inferior in ſome Reſpects*, as inferior *in all Reſpects*. Thus every body admires the Science he profeſſes; and other Sciences appear to him inconſiderable: But he is ready to ſpeak another Language, as ſoon as a better Occaſion moves him to teach what he ſpoke of with ſo great a Contempt. Thus again, an Orator, according as he is acted by Prejudices or Intereſts, ſees nothing but Happineſs in the Nation he deſigns to commend, and nothing but Miſery every where elſe. Again, to ſet off the Advantages of Rich People, in Oppoſition to the ſad Circumſtances of the *Poor*, the latter are, in a manner, made to believe, that they may be Lazy and Fraudulent; and that they are never ſufficiently indemnified for the hard Unequality they have been reduced to by the Unhappineſs of their Birth. Again, by magnifying the *Happineſs* of good Men in this Life, in Oppoſition to the Troubles of the Wicked, the Argument taken from the Proſperity of the latter, and the Tryals of the former, to prove the Neceſſity of a future Judgment, loſes its whole Strength.

THAT Method of arguing from the Rule of Contraries has ſomething plauſible in it, and therefore it is very frequently uſed; but nothing can be more fallacious. *Knowledge puffs up: Therefore Ignorance makes a Man humble.* But, don't we ſee many ignorant Men intolerably proud? A Man happens to fall into *Error in examining*: Therefore he will

prevent it by a blind Submiſſion. But does not ſuch a Submiſſion confirm a Man in Error without Recovery? Beſides, Maſters would not be very cautious in teaching, if they knew they would be applauded, whatever they might ſay. Thoſe Countries, wherein the Supreme Power is limited by the Laws, are liable to Troubles; therefore Deſpotiſm is very proper to prevent them, and to eſtabliſh a *firm* and *conſtant Peace*. Experience proves the quite contrary. When the Conſequences of a Civil War cannot very much encreaſe the Miſery of the People, even though it ſhould turn to their Diſadvantage, Men do not ſcruple to venture upon it. Wherefore we ought to know perfectly the Subjects about which we argue, inſtead of judging of them by general Ideas.

NOTHING is more common than to ſtrain Oppoſitions, and to go from one Extreme to another. Out of Contempt for Superſtition Men fall into Libertiniſm: Out of Hatred for Flatterers, they become unpolite. Perhaps the *Cynicks* deſpiſed outward Decencies, only out of Hatred againſt thoſe Men who placed all their Virtue in a fair Outſide.

Antitheſes.

X. THE Clearneſs and Livelineſs of *Antitheſes* proceed from their raiſing the Attention, and ſupporting it by a Variety of Objects, which they offer at the ſame time. But they ought to be juſt, otherwiſe they will not afford what is expected from them; and they are a Sign of a falſe Taſte, which confounds the Oppoſition of Words with the Oppoſition of Things.

IT is not enough that they ſhould be juſt, they muſt alſo be natural, that is, they muſt appear to ariſe from the Subject, as it were, of themſelves, and without the Help of Study; for Affectation is always odious. We love an Orator, who pleaſes; but we cannot bear an Orator, who affects to pleaſe, and we deny him the Praiſes we ſhould perhaps have beſtowed upon him, had he not ſhewn that he deſired them.

SENECA loved Antitheſes: The Vivacity of his Imagination made him fond of bright Thoughts. He loved not only to make Antitheſes, but alſo to relate thoſe, which he had read elſewhere. *Æſchines* told *Socrates*, *Your other Diſciples, who give you a great deal, keep ſtill for themſelves more than they give you: As for me, I give you every Thing I have, by giving my ſelf. Socrates* replies to *Æſchines*, *I ſhall return you a better Man than you was, when I received you.* Whereupon *Seneca* adds an Inſult to Fortune in the Name of *Æſchines*, *I have received nothing from thee,*

and

and therefore I ſhall not expreſs my Acknowledgment to Socrates *with thoſe Things that are thine, but only with my own* (*e*).

THE Antitheſis gives a greater Life to this ironical Apology for thoſe Magiſtrates, who, having obtained a Place by unlawful Means, diſcharge the Duties of it accordingly. *What Wonder is it, that a Man ſhould ſell what he has bought? Is it not the Law of Nations? A great Care of the Beauty of the Body*, ſays *Seneca*, a little lower, *is not a Sign of a noble Soul* (*f*).

THOSE, *who* raiſe themſelves *moſt* proudly, *are generally Men who know how to* creep *with the greateſt* Meanneſs; *and none are more eager to tread others under Foot, than thoſe who have learned to* affront *others by being* affronted (*g*).

THERE *is a great Difference between* haſtening to return *a Benefit, that one may have the* Pleaſure of being thankful, *and doing it, to have* the Satisfaction of being no longer indebted (*h*).

TO ſay that *one is rich*, is (at leaſt very often) to ſpeak as improperly, as when a Man ſays *he has a Fever*; for moſt People *are not Maſters* of their Riches, but their Riches,

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(*e*) Socrati cum multa multi pro ſuis quiſque facultatibus offerrent: Æſchines pauper auditor, Nihil, inquit, dignum te quod dare tibi poſſim, invenio: & hoc uno modo pauperem me eſſe ſentio. Itaque dono tibi quod unum habeo, Me ipſum. Hoc munus togo qualecunque eſt, boni conſulas, cogiteſque alios cum multum tibi darent, plus ſibi reliquiſſe. *Cui Socrates:* Quidni tu, inquit, mihi magnum munus dederis, niſi fortè, parvo te æſtimas? Habebo itaque curæ, ut te meliorem tibi reddam quàm accepi. *Sen. de Benef. Lib.* I. *Cap.* 8. Nihil egiſti, Fortuna, quod me pauperem eſſe voluiſti: expediam nihilominus dignum huic viro munus: & quia de tuo non poſſum, de meo dabo. *Ibid. Cap.* 9.

(*f*) Nam Provincias ſpoliari, & nummarium Tribunal, auditâ utrimque licitatione, alteri addici, non mirum, quando, quæ emeris, vendere, jus gentium eſt. *Ibid. Cap.* 9.

Cultus Corporum nimius & Formæ cura præ ſe ferens animi deformitatem. *Ibid. Cap.* 10.

(*g*) Quæ eſt tanta animi diſcordia? eodem tempore ſervos deſpicis, & colis. Imperioſus intra limen atque impotens, humilis foris: & tàm contemptus quàm contemnens. Neque enim ulli magis abjiciunt animos, quàm qui improbè tollunt: nullique ad calcandos alios paratiores, quàm qui contumelias facere, accipiendo didicerunt. *Sen. de Benef. Lib.* III. *Cap.* 28.

(*h*) Multum intereſt utrum properes referre gratiam, ut reddas beneficium, an ut ne debeas. *Sen.*

* the one is Gratitude: the other falſe & mean Pride

Riches, like a Fever, *poſſeſs them, and keep them in Subjection* (*i*).

A CERTAIN Gracefulneſs, a certain Obſervation of Decencies, is the Maſter-piece of Art; and yet the only Thing that Art can neither give, nor even explain exactly. This is a Remark of *Cicero: Caput eſt Artis dicere, quod tamen unum id eſt, quod tradi arte non poſſit.* De Orat. *Lib.* I.

HERE follows another Remark of the ſame Author, which does not appear to me clear enough. "To be able upon "every Subject to do what is proper, is a Fruit of Art, and "a Gift of Nature." *Omniqne in re poſſe quod deceat facere, artis & naturæ eſt; ſcire quid, quandoque deceat, prudentia.* But an exquiſite Prudence, which diſcovers what is beſt to be done, is alſo a Fruit of Study, an Effect of an excellent Genius, and of a natural Juſtneſs of Mind.

ANTITHESES, and the Quibbles with which they are attended, impoſe ſometimes even upon thoſe who make them. *If Paſſions ariſe* (ſays *Seneca*) *without the Conſent of Reaſon, they will prevail, notwithſtanding its Oppoſition* (*k*).

THAT Argument is not juſt; for a Man may be ſurpriſed, and afterwards mend his Fault. Paſſions generally ariſe without the Conſent of Reaſon; but they ſeldom continue, without bringing it on their Side. They are ſometimes perfectly maſter'd by Reaſon without being weaken'd, ſeldom attack'd by it, and always conquer'd if Reaſon goes on with the Attack.

I HAVE read this Antitheſis ſomewhere: *We rather chuſe to feel than to imagine; and we rather chuſe to imagine than to think.* It is too general to be granted. There are ſome Things we rather chuſe to imagine than to ſee; ſuch are a Tempeſt, a Battle. There are others we rather chuſe to think of intellectually than to imagine; for they are conceived by the Mind clearly and without any Labour; but it would require great Pains to imagine them, and yet it would be but imperfectly. Such are a Figure of 999 Sides, and in general all Curves.

THE following Antitheſis does not appear to me juſt neither: *It is a great Fault in a Diſcourſe, to have no Faults.* Muſt a Diſcourſe have a Fault, to be without Faults? When an Orator, extremely apprehenſive of any Fault, takes great Pains,

(*i*) Sic divitias habent quomodo habere dicimur febrem, cum illa nos habeat. *Sen. Ep.* 119.

(*k*) Si invitâ ratione cœperint, invitâ perſeverabunt. *Sen. Ep.* LXXXV.

Pains, and leaves in his Diſcourſe, as it were, an Impreſſion of his great Labour, the Fault of ſuch a Diſcourſe does not proceed from being without any Fault, but from having a great one, an Air of Conſtraint.

HERE follows a juſt Antitheſis: *None but excellent Orators are allowed to be prolix, becauſe Heaven has enabled them, and none elſe, to be prolix without appearing to be ſo.* Antitheſes contribute to make one ſenſible of the following Truths; *If good and ſolid Morals do not mend our Paſſions, 'tis almoſt impoſſible but our Paſſions will teach us a falſe Morality. We rather chuſe to believe that our Actions are not vicious, than to acknowledge that we are vicious. We do not blame, with a good Grace, thoſe Faults with which we are pleaſed.*

SOMETIMES an Antitheſis, though it be juſt, and contains a great Senſe, appears obſcure, if it be conſidered in it ſelf, and independently from what goes before. Such would be this Antitheſis, *Truth ought to be adorn'd, but not painted.* Its Juſtneſs could not be perfectly known, without knowing what Difference there is between the Ornaments, that deſerve to attend Truth, and the Intricacies, which hinder us from perceiving all the Evidence of the Proofs it is grounded upon.

THE Oppoſition between the *Mind* and the *Heart*, is of Uſe to unfold a great many Things that paſs in the Inſide of Man. The Uſefulneſs and Brightneſs of that Antitheſis made it immediately current; but ſome Men of confuſed Thoughts have diſcredited it by their wrong Applications of it, and by their Nonſenſe. I think it will be free from Obſcurity, if by the *Mind* we underſtand the Soul *intent upon her Knowledge*, and by the *Heart* the Soul indulging her *Senſations* and *Paſſions*. In this Senſe the following Antitheſis is partly falſe, and partly true. *Prejudices tyrannize over the Mind, as Paſſions tyrannize over the Heart. They are unreaſonable Maſters, who oppreſs Liberty. A Man prepoſſeſs'd, and a Man, who indulges his Paſſions, do no longer chuſe with Knowledge.* It might be ſaid, that Prepoſſeſſion and Paſſions are two different Maſters, who tyrannize over Reaſon, and oppreſs its Liberty. When a Man is prepoſſeſs'd, and indulges his Paſſions, he only ſees what his Paſſions and Prejudices allow him to ſee. But Prejudices belong to the Heart as well as Paſſions. Lazineſs, Intereſt, Cuſtom, and Paſſions, are the Cauſes of our Prejudices.

BUT it is neceſſary to obſerve about Antitheſes, that ſome Turns and Ways of Speaking, which are not proper at a certain

certain Time, *have been proper at another Time*; for, in Point of Language, ſome Allowance muſt be made for the prevailing Taſte. The figurative Style, and particularly Antitheſes, were *formerly* much *more in Vogue* than they are now; it was chiefly the Taſte of the Eaſtern Nations; and the Old and New Teſtaments are written in that Style.

WHEN St. *Paul* ſets two Things in Oppoſition, he borrows the Name of one of them to give it to the other; and ſo offers them like two oppoſite Species of the ſame *Genius*. The *Law*, that is, the *Knowledge of our Duty*, is a *Principle*, which moves us to perform it: We find in our *Paſſions* a contrary *Principle*. That Principle is called *the Law of the Members*; and *the Law of the Spirit of Life, which is in* Jeſus Chriſt, *frees us from the Law of Sin and Death*. That is, our Inclination for worldly Things yields to the Precepts of *Jeſus Chriſt*, ſupported by his Example, and by Faith in his Promiſes. That Metaphor wants now to be unfolded, and plain Expreſſions muſt be put in the Room of it, to make it intelligible; but formerly Men, being uſed to it, ſaw immediately through its Cover, and the Figure did not perplex any Body in the leaſt.

Rom. vii.

Subtilties.

XI. THERE are ſome Differences, not perceived by Men of an ordinary Genius; but they do not eſcape the Knowledge of Men more attentive, and of a more refined Wit. They have their Worth, when they are of Uſe; but they are very contemptible, when no Benefit can be reaped from them; and there is no ſurer Sign of a ſhallow and falſe Wit, than to be fond of Diſcoveries, that are only valuable, becauſe they were not made by others, and required a great Attention. Wherefore there are *ſolid* and truly valuable Subtilties; but there are alſo *vain* and contemptible ones. Beſides, there are *falſe* Subtilties, which ſuppoſe a Difference where there is none at all. I ſhall give ſome Inſtances of all thoſe Subtilties.

One Man (ſays *Seneca*) *thinks he owes ſome Money, which he has received; another the Conſulſhip, to which he has been raiſed; another a Sacerdotal Dignity, another the Government of a Province: But the Benefit is not confined within that Money, that Conſulſhip, and that Government. A Benefit is above our Senſes; the Mind only can perceive it: The Matter of a Benefit muſt not be confounded with the Benefit it ſelf. Money, Dignities, and other Preſents of that Nature, proceed from a good Will, and are Signs which ought to recall the Remembrance*

membrance of it. A Man does not return what he has received from his Benefactor, and does not ſufficiently expreſs his Gratitude, by returning Money for Money, and Honour for Honour: He owes him his Heart, becauſe the Heart made his Benefit valuable. What a Man receives, may be loſt; but a Benefits does always remain with the Obligation of acknowledging it. I preſerved your Children from Shipwrack, from a Fire; a Diſeaſe deprives you of them. However, you owe me ſtill what I gave you, when I preſerved the Lives of your Children (*l*). That double View, in which *Seneca* repreſents a Benefit, offers a ſubtil Diſtinction, but of great Uſe; ſince it enables us to be truly thankful.

SOME Reflections are not *neceſſary*; and yet they do not deſerve to be accounted *ſuperfluous*. That Diſtinction is no leſs important than ſubtil. If you confine your ſelf to what is neceſſary, your Dryneſs will tire the Reader. If you

(*l*) Hoc primum nobis eſſe diſcendum quid accepto beneficio debeamus. Debere enim dicit ſe alius pecuniam quam accepit, alius Conſulatum, alius Sacerdotium, alius Provinciam. Iſta autem ſunt meritorum ſigna, non merita. Non poteſt beneficium manu tangi: animo cernitur; multum intereſt inter materiam beneficii, & beneficium. Itaque nec aurum, nec argentum, nec quidquam eorum quæ à proximis accipiuntur, beneficium eſt, ſed ipſa tribuentis voluntas. Imperiti autem id, quod oculis incurrit, & quod traditur poſſidentque, ſolum notant; contrà illud quod in re carum atque pretioſum eſt, parvi pendunt. Hæc quæ tenemus, quæ aſpicimus, in quibus cupiditas noſtra hæret, caduca ſunt; auferre ea nobis & fortuna, & injuria poteſt: beneficium verò, etiam amiſſo eo quod datum eſt, durat. Eſt enim rectè factum, quod irritum nulla vis efficit. Amicum à piratis redemi: hunc alius hoſtis excepit, & in carcerem condidit; non beneficium ſed uſum beneficii mei ſuſtulit. Ex naufragio alicui raptos, vel ex incendio liberos reddidi: hos vel morbus, vel aliqua fortuita injuria eripuit: manet etiam ſine illis, quod tu illis datum eſt. Omnia itaque, quæ falſum beneficii nomen uſurpant, miniſteria ſunt, per quæ ſe voluntas amica explicat. Hoc quoque in aliis rebus evenit, ut alicubi ſit ſpecies rei, alicubi ipſa res. Imperator aliquem torquibus, murali, & civicâ donat; quid habet per ſe corona pretioſum? quid prætexta? quid faſces? quid tribunal, & currus? nihil horum honor eſt, ſed honoris inſigne. Sic non eſt beneficium id quod ſub oculos venit, ſed beneficii veſtigium & nota. Quid eſt ergo beneficium? Benevola actio tribuens gaudium, capienſque tribuendo, in id quod facit prona, & ſponte ſua parata. Itaque non quid fiat, aut quid detur, refert, ſed quâ mente. Quia beneficium non in eo quod fit aut datur, conſiſtit, ſed in ipſo dantis aut facientis animo. *Sen. de Benef. Lib.* I. *Cap.* 5, & 6.

you run into Superfluities, he will grow weary of your Prolixity. Happy are those Authors, who know how to make such a wise Distinction, and who, by keeping off from one of those Rocks, avoids the other! Whatever makes Part of a Science, is *necessary*, as well as every Thing without which one could not understand the Explication of what is necessary; and what *facilitates* the Understanding of it, and makes one more *sensible of its Usefulness*, though it be not *necessary*, ought not to be accounted superfluous.

THERE is some Difference between *wanting a Thing*, and *not having it*. Many Things are not in our Power; and yet we don't stand in need of them. A Man, who is in want, is always a Sufferer, at least in some Degree; but he may be easy in his Mind, even when he is destitute of many Things. However, he does not despise them; he values them in proportion to their Worth, nay, he acknowledges it were better for him to enjoy them; but, if he does not despise those Things, he does not think himself contemptible, because he is not possess'd of them *Sapiens quæ* Sen. *Ep.* IX. *sibi desunt, non desiderat, sed non deesse mavult. Ita de se contentus est, non ut velit esse sine amico, sed ut possit.*

IT might also be said, that there is some Difference between wanting a Thing, and standing in need of it. The *Stoicks* made a Distinction between χρεῖος and ἐνδεὴς. Reflection and Taste are requisite to be sensible of that Difference; but it is no less solid than subtil.

UNCOMMON Talents are admired, and frequently supply the Room of *Merit*; and yet, to speak the Truth, Merit consists only in the good Use a Man makes of his Talents.

AS there are judicious and solid Subtilties, there are also vain and unreasonable ones. Such were the Subtilties whereby the *Stoicks* distinguished themselves from other Philosophers. Riches and Health it self, said they, are not *good Things*, they are at most *Conveniencies*. When a Man is sick of the Gout and Gravel, he *struggles*, but he *suffers* no Evil; his Condition is rather a State of Labour than of Uneasiness; *Laborat, non dolet*. 'Tis in vain to represent Evil in a subtil Manner, under a Word that disguises it; Sense will always contradict the Subtilty. Words do not change the Nature of Things.

HERE follows another Reflection of *Seneca*, *Ep.* XIV. "*Cæsar* and *Pompey* are contending for the Empire. To "what Purpose should you side with one of them against "the

"the other? He, who ſhall be worſted, may be the worſe "Man; but the Conqueror cannot be the better Man." *Poteſt eſſe pejor, qui victus fuerit, non poteſt eſſe melior, qui vicerit.* What's the Meaning of thoſe Words? If *Cæſar* and *Pompey* are equal in Probity, the Vanquiſhed will be as honeſt a Man as the Conqueror; and if they are unequal in that Reſpect, the more honeſt will remain what he is, whether he miſcarries, or not.

THE ſame *Seneca*, in his 30th *Letter* ſays, "That Death "muſt be expected, but not feared; for we expect what is "certain, but fear only what is doubtful." *Certa expectantur, dubia metuuntur.* I ſee here an Oppoſition between Words, but not between Things. We ſuffer at the Thoughts of an expected Evil; and this we call to fear it. A Man may, if he pleaſes, forbear uſing that Word; but the Nature of the ſorrowful Senſe, expreſſed by another Word, will always remain the ſame. When that Philoſopher ſports with ſuch Diſtinctions, he forgets his own Maxims. *To what Purpoſe* (ſays he elſewhere) *are thoſe Subtilties, which will perplex no Body but in a Diſpute? A Difference* muſt *be ſhewn between Things, and not between Words.*

WHEN *your Head is giddy upon the Brink of a Precipice, you are not ſeized with Fear; 'tis a Commotion, which Reaſon cannot prevent.* As many Words, as many Errors; for that Commotion is a true Fear, and it may be prevented.

SOMETIMES a Man ſeems to ſay ſomething, that was not obſerved before. His Reflection appears ſubtil, becauſe it eſcaped every Body. But when we come to unfold the Senſe of that Expreſſion, it offers nothing but what is common, and contains only, with more Obſcurity, what every Body grants.

THERE *is but one Paſſion*, viz. *Self-Love.* When thoſe, who are pleaſed to talk ſo, are deſired to explain themſelves, it appears they acknowledge as many Paſſions as other Men, and that all their Windings come only to this; That Self-Love has a Share in every Paſſion; that we are affected with different Paſſions, according to the different Relations of Objects with reſpect to us, and as they appear more or leſs proper to make us happy; and that different Paſſions ariſe from thoſe different Relations. This is no new Thing; it was always underſtood ſo.

SOME pretend, that every *Virtue* is a *Kind* of *Humility*. Others affirm, that all Virtues are nothing elſe but *Diligence*, which aſſumes different Faces, and acts *under different Forms*. One would be apt to think, that thoſe Men have meditated upon

upon the Nature of Virtue more than others, and refined upon it more than all the Moraliſts. But there is no ſuch Thing. After in any unnatural, intricate, and far-fetch'd Definitions, they mean only that Virtue is ſpoiled by Pride; that a virtuous Man is governed by Knowledge; that he conſiders attentively what he is, the Worth of thoſe Things for which he labours, and the Merit accruing to them from certain Circumſtances; that he does not magnify his own Worth, nor the Worth of any Thing different from himſelf. It is in that intricate Senſe that each Virtue is a kind of *Humility*. A Man is not vertuous, when he has but an indifferent Love for Virtue; and he does not value it ſufficiently, unleſs he be very eager to practiſe it upon all Occaſions. When a Man is truly virtuous, he is neither cold nor lukewarm; as ſoon as an Occaſion offers to perform his Duty, he performs it with all his Heart. But this is a Thing known to every Body. In that Senſe Virtue is a *Diligence*.

Conjunction of the two Relations.

XII. THE Relation of Reſemblance is ſometimes joined with the Relation of Oppoſition; and thoſe Compariſons, which reunite the Force of two ſuch different Relations, have often a very good Effect. *As there is nothing finer than to help Men in Danger againſt their Will; in like manner, to grant Mens Deſires, when it is to their Diſadvantage, is to conceal one's Hatred under a ſeeming Goodneſs* (*m*). In theſe Words *Seneca* ſets in Oppoſition a great Duty and a great Fault; but in thoſe two Caſes the Appearances are very different from the Reality; and in that Reſpect the two Caſes are alike.

HERE follows another Example: As the ill Uſage of a Perſon, who never offended us, is an odious Action in its own Nature; in like manner, to love to do a Kindneſs, is an amiable Diſpoſition in it ſelf, and independently from its Conſequences, and the Benefit *that can be reaped from it* (*n*).

AS it is a Piece of Luxury to be fond of Delicacies; in like manner, it is a Piece of Extravagance to deny one's ſelf thoſe

(*m*) Quemadmodum pulcherrimum opus eſt, etiam invitos nolentesque ſervare; ita rogantibus peſtifera largiri, blandum & affabile odium eſt. *Sen. de Benef. Lib.* II. *Cap.* 14.

(*n*) Quomodo injuriam facere per ſe vitanda ac fugienda res eſt, ſic beneficium dare per ſe expetenda. *Id. Lib.* IV. *Cap.* 15.

thoſe Things that are common, and may be got at a cheap Rate (*o*).

A Parallel between both.

XIII. THE Compariſon of Relations of Reſemblance with Relations of Diverſity, has occaſioned a Remark, which deſerves ſome Reflection. Here follows that Remark: Some are pleaſed with looking for Reſemblances, whilſt others love to find out Diverſities. The former are accounted ingenious, and the latter are ſaid to think judiciouſly: Wit is aſcribed to the former, and Diſcernment to the others.

IT ſeems to me, that this Thought may be placed among falſe Subtilties; for one muſt have Wit and Penetration to diſcover in Subjects, which appear perfectly alike, ſome Differences not perceived by thoſe who ſee Things only in general and ſuperficially. And a Man muſt have Juſtneſs and Diſcernment to find out wherein different Subjects agree.

IT is more important to obſerve, that there is a *falſe Wit*, and alſo a falſe Imitation of *Diſcernment*. When Images are borrowed from a Subject to repreſent another Subject, they are the more affecting, becauſe unexpected; and a Man is admired for the Extent of his Wit, and for joining together Things that are ſo remote. But if the Image is not juſt, that bright Compariſon ought rather to be looked upon as a Flight of a wandering Imagination, than as an Effect of Penetration, and of a true Extent of Mind. As for what concerns Differences, 'tis true, a great Wit will obſerve ſome in thoſe Things, wherein a ſuperficial Wit can perceive none; but ſome Perſons will imitate Men of a great Genius, and do it wrong. Being too greedy of Reputation, and willing to be thought to have a more refined Wit than others, they run into imaginary Differences, or take great Pains to make others perceive Differences ſo inconſiderable, that no Uſe can be made of them. There is the ſame Difference between a falſe Vivacity and true Wit, between a vain Subtilty and a ſolid Diſcernment, as between Talkativeneſs, and a judicious and inſtructive Eloquence.

A GREAT Difference is made between thoſe, who firſt propoſe a new Opinion in Religion, or depart from the common Explication of ſome Paſſages in the Scripture, and thoſe who embrace that new Opinion, and thoſe new Explications. The latter are only called *Hereticks*; but the others go by the

(*o*) Quemadmodum delicatas res deſiderare, luxuriæ eſt: ita uſitatas & non magno parabiles fugere, dementia eſt. *Sen. Ep.* V.

the Name of *Heresiarchs*. Some Men can have some Indulgence for those who suffer themselves to be seduced, but they inveigh with a fiery Zeal against the Seducers, and yet the Difference, to be found between them, is not a reasonable Ground for that different Treatment. If the Error of the former proceeds from Pride and Libertinism, the same Principles may have the same Effect upon the latter. If some Disorder in the Brain can excuse the latter, the same Disorder may also excuse the others. Lastly, the Error of both may proceed from a commendable Desire of knowing the Truth; and perhaps that Desire is not attended with all the Attention and Capacity requisite to discover the Weakness of some Arguments, which, being considered in a certain Sense, want neither Weight nor Probability.

MEN are also very much mistaken in the Difference they make between a *Layman* and a *Clergyman*. One would think they are two Beings of a different Species; that there will be a different Decalogue for each of them; and that they will not be judged by the same Law, and the same Gospel. A Layman does not scruple to do a great many Things, which would appear to him horrid in a Clergyman; and a Clergyman ascribes to himself several Rights and Privileges, which he would look upon as so many Encroachments in a Layman. The Clergy, in order to preserve those Privileges, and make themselves more respected, have laid upon themselves a great many Obligations, most of them very hard, but of no Use to Salvation. By reason of that Distinction, their good Actions have no Influence but upon their Brethren. Lay People do not think themselves obliged to imitate the Clergy, and look upon them as Men who have separate Laws of their own.

CHAP. V.

Of the Relations of Unity.

Unity and Multitude.

I. WHEN those Objects that are compared together, and the Ideas whereof are present to the Mind, happen to exist united out of our Minds, as their Ideas are united in our Intelligence, they offer themselves under a Relation

of *Unity*. But, if they are conceived ſeparately, their Relation is a Relation of *Multitude*.

AMONG the many Objects known to us, every one of them, though never ſo ſimple, contains many *Realities*; but thoſe Realities, though very numerous, form one *Whole* by their Union. Some are united in one Whole, becauſe they cannot exiſt ſeparately. Thus Length cannot be without Breadth and Depth. Thoſe three Dimenſions are neceſſarily united. In like manner, a Portion of Matter does eſſentially include Mobility, Figure, and Impenetrability. If we give the Name of *Parts* to thoſe *Realities*, that are thus neceſſarily united, their Compound will be a *neceſſary Whole*.

THERE are alſo *Realities* which indeed may exiſt ſeparately, but they *ought to be united*, in order to compoſe a *Whole* of a *certain Kind*, and of a certain Name. For inſtance, Particles, ſeparated one from another, and in a very ſwift Motion, are requiſite to form what we call *Fire*. Stones, Sand, Lime, and Water, are requiſite to compoſe what we call a *Wall*. Thoſe Parts may exiſt at a Diſtance one from another; but they muſt be joined together to make a Wall. The *Units* of that Kind may be called *contingent Wholes*. I do not live in two Houſes, but only in one Houſe, though that Houſe conſiſts of many Apartments; and my Soul is not united to two Bodies, though my Body conſiſts of many Members.

II. IT appears, that Parts taken together, and the Whole, are one and the ſame Thing; from whence it follows, that there are many Kinds of *Wholes*, according to the Nature of the Parts they conſiſt of, and the Manner of their Union. And therefore, beſides the Diviſion I have juſt now made, the *integral Whole* is alſo diſtinguiſhed from the *eſſential Whole*; and that Diſtinction comes pretty near the foregoing one. The *integral Whole* is compoſed of Parts, which may exiſt ſeparately, and conſequently of Subſtances. Such is the Human Body, each Member whereof may be extirpated, without ceaſing to exiſt, though it ceaſes by that Separation to preſerve its good State. The *eſſential Whole* is compoſed of Parts, ſome of which, at leaſt, cannot exiſt ſeparately. Thus the Roundneſs of a Leaden Ball will be ſeparated from it, if that Metal be melted; but it will no longer exiſt. *Wholes of different Sorts.*

TWO Bodies make one Whole, either by their immediate *Contact*, or when each of them does immediately touch a third Body, lying between them. But, becauſe

theſe are Relations, we may compare as we pleaſe two or many Bodies, and conceive between them a greater or leſſer Number of Bodies. Thus we ſay, that many Stones make one Houſe, that many Houſes make one Town, many Towns one Country, many Countries one Land, and many Spaces one Univerſe. Thoſe Wholes might be called *Phyſical Wholes*.

I DON'T apprehend, that *Intelligent Beings* can form one Whole, otherwiſe than by the *Conformity* of their *Sentiments* and *Will*. If the Ideas, Sentiments, and Inclinations of one of them are an exact Rule of the Ideas, Sentiments, and Affections of all the others, ſo that there is nothing wanting for a perfect Conformity, they will form one Whole. Thus we may conceive the Union of the Bleſſed with *Jeſus Chriſt*; and that Union comes the nearer to a perfect Unity, becauſe the Uniformity is more compleat. Such are *Intelligent Wholes*.

MAN is an Example of an Union ſo ſingular, that he himſelf cannot ſufficiently wonder at it. An *Intelligence united* to a Body; Thought making but one Whole with Extenſion. Perhaps one of the Difficulties about the *Union of the Soul with the Body*, proceeds from our ſuppoſing that Union to be more like a material Union than it is. If we do not ſuppoſe the Soul to be more united to the Body than we are convinced of it by Experience, the Difficulties will vaniſh away. What does Experience teach us? That certain Motions are attended with certain Thoughts; and that certain Thoughts are attended with certain Motions. This is a *Concomitancy*, which has been called *Union*; the Name does not alter the Thing, and oblige us to ſuppoſe more than we perceive. But what is the *Cauſe* of that Concomitancy? It may be found in ſome general *Laws* eſtabliſh'd by the Will of the *Supreme Being*.

I SHALL further obſerve, that in order to apprehend exactly in what Manner the Soul may be united to the Body, we ſhould have a more exact and perfect Idea than we have, not only of the Nature of the Body, but eſpecially of the Nature of the Soul. We know the Nature of Matter ſufficiently to conclude, that a Body can act upon another Body, only by touching and moving it; but we have not a ſufficient Knowledge of the Soul, to conclude, that a Body cannot act upon it in another Manner. There will be a Time, when we ſhall be unfolded to our ſelves; and I think the Hope that our Knowledge will be ſo far encreaſed, as to enable us to know what we are, is not one of the moſt

inconſiderable

inconſiderable Motives to make a good Uſe of our preſent Knowledge.

I DON'T know how to call the Thought of a great Man, who fancy'd the Material World to be a Machine of ſuch a Compoſition, that as ſoon as the Creator put it into Motion, every Thing we ſee in it, muſt have infallibly happen'd, though no Intelligence had been further concern'd in it. Whatever happens upon Earth, would have been effected, though the Bodies of Men and Animals had been only mere Machines, without any Soul united to them. Thoſe Machines would have invented Swords, Pikes, Fire-Arms, Gun-Powder, Mortars, and all Inſtruments made uſe of to throw Bombs. Mines would have been ſearched: Money would have been coined. Thoſe Machines with a human Form would have been luxurious to the higheſt Degree. They would have built Palaces, raiſed Thrones, erected Tribunals, enacted Laws, ordered Puniſhments and Rewards. Some would have been determined by, the Impreſſion of the Laws upon their Eyes: Others would have been determined by the Rays of Light, reflected by Money, and united upon the *Retina*. The Art of War would have been ſuch as it is now; and after many bloody Battles, Treaties of Peace would have been ſet on foot without knowing what Peace and War are. Ambaſſadors would have been ſent, and Quarrels ſtarted about the Breaking of one's Word, without knowing what Speech is. Printing would have been invented the very ſame Year. The ſame Machines would have writ one againſt another; diſputed about the Superiority of the Antients above the Moderns; quarrelled about the firſt Diſcovery of the Doctrine of Fluxions; which would have been underſtood by no Body, no more than it is now by Labourers. Again, thoſe Machines would have preach'd and inveigh'd againſt Prophanation: They would have bewail'd Sins, of which they were not guilty; and thoſe, which had not ſpoke as others did, would have undergone all the Severities of the Inquiſition; which, in ſuch a Caſe, had been only a Comedy acted by mere *Automata*.

ON the other hand, if GOD had been pleaſed to create the Soul of *Adam*, without uniting it to a Body, and without creating any Matter at all, that Soul would have been made after ſuch a Manner, that ſhe would have neceſſarily fancy'd her ſelf to be united to a Body: She would have looked upon that Body, as not being different from her ſelf: She would have fancy'd to ſee an Earth, a Sun, a Moon, which did not exiſt; to manure a Garden exiſting only in her Ideas;

to be asleep, and to find *Eve* by her Side, when she awaked; to contract Guilt, and make her self liable to Death by eating an imaginary Fruit: She would have fancy'd her self to be hungry, to eat, to be tired with working, to be sick, to prepare Remedies, and those imaginary Remedies would have cured her of her imaginary Illness. One must have a great Courage not to be terrified with those Consequences, and not to mistrust the Principle from which they arise. A long Habit of making happy Conjectures, and forming Ideas, which lead to Truth, has occasioned too hasty an Admittance of some other Ideas; and they have been thought to be of the same Nature, because they were formed by the same Mind.

MANY Men do also make up one *Whole*, when they unite in order to obey certain Laws, to enjoy certain Rights, to execute what is ordered by one Person, or resolved upon by a Majority of Votes, or to submit to it. This is a *Whole of Association*; it may be also called a *Moral Whole*. Many People enter upon the same Treaty, contract the same Obligations, and acquire the same Advantages. The Consent they give to that Treaty, is *external* or *internal*, *express* or *tacit*. The same Interest, the same Dependance, the same Relations to one Head, are the Ground of the *Unity* of a Community.

LASTLY, there is a *Whole* much more relative than those above-mention'd, and which, for that Reason, may be called *Relative* by way of Eminency, because it has the least internal Reality. Many Things, though very much separated, are looked upon as united in one *Whole*, when each of them has the same Relation, as all the others, to a certain Subject. Thus Money, Houses, Land, Flocks, are thought to make up one *Whole* with a Man, who differs still more from them, than they differ among themselves. I say, they make up one *Whole*, because each of them has the same Relation of Dependence, that is, depends in the same Manner upon a Man, who equally disposes of them all.

Relations are confounded.

III. IF Men had been more exact in their Thoughts, and more cautious to avoid Mistakes, they would not have given, by reason of some slight Resemblances, one and the same Name to very different Relations. In all the Cases just now mentioned, there is indeed some Union; but they have nothing else, that is common to them; and in other very material Respects they differ extremely. Yet, because they have a common Name, Men, who have minded Words

at

at all Times, judge of one of thoſe Relations in the ſame Manner as they judge of the others, and by that Means frequently fall into Error.

BECAUSE the *Inhabitants* of *one and the ſame Country* are called *the ſame People*, during a long Courſe of Years, provided they continue to be ſubject to the ſame Fundamental Laws, and poſſeſſed of the ſame principal Rights; thoſe, who live in the following Ages aſcribe to themſelves all the *Glory* and Virtue of their remoteſt *Anceſtors*, with the ſame Aſſurance, and, as they fancy, with the ſame Right, as an old Man values himſelf for the noble Actions of his Youth, which really belong to him, becauſe he is ſtill one and the ſame Perſon. Men, without any Scruple, take Advantage of every Thing that pleaſes them, and flatters their Vanity; they do not care to enquire into the Ground of it without Partiality.

THERE is nothing, that is leſs in our Power, and leſs our own, than our *Birth*; and therefore, of all the Pretences a Man takes hold of to value and prefer himſelf to others, that of his Birth appears to me the moſt groundleſs; and the Truth is, a Man does ſeldom inſiſt upon it, but for want of another Merit. However, thoſe who deſpiſe the Advantages of Birth, which they cannot boaſt of, are very often in the wrong; and if they were tender of their Reputation, they ſhould, like rational Men, ſecure themſelves by their Silence from the Suſpicion of envying an Advantage, which, by their own Confeſſion, is an inſignificant Thing. One of the greateſt *Advantages of Birth* is, in my Opinion, the Right of ſpeaking of it exactly, and giving it its true Worth. It was highly neceſſary, for the Good of the Society, that Sovereigns ſhould be able to acknowledge the Services of their Subjects by Rewards that ſhould coſt them nothing, and conſequently not chargeable to their People. A mere Title would have been a Reward too inconſiderable, if a Man could not have tranſmitted it to his Poſterity. A Man is the more tied to his Country, becauſe he finds in its Hiſtory that of his own Family; he loves thoſe Maſters, by whom he has been eſteemed from Father to Son; and it was no ſmall Secret to beſtow Rewards upon Men, that they ſhould think themſelves more and more obliged to deſerve them. Men diſtinguiſhed by their Birth are the more bound to diſtinguiſh themſelves by their Merit, becauſe all their Actions are more attended to. Beſides, the Meanneſs of Vice diſgraces them more than others, by its Contraſt with their Elevation; and their Virtues are the more admired, becauſe they may offend with greater Impunity.

IT is alſo highly neceſſary, for the Good of the Society, that all Occaſions of Envy ſhould be removed. People eaſily ſubmit to thoſe, whom they are uſed to obey; they are not ſo well pleaſed with the Elevation of an Equal; and nothing but an extraordinary Merit, attended with great Moderation, can make them bear ſuch a Superiority. The Generality of Men having but little Taſte for a ſolid Virtue, 'tis well that ſome practiſe it by a Point of Honour. When a Man values himſelf for his Riches, his Furniture, and Equipage, and thinks himſelf as great as he would be by the Beauty and Strength of his Body, the Knowledge of his Mind, and Uprightneſs of his Heart, *the Conformity of Names deceives him*, and does not allow him to reflect upon the Difference of Things.

IT appears therefore, that Men are unreaſonable in valuing themſelves upon a great many Things, which, far from making part of them, are not ſo much as their own, ſince they are not in their Power, and they may be deprived of them by many Accidents. They would be much more aſhamed of their Miſtakes, if they would conſider by what indecent Means they generally come to great Preferments, and the ill Uſe they make of them. If they ſuffer for it, 'tis their Fault. As ſoon as they ſee a Man above them, which way ſoever he has raiſed himſelf, how careful are they to perſuade him by their Encomiums that he really is what he ſhould be? Nay, in Point of Reaſoning, Rank is inſtead of a Proof; Authority ſupplies the Room of Knowledge; and a Man's Compliance is grounded upon the Titles of the Perſon he quotes, and the Figure he makes in the World.

Whole homogeneous and heterogeneous.

IV. WHEN all the Parts, which make up a Whole are alike, that Whole is called *homogeneous*; and when they differ one from another, it is ſtyled *heterogeneous*. And becauſe the Parts of a Whole are more or leſs alike, a Whole is alſo more or leſs homogeneous. Nay, it will be homogeneous in one Senſe, and heterogeneous in another Senſe. A Lump, conſiſting of ſeveral Metals melted together, will be an homogeneous Whole, with reſpect to a Maſs conſiſting of Metals, Minerals, and Stones. A Lump of pure Gold will be homogeneous, with reſpect to a Mixture of Gold and Silver. The Mercury, Salt, and Sulphur of Gold, when ſeparated, will form Wholes more homogeneous than Gold it ſelf, though never ſo diſengaged from any other mix'd Body. Theſe are plainly relative Names; and

and the ſame Subject may have relative Names quite different, and even quite oppoſite.

INSTEAD of the Remarks I have juſt now made, the Schools mention ſome other Kinds of *Wholes:* But becauſe they are only impertinent Diſtinctions, and uſeleſs Fooleries, I ſhould abuſe the Patience of my Readers, ſhould I loſe my Labour in mentioning them. 'Tis time the Synagogue ſhould lie buried in Oblivion: Should we perform ſtill her Obſequies, ſhe would perhaps awake and riſe out of her Grave.

V AMONG thoſe Parts, which make up a *Whole*, if one of them receives the others, we conceive between them a Relation of *Subject* and *Adjunct*. A *Subſtance* is always the *Subject* of Modes; for Modes having no ſeparate Exiſtence, ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of a Subſtance, and exiſt in it: They are the Subſtance it ſelf in a certain State, as I have ſhewn before. *Subject and Adjunct.*

A *MODE* is looked upon as the *Subject* of another Mode, when the ſecond exiſts only by Virtue of the firſt. Thus Motion is the Subject of Determination; for 'tis by Motion that a Body deſcribes a certain Line: 'Tis becauſe it moves, that it departs from one Term, and comes near another in a certain Way. 'Tis not the Way that makes the Motion; 'tis Motion which deſcribes a certain Way.

LASTLY, a *Subſtance* becomes the *Subject of another Subſtance*, when it Supports it. Thus the Ground is the Subject of a Houſe; and when a Subſtance is made for another Subſtance, they are looked upon as forming a ſort of a Whole; and the former is accounted an *Adjunct* of the latter. In this Reſpect, a Houſe is an *Adjunct* of a Man, as well as his Cloaths. Words are very unexact: A ſmall Reſemblance makes them common to very different Objects. I ſay *my* Houſe, as I ſay *my* Colour. It is very proper to be frequently put in mind of this, ſince the Confuſion ariſing from it is ſo frequent.

VI. THESE are three Sorts of Subjects and Adjuncts, ſo called, becauſe they are Realities, which make up a Whole, and ſome whereof receive the others, each in its own Way. But 'tis very improper to take for *Adjuncts* of a Subject ſome Things, which are not united to it, and do not make up one Whole with it. To be on the Right Hand or on the Left of a Man; to be near or at a Diſtance from him, are no Adjuncts; for though a Man turns about me, though he comes near me, or removes from me, as much as he pleaſe *External Denominations.*

pleaſes, yet I always remain the ſame, and in the ſame State. Theſe are therefore *external Denominations*.

THE following Expreſſions ought to be placed in that Claſs, *to be eſteemed, to be praiſed, to be deſpiſed, to be abuſed*, and the like. Eſteem, Praiſe, Blame, are Actions, not of thoſe who are eſteemed, praiſed, or blamed, but of others, who are commendable or blameable, according as they eſteem or blame juſtly or unjuſtly.

WHAT they ſay of us, does neither add any Thing to us, nor take any Thing from us; but we vex our ſelves, or grow vain, upon Account of the Opinions of other Men.

A MAN, who beſtows juſt Praiſes, and does Juſtice to Merit out of Generoſity, gives a Proof of his good Taſte. A Man, who cannot reſolve to acknowledge the good Qualities of others, ſhews by that Reluctancy, that he has an ill Heart. A Man, who commends what ought to be looked upon with indifference, or what rather deſerves to be blamed, is miſtaken, and has wrong Notions of Things. Praiſes are in thoſe who beſtow them. They are extraneous to thoſe who are commended, and make no more a Part of them, than the Health of their Neighbours makes Part of their own Health (*a*).

WHETHER God be offended or honoured; whether we be rewarded or puniſhed by him; whether he acts like a Father, or like a Judge; he remains immutable: Our Inconſtancy makes no Alteration in him. When we change, our Relations to him change; but he perſiſts in the Will of favouring thoſe who ſeek him, and forſaking thoſe who depart from him. To be received, or to be forſaken, are different States in Men; but whether God be found or not found by Men, his State is not altered: Theſe are only *external Denominations* with reſpect to him. Without changing my Situation, if a Man turns his back to me, he does not perceive me; and if he looks upon me, he ſees me.

OUR Miſtake upon this Head proceeds altogether from Expreſſions too like one another, about unlike Subjects. Men take a Subſtantive Noun to denote a Subject, and an Adjective to denote its Adjunct. I do the ſame to expreſs an

(*a*) Dicite nobis, utrum laudantis, an laudati, bonum ſit? Si laudantis bonum eſſe dicitis, tam ridiculam rem facitis, quàm ſi affirmetis meum eſſe, quod alius benè valeat. Sed laudare dignos, honeſta actio eſt: ita laudantis bonum eſt, cujus actio eſt, non noſtrum qui laudamur. *Sen. Ep.* CII.

an external Denomination and its Subject. I ſay, a *celebrated Man*, as I ſay, a *learned Man*; and I judge of the one as of the other. I imagine in both Phraſes a *Subject* and an *Adjunct*; but there is a great difference. Learning is in Man, and modifies him. Reputation is an extraneous Thing, and does not improve a Man. It is a State and an Adjunct, not of the Man, who is approved, but of thoſe who approve him.

Neceſſary and contingent Adjuncts.

VII. THOSE Realities, without which a Subject cannot Exiſt, are called its *neceſſary Adjuncts*. Thoſe that can be ſeparated from it, are *contingent Adjuncts*. A Portion of Extenſion cannot Exiſt without Figure; but it may Exiſt without Roundneſs. Figure is the *neceſſary Adjunct*, Roundneſs is the *contingent* one.

The Subject and the Adjunct diſcover one another.

VIII. WHATEVER Adjunct be aſcribed to a Subject, great Care ought to be taken that it may agree to the Nature of the Subject; for I have already ſaid in the foregoing Chapter, that we are always miſtaken, when we pretend to join together Things that are inconſiſtent. Wherefore nothing ought to be aſcribed to a Subject, till we have ſufficiently conſidered its Nature, and formed a right Notion of what we deſign to join to it.

AND whenever there is ſome Obſcurity in a Diſcourſe, which runs upon ſome Subject, and ſome Adjunct, we muſt out of two Ideas, aſſume for a Principle, that which is beſt known, and make uſe of it to remove the Obſcurity of the other; for the Adjunct ought to be explained in a Senſe agreeable to its Subject, and reciprocally.

IT is certain we come to the Knowledge of a Subject, if we conſider its Adjuncts; for we call *Adjunct* of a Subject its Manner of being, its different States; and the State of a Subject, its manner of Exiſting, is the Subject it ſelf diſpoſed and exiſting after a certain Manner. In ſome Caſes reciprocally, the Knowledge of a Subject leads to the Knowledge of its Adjuncts; and whenever Adjuncts are expreſſed in metaphorical Terms, it is highly neceſſary to know the Nature of the Subject to which they are aſcribed; for otherwiſe, by ſtraining the Senſe of thoſe Metaphors, one may eaſily aſcribe to a Subject an Adjunct, which cannot agree to it, and ſo fall into Contradictions. It appears from thence how uſeful thoſe Sciences are, which, by diſcovering to us the Nature of Things, prevent the Abſurdities we might fall

fall into, by aſcribing to a Subject what is repugnant to its Nature.

Maxims of the Rhetoricians about Adjuncts.

IX. THE antient Rhetoricians referred to the Claſs of Adjuncts a great many Relations, which did not belong to it: They placed in that Claſs, moſt of thoſe Things which ſurround a Subject, when they contributed to the clearing of it. Such are *Signs*, for inſtance, which they defined thus: A Sign is *a Thing, which leads us to the Knowledge of another.* Afterwards they divided them into many Orders, and among others, into *preceding*, *attending*, and *ſubſequent* Signs. But 'tis plain, that an Adjunct does neither precede nor follow its Subject: It attends only the Subject, and makes one Whole with it. They confounded the Cauſes and Effects of a Subject with its Adjuncts (*b*). The Rhetorick of the Antients

(*b*) Omnes res argumentando confirmantur, aut ex eo, quod perſonis, aut ex eo, quod negotiis eſt attributum. Ac perſonis has res attributas putamus: nomen, naturam, victum, fortunam, habitum, affectionem, ſtudia, conſilia, facta, caſus, orationes. Nomen eſt, quod unicuique perſonæ datur, quo ſuo quæque proprio, & certo vocabulo appellatur. Naturam ipſam definire difficile eſt: partes autem ejus enumerare eas, quarum indigemus ad hanc præceptionem, facilius eſt. Hæ autem partim divino, partim mortali in genere verſantur. Mortalium autem pars in hominum, pars in beſtiarum genere numeratur. Atque hominum genus & in ſexu conſideratur, virile an muliebre ſit: & in natione, patriâ, cognatione & ætate. Natione, Græcus an Barbarus. Patria, Athenienſis an Lacedæmonius. Cognatione, quibus majoribus, quibus conſanguineis. Ætate puer an adoleſcens; natu grandior an ſenex. Præterea commoda & incommoda conſiderantur ab naturâ data animo, aut corpori, hoc modo: Valens an imbecillis; longus an brevis; formoſus an deformis; velox an tardus ſit; acutus an hebetior; memor an oblivioſus; comis, officioſus, pudens, patiens, an contrà: & omninò qua à natura data animo & corpori conſiderabuntur, in naturâ conſideranda ſunt. Nam quæ induſtriâ comparantur, ad habitum pertinent: de quo poſterius dicendum eſt. In victu conſiderare oportet, apud quem, & quo more, & cujus arbitratu ſit educatus, quos habuerit artium liberalium magiſtros; quos vivendi præceptores; quibus amicis utatur; quo in negotio, quæſtu, artificio ſit occupatus; quomodo rem familiarem adminiſtret, quâ conſuetudine domeſtica ſit. In fortuna quæritur, ſervus ſit an liber; pecunioſus an tenuis; privatus an cum poteſtate. Si cum poteſtate, jure an injuria, felix, clarus, an contra; quales liberos habeat. Ac ſi de non vivo quæretur, etiam quali morte ſit affectus, erit conſiderandum.

Negotiis

Antients enabled an Orator to ſpeak eaſily, but not accurately. Their main Deſign was to ſpeak *ex tempore*, to pleaſe and dazzle the Audience: Probabilities are ſufficient for that Purpoſe. A great Clearneſs would have betrayed them in bad Cauſes, which they affected to defend: A dexterous Confuſion was more ſerviceable to them than a Demonſtration.

Matter, Subject, Form, Adjunct.

X. AMONG Adjuncts, that which contributes moſt to *ſpecify* a Thing, that is, which contributes moſt to place it in a certain Rank, to give it a certain Name, and make it ſuch a Thing, I ſay, the Adjunct, which is the *Foundation* of all the Adjuncts, whereby a Subject may be *diſtinguiſhed* from all others, and which conſequently makes their firſt and *main* Difference, is called not only *Eſſence*, (a Term already explained above,) but alſo *Form*; and the Subject of ſuch an Adjunct goes by the Name of *Matter*; for the Subject of Form is called *Matter*.

Matter and Form are not Cauſes.

XI. THE prevailing Cuſtom of reckoning Matter and Form in the Number of *Cauſes*, is a plain Proof that the Antients did not think much, and minded *Words* more than *Things*. The ſame Queſtion is ſometimes anſwered by alledging the Cauſe, and ſometimes by alledging the Matter and Form. Why is it Day-light? Becauſe the Sun is upon the Horizon. Why do you call what you hold in your Hand a Fork? I call it ſo by Reaſon of its Figure. Why do you ſet ſo great a Value upon it? Becauſe of its Matter, which is Gold. This is ſufficient to confound very different Relations, and ſo place them under the ſame Claſs. That Fork is Gold diſpoſed after a certain manner. Gold and its Diſpoſition is the Fork it ſelf. To ſay that Gold and its Figure are the Cauſes of the Fork, is the ſame, as if one ſhould ſay that it is the Cauſe of it ſelf.

A wrong Uſe of thoſe Terms.

XII. THOSE Terms, deſigned for material Things, which they expreſs clearly enough, bring no ſmall Confuſion into *Spiritual* and *Moral* Things, when applied to them; for we conceive Moral and Spiritual Things the more clearly, as we are leſs diſturbed by the Phantoms of Imagination.

WHAT

Negotiis autem quæ ſunt attributa, partim ſunt continentia cum ipſo negotio, partim in geſtione negotii conſiderantur, partim adjuncta negotio ſunt, partim geſtum negotium conſequuntur. *Cic. de Invent. Lib.* I.

WHAT an Obſcurity have not Divines themſelves introduced into their Sacred Syſtems, by bringing Matter and Form into ſome of thoſe Subjects, of which they are compoſed (*c*)? Matter and Form of Predeſtination, Matter and Form

(*c*) *Wendel. Theol. Lib.* I. *Cap.* 24. *Theſ.* 6. *Efficiens* fidei principalis eſt Deus, & ſingulariter Spiritus Sanctus. *Impulſiva* eſt miſericordia Dei, ſecundùm eternam electionem: *Meritoria*, Chriſti meritum: *Inſtrumentalis*, verbum Dei.

Theſ. 8. *Materia in qua*, ſeu ſubjectum recipiens, eſt homo ad vitam æternam electus, cujus intellectus & voluntas fide afficitur.

Theſ. 9. *Materia circa quam*, ſeu objectum, quod ſalvifica fides apprehendit, eſt *commune* vel *proprium*.

Theſ. 10. *Commune objectum* eſt veritas divina verbo Dei revelata: oportet enim fidelem credere Deo loquenti in verbo, & pro veris habere omnia, quæ Spiritus Dei affirmat vel negat, imprimis autem ea, quæ ad ſalutem pertinent.

Theſ. 11. *Proprium, principale & proximum objectum* eſt promiſſio Evangelica de peccatis per & propter Chriſti mortem expiatis, omnibuſque peccatoribus pœnitentibus & credentibus, propter Chriſtum crucifixum fide apprehenſum, in gratiam ex miſericordia receptis. Hanc promiſſionem in ſpecie ſinguli fidelis per fidem ſibi applicant, & ſic ad ſalutem dicuntur credere.

Theſ. 12. *Hactenus materia fidei juſtificantis.* Sequitur *forma*, quæ conſiſtit in tribus partibus, nempe, *notitiâ*, *aſſenſu* & *fiduciâ*.

That is, in order to have a right Notion of Faith, one muſt know, that "Faith, beſides its *principal Cauſe*, which is God, and particularly "the Holy Spirit, and its *inſtrumental Cauſe*, which is the Word of "God, has a *Matter in which*, a *Matter about which*, which is alſo "the Word of God, and a *Form*, which conſiſts in Knowledge, Ac"quieſcence and Truſt". From thence will ariſe many Controverſies.

Thus again in the 25th Chapter, which runs upon Juſtification. "Its *efficient and principal Cauſe*, is God the Father, the Son, and the "Holy Spirit: The *impulſive*, his Mercy: The *inſtrumental*, Faith. "The *Matter* is the Satisfaction of Chriſt, or his paſſive Obedience. "The *Form* is the Imputation of the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt ap"plied by Faith, and the Forgiveneſs of Sins, or the Abſolution from "the Curſe": Theſe are Matters which open a large Field for Diſpute.

In the 4th Chapter. "The *principal Cauſe* of Reprobation is God. "The *Impulſive*, Sin, The *Matter*, the greateſt part of Mankind: "Its *End*, the Manifeſtation of the Divine Juſtice: Its *Adjuncts*, "Eternity and Irrevocability: The *Effects*, being forſaken by God, "and Hardneſs of Heart".

Predeſtination is an eternal Decree of God. What is the *Matter* of that eternal Decree? Men, who did only exiſt an Eternity after that Decree.

Chap.

Form of Juſtification. Thoſe metaphorical Expreſſions raiſe material Ideas where there is no occaſion for them: Beſides, they are very general. One Man takes them in one Senſe, and another in a different one; and ſo they clear nothing.

THERE was a Time when I admired that Method. Nay, I did now and then wonder, that the Matters, contained in the Holy Scripture, were not diſpoſed in ſuch a Method, which appeared to me ſo proper to learn them, and to diſpute about them with Subtilty

XIII. BY *Matter*, we may underſtand what is common to all Bodies, what is to be found in all of them, and wherein they are perfectly alike. Such is *Extenſion*; for all Bodies are extended. Which being laid down, the *Form* would conſiſt in the *Varieties* of which that Extenſion is ſuſceptible in the different Bulk of its Parts, and their ſeveral Figures and Motions. *True Matter.*

THE Name of *Matter* may be alſo particularly beſtowed upon the *ſmalleſt* and moſt *laſting Particles*, of which Bodies are compoſed; and the Name of *Form* might be given to the different *Mixtures* and *Combinations* of thoſe Particles.

AND thoſe Particles may be divided into two Sorts, either the *Moleculæ* of Sulphur; for inſtance, Salt, Earth, *&c.* which by their Union will form Iron, Gold, Stones, Wood, *&c.* or the ſmall Parts, and, as it were, the *Roots* and firſt *Elements* of thoſe *Moleculæ*. Thoſe Roots and elementary Parts will be diſpoſed in a certain Manner; which may be the Cauſe of the Difference of different Sulphurs or Salts, or perhaps only of the different Soils, which are the Receptacles of Salts and Sulphurs.

IN order to know the Matters of which mix'd Bodies are compoſed in this Senſe, one ſhould be able to reſolve thoſe Mixtures, to ſeparate their different Parts, and collect thoſe of the ſame Kind into ſenſible Heaps. The more exactly that

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Chap. 5. *Theſ.* 6. He acknowledges that *the Matter of Creation was nothing*. He ſays the *Form* of that Creation is *the Production out of Nothing*.

This is ſufficient to ſhew the Confuſion occaſioned by thoſe material Ideas and metaphorical Expreſſions in Matters, which are already difficult enough in themſelves. If that Divine had been a Biſhop, and againſt Toleration, Woe to the Prieſts of his Dioceſe. Beſides, had he been in the Prince's Favour, he would have endeavoured to perſwade him, that all thoſe who did not admire his Scholaſtick Language, were contriving a new and dangerous Religion.

that *Analyſis* would be performed, either with Fire, or other diſſolvents, the more we might be ſure that we know the Matter of Bodies, and have diſcovered their Principles.

WHAT is to be feared in thoſe Operations, is that the Force of the Diſſolvents, which ſeparate the Particles, will deſtroy their Contexture; that the Particles extricating themſelves violently one from another, will break, and alter their Figures; and laſtly that the ſmalleſt and the moſt active will eſcape, inſtead of forming *Moleculæ*, that is, ſmall viſible Heaps.

HOWEVER, we may believe we are come the nearer to a compleat Analyſis, according as the ſeparated Particles contain a greater Number of the Qualities, which they diffuſed in the Mixture; eſpecially, if thoſe Qualities are more lively and active in the ſeparated Principles, than when thoſe Principles were mutually tempered by their Union.

LASTLY, the Conjecture will go as far as Certainty, if the reunited Principles form a ſecond Time the ſame Compound with a very ſmall Difference: I ſay, with a very ſmall Difference, for ſome Particles do always eſcape; and it is no eaſy Thing to give again the ſame Diſpoſition to all the others.

THE Smallneſs of thoſe Particles appears incredible, though it cannot be doubted of. An Ounce of Gold is actually drawn into a Thread, that might reach fifty Leagues; and a Grain of Colour, of the Bigneſs of a Lentil, can dye many Ounces of Oyl; and that Oyl communicates its Colour to the Flame for many Hours, though the Flame vaniſhes away continually.

How thoſe Forms may be known.

XIV. IN order to know how the Particles ought to be modified to give a Body a certain *Form*; to make it, for inſtance, hard, liquid, hot, luminous, *&c.* we obſerve, 1. Whatever is *common* to thoſe different Bodies, in which that ſame Form is to be found, for inſtance, Fire, Dunghills, and other hot Bodies, otherwiſe very indifferent. 2. We conſider what *ſhines*, eſpecially in thoſe Subjects wherein that Form is to be found in its higheſt Degree. In Fire, for inſtance, we ſee a very great Mobility. 3. We obſerve whether that ſame Mode appears in *weaker* Subjects in a proportionable Degree. 4. We enquire whether that Form, which we ſuſpect to be an Effect of a certain Mode, be *inſeparable* from all the Subjects, from which that Mode is not ſeparated; as Fire is never without Heat and Mobility. 5. We obſerve whether what gives *Riſe* to that Mode, produces at the ſame

ſame Time the Form, which ought to depend upon it; and whether what takes away the Mode, *deſtroys* the Form. Whatever produces a Shaking in the Particles, heats a Body; and whatever puts a ſtop to it, ſuch as a direct and ſtrong Blowing, removes its Heat. 6. The *Generation* of a Thing, when it can be obſerved, diſcovers its Form; for a Thing has only what it has received from its Cauſe. Thus, when we ſtir Water, and make it foam, becauſe we only produce a Multiplication of Surfaces, each of which reflects ſome ſmall Light, we conjecture that Whiteneſs conſiſts in a Reflection of Light ſomewhat weakned.

BUT to make ſuch a Diſcovery, the Generation muſt be neither too ſlow, nor too quick, leſt the Manner of it ſhould eſcape our Attention.

WE alſo proceed from a *like* Subject to another, as I have ſhewed, ſpeaking of that Relation. Laſtly, it is ſometimes neceſſary to join together *many Modes*, for the Eſtabliſhment of *one ſingle Form*, ſuch as the Smallneſs and Smoothneſs of Parts, and a confuſed Motion to explain Liquidity. The illuſtrious *Bacon* is the firſt who publiſhed all thoſe Hints. He calls them Inſtances, and gives them ſingular Names, moſt of which are Metaphorical, according to the Cuſtom of that Time, when Men were fond of Terms of Art.

XV. IT will be ſufficient to obſerve here, in few words, that in order to ſucceed in the Diſcovery of Forms, we ought to know ſimple Forms, before we proceed to the Enquiry of the more compounded ones. Whilſt Philoſophers will be contented to publiſh ſeparate Treatiſes upon curious Matters, the Principles whereof have not been yet laid down with great Solidity, their Conjectures will never Riſe above Probabilities, as Moraliſts will never demonſtrate the Beauty and Neceſſity of a good Conduct, the Principles of which have not been ſet in their true Light. *Simple and compounded Forms.*

XVI. BEFORE Nature and Art had been well ſtudied, and their Difference was well known, Logicians have been pleaſed to imagine two Sorts of Forms, *Natural* and *Artificial* Forms (*d*). But whereas the Deſign of *Diſtinctions* is *Natural and Artificial Forms.*

(*d*) The beſt Way of explaining Nature, if it could be frequently practiſed, would be to counterfeit Nature, and to give, as it were, Repreſentations of it, by making known Cauſes produce the ſame Effects.

is to clear Matters, and they ought to remove Difficulties, the Diſtinction I am now ſpeaking of, perplexes Authors to the higheſt Degree. If they ſay that Artificial Forms run upon Bulk, Figure, and Motion, they will be asked, What other Principles Nature makes uſe of? Is any Thing produced without Motion? Is any Alteration made without it? And does not every Thing that moves, act differently, according to its Bulk and Figure, and according to the Bulk and Figure of what it meets with? If they ground their Diſtinction upon the great Changes, and the Variety of Forms whereby Nature diverſifies her Works; they will be told, That Corn is changed into Meal, and then into Bread; that Wool is changed into Cloaths, and Hemp into Paper; Transformations which equal, and even exceed ſeveral natural Forms. Laſtly, if they inſiſt upon the Imperceptibility of the Ways of Nature, they will alſo be told, That ſome Works made with Mens Hands, cannot be unfolded without the Help of Microſcopes. The Force of Nature runs upon Motion, Bulk, and Figure, and upon the Collections of Agents with which it works. All human Induſtry is exerted with the ſame Helps. Nature is therefore the Model of Art, and Artificial Forms are Natural Forms.

Effects. In ſuch a Caſe, we ſhould no longer gueſs; we ſhould ſee with our own Eyes, and be ſure that Natural and Artificial Phænomena proceed from the ſame Cauſes, or at leaſt, from Cauſes not much unlike.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of Causes and Effects.

I. AFTER having compared Things by conſidering them with reſpect to what they are, we conſider them with reſpect to what they *can do*; and if we diſcover that one of them can produce the other, or only alter it, we conceive between the Agent, and what ariſes from it, a Relation of *Cauſe* and *Effect*. And becauſe that Relation does always ſuppoſe ſome real Change, ſome new Being, or ſome new Manner of Being, out of our Thoughts, it may be that what happens in that particular Relation, gave occaſion to fancy that all the other Relations do alſo conſiſt in certain Realities, which befal the Terms compared together, and are different from them. The Agent, the Thing acted upon, and the State reſulting from that Action, exiſt out of our Minds; but the Compariſon of all thoſe Objects is made within us. *The Relation of Cauſe and Effect more real than the others.*

II. A *Cauſe* is that which gives *Exiſtence*, the *Virtue* whereof *produces* a Thing, the *Reality* whereof *gives Riſe* to another Reality, and by the *Efficacy* of which a Thing is *formed*. What is *produced*, what receives its *Exiſtence*, what *ariſes* from the Cauſe, goes by the Name of *Effect*. *Definition.*

III. THE *Power* of the Cauſe is the Reality of a Thing conſidered with reſpect to the Riſe of another Thing, which depends upon it. That Power is called *Active*; and the *Paſſive Power* is the Diſpoſition of a Thing to receive an Alteration, or it is the Thing it ſelf conſidered, as being Mutable. Thoſe Ideas are Simple, and can hardly be defined but by Synonymous Terms. The *Action* of the Cauſe is the Reality of the Thing, as operating. *Power and Action.*

IV. WE are convinced that a Thing has the Character of a *true Cauſe*, when it implies Contradiction that it ſhould act without producing an Effect; for what ſurer Sign can we have that a *Character of the true Cauſe.*

Cauſe is really a Cauſe, that it deſerves that Name, that it is real and not imaginary; I ſay, what ſurer Sign can we have of it, than the infallible and neceſſary Certainty that it will produce its Effect, than the Impoſſibility that its Effect ſhould not enſue?

GOD is certainly a true and moſt real Cauſe; for it is abſolutely and plainly Contradictory, that a perfect Being ſhould want Efficacy; that the Power of an unlimited Reality ſhould be limited; and that an Infinite Being ſhould make uſeleſs Efforts.

THERE are alſo true Cauſes among Creatures. Upon a thouſand Occaſions, we are ſenſible that we determine our ſelves; and there is no Certainty above that of Self-conſciouſneſs. It implies Contradiction that a Body ſhould move the Length of a *Toiſe*, for inſtance, and that the Bodies lying along that Toiſe be not put into Motion: I ſay, it implies a Contradiction that a Body ſhould continue to move, and not carry along with it the Bodies that are in its Way. *Motion* does therefore neceſſarily move, becauſe it is Motion: Its Power may be loſt; for Motion it ſelf may ceaſe; but its Force is eſſentially annexed to its Reality and Exiſtence: It received at the ſame Time its Efficacy and its Nature. The eternal and unlimited Being, who willed the Exiſtence of Motion, willed for that very Reaſon its Activity. 'Tis true, its Nature and its Force are derived; but however, it has both of them really, and not in Appearance; and becauſe it does not only appear to be Motion, but is really ſo; it does not only appear to move and impel, but actually moves, and carries along with it what lies in its Way.

Occaſional Cauſes.

V. I KNOW that ſome great Men, for whoſe Merit I have a due Reſpect, have reckoned all Creatures among occaſional Cauſes, that God alone might have the Glory of doing every Thing immediately. *Upon occaſion of the Sun, placed in Heaven, God imprints a Motion in my Eye, and Traces in my Brain; and by that means he makes me ſee in himſelf the Spiritual and Eternal Repreſentation of the Sun.* That Hypotheſis appears great. *Properly ſpeaking, we have no Commerce but with God. He is the World of Ideas, which the Soul ſurveys in its own Way.* When our Thoughts are pleaſed with ſuch a high Flight, the whole material World appears to us of a contemptible Smallneſs. It vaniſhes away from the Eyes of a Man, who opens them only to contemplate the intelligible World.

BUT how many Inconveniencies is that Hypotheſis liable to, when applied to other Examples? If we ſpeak the Language of thoſe Philoſophers, Butchers do not kill Calves and Sheep: God himſelf does it immediately. Upon occaſion of a Knife, he opens the Skin, thruſts in his Arm, and drives out of the Veins a Blood, which would not come out, were it not for that immediate Mover. A Scullion does not Light a Fire in a Kitchin; but a certain Figure of his Mouth, a certain Conformation of his Muſcles, are only an Occaſion for God to blow it. The Meat between our Teeth affords the ſupreme Being an Occaſion of moving our Jaws. A Philoſopher would ſpeak agreeably to Truth, and give the firſt Cauſe all the Glory due to it, if he ſhould ſay that a bad Raſor, with want of Skill in his Barber, has afforded the ſupreme Being an Occaſion of cutting his Face. A Man is frighten'd, when his Imagination carries thoſe Examples farther; and I am perſwaded that a ſacred Reſpect, removing a great many ſuch Images, did not allow thoſe Philoſophers to ſee the Inconveniencies of an Hypotheſis, which would have forced them to give it up.

THE exact Proportion which God has eſtabliſhed, and which is conſtantly obſerved between Cauſes and their Effects, convinces me that they are not mere Appearances of Cauſes, but real Cauſes: I ſay, that conſtant and exact Proportion does not allow me to doubt of it. Otherwiſe we muſt ſay, that the Wiſdom of God has left nothing unattempted to give an Air of Reality to mere Appearances, to lead us into Error, and prevent our knowing it. If there was to be no real Cauſe, it had been as well that the Motion and Impulſe of a Cannon-Bullet ſhould be an Occaſion of making a Wall ſteady, as an Occaſion of ſhaking it: A Bullet is, in it ſelf, as proper for the one as for the other. The acute Angle of an Edge has no more Aptitude in it ſelf, to cleave Wood, than an obtuſe one; and the Grafts of a Pear-Tree would be as proper Occaſions to produce Apples and Cherries, as the Grafts of an Apple-Tree and of a Cherry-Tree.

IT will be ſaid, that the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of GOD required, that Men ſhould eaſily know the occaſional Cauſes aſſigned to each Effect, and diſtinguiſh thoſe Occaſions one from another; and that the apparent Proportion of thoſe Cauſes, with their Effects, teaches us the Uſe of them. At this rate, that a Man may have Plums, when he deſires it, a certain Graft has been appointed to be the apparent Cauſe of the Formation of a Plum-Tree, which will be alſo in time an

an Occaſion to the Production of Plums. If a Man did not offer to GOD that Occaſion of producing Plums, he would never have any. But if GOD has reſolved to produce Fruits for the Satisfaction of Men, why ſo many Windings? Why is not that Deſire it ſelf the occaſional Cauſe of what may ſatisfy it? The Deſire is indeed the occaſional Cauſe of the Motion whereby a Man takes hold of a Graft, and inſerts it. That Graft is the Occaſion of the Tree, and the Tree is the Occaſion of the Fruit. But, ſince GOD alone is the Author of the Motion, whereby the Graft is inſerted, and of the Tree and its Fruit, I ask once again, to what Purpoſe ſo many Windings? Had it not been a ſhorter Way to produce the Fruit upon the ſole Occaſion of the Deſire, ſince that Fruit is only deſigned to ſatisfy it? Every Thing that intervenes between the Deſire and the Production of the Fruit, is a mere Ceremony without any Efficacy, without any real Force. A Man deſires to eat Plums: GOD, far from diſapproving that Deſire, is willing to diſplay his Power in order to ſatisfy it. But 'tis not ſufficient, that a Man ſhould offer that humble Deſire to GOD, as a natural Prayer; if he has a Mind to be heard, his Prayer muſt be attended with certain Practices, which might be called the Myſteries of Natural Religion: He muſt take hold of a certain Graft, inſert it in a Trunk of a certain Kind, and beſides pitch upon a certain Seaſon. At this rate, may not one find a myſterious Alluſion to occaſional Cauſes in the Advice of the Sibyl to *Æneas*, not to go to *Proſerpine* without a golden Branch, gathered in the thickeſt Part of a certain Foreſt. Nothing will be deny'd to a Prayer attended with that Ceremony; nay, the moſt inviolable Laws of Nature will yield to it; and a Man will return alive from the very Abode of Death (*a*).

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(*a*) *Quod ſi tantus amor menti, ſi tanta cupido eſt,*
Bis Stygios innare lacus, bis nigra videre
Tartara; & inſano juvat indulgere labori;
Accipe, quæ peragenda prius. Latet arbore opaca
Aureus, & foliis, & lento vimine ramus,
Junoni inferna dictus ſacer: hunc tegit omnis
Lucus, & obſcuris claudunt convallibus umbræ.
Sed non ante datur telluris operta ſubire,
Auricomos quam quis decerpſerit arbore fœtus.
Hoc ſibi pulchra ſuum ferri Proſerpina munus
Inſtituit: primo avulſo non deficit alter
Aureus & ſimili frondeſcit virga metallo.

Ergo

A GREAT Difference ought to be made between a *ſecond Cauſe* and an *occaſional Cauſe*. Second Cauſes have received their Exiſtence, their Nature, and their Force; but they are actually poſſeſſed of the Reality and Power they have received; whereas occaſional Cauſes have no Aptitude, no Reality to produce their Effects. Thus the Handkerchiefs, touched by the Apoſtles, were occaſional Cauſes of the Cure of Diſeaſes; and in the uſual Courſe of Nature, it may be ſaid, that the Diviſion, made by a Pin in the Fibres, is an occaſional Cauſe of the painful Senſation it is attended with; for there is no neceſſary Connexion between a Motion and a Senſation; it is an arbitrary Inſtitution of the ſupreme Author, who might as well have annexed to that Diviſion the diſagreeable Senſe we are affected with, when we hear a Diſſonance. His Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Power appear in the Uſe, Diſtribution, Conſtancy and Regularity of thoſe Connections, which he has eſtabliſhed between Motions and Thoughts; but we plainly ſee that the former are not true, neceſſary, and immediate Cauſes of the latter, as the Impulſe of a Body is the Cauſe of the Motion of the Body impelled, and as the Figure of a ſolid Tube is the Cauſe of the Figure of the Liquid poured into it.

IF there are none but occaſional Cauſes among Creatures, and if the Sun does no more enlighten the Earth than the Earth the Sun, where is the Wiſdom of the Creator in the Diſpoſition of the Univerſe, and the Variety of Creatures? If, properly ſpeaking, GOD does every Thing, and we are only mere Witneſſes of what we fancy to be our own Actions, what does Morality ſignify? What ſignify the Words *Law*, *Virtue*, *Vice*, *Reward* and *Puniſhment*? What becomes of Religion?

IT has been objected againſt *Homer*, that he changes his Heroes into Gods, and his Gods into Men. Does not the Syſtem of occaſional Cauſes expoſe its Defenders to the ſame Objection? If their Opinion be true, Man does nothing; he only ſeems to act, but, in truth, GOD alone does every Thing. A Thought of a Man is the Occaſion of another Thought; but GOD, and not Man, is the Author of

Ergo alte veſtiga oculis, & ritè repertum
Carpe manu: namque ipſe volens, facilisque ſequetur,
Si te fata vocant: aliter non viribus ullis
Vincere, nec duro poteris convellere ferro.

Æneid. VI. 133. & ſeq.

of that firſt Thought. Where will the Fault begin? What can we find in Man, that deſerves Puniſhment? Can any one be more innocent than he, who does no harm, becauſe he is uncapable of doing any Thing? It cannot be ſaid neither, that he neglects any good Thing, that he is wanting to any Duty; for neither we, nor our firſt Parent, who was no leſs a Creature than we, ever had the Power of doiug any Thing whatſoever. Wherefore Man in that Syſtem would be perfectly innocent; and in his Diſorders and Sufferings, a Conſequence of his Diſorders, he would be very much to be pity'd; and the firſt and only Mover, the firſt and only Cauſe of all his Ideas, Senſations and Motions, would appear a Being infinitely cruel, who makes his Creatures ſuffer for doing what they cannot forbear doing, in the Circumſtances wherein they have been placed by him. And indeed all Deiſts and Libertines embrace the Syſtem of occaſional Cauſes; 'tis their Favourite Syſtem; they love to fancy they are Machines, which have neceſſarily and unavoidably received from the firſt Mover all the Motions whereby they are determined.

CAN metaphyſical Ideas, general Expreſſions, (the uſual Cauſe of Equivocations and Fallacies,) hold out againſt ſuch plain Conſequences? Muſt the Ideas of Virtue and Vice, Law, Obligation, Reward, Merit, Demerit, Reproach and Thanks, Praiſe and Blame, be accounted chymerical, becauſe they do not agree with I know not what metaphyſical Abſtractions?

WE are told, that to act is to bring ſomething, ſome Subſtance or ſome Mode out of Nothing into Being. But from Nothing to Being there is an infinite Diſtance; and therefore an infinite Power is requiſite for that. Every Production is an infinite Effect, which exceeds the Power of a finite Being. Such are the Speculations whereby the Univerſe is changed into a Puppet-Shew, and Religion into a mere Mummery.

WHEN a Man ſays, that whatever exiſts, is for that very Reaſon infinitely above Nothing, he uſes an Expreſſion almoſt conſecrated by a long Uſe; but I don't think it to be the more exact upon that Account: For a Being appears to me to be diſtant from Nothing, only in proportion as it is Being. But when it is only a finite Being, when its Eſſence, Attributes, Power, *&c.* are finite, why ſhould I ſay, it is infinitely diſtant from Nothing? It can only be diſtant from Nothing by virtue of what it is; and ſince it is finite, it has only a finite Diſtance from Nothing.

I CONJECTURE, that the Error upon this Head is originally derived from an Equivocation, at a Time when Men minded Words more than their Senſe. When theſe two Expreſſions, *To be*, *Not to be*, were ſet in Oppoſition, the ſecond was ſaid to deny *in infinitum*, becauſe it deny'd not one or two Beings, not a certain Number of Beings, or Kinds of Beings, but all Beings, and all their Kinds. For this Reaſon finite Terms were called *infinite*, when the negative Particle was prefixed to them. Which gave Occaſion to theſe equivocal Words, *To be*, *Not to be*. The ſecond Term is infinite; and therefore it is infinitely diſtant from the firſt. But by a like Argument I might conclude, that all thoſe who are not very learned, are infinitely far from becoming learned; for I would ſay, *Very learned*, *Not very learned*. I might conclude, that a Lamb is infinitely far from becoming a Sheep, *&c.*

A PIECE of flat Wax is not ſo far from receiving a round Form, as Nothing is far from Being; and the Production of a Ball out of Nothing would be a greater Effect than *to* bring it from a State of Reſt to a State of Motion. If one of thoſe Effects was infinite, the other would not be ſo, ſince it is not ſo great. What does not exiſt, has no Diſpoſition to exiſt; but a Body, which already exiſts, is actually ſuſceptible of a certain Figure, and a certain Motion.

SOME Men are not ſenſible, that by zealouſly depriving Creatures of all Power, they ſtrike at the very Power of the Creator, who can do nothing that is active and truly real, and whoſe infinite Power can only produce Appearances, and ſurround us with Illuſions, whereby we are apt to believe that he has done what he cannot do.

WE are uſed to judge of the Merit and Happineſs of Men by comparing them one with another. Some indulge the ſame Habit, when they form an Idea of the Greatneſs of God. One would think that Greatneſs ariſes only from our Depreſſion; and that though it be infinite, it would loſe Part of its Luſtre, if we were ſomething more than nothing. But 'tis the quite contrary: There is nothing more natural and reaſonable than to judge of the Excellency of a Cauſe by the Greatneſs of its Effects. Wherefore, it is more glorious to create intelligent Beings, than mere Matter; the Power and Wiſdom of GOD are better obſerved in Plants than in Stones, and more admired in Animals than in Plants. For the ſame Reaſon, it is doubtleſs more glorious to be able to create real Beings than mere Appearances, and Beings truly active

active than Beings without Force and Activity. Such Beings are more worthy of GOD, whose Power is unlimited.

The first Cause. VI. THESE Reflections lead us to distinguish Causes into their different Kinds. I shall, in the first place, divide them according to the Nature of those Things that go by the Name of Causes, and are really so. In this Respect there is a *first* Cause, and there are *second* Causes.

THE Properties, whereby the first Cause is distinguished, are first to have an unlimited Power, as it has an infinite Essence and Reality. From whence it follows, secondly, that being unlimited, or infinite, it acts with an infinite Easiness, and consequently, that it acts by the sole Efficacy of its Will; for, if the first Cause, being willing to produce an Effect, wanted an Application besides its Will, it would not act with a perfect Easiness, since there is no perfect Easiness, but when the Effect exists, because it is ordered, and when to will and to do are the same Thing. We produce in our Bodies several Effects, only because we will them; our Will, upon many Occasions, without any Effort, is immediately follow'd by the Execution. If it be said, that our Will is only an apparent and occasional Cause of those Effects, which seem to arise from it; I answer, that it is highly proper to ascribe to the Will of GOD the Reality of which the Appearance is to be found in ours, and to believe that he is actually possessed of the Power, whereof we have a Shadow and an Image in our selves.

THIS Notion of the Divine Power is altogether worthy of GOD, and extricates us from many Difficulties. It is not necessary to suppose that his Essence acts continually upon our Souls, to produce in them that numberless Variety of Perceptions, which arise one from another, or are the Consequences of the Motion of the Brain. He acts only by his Will. Let us therefore conceive that he is willing that the Division of the Fibres, made by a Pin, be attended with a certain Sensation; that Sensation cannot fail to arise. Let us conceive that his Will, in creating Man, establishes a Law to regulate the mutual Succession of the Motions of the Body and the Sentiments of the Soul, for all possible Men and all imaginable Cases, (for he has an Idea of all Men, and all Cases,) and that the same Will he had in creating the first Man, remains unvariable; for his Will is not changeable, like that of Men. That constant Will, which has regulated all the Cases, must be attended with the Execution in all those Cases; and because 'tis as easy for the supreme Intelligence

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gence to form a thouſand Millions of Ideas, as to form a ſingle one, his Will has not only eſtabliſh'd a Connection between a Pricking and a Pain, but alſo with the ſame Eaſineſs a Connection between each Thought and each Motion.

WHEN I put a Piece of Sugar upon my Tongue, I don't engage the ſupreme Cauſe to produce in me a new Effect, ſince I do not determine it to a new Will: I only make uſe of the Will it had, before I exiſted, and which remains the ſame ſtill.

THE third Character of the firſt Cauſe, is to produce any Effect without any Help; and indeed what Help can it want? The Power of GOD is not limited; and whatever he is pleaſed to make uſe of, has its Exiſtence from him. GOD has certainly as much Power, as he has given to any Creature he would be pleaſed to make uſe of.

THE firſt Cauſe therefore wants no *Inſtruments* to act; and it does not ſuppoſe any Subject to act upon. It produces every Thing out of nothing. *Creation*, that is, the Exiſtence of a new Being, the Production of a new Subſtance, is not an Effect above its Strength; this we may eaſily be convinced of. A firm Reſolution, and a long Habit, contribute to make thoſe Things, which we undertake, *eaſy* to us; but an *Effect* is in it ſelf the more *eaſy*, as it requires a leſſer Change; and with reſpect to its Cauſe, it is the more *feaſible*, as its Reality is inferior to the Reality by which it is to be produced. But we know no Being, and there can be none, the Reality whereof comes near the Reality of God; and how great ſoever the Change from Nothing to Being may be, it is not above the infinite Power of the neceſſary Being, who is infinitely far from Nothing.

EVERY Effect conſiſts in a Change; and conſequently, the Difficulty or Greatneſs of an Effect is exactly anſwerable to the Greatneſs of the Change wherein it conſiſts. Laſtly, that Change is ſo much the greater, or, which comes to the ſame, ſo much the more difficult, as there is a greater Diſtance from the Term a Thing is taken from, to that wherein it is placed. Now, though we ſuppoſe the Difference and Diſtance from the Non-Exiſtence to the Exiſtence of an infinite Subſtance to be never ſo great, yet that Diſtance will always be infinitely leſſer than the Diſtance and Difference there is between Nothing and the neceſſary, perfect and infinite Being, and his perfect and infinite Power.

THIS is a convincing Argument. The Power of creating does plainly belong to the firſt Cauſe, though the Manner of

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that Operation is above us. We cannot apprehend how the Will of GOD creates, though we can demonſtrate that the Power of creating does eſſentially belong to it. We cannot apprehend what State the Will of GOD is in, when it makes a Being exiſt by willing; for, in order to have an Idea of the Will of GOD operating in that Manner, we ſhould diſpoſe our Will, as he diſpoſes his own; we ſhould will and think, as he wills and thinks, when he creates Subſtances; but becauſe we have not received that Power, we have no Idea of it. If we had never willed, we ſhould not know what Will is; it is by Self-conſciouſneſs that we have learned to know it. We know ſuch Manners of Willing, as are like thoſe we have experienced. As for the others, we know nothing of them; we cannot apprehend them; and we never experienced that creating Will in our ſelves.

I HAVE not undertaken in Logic to prove the Exiſtence of GOD, and to treat of his Nature and Attributes. I never deſigned to confound this Introduction to Philoſophy with Natural Theology. I only thought it proper to explain in this Place the Notions of Cauſes according to the Order of their Kinds.

To conclude what I have to ſay upon this Head; nothing but a voluntary Obſtinacy, and an Averſeneſs to the Idea of GOD, can make one prefer to the Syſtem of a firſt Cauſe, the Syſtem of a Subalternation of Cauſes *in infinitum*. I acknowledge that there is *Infinity* in both, and conſequently Incomprehenſibility. But in one of them Infinity is placed in a proper Subject, in the perfect, neceſſary and unlimited Being, in Reality it ſelf; whereas in the other, Infinity is to be found in a Succeſſion of finite and imperfect Parts, an infinite Number whereof does no longer exiſt, and numberleſs Millions did not exiſt during infinite Ages. It cannot be ſaid, that any of them did neceſſarily exiſt; for then it would exiſt ſtill; and one cannot ſuppoſe without Extravagance a fortuitous Infinity, which might never have exiſted, and which exiſts only by I know not what Chance. Admit a neceſſary Being, who has created all Things by a free Choice; and then inſtead of a dark Chaos you will be ſurrounded with Light.

A MAN, who is willing to uſe his own Reaſon, will plainly ſee that the ſeveral Parts of the Univerſe, and their Diſpoſition, move us to go higher than what we call ſecond Cauſes. Nothing can be more incomprehenſible than Atoms, Particles of Matter, which, without a Cauſe, happen to have a certain Form, and to be moved in a certain Manner and

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in a certain Degree, though Extenſion, and each Part of Extenſion, be equally ſuſceptible of Reſt and Motion, of all ſorts of Figures, and all ſorts of Motions. It would be more credible to ſuppoſe, that Wheels, diſpoſed without the Direction of an intelligent Being, can form a Watch, that goes regularly. The Reſurrection of a dead Man, which makes our *Epicureans* laugh, is more eaſily conceived than their Principles.

A SUCCESSION of Beings, each of which depends upon thoſe, by which it was preceded, I ſay, ſuch a Succeſſion of dependent Beings, eternal and neceſſary, is a Contradiction; for, no Part of that Whole would be neceſſary, otherwiſe it would be ſelf-exiſtent; and how can that Whole be neceſſary, if none of its Parts are ſo (*b*)?

VII. THE Cauſes, produced by the firſt Cauſe, and which act by a Power derived from it, are *Intelligent* or *Material*. Intelligent Cauſes act not only outwardly, but alſo upon themſelves, as we know by our own Experience. Knowledge and Choice precede their Actions; and we are ſure of it by the ſame inward Experience. I have already ſufficiently explain'd the Notion of *Liberty*. *Intelligent Cauſes.*

HOWEVER, an intelligent Being does not always conſult his Ideas as much as he can, nor ſuſpend his Judgment as much as he ſhould. He does not always ſufficiently mind what he undertakes; he does not conſider the Circumſtances of it with a ſufficient Exactneſs, nor foreſee its Conſequences with a ſufficient Circumſpection. And therefore, in his *Ignorance*, he does what his Knowledge would have prevented; and that Ignorance is more or leſs excuſable, as it was more or leſs in his Power, or more or leſs his Duty to avoid it.

THERE is an *Ignorance* altogether *involuntary*. Such would be in all Reſpects the Ignorance of a Man carry'd away and nurſed by a She-Bear; and in a particular Caſe, the Ignorance of a Man, who being dazzled with a violent Blow upon his Eyes, and running away from a cruel Enemy, ſhould meet his Father without ſeeing him, and throw him down. There is a Cauſe, which, though *invincible* in ſome Circumſtances, yet is accounted *voluntary*, becauſe it ſhould have

(*b*) " See the *Bibliotheque Choiſie*, Tom. XXVI. *p.* 280 You " will find there the Characters of the firſt Cauſe very plainly de- " monſtrated.

have been prevented. Such is the Ignorance of a Man, who being drunk does not know what he does; or the Ignorance of a Judge, who does not understand a Law-Suit, because he neglected to be instructed in his Youth, to use himself to be attentive, and to get a Clearness and Justness of Thought.

A CAUSE, uncapable of acting with Knowledge and Choice, cannot be *answerable* for what it does. From whence it appears, that the *Greatness* of a Fault depends upon the Extent of the Knowledge, which has been neglected, and the Easiness of acting according to that Knowledge. The Uncertainty of Knowledge does not set off the Worth of Virtue; for, there is no Virtue in acting at random, and without knowing whether we do well; but we judge of the Degrees of Virtue, by the Obstacles that have been overcome to preserve it. For Liberty was given us, to enable us to prefer the Dictates of the Understanding to the Suggestions of the Senses.

'TIS true, that GOD, who searches the Heart, and perfectly knows our Inclinations, may see in a Soul, which delights in doing her Duty, so great a Desire of performing it, that she would overcome the most discouraging Difficulties: So that the Greatness of Virtue is measured, not merely by what a Man does, but rather by what he could do; not by the Victories he has obtained, but by those he could obtain. When we meet with no Difficulty, we have Reason to congratulate our selves (*c*). When we meet with Obstacles, we have an Occasion to know our selves; and in our present State upon Earth, 'tis by our Perseverance in those Virtues, which are opposite to our Temper and present Interest, that we can be sure of the Purity of those, to which we are naturally inclined.

Contingent Causes.

VIII. BECAUSE intelligent Causes act with Knowledge and Choice, they can act or forbear acting, and they can act to Day quite contrary to what they did Yesterday; they grow eager or remiss, as they think fit. And therefore they are called *Contingent*, because sometimes they operate, sometimes they are unactive, and sometimes they act contrary to what was expected. But though material Causes always act without Knowledge, and do

(*c*) Ego illum feliciorem dixerim, qui nihil negotii secum habuit: hunc quidem de se melius meruisse, qui malignitatem naturæ suæ vicit, & ad sapientiam se non perduxit, sed extraxit. *Sen. Ep.* LII.

do every Thing neceſſarily, and according to the whole Extent of their Power; yet, when an Effect depends upon a very hidden Cauſe, or an uncommon Combination, the Uncertainty we are in about that Event, moves us to call that material Cauſe a *contingent* Cauſe, though it be neceſſary. Our ignorance about that Cauſe makes the Prediction of its Effect as uncertain, as it was a free Cauſe. Wherefore that Name goes from the free Cauſe to the neceſſary Cauſe, not becauſe they are alike, but becauſe we are equally uncertain about their future Effects.

UNBELIEVERS and Superſtitious Men make an ill Uſe of the Words *Chance* and *contingent Cauſe*? And therefore it is neceſſary to give a right Notion of them. We have already ſeen that the Word *Chance* ſignifies nothing, and that it becomes a vain Sound, without an Idea, when applied to a Cauſe which is neither free nor neceſſary. That Word has no Senſe, but when it is uſed to denote a Cauſe, which is not ſufficiently known to foreſee its Effects. In that Senſe, to ſay, *Chance has done it*, is the ſame as to ſay, *I cannot tell how it came to paſs*. Unbelievers, who will not acknowledge an intelligent and free Being to be the Cauſe of the World, are obliged to aſcribe it to a blind and neceſſary Cauſe. When they are deſired to conſider attentively, whether it be poſſible that a blind Cauſe ſhould produce ſuch a numberleſs Multitude of regular Things, and when they anſwer that ſuch a Diſpoſition is owing to Chance, is it not the ſame as if they ſhould ſay, *I cannot apprehend how ſuch a Thing could happen*? Such is at laſt the Confeſſion of thoſe Men, who pretend to be infinitely more clear ſighted than every body elſe. Sect. II. Ch. I. §. 10.

AGAIN, if the word *Chance* ſignifies Nothing, or if it ſignifies a Cauſe, or many Cauſes, not ſufficiently known to us; when a Man ſays that Providence is particularly concerned in the Effects of Chance, he knows not what he ſays, or he affirms that Providence has a greater Share in Events, according as we know leſs how they come to paſs; but that very Thing is ſufficient to ſhew the Unreaſonableneſs of that Deciſion, ſince it is againſt Reaſon to pretend to judge of Things that are unknown. When two Effects appear to me very obſcure, and I am aſked to which of them Providence contributes moſt, if I am a reaſonable Man, I ſhall anſwer that I cannot tell; and if one of thoſe Effects is known to me, and the other unknown, Reaſon requires again from me, that I put off my Anſwer to that Queſtion till,

till I understand equally the two Terms upon which it runs.

BESIDES, all Men have not the same Degree of Knowledge, nor one and the same Man at all Times; but according as he improves his Time and his Attention, a Subject, which at first appeared to him obscure, will at last be very clear to him. It will not be doubted that there are intelligent Beings, whose Penetration exceeds as much that of the most knowing Man, as the Knowledge of the latter is above that of the most ignorant People. Which being laid down, it must be acknowledged that the same Effect, which appears contingent to the one, does not appear so to the other. A Subordination of Causes, united to produce an Effect, may appear extremely obscure to one, whilst another will apprehend that Series as clearly, as a Clock-Maker sees the Connexion of all the Wheels of his Clocks. Thus one will fancy that Providence has been particularly concerned in an Effect; and another will plainly see that there is nothing extraordinary in it. Is it not a secret Vanity which disposes Men to look upon every Thing they cannot account for, as being above the Power of Nature, and to believe that God directs whatever appears obscure to them?

RELIGION is not free from Obscurity; and it cannot be otherwise, by reason of the infinite Sublimity of its Object. But that Obscurity has been very much encreased by the Laziness of Men, their Want of Taste for the true Objects of Religion, and their obstinate Vanity; and yet they pretend that this Obscurity should be as much respected as the other. As soon as they think fit to draw a Veil over what they are ignorant of, it is a sort of Impiety not to have a Religious Respect for their Ignorance. On the one hand, Men think it convenient to lay upon Providence the ill Success of their own Imprudence; and on the other, they are no less pleased to look upon themselves as the Favourites of that Providence, when Things succeed according to their Desires. By those secret Principles they grow fond of certain Imaginations, and cannot be reclaimed from them by the most evident Reasons.

CAN any Thing be answered to this Argument? God would work in a Gaming-House more Miracles in one Day, than are mentioned in the Old and New Testaments. When an unskilful Man plays at Billiards and wins, 'tis by chance, and consequently Providence is concerned in it. But as soon as he grows better skilled by Exercise, Providence has not so great a share in his Gaming. A Man plays

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at Chefs, he is very much troubled with the Head-Ach, he is weary, he hardly knows what he does; and yet he wins. Providence has therefore preſided over his Game in a particular manner. If it be ſo, Gamſters do not cry out without Reaſon, *O God!* at a ſurpriſing Throw. There are nine White Balls, and a Gilded one in a Bag; and he who takes hold of the latter, is the Happy Man. If he looks into the Bag, he can tell how and why he has taken that Ball; but, if he takes it without ſeeing it, he cannot tell why he has taken that rather than the others. Therefore Providence has directed his Fingers miraculouſly; and 'tis but ſhutting one's Eyes to move Providence to work Miracles. But is it not agreed that Wiſdom does always uſe the ſimpleſt Means to obtain its End? How comes it then that Providence frequently rather chuſes to work many Miracles by diverting the Hands of thoſe for whom it does not deſign the gilded Ball, than to work one ſingle Miracle by making the Lot fall, in order to draw firſt, upon the Perſon, for whom that Ball is deſigned? It appears by this Example how neceſſary it is to form diſtinct Ideas, that Religion may not be ſet in oppoſition to Reaſon. A clear Knowledge is no leſs uſeful in the Practice than in the Theory.

IT is a curious Thing to ſee how Men beſtir themſelves to prevent the Effect of ſome natural Impreſſions, whereby they might be brought to Truth, and cured of ſome Errors, of which they are grown fond. A Man believes that Providence is immediately and particularly concerned in Chance Games; and that the Throws of Dice are a ſort of Prayers, whereby we beg its Aſſiſtance. Whereupon it is natural to propoſe this Queſtion: Muſt we then altogether forbear thoſe Sorts of Games? They anſwer, that it is an impious Thing to pretend to bring Providence into our Amuſements, and conſequently that it is not lawful to Play for mere Diverſion. But, ſay they, one may Play to recover or preſerve one's Health, by ſuch an amuſing Occupation: One may deſire to Win, in order to make a good Uſe of one's Gain. But he, from whom I win, and who is not ſo well pleaſed with loſing, as I am with winning, does he not want Health, or does he want it leſs than I do? Does he not love the Poor ſo much as I do? Does he leſs deſerve to win, that he may have the Pleaſure of relieving them? Do we offer up Prayers one againſt another, that are contrary, and yet equally reaſonable?

Neceſſary Cauſes.

IX. A *neceſſary* Cauſe is ſaid to be contrary to a *contingent* one; and we are told that there are three Sorts of Neceſſity: A *blind Neceſſity*, like that of a Stone, which falls: A *Neceſſity of Event*; as when 'tis ſaid that a wiſe Man will infallibly repair, though very freely, to an Aſſembly, whither his Duty requires he ſhould go, if he remembers it, and be not prevented by ſome Illneſs, or ſome more urgent Buſineſs. Laſtly, *a Neceſſity of Conſtraint*. This Neceſſity is *abſolute*, when a forcible Power acts upon our Body independently upon our Will; and it is *mixed*, when we are reduced to do what diſpleaſes us, in order to avoid an Evil to which we are ſtill more averſe. In thoſe Caſes, the more a Man is terrified, the leſs he is anſwerable for what he does.

MEN have too eaſily beſtowed one and the ſame Name upon different Things, minding only ſome Likeneſs which they obſerved in them. A Stone does not fail to deſcend, when it is no longer ſupported. A rational Man does not fail to repair whither his Duty calls him. And a Man does not fail to reſolve upon an Evil, in order to avoid a more grievous one. The firſt of thoſe Cauſes is neceſſary; but the Notion of the others becomes obſcure by aſcribing to them a kind of Neceſſity; and after it has been precariouſly ſuppoſed, one can hardly reconcile it with Liberty and Choice.

I CANNOT tell why a fourth Neceſſity has not been added to the three Neceſſities juſt now mentioned. It might be called a *Neceſſity of Conſent*. Thus we neceſſarily deſire to be happy. Man cannot but love and ſeek his Happineſs (*d*). He can put an End to his Life; but he cannot forbear deſiring

(*d*) Nemo enim ſibi beneficium dat, ſed naturæ ſuæ paret, à quâ ad caritatem ſui compoſitus eſt: unde illi ſumma cura eſt nocitura vitandi, profutura appetendi. Itaque nec liberalis eſt, qui ſibi donat: nec clemens, qui ſibi ignoſcit; nec miſericors, qui malis ſuis tangitur. Quod aliis præſtare liberalitas eſt, clementia, miſericordia: ſibi præſtare, natura eſt. Beneficium res voluntaria eſt: at PRODESSE SIBI NECESSARIUM EST. Quo quis plura beneficia dedit, beneficentior eſt. Quis unquam laudatus eſt, quod ſibi ipſi fuiſſet auxilio? quod ſe eripuiſſet latronibus? nemo ſibi beneficium dat, non magis quàm hoſpitium: nemo ſibi donat, non magis quàm credit. Si dat ſibi quiſque beneficium, ſemper dat, ſine intermiſſione dat: inire beneficiorum ſuorum non poteſt numerum. *Sen. de Benef. Lib.* V. *cap.* 9.

deſiring what he thinks to be his Good: And when he kills himſelf, 'tis with a Proſpect of being leſs unhappy; nay, according to his Notions of Things, it is with a Proſpect of bettering his Condition.

Final Cauſes.

X. WHEN an intelligent Cauſe is determined to act by the Idea of a Good it deſires, that Idea, whereby it is determined, is an efficient Cauſe of its Choice and Determination: It is called a *Final Cauſe*.

THE Idea of Good raiſes a Deſire, which is attended with a Reſolution of ſeeking that Good; the Reſolution puts a Man upon acting, and the Action produces the Effect. This is a Concatenation of efficient Cauſes, though the firſt be called a *final Cauſe*, as it were, to diſtinguiſh it from the Efficient. 'Tis true, Liberty can break that Chain, divert the Attention from an Idea, and put an End to the Deſire raiſed by that Idea. A Man can alſo oppoſe an Idea to another Idea, and a Deſire to another Deſire; and herein the final Cauſe differs from the other efficient Cauſes, which are neceſſary, and called *phyſical* Cauſes.

THE Object of the determining Idea has been confounded with the Idea it ſelf, becauſe Men *ſtick to Words*, and becauſe the Thought and the Object of the Thought are expreſſed by the ſame Name. And yet the deſired Object cannot be always called a *Cauſe*, ſince frequently it does not exiſt even before the Deſire, but is only an Effect of it; as when a Man ſtudies to improve his Knowledge, or to get ſome Reputation; or when a Man marries, that he may have ſome Heirs of his own Name. For then he is acted upon and determined by an Idea, and not by the Thing he deſires to acquire, and which does not exiſt yet, and will only be a Conſequence of his Actions.

BECAUSE the Uſe of a Thing is frequently the End intended by doing it, that Uſe is alſo called a *final Cauſe*, and ſometimes impropetly. The Uſe of a Houſe conſiſts in living in it; but a Man may reſolve upon building out of Vanity or Intereſt; and in ſuch Caſes, the final Cauſe differs from the Uſe, which is an Effect rather than a Cauſe.

SOME *Likeneſs*, as I have already obſerved in the foregoing Chapters, and in this, has given occaſion to impoſe one ſingle Name upon Things, that are not like in every Reſpect; and that Unity of Name has occaſioned their being confounded together. Thus again, the laſt Term of a Thing is called its *End*, (as Death, for inſtance, is called *The End of Man*,) though that laſt Term be not the Aim, the final Cauſe, and the Deſtination.

Characters of a final Cauſe.

XI. THOUGH *material* Things act without Knowledge, yet they may be ſaid to tend to their End, when they are ſubſervient to the Uſe for which they were deſigned by the intelligent Being who made them; and their moſt excellent Effects are looked upon as the End for which they were formed. A Tree, for inſtance, which bears Fruit, tends to what is the End and Deſtination of a Tree. Now we are ſure that certain Works have been made by an intelligent Being. 1. When thoſe Works are of great Uſe. 2. When among the many Parts, which concur to the ſame Effect, there are none, or very few, that neceſſarily depend one upon another, and have among themſelves ſuch a ſtrict Connexion, that the Poſition of the one does unavoidably imply, or abſolutely ſuppoſe the Poſition of the other, and is the Cauſe or Effect of it. For ſince ſuch a Conjunction of Parts might exiſt, or not exiſt, it muſt have been determined by ſome Cauſe to exiſt, rather than not to exiſt. That Conjunction not being an Effect of Neceſſity, muſt be an Effect of Choice, and conſequently of an intelligent and free Cauſe. Would any Man, who ſhould find a Violin with its Bow, and Notes pricked down by it, aſcribe all thoſe Works to a fortuitous Concourſe of blind and neceſſary Cauſes? There is no Neceſſity between the Exiſtence of one of the ſmall Boards of the Violin, and the Exiſtence of another; no Neceſſity between their Figures and their Poſitions; between the Handle and the Pegs; the Strings and the Bridge; the number and bigneſs of the Strings; the Bow and the Roſin; the Paper and the Lines; the Lines and the Notes. There is nothing more eaſy than to diſcover by a like Reaſoning the ſupreme Cauſe of Mankind and the Univerſe. A Man who ſhould look upon a Sphere as a Work of Chance, would be accounted a mad Man; and yet ſome dare aſcribe to Chance the magnificent Sphere of the World (*e*). Such Thoughts are plain Proofs of Folly and Malignity.

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(*e*) Qui igitur convenit ſignum, aut tabulam pictam cum aſpexeris, ſcire adhibitam eſſe artem: cumque procul curſum navigii videris, non dubitare quin id ratione atque arte moveatur: aut cum ſolarium vel deſcriptum, aut ex aqua contemplere, intelligere declarari horas arte, non caſu: mundum autem, qui & has ipſas artes, & earum artifices, & cuncta complectatur, conſilii & rationis eſſe expertem putare? Quod ſi in Scythiam, aut in Britanniam Sphæram aliquis tulerit, hanc quam nuper familiaris noſter effecit Poſidonius, cujus ſingulæ

CAN any one number the Parts that are to be united, in order to produce one ſingle Effect, the Sight, for inſtance? and yet the Exiſtence of each of them is independent upon the others. Remove ſome of them: Their Effect will be no longer produced; but the others will ſubſiſt as before. Though we ſhould loſe our Eyes, yet the Light would be Light ſtill; and if the Light was extinguiſhed, our Eyes would be of no Uſe; but they would not vaniſh away.

IT is no leſs ridiculous to ſay, That the Eye was not made to ſee, but that it was uſed for that Purpoſe, becauſe it happened to be proper for it. That Thought of the *Epicureans* is no leſs ridiculous than if one ſhould ſay, That a Book was not written in order to be read, but that it was read, becauſe it happened to be proper for that Uſe.

BESIDES, the inward Parts of the Body, unknown to moſt Men, were made for a certain End. Do we apply them to their proper Uſe, becauſe it has been found out that they were fit for it?

THE Supreme Wiſdom may have ſome Things in view, without deſigning all the Conſequences of thoſe Things. The ill Uſe Creatures would make of their Faculties, did not hinder the Supreme Being from beſtowing them upon Men.

WE affirm, that a Thing is deſigned for the Uſe of another, and even may be deſtroyed by it; 1. When it is very inferior to the other. 2. When it would periſh of it ſelf, if it was not deſtroyed. 3. When there is a Neceſſity that the moſt Excellent ſhould provide for its Preſervation, by deſtroying that which is not ſo excellent. Theſe Reaſons juſtify Man in killing Animals for his Food; for if they were allowed to multiply, the Herbs and Fruits of the Earth would not be ſufficient for Mankind, and all the Animals;

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gulæ converſiones idem efficiunt in Sole & in Luna & in quinque Stellis errantibus, quod efficitur in cœlo ſingulis diebus & noctibus: quis in illa barbarie dubitet quin ea Sphæra ſit perfecta ratione? Hi autem dubitant de Mundo, ex quo oriuntur, & fiunt omnia, caſune ipſe ſit effectus, aut neceſſitate aliquâ, an ratione, an mente divinâ: Et Archimedem arbitrantur plus valuiſſe in imitandis Sphæræ converſionibus, quàm naturam in efficiendis, præſertim cum multis partibus ſint illa perfecta, quàm hæc ſimulata ſolertiùs. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. Lib.* II.

Cœleſtem ergò admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque conſtantiam, ex quâ conſervatio, & ſalus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat, is ipſe mentis expers habendus eſt. *Id. ibid.*

and what happened in an Iſland of the *Archipelago*, would happen in the whole Earth. The Inhabitants of that Iſland would have been obliged to remove from it, if they had not killed the Partridges, which deſtroyed every Thing.

THE Nature of *moral* Things is known by the End for which they are deſigned. If you deſire to know how they ought to be uſed; if you deſire to know wherein their Perfection conſiſts; conſider what they are deſigned for. After having ſhewed why the *Miniſtry* has been eſtabliſhed in the Church, the Duties and Rights of the Miniſters will be well known. After having laid down that the Uſe of *Speech* has been eſtabliſhed for the good of Men, the Queſtions about Lies, and the Obligation of ſpeaking the Truth, will be eaſily determined.

WHAT is the End of *Science*? To improve common Senſe. From thence I conclude that Men of the *greateſt Genius* have the leaſt Affectation, and the greateſt Simplicity.

IF you deſire to give a right Judgment about a Book, and to know its true Worth; conſider, in the firſt Place, with what deſign it was written, and then ſee how far the Author has attained his Aim.

IF you deſire to define *Eloquence*, and to know whether it appears in a certain Diſcourſe; conſider the End of Eloquence, and you will ſee that it is an Art of explaining an important Truth in the moſt proper Method to make it known, and to inſpire a true Love for it.

IN order to judge rightly of the Worth of Things, it ought to be meaſured by their real Uſefulneſs, rather than by a needleſs Uſe (*f*).

THE Deſire of reaching one's Aim, makes one think of the *Means* proper for that purpoſe; and *Wiſdom* appears in the Excellency of the Aim, and the Certainty and Facility, or, if you will, the Efficacy and Simplicity of the Means made uſe of to attain to it.

WHEN a Man is full of his Deſign, he will eaſily find out the Means of executing it. If a Preacher deſires to be uſeful, he will be ſo. If he deſires to be uſeful in drawing Characters, they will be juſt and inoffenſive: He will pleaſe and mend his Hearers, without exaſperating them. When Characters have an ill Effect, the Preacher has an ill Deſign, or knows not how to obtain his End.

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(*f*) Aſſueſcamus à nobis removere pompam, & USU RERUM ORNAMENTA METIRI. *Sen. de Tranq. Anim. cap.* 9.

IT is a ſurpriſing Thing, that Man, whoſe Capacity is ſo limited, and who upon that Account is often perplexed with a ſmall Matter, ſhould acquire ſo late that *Simplicity* which would prove ſo convenient to him. I am apt to think the Reaſon of it is, that Men are not ſufficiently acquainted with Simple Notions: They get an Habit of proceeding quickly to compound Objects: They are wholly taken up with them, becauſe they make a more lively Impreſſion, and are more proper to ſatisfy Vanity and Curioſity. Wherefore the compounded Ideas, to which Men have been uſed, offer themſelves firſt: And the Mind takes hold of them; and when it finds any Incoveniencies in the Execution, inſtead of parting with thoſe Ideas, to look for a more convenient Method, it only endeavours to make up thoſe Inconveniencies by new Additions. Men love and adhere to their Productions, and are better pleaſed to believe they have not ſeen every Thing, than to confeſs they have not ſeen well.

SIMPLICITY is ſo uncommon, that there is nothing more admired, even in Point of Eloquence; for a new Thought is the more affecting by its very Simplicity, becauſe we are apt to wonder it did not come before into every Body's Mind.

IN point of Religion, as well as in all other Matters, Men will not arrive at *Simplicity* till after many Windings. Wherein they are the more to blame, becauſe the Chriſtian Religion began with Simplicity, as it appears from the Revelation, where Chriſtianity ſhould be only looked for. We commend the Chriſtian Religion on Account of its Simplicity, and we reckon that Simplicity among the Proofs of its being derived from God. We ought therefore to conclude from thence, that whatever is added to Chriſtianity, under Pretence of adorning that Religion, does actually diſgrace it. Thoſe who exclaim moſt againſt the Subtilties of Philoſophers, are frequently Men whoſe Theology is ſtill more clogged with Subtilties than Philoſophy, but with this Difference, that they are leſs intelligible, leſs coherent and more difficult to prove.

Diviſion of Final Cauſes.

XIII. IT happens ſometimes that the *Means* have nothing in them that is commendable, but their Influence upon the End. Such are moſt Remedies made uſe of to recover one's Health; and then thoſe Means are *ſimple Means*. Sometimes they deſerve ſome Eſteem; and then becauſe they are uſed out of Love for them, and to be enjoyed, their Idea may be alſo

accounted a final Cauſe; and they are called *ſubordinate Cauſes*, becauſe we don't confine our ſelves to them, but whilſt we deſire to be poſſeſſed of them, we are alſo willing to make uſe of them in order to go farther.

ALL Ends therefore are not purſued with the ſame Eagerneſs, and all final Cauſes have not the ſame Power. Thus there are *principal* and *inferior Ends*. But an End is call'd *Principal*, either in Oppoſition to *ſubordinate Ends*, which are like ſo many Steps towards the principal one, or in Oppoſition to *acceſſory Ends*, which are deſired at the ſame time as the principal End, but however do not contribute to it, as they are not oppoſite to it neither. To live is a principal End: To eat with Pleaſure is alſo an End, but a ſubordinate one: To improve in Knowledge is a principal End of Study: To live by that Means an eaſy Life, to get ſome Preferment, is an *acceſſory End*.

IT happens but too ſeldom, that Men invert the Order of Things, that they change the Principal into the Acceſſory, and the Acceſſory into the Principal; and what makes that Fault very difficult to be mended, is, that they own it is a Fault, and diſapprove it; but the more they diſapprove it, the more they believe they are free from it, even when they are guilty of it. A covetous Man, who places his Happineſs in Riches, fancies he has a good and reaſonable End, though it be far otherwiſe. A learned Man, who is reſolved to domineer, and who, blinded by Ambition, cannot ſee Truth, when propoſed by another Man, flatters himſelf that he is jealous of his Authority no farther, than it is neceſſary for the Preſervation of Truth. Every body knows his Duty in general: He is well pleaſed to fancy that he performs it, and ſaves himſelf the Trouble of a painful and ſcrupulous Examination. If you ask a Prince why he loves to reign? He will anſwer with great Sincerity, that 'tis chiefly to make his Subjects happy, and to find his own Happineſs in that of his People. But in order to be undeceived, the principal End ought to be compared with the inferior Ends, when they are oppoſite, when one of them ought to be choſen, and the other laid aſide. Thoſe Caſes lay open the ſecret Springs of the Heart. Does a Man make his People happy by his own and his Miſtreſſes Luxury, by his ſtately Buildings and ambitious Wars? Are they in a Condition to bear ſo much Charge? Can it be ſaid, that thoſe Things deſerve to be purchaſed with the Lives and Fortunes of Subjects?

ASK a young Man with what Proſpect he ſtudies; whether it be only to get a good Income, or a Preferment, or rather to make himſelf uſeful to the Church and State. He will not ſcruple to anſwer, as Decency requires; and he will think his Anſwer is very ſincere. But as ſoon as he has obtain'd the Dignity he had in view, does he go on with the ſame Ardour? and having attained the End, does he not begin to neglect the Means? He has got a large Income and great Privileges; he muſt make it his Buſineſs to preſerve and encreaſe them, if he can. Why ſhould he take more Pains to get more Learning, and to acquire a greater Merit? Is he not great enough without it? A Clergyman, whoſe only Deſign is to be promoted to ſome Dignity, takes Care to have an Appearance of Learning and Virtue; that Appearance will ſerve his Turn, and therefore he is contented with it. He goes no farther; he is reſolved to make a Figure, and to domineer; he will ſucceed in it by impoſing upon the World. In ſuch a Caſe, a conſtant Gravity will be of greater Uſe to him than Virtue.

IT frequently happens, that a Man does not make it his Buſineſs to deſerve a Dignity, and to enable himſelf to diſcharge the Duties of it, but when there is no other Way left for him to obtain it, and when the Advantages of Birth, Intereſt, and Recommendations, are already poſſeſs'd by others.

BUT the principal End does not exclude the acceſſory ones; and becauſe they are dear to a Man, it does not follow that he confines himſelf to them. Moſt People apprehend Things only by Halves, and ſo confound together very different Relations. An honeſt Man aſpires to a Place ſuitable to his Birth; he thinks it his Duty, that he may ſpend his Time, and uſe his Talents for the Publick Good. It plainly appears, that this is the true Motive he is acted by; for he will ſupplant no body; and when a great Poſt is offer'd to him, for which he is not yet qualified, he ſcruples to accept of it; he names thoſe whom he thinks proper for that Poſt; he will not be raiſed to it, but according to the Rules of the niceſt Honour; and at laſt refuſes it peremptorily, unleſs he be allow'd to diſcharge his Duty in that Station with an Exactneſs neglected by a great many People. And yet if that truly honeſt Man does not expreſs a great Zeal for a Perſon, who thinks he deſerves it from him, it will be ſufficient to ask how his great Wiſdom, ſo much admired, can be conſiſtent with his exorbitant Ambition. We ought not to be too poſitive about the Motives by which other Men

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are determined; every Body must be contented to be in that Respect a severe Judge of himself.

WHAT is of no other Use but to bring us nearer an End, is a simple *Means*. What is lovely in it self, and besides serves to carry us farther, if both a Means and an End, 'tis a *subalternate* End. A Fruit nourishes and refreshes me: I am well pleased to see and eat it, independently upon the good Effects I expect from it. A fine Prospect rejoices me. Recreation encreases the Strength of my Mind, and enables me to apply my self to something of greater Importance. I open my Eyes, I eat, I walk, for Pleasure sake; but I don't confine my self to those Things. Those Ideas may clear some important Cases of Morality. We ought not to mind only *Creatures*; we must seek a Happiness greater than that, which they afford; and we ought to thank GOD for all the Comforts arising from them. But for that very Reason we must know and enjoy those Comforts; or else we should thank GOD for nothing, and our Thanks would consist only in Words. Creatures cannot be a Proof of the Goodness, Wisdom, and Power of GOD, if they have nothing in them that is good, beautiful, and real. But, if they contain something, that is real, beautiful and good, they are valuable and lovely. 'Tis true, they must not take up the whole Extent of our Affection; a more worthy Object ought to have the first Place in our Souls; but it does not exclude the Ideas and Motions over which it prevails.

The Supreme End.

XIV. THE *Supreme End* is that, beyond which our Desires cannot reach: And this ultimate End is consider'd, either in our selves, or out of us. In our selves, it consists in a perfect *Felicity*; and out of us, it is to be found in GOD alone; for all other Objects not being infinitely Perfect, which soever of them we be possessed of, we may conceive, and consequently desire something better. Whatever Happiness we may enjoy in the Possession of a created Object, that Happiness may be greater still, if a more perfect Object becomes the Ground of it. That external Supreme End must necessarily be united to the internal. They cannot be separated without Nonsense. Whoever seeks an Object, desires to have a Sense of it. It is a Contradiction to seek an Object without desiring to enjoy it. To make an Object our ultimate End, is to look upon it, and desire it as the Ground of a perfect State, as being able to satisfy all Desires; and whoever thinks so, does not forget himself. To say, as some do, that we seek in GOD, who is the Supreme End, a Perfection of

Holiness,

Holineſs, Reſignation and Obedience; but not a Perfection of Contentment, the moſt delightful Senſe, the higheſt Degree of Happineſs, is to fall into the Miſtake mentioned by me in the foregoing Chapters, which conſiſts in ſeparating what is inſeparable. It is no leſs abſurd to pretend to ſeparate Things, that cannot be one without the other, than to ſuppoſe an Union between thoſe that are inconſiſtent. A perfect Being, infinitely wiſe, happy, and good, who recommends to us above all Things Goodneſs, Gentleneſs, Beneficence, and Generoſity, who propoſes himſelf as the Model of thoſe Virtues, and yet leaves in Miſery and Sufferings a Man who worſhips and imitates him in the moſt perfect Manner, is a Heap of Contradictions, a chimerical Suppoſition; and it would be a Piece of Extravagance to dwell upon that Suppoſition, were it but one Moment, far from making it the Rule of one's Conduct.

IT is no difficult Thing to be convinced, that GOD is the Supreme End, to which all other Ends lead us; whoever reaſons never ſo little, muſt acknowledge it. A Man, who lives at random, without any Aim, does not live according to his Nature. He, who makes it his only Buſineſs to grow rich, confines himſelf to the Means without uſing them. He, who places his Happineſs in Honours, places it in Appearances. An ambitious Man has a great deal of Uneaſineſs, and little Satisfaction. Senſual Pleaſures, when too much indulged, wear out the Taſte and the Body (*b*). Does a Man reſolve to be an honeſt Man, and to make himſelf uſeful to the Society? But what Sort of Men does the Society conſiſt of? How often will a Lover of Virtue be mortified in the Commerce of the World? And how can he preſerve his Virtue, unleſs he ſtrengthens himſelf with this Thought, That GOD ſees him, and will reward him?

THAT we may truly ſay, that we make GOD our great Aim, and our ultimate End, it is not neceſſary to have his Idea continually preſent to our Minds, and to think of him without any Intermiſſion. This is impoſſible; and our Duty requires we ſhould now and then mind a great many Things, which take up all our Thoughts. But our Love for a certain End puts us upon chuſing ſome Means to come to that End, and executing them. We actually think of the End, when we chuſe the Means proper for it; but when they are choſen,

(*b*) Quos voluptas habet, illi aut ejus inopiâ torquentur aut copiâ ſtrangulantur. *Sen. de Vit. Beat. Cap.* 14.

choſen, we think of putting them in Execution. A Man, who reſolves to travel in order to improve his Knowledge, does not think continually of that End during the whole Courſe of his Travels; he muſt mind a great many Things very different from his Aim, but, however, ſuch as he cannot neglect without departing from that Aim.

IT is but a ſmall Matter to know that the Soul of Man can have an Aim; that the Idea of that Aim is one of the internal Cauſes, which determine it to will and to act. It is not ſufficient to know that one End leads to another; and that there is one beyond which we cannot go, becauſe there is nothing beyond it, becauſe it contains a perfect Felicity. What ſignifies all this Knowledge, if a Man lives at random? if, for want of tending to that End, and forming and conſtantly following a Scheme of Life proper to lead him to it, he departs from it continually? if he turns his Back to an infinite Happineſs, that he may run after ſeeming Goods, which frequently prove real Evils?

LET a Man, who believes he is unhappy, ask himſelf the following Queſtions. What do I want? What do I deſire? Wherein have I miſcarry'd (*i*)? When he has recalled to mind what he intended to do, let him ask himſelf again, Whether did I deſign to go by that Means? And what was the Aim of that ſecond Degree of Happineſs? If that Gradation leads him at laſt to Light, to Wiſdom, to GOD, who is infinite Light and Wiſdom, and the eternal Reward of thoſe who love Light and Wiſdom; I will ſhew him a ſhorter and ſafer Way to arrive at that great

(*i*) Illud maximè revolvo mecum; ſi corpus perduci exercitatione ad hanc patientiam poteſt, qua & pugnos pariter & calces non unius hominis ferat, qua Solem ardentiſſimum in ferventiſſimo pulvere ſuſtinens aliquis, & ſanguine ſuo madens diem ducat: quantò facilius animus corroborari poſſit ut fortunæ ictus invictus excipiat, ut projectus, ut conculcatus exſurgat? Corpus enim multis eget rebus, ut valeat: animus ex ſe creſcit, ſe ipſe alit, ſe exercet. Illi multo cibo, multa potione opus eſt, multo oleo, longâ denique operâ: tibi continget virtus ſine apparatu, ſine impenſa. Quidquid facere te poteſt bonum, tecum eſt. Quid tibi opus eſt ut ſis bonus? velle. Quid autem melius potes velle, quàm eripere te huic ſervituti, quæ omnes premit, quàm mancipia quoque conditionis extremæ, & in his ſordibus nata, omni modo exuere conantur? Peculium ſuum, quod comparaverunt ventre fraudato, pro capite numerant: tu non concupiſces quanticunque ad libertatem pervenire, qui te putas in illa natum. *Sen. Ep.* LXXX.

great End: I will make him ſenſible, that the beſt Aim is the eaſieſt to attain to, that to know and deſire it conſtantly, is already to come near it (*k*). But if the Projects of which he complains, becauſe they have proved unſucceſsful, did not tend to the great End, why does he vex himſelf for meeting with ſome Obſtacles, which oblige him to go back in a Way wherein he would have been loſt? 'Tis no wonder that moſt Men ſhould not obtain what they would have; they will not have what they ſhould deſire to have, nay, moſt times they know not what they would have (*l*).

MOST Men have ſo little Reaſon to be pleaſed with themſelves, and are actually ſo little pleaſed in that Reſpect, that they think only of concealing their own Faults from themſelves, and appearing to others in a Diſguiſe. They affect to commend moſt what pleaſes them leaſt; they pretend to deſpiſe what they love beſt; and by degrees they know not what they do, nor what is proper for them. From thence proceed their Wearineſs, Inconſtancy, and Uneaſineſs (*m*). When a Man is pleaſed with a Scheme, he has always

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(*k*) Ad parata nati ſumus: nos omnia nobis difficilia facilium faſtidio facimus. *Ep.* XC.

Tantum enim quantum vult poteſt, qui ſe, niſi quod debet, non putat poſſe, *Ibid.*

(*l*) " 'Tis no wonder, ſays an Antient, that Chance ſhould have " ſo great a Power over us, ſince we live at a Venture. A Man, " who has not in general directed his Life to a certain End, cannot " order his particular Actions. A Man, who has not a Notion of " a Whole in his Head, cannot place the ſeveral Parts of it together. " To what Purpoſe ſhould a Man provide himſelf with Colours, if " he knows not what he is to paint? No one draws up a general " Scheme of Life: we only make particular Schemes. A Bow-man " ought to know firſt what he aims at, and then adapt to his Bow " the String, and the Arrow. Our Deſigns miſcarry, becauſe they " have no Aim. No Wind will ſerve a Man, who knows not what " Port he is to go to." *Montagne, Book* II. *Chap.* 1.

(*m*) Quoties quid fugiendum ſit, aut quid petendum, voles ſcire, ad ſummum bonum, & propoſitum totius vitæ reſpice. Illi enim conſentire debet quidquid agimus; non diſponet ſingula, niſi cui jam vitæ ſuæ ſumma propoſita eſt. Nemo, quamvis paratos habeat colores, ſimilitudinem reddet, niſi jam conſtet quid velit pingere. Ideò peccamus, quia de partibus vitæ omnes deliberamus, de tota nemo deliberat. Scire debet quid petat ille, qui ſagittam vult mittere, & tunc dirigere, & moderari manu telum; errant conſilia noſtra, quia non habent quo dirigantur. Ignoranti quem portum petat, nullus ſuus ventus eſt. *Sen. Ep.* LXXI.

always ſomething to do; and when it is well drawn up, he makes no Alteration in it; by which Means he is above Wearineſs and Inconſtancy

Impulſive Cauſes, external and internal.

XV. THE Will of Man is alſo determined by other Cauſes, beſides the final ones; it is determined by Cauſes different from the Idea of a Good we deſire to enjoy. Thus the Diſcourſe, the Air, and Tone of a Man, Muſick, Walking, Reading, will make us good or ill-humour'd, eaſy or uneaſy; (*n*) and according to thoſe different States, we form different Projects, and are differently determined. Thoſe Cauſes, which contribute to determine us in that Manner, are called *Impulſive*. Every final Cauſe is impulſive; but it appears by the Examples juſt now mention'd, that every impulſive Cauſe is not final. But it ought to be obſerved, that external Objects work upon us only by vertue of certain Diſpoſitions agreeable to their Nature. Threatnings prevail upon a timorous Man; Benefits move a generous Soul. On the contrary, a courageous Man is exaſperated by Threatnings; and good Offices do but increaſe the Haughtineſs of thoſe, who fancy that no body can do too much for them. Thoſe internal Diſpoſitions, from which external Cauſes derive their Efficacy, are called *Impulſive Cauſes internal*. 'Tis plain, thoſe Cauſes cannot be ſeparated, nor work without being united.

SELF-

(*n*) Circumcidenda eſt concurſatio, qualis eſt magnæ parti hominum, domos, & Theatra, & fora pererrantium. Alienis ſe negotiis offerunt, ſemper aliquid agentibus ſimiles. Horum ſi aliquem exeuntem de domo interrogaveris: QUO TU? QUID COGITAS? reſpondebit tibi: NON MEHERCULE SCIO: SED ALIQUOS VIDEBO, ALIQUID AGAM. Sine propoſito vagantur, quærentes negotia; nec quæ deſtinaverunt, agunt, ſed in quæ incurrerunt. Inconſultus illis vanuſque curſus eſt; qualis formicis per arbuſta repentibus: quæ in ſummum cacumen, deinde in imum inanes aguntur. His plerique ſimilem vitam agunt, quorum non immeritò quis inquietam inertiam dixerit. Quorundam, quaſi ad incendium currentium, miſereberis: uſque eò impellunt obvios, & ſe alioſque præcipitant: cùm interim cucurrerint, aut ſalutaturi aliquem non reſalutaturum, aut funus ignoti hominis proſecuturi, aut judicium ſæpè litigantis, aut ſponſalia ſæpè nubentis, & lecticam affectati, quibuſdam locis & ipſi tulerint; deinde domum cum ſupervacua redeuntes laſſitudine, jurant neſciſſe ſe ipſos, quare exierint, ubi fuerint, poſtero die erraturi per eadem illa veſtigia. Omnis itaque labor aliquò referatur, aliquò reſpiciat. *Sen. de Tranq. Animi, Cap.* 12.

SELF-LOVE is the Ground of the Strength of all Motives; for if we did not love our ſelves, any State would be indifferent to us, and we ſhould not prefer any Object to another. But according as Self-Love is more or leſs attended with Knowledge, we are acted by different Motives. The mere Knowledge of the Beauty of Virtue determines one Man to practiſe it: Another wants that the Majeſty of the Legiſlator ſhould be added to that Motive: A third will not yield to thoſe Motives, unleſs they be attended with Promiſes. Some have got ſuch ſtrong Habits, that they cannot mend them without Threatnings. One Man, who holds out againſt remote Threatnings, yields to preſent Threatnings; and laſtly, he, who cannot be prevail'd upon by Threatnings, will yield to Blows.

SELF-LOVE is concern'd in every Thing; and an Advantage has been given to the Libertines by aſſerting, that an Action cannot be truly virtuous, if Self-Love has any Share in it; for they take hold of that Principle to infer from it, that Virtue is a chimerical Thing, and that thoſe who are accounted the beſt Men, have only an Appearance of it; whereby they impoſe upon themſelves and others. *It is not out of Love for Chaſtity, but out of Self-Love, that a Man is offended at certain Expreſſions.* But would a Man, out of Self-Love, be offended at it, if he did not love Chaſtity; and out of Self-Love would he pretend to be offended at thoſe Expreſſions, if he did not love to be accounted a modeſt Man? It is a Sophiſm to ſet Things in Oppoſition, which are indeed very different, but perfectly united.

THERE is a very great Difference between loving an Object, without a Proſpect of reaping any Benefit from it, and loving it in ſuch a Manner, that Self-Love is not at all concern'd in it. A Father does certainly love his Children in the firſt Senſe, when being upon his Death-Bed, he gives them good Advice, and divides his Eſtate among them; and in general, a dying Man loves his Heirs in that Senſe (*o*). But becauſe he has ſome Satisfaction in loving them ſo, that very Satisfaction confirms him in the Love he bears to them. Love is an Eſteem attended with Pleaſure; and Self-Love has always ſome Share in the Pleaſure we have, when we do what we think to be reaſonable. When therefore it

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(*o*) Liberis conſultum volumus, etiam ſi poſthumi futuri ſunt, propter ipſos. *Cic. de Fin.*

is ſaid, that a Man loves an Object for it ſelf, it is in the firſt Senſe, and not in the ſecond.

Occaſion. XVI. WHEN we are determined to undertake a Deſign, becauſe we happen to be in proper Circumſtances for the Execution of it, that Sort of impulſive Cauſe goes by the Name of *Occaſion*.

Merit. XVII. WHEN the Reaſons, which determine us, are derived from the Qualifications of a Perſon, who is the Object of our Action, *Merit* is the impulſive Cauſe of it. The Word *Merit* is taken in a good or bad Senſe; for Men deſerve Puniſhments as well as Rewards. *Merit* is not ſo much an Effect of the Talents, with which we were born, as of the Uſe we make of them. *Merit* ſuppoſes thoſe Talents, but thoſe Talents do not perfect it. Far from perfecting *Merit*, they bear Witneſs againſt a Man, not only when he miſapplies them, but even when he neglects to make a right Uſe of them.

Rule. XVIII. WHEN an intelligent and free Being governs himſelf by certain Ideas, the Cauſe, whereby he is determined, goes by the Name of *Rule*; and if it proceeds from a Superior, it is call'd a *Law*.

LIBERTY is ſo charming, and ſo noble a Preſent, that we need not wonder Men ſhould be ſo fond and ſo jealous of it. The Laws whereby it is reſtrained, have for that very Reaſon ſomething in them, which is painful and almoſt grievous. But in order to induce Man to obey the Laws, he ought to be made ſo ſenſible of their Agreeableneſs to the Excellency of his Nature, that his Obedience may be his own Choice. That Choice is the Perfection of Liberty. We have received Liberty to ſuſpend our Judgments, till Evidence forces us to judge, and our Reſolutions, till we are determined to them by Equity. Whoever carries Liberty farther, makes an ill Uſe of it.

WHAT is the Law? Sound Reaſon. What is to obey the Law? 'Tis to prefer the Glory of living like a rational Man to the Diſgrace of being unreaſonable. The Law is a Light, which enlightens us. What a Madneſs to prefer Darkneſs to it! Thoſe who treat of Morality, ſhould never loſe the Sight of theſe Principles (*p*).

XIX. I

(*p*) Lex eſt ſumma Ratio inſita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda ſunt, prohibetque contraria. *Cic. de Leg. Lib.* III.

Leges quoque proficiunt ad bonos mores: utique ſi non tantum imperant, ſed docent. *Sen. Ep.* XCIV.

XIX. I HAVE already diſcourſed of *Example*; but I have not yet conſider'd it as a Cauſe. A good Example ſets before our Eyes, and makes us ſenſible of the Beauty of the Law, without laying any Conſtraint upon us. A good Man does not bid us to imitate him; he invites us to it, and ſo tacitly, that he leaves us the Pleaſure of a free Choice (*q*). Nothing can be more proper than the Commerce of honeſt Men to remove our Prepoſſeſſions againſt Virtue. By ſuch a Commerce we are convinced, that what appear'd to us diſagreeable and difficult, is both amiable and eaſy (*r*). *Sect.* II. *Ch.* 3. *Example.*

AN Example is of great Efficacy, becauſe it makes a more lively Impreſſion than a Precept; for the Rule is only expreſſed in general Words, whereas an Example raiſes determinate Ideas, and ſets the Thing before our Eyes. When an Example is bad, we are more ſenſible of the Heinouſneſs of Vice; and when it is good, it moves us to an Imitation, becauſe Man, either by the Diſpoſition of his Machine, or through an Habit, or by a Conſequence of his Education, is very apt to imitate. Self-Love will not yield to others; and Man's Lazineſs is inexcuſable, when he ſees that others have done eaſily and with Pleaſure, what is required of him. I aſſign more than one Cauſe of the Power of Examples and Mens Propenſity to imitate them. Many look upon it only as an Inſtinct of Nature, or an Effect of the Conſtitution of the Organs, and a mechanical Operation. I grant, that the Structure of the Organs does very much facilitate Imitation; but I queſtion, whether it be the only Cauſe of our Inclination to imitate others. It is certain by a frequent and eaſy Experience, that thoſe Motions, which have been produced at the ſame Time by the fortuitous Meeting of two Cauſes, do not eaſily ſeparate, and ariſe again together without wanting the Preſence of the two Cauſes

(*q*) Naturâ contumax eſt animus humanus, & in contrarium atque arduum nitens, ſequitur faciliùs quam ducitur. *Sen. de Clem. Lib.* I. *Cap.* 24.

(*r*) Nulla res magis animis honeſta induit, dubioſque & in pravum inclinabiles revocat ad rectum, quam bonorum virorum converſatio. Paulatim enim deſcendit in pectora, & vim præceptorum obtinet, frequenter audiri, adſpici frequenter. Occurſus mehercule ipſe ſapientium juvat: & eſt aliquid, quod ex magno viro vel tacente proficias. Nec tibi facilè dixerim quemadmodum proſit, ſicut illud intelligam, profuiſſe. *Sen. Ep.* XCIV.

Cauſes by which they were at firſt united. One of them is ſufficieut to revive the two Effects. Our Stomach riſes at the Sight of a very neat Ragoo, which is ſomewhat like another, in which we have found ſome Naſtineſs. Some Reſemblance in the Air of a Man, or in his Features, or in the Tone of his Voice, or the mere Colour of his Cloaths, brings into our Minds the Idea of a Perſon very dear to us, and prepoſſeſſes us in Favour of that Man, who is ſomewhat like him. Let us apply this Principle. A Child is hungry; they give him ſomething to eat; he is well pleaſed, becauſe he loves to eat when he is hungry. But at the ſame Time he eats, he ſees other People eat; and one of thoſe two Cauſes, which act upon him, will be afterwards ſufficient to revive the Effect of the other. When that Child ſees again ſome People eat, the Deſire and Pleaſure which that Sight was at firſt attended with, ariſe again. At firſt, he eat in the Preſence of other People, who eat alſo; and at the ſame time he eat, becauſe he was hungry. Afterwards, that Preſence does no leſs revive the Deſire of Eating, than if it was produced by mere Hunger. Again, when Children have a Mind to run, they are ſurrounded with other Children, whoſe Machine is in the ſame Diſpoſition, and who would run, though they were alone. Afterwards the Sight of others who run, raiſes a Deſire of running with them, which at firſt was only occaſion'd by the internal Motion of the Spirits.

BUT becauſe a good Example, an Example proper to be imitated, is the Execution of a Law, 'tis plain, that before we take an Example for a Model, we muſt examine it by the Law. This is ſeldom practiſed: Men ſhould be directed by the Laws; but they are only directed by Examples. They are willing to ſuppoſe them to be good, when given by thoſe whom they have a Love and Reſpect for. The antient Fathers of the Church ran into vain Subtilties, to juſtify whatever we read in the Scripture about thoſe Men, who were eminent among the People of GOD; and 'tis a common Thing to juſtify one's ſelf by the Example of great Men, as if they could not make a wrong Choice, though it be more difficult for them than for others to avoid Error, ſince they are dazzled with their own Grandeur, frequently ill-bred, and ſurrounded with dangerous Flatterers. When they diſtinguiſh themſelves by noble Virtues, their Example ought to confound thoſe who do not follow it, though they cannot ſin with the ſame Impunity.

I GRANT

I GRANT, that Flatterers and Impunity contribute to ſet off the Virtues of great Men, and to make their Faults more excuſable. But it is no leſs certain, that the contagious Influence of their Example upon others ſhould make them more attentive to their Duty. It may be ſaid, that by one ſingle Fault they are guilty of many Sins.

WHILST ſome think themſelves to be above Precepts, and others take for their Rule thoſe who know no Rule at all, Men will argue very wrong. If the Reader minds this Obſervation, he will not wonder that I have ſo much enlarged, in the firſt Section of this Work, upon thoſe ill Effects of Fortune in Men who are dazzled with it, whether they admire it in themſelves, or in others.

SINCE Man is ſo much inclined to Imitation, it will be difficult for him not to be drawn by ill Examples, if they are frequent before his Eyes, and if he grows familiar with them. 'Tis true, an ill Example has a good Effect upon a Man who hates Vice; for Vice will appear more heinous to him, when it ſtrikes upon his Senſes, or when his Imagination, heightened by a lively and particular Deſcription, repreſents it to him, as if it was preſent.

BUT an ill Example, in order to produce that good Effect, ought to be preſented on its odious ſide, and never be propoſed without making one ſenſible of its Heinouſneſs. Nothing can be more dangerous than to ſpeak of it indifferently, or only ridicule it, as one would ridicule a trifling Thing. Thoſe who take Delight in Diſcourſes of that Nature, uſe themſelves by Degrees to entertain a more favourable Opinion of Vice, and to look upon it with an indifferent Eye, or as a ſmall Weakneſs, or a jeſting Matter. When a Man grows familiar with the Idea of Vice, he will quickly grow familiar with Vice it ſelf; and as ugly People appear no longer ſo, when we are uſed to ſee them, the ſame may be ſaid of Vice: The Ignorance of it is a great Help to Innocence (*s*).

By

(*s*) Tam bonorum quàm malorum longa converſatio amorem induit. *Sen. de Tranq. An. cap.* 1.

Subducendus populo eſt tener animus, & parum tenax recti: facilè tranſitur ad plures. Socrati, Catoni & Lælio exoutere mentem ſuam diſſimilis multitudo potuiſſet: adeò nemo noſtrum, qui cum maximè concinnamus ingenium, ferre impetum vitiorum tam magno comitatu venientium poteſt. Unum exemplum aut luxuriæ, aut avaritiæ, multum mali facit: convictor delicatus paulatim ener-

By much ſeeing Evil, a Man is no longer affected with it: Evil appears by Degrees leſs odious to him, and at length it does not appear odious at all. Nay, a Man goes farther, he likes it, and either out of Complaiſance, or Intereſt, is willing to imitate it. *Tell me whom you keep Company with; and I'll tell who you are:* 'Tis an antient Proverb. *You muſt needs ſmell of Soot, if you are always with thoſe that are covered with it:* 'Tis a Sentence of *Epictetus*. He who avoids the Company of vicious Men, ſecures his Vertue. It has been ingeniouſly ſaid, that *if a Man finds only naughty People in his Way, he will become a naughty Man.*

Buſſi's *Letters.*

It requires no ſmall Strength of Mind to be able to practiſe certain Maxims, when we are ſurrounded with People, who do not follow them, and even allure us to tranſgreſs them. A Man is afraid of going by himſelf: He hardly dares rely upon his own Notions, when they are diſapproved by every body elſe (*t*).

One cannot ſufficiently wonder at the great Influence of the Examples of Men in Authority, when he reads the following Words in *Seneca* himſelf: *Catoni ebrietas objecta eſt; at facilius efficiet, quiſquis objecerit, hoc crimen honeſtum,* "*quam*

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vat & emollit: vicinus dives cupiditatem irritat: malignus comes quamvis candido & ſimplici, rubiginem ſuam affricuit: quid tu accidere his moribus credis, in quos publicè factus eſt impetus? Neceſſe eſt aut imiteris, aut oderis. Utrumque autem devitandum eſt: ne vel ſimilis malis fias, quia multi ſunt; neve inimicus multis, quia diſſimiles ſunt. Recede in teipſum quantum potes: cum his verſare, qui te meliorem facturi ſunt: illos admitte, quos tu poteſ facere meliores. Mutuò iſta fiunt, & homines dum docent, diſcunt. *Ep.* VII.

Nam enim omnibus horis ferè aliquid atrociter fieri videmus aut audimus, etiam quia natura mitiſſimi ſumus, aſſiduitate moleſtiarum ſenſum omnem humanitatis ex animo amittimus.

Id agere debemus, ut irritamenta vitiorum quàm longiſſimè profugiamus. *Sen. Ep.* LI.

Hærebit tibi avaritia, quamdiu avaro ſordidoque convixeris: hærebit tumor, quamdiu cum ſuperbo converſaberis: nunquam ſævitiam in tortoris contubernio pones: incendent libidines tuas adulterorum ſodalitia. Si velis vitiis exui, longè à vitiorum exemplis recedendum eſt. *Ep.* CIV.

(*t*) Ultimum venit, ut fidem tibi habeas, & recta ire via te credas, nihil avocatus tranſverſis multorum veſtigiis paſſim diſcurrentium, & quorundam circa ipſam errantium viam. *Sen. de Tranq. An. cap.* 2.

quam turpem Catonem. "Drunkenneſs has been objected "againſt *Cato*; but it would be more eaſy to juſtify that "Fault, than to condemn *Cato*."

AN Hiſtorian may do a great deal of Miſchief by preſenting a vicious Example on a certain ſide, which conceals the Heinouſneſs of it. *Quintus Curtius* makes *Alexander* a continual Object of Admiration. The reſtleſs Temper of that Prince, his inſatiable Ambition, his Love of Slaughter, all thoſe Things are Greatneſs of Soul, Vigilance, Intrepidity. By that Means he raiſed himſelf above the moſt common Weakneſſes, the Fear of Pain and Death. This is ſufficient to induce a fierce Man to imitate *Alexander*, and place his Glory in chimerical Things.

AN illuſtrious Man pretends that we ought to believe without any Examination. Another, whoſe Name is no leſs celebrated, runs into Scepticiſm and Irreligion. Some follow the one or the other, and fall into Superſtition or Libertiniſm. Inſtead of an Examination, which would be eaſy and ſafe, they rather chuſe to go upon a very obſcure and uncertain Suppoſition, *viz.* that no Enquiry ought to be made after thoſe whom they are pleaſed to admire. But, how do they know that Prejudices, Humour, Lazineſs, Precipitation, Vanity, the Pleaſure of contradicting others, and Policy, have had no Share in the Opinions, which are thought to be ſufficiently juſtified by the Names of their Authors.

'TIS only after many Reflections upon the Folly of Men, that I have at laſt underſtood how it comes to paſs, that grave Men are not afraid of the ill Effects which the Obſcenities to be found in Mythology, and the Poets, may have upon young People. It ſeems to me that it were better to make them ſenſible, by a modeſt Silence, of the Danger ariſing from thoſe Things; but, on the contrary, they learn them from their Maſters in Lectures, that begin with a Prayer. Does the *Latin* Tongue ſanctify every Thing? Thoſe who look upon it as the Language of the Church, will not ſay ſo, and much leſs thoſe who profeſs to believe that it is not more holy than the moſt vulgar Languages.

A WRONG Uſe is made of the moſt holy Examples. The Apoſtles made an ill Uſe of the Example of *Elias*; and an ill Uſe has been alſo made of the Examples of Chriſt himſelf. *We read that he wept*, ſay ſome; *but we don't read that he did ever laugh.* They dare conclude from thence, that a Man muſt never laugh. They would be

well pleaſed, if we ſhould draw the ſame Conſequence; for it would make their ill Humour venerable.

EXAMPLES ought to be examined by the Law, to make a right Judgment of them; and the Senſe of the Law ought not to be determined by Examples. Nay, tho' an Example appears to be without any Fault, all the Circumſtances of it muſt be examined before we think our ſelves bound to imitate it. According to the Difference of the Circumſtances, the ſame Action will be good, indifferent, or blameable. Chriſt reproved his Apoſtles for their Deſire of imitating *Elias*. His turning out of the Temple thoſe who profaned it, is an Action which Servants and Subjects cannot lawfully imitate. He was a Prophet, a King, a Victim, and a Prieſt. A Man ſhould be inveſted with the ſame Characters, to have a Right to imitate what Chriſt did in thoſe Capacities.

MEN are too apt to imitate others. It were freqnently much better to follow one's Genius, and to improve it. Such a one might have become a Model, had he not been contented to take others for his Model. It is more eaſy to ſee what others do, in order to do the like, than to find out a new Way in order to do better (*u*).

THE ſame Lazineſs, whereby a Man confines himſelf to Imitation, is alſo the Reaſon why he imitates only what is moſt eaſy in the Model he has pitch'd upon. This is one of the Reaſons why Copies are always inferior to Originals (*x*). The Diſproportion frequently to be found between the Genius of the Model, and the Genius of the Copiſt, affords a ſecond Reaſon of it. A Man is conſtrained, when he goes out of his Character, and conſequently does every Thing wrong. Art ſhews it ſelf too much, and cannot imitate Nature, when contrary to it.

IF

(*u*) Atque eſſe tamen multos videmus, qui neminem imitentur, & ſuapte naturâ, quod velint, ſine cujuſquam ſimilitudine conſequantur: quod & in vobis animadverti rectè poteſt, Cæſar & Cotta, quorum alter inuſitatum quidem noſtris Oratoribus leporem quemdam & ſalem, alter acutiſſimum & ſubtiliſſimum dicendi genus eſt conſecutus. Neque verò veſter æqualis Curio, patre, mea ſententia, vel eloquentiſſimo temporibus illis, quemquam mihi magnopere videtur imitari, qui tamen verborum gravitate & elegantia & copia ſuam quandam expreſſit quaſi formam figuramque dicendi. *Cic. de Orat. Lib.* II.

(*x*) Ac ſine dubio in omni re vincit imitationem veritas. *Id. Lib.* III.

IF we could uſe the Eyes of the Mind as eaſily as thoſe of the Body, we ſhould perhaps diſcover as many Differences between the Characters of Men, as between their Faces. *Cicero*, who had carefully ſtudied the excellent Orators, found among thoſe, whom he places in the firſt Rank, as many different Characters, as different Names. Now it is certain, that among that prodigious Variety of Characters, a Man pitches upon a Model long before he is able to know his own Character, or even the Character of the Author he deſigns to imitate. Chance generally determines what would require a very careful Choice. (*y*)

SOME imitate a Man, becauſe 'tis their Intereſt to court him. Others imitate another Man, and look upon him as an accompliſh'd Perſon, becauſe he is the moſt eminent in the ſmall Sphere, within the Bounds of which they would confine themſelves. They fancy they will almoſt attain to Perfection, if they come near a Model, which happens unluckily to be very remote from it. Beſides, every thing appears great and admirable to a Man of a ſhallow Genius, in an Object which ſeems to offer ſomething great and admirable. He is highly pleaſed, if he can hit upon the moſt indifferent Characters of his Model, nay, he thinks he does Wonders, when he copies the Faults of his Original.

ONE muſt therefore begin with a careful Study of the *Rules*, and then perceive the excellent Effects ariſing from their Obſervation, in thoſe Examples wherein they have been followed. Thoſe excellent Effects muſt be ſet in Oppoſition to the Faults occaſioned by the Ignorance and Forgetfulneſs of the Rules. When a Man has got a Juſtneſs of Thought by the Study of the Rules, he will get a Taſte by their Application to Examples.

SENECA is partly miſtaken, when he ſays, *Longum eſt iter per præcepta, breve & efficax per exempla:* "It requires "a great deal of Time to be inſtructed by Precepts: Ex- "amples afford a ſhorter and more effectual Method." I grant that Examples afford a more effectual Method, but not ſhorter; for one muſt begin with Precepts to avoid being impoſed upon by Examples. SHALL

(*y*) Diligentiſſimequè hoc eſt eis, qui inſtituunt aliquos atque erudiunt, videndum, quo ſua quemque natura maximè ferre videatur. Etenim videmus ex eodem quaſi ludo ſummorum in ſuo cujuſque genere artificum & magiſtrorum exiſſe diſcipulos diſſimiles inter ſe, attamen laudandos, cum ad cujuſque naturam inſtitutio doctoris accommodaretur, *Id. Lib.* III.

SHALL I expreſs my ſelf obſcurely, if I ſay that there is a very great Difference between *Imitating* and *Copying*? A mere Copiſt borrows the Thoughts and Words of another, and repeats them like an Echo, or like a Looking-Glaſs, which repreſents the Features, the Air and Motions of a Man. Nay, thoſe ſervile Copiſts may be compared to thoſe Glaſſes, which disfigure more or leſs the Objects repreſented by them. But a true Imitator is like his Models, becauſe he has, as well as they, his own Character. He is alſo like them, becauſe penetrated with the ſame Maxims, he follows them without any Labour; and becauſe inſtead of pilfering up and down, he fetches every Thing from his own Genius, or from his own Subject.

Sole Cauſe, and conjoined Cauſes.

XX. THE general Idea of *Cauſe* admits of many Determinations, whereby it is diſtinguiſhed into ſeveral Kinds. The Diviſions of Cauſes above-mentioned have been taken from their Nature. I ſhall now divide Cauſes into ſeveral Claſſes, according to their *different Manners of acting*, when that Difference does not ſo much proceed from the Difference of their Nature, as from the Difference of their Operation.

A CAUSE produces its Effect, either *alone* or *jointly* with others. A Cauſe produces its Effect *alone*, either *abſolutely*, as God, when he created the World; or it is a *ſole* Cauſe *in its kind*, when the others joined to it, are not of the ſame Order, and do not act in the ſame Manner. Such a Cauſe is therefore a ſole Cauſe, not abſolutely, but *in ſome Reſpect*. Thus the Conſtruction of a Building is aſcribed to one ſingle Architect, though he was helped by many Workmen. A State is governed by one ſingle Maſter, when the Supreme Authority reſides only in one Perſon, though he follows the Counſels of many.

Conjoined Cauſes, Co-ordinate or Subordinate.

XXI. ALL conjoyned Cauſes do not bear that Name in the ſame Senſe. Sometimes they are all of the ſame Order, and act in the ſame Manner; and they are called *Co-ordinate*. Thus all the Weights acting jointly upon a Board to break it, are co-ordinate Cauſes; Each of them has the ſame Power. Sometimes the Power of ſome Cauſes is occaſioned by others; and they are called *Subordinate*. In a Mill, the fall of the Water occaſions the Motion of a Wheel; that Wheel puts others into Motion; and ſo there is a Subordination as far as the bruiſing of the Corn. It appears from thence that the

ſame

ſame Cauſe may be ſingle in one Reſpect, and joyned to others in another Reſpect.

XXII. THAT Cauſe which puts the others into Motion, and without the Motion of which the others would not have acted, goes by the Name of *Principal* Cauſe, in Oppoſition to thoſe that are ſet to work by it, and are called *leſs Principal.* *Principal Cauſe.*

BECAUSE thoſe Ideas have been entertained by the Vulgar, whoſe Language is very *Equivocal*, and becauſe they have been treated of by the Schoolmen, who could not boaſt of being more exact than the Vulgar, there is hardly any Term upon that Subject, but what has more than one Signification. A Cauſe, for inſtance, may be alſo called Principal, when it has contributed moſt to the Production of an Effect, and the Succeſs of an Enterprize, an Honour, which is ſometimes due to one of the ſubordinate Cauſes. It frequently happens that an Enterprize is raſhly formed; and its happy Succeſs is only owing to an unforeſeen Circumſtance; and yet all the Glory, or at leaſt the principal Glory of that Succeſs, is often aſcribed to the Author of that raſh Project. And if thoſe who had the greateſt Share in that happy Circumſtance, are few, or Men of no Note, they will not be ſo much as talked of. I have been informed by an Officer of great Merit and Wiſdom, that one of the greateſt Princes, and moſt celebrated Captains that ever was, taking a View of his Army from a riſing Ground, told with a ſmile one of his Generals, whom that Officer attended as his Aid de Camp: "Do you ſee the Extent of that Army? "'Tis thought that in a Day of Battle we direct all thoſe "Troops; and we are highly commended for a Victory, to "which a Sergeant has perhaps contributed moſt." That Diſcourſe was no leſs True than Modeſt. The Fault of a General may render the Skill of his Officers, and the Courage of his Soldiers uſeleſs: He will then be, in all Reſpects, the principal Cauſe of the Loſs of a Battle. But when he is looked upon as the Principal, and almoſt only Cauſe of a ſignal Victory, 'tis rather out of Affection for him, than out of Knowledge. There is nothing more neceſſary than the Ability of a General, ſince one of his Faults is ſufficient to ſpoil all; but what can his Capacity do, unleſs it be ſeconded?

THE *Romans* were obliged by a particular Reaſon to aſcribe to their Generals the principal Part of a happy Event. Their Principle was not ſolid; but they argued conſequently

ly. Whether the General was preſent or abſent, the Auſpices were taken in his Name; and according as the Gods favoured his Perſon, thoſe Auſpices were happy, as well as the Event, which verified them. A Name leſs acceptable to Heaven would have altered the Face of Things.

BUT now, when Glory is diſtributed, and given to great Men in proportion to their Grandeur, many People would be at a Loſs, if they were to juſtify their Praiſes. We love to hear of a great Event; for what ſtrikes lively upon the Imagination, affords Pleaſure; and becauſe we concern our ſelves in it, we muſt needs praiſe it. But whom ſhall we praiſe? We are more affected with a great Name; and it ſeems there is more Glory in praiſing it; for when we commend our Equals, we ſeem to depreſs our ſelves; whereas the Elevation of a great Man is ſo much the more conſiſtent with the Vanity of his Inferiors, as he appears to have a greater Merit, and to be more worthy of his Rank. And therefore we love to praiſe him, and to think he deſerves the Encomiums we beſtow upon him. This is a Privilege of great Men. What draws Hatred and Envy upon others, draws Love and Admiration upon them. Beſides, it is the Intereſt of thoſe, with whom they are ſurrounded, to court them; and others glory in thinking and ſpeaking as Courtiers do; by which means Praiſes are repeated from Mouth to Mouth, and beſtowed without Knowledge. Nay, the Happineſs of a People, the Conqueſt of ſtrong Places, and great Victories, are aſcribed to a Prince, who ſpends the greateſt Part of his Time in good Cheer, Muſick, Love, Hunting, and Gaming. In the Commonwealth of Learning Men do do not get a Name ſo eaſily, and purchaſe ſome Reputation at ſo cheap a Rate. Though a Man, plunged into Pleaſures, ſhould beſtow Penſions and Libraries upon the Learned, yet in reading the Works to which he would have contributed by his Liberality, it would not be ſaid of him, What a learned Man he is! As it is ſaid of a Prince, What a Hero! What a Conqueror! Wherefore Prejudices and Paſſions are generally the Judges of Merit, and aſcribe to a Cauſe the Honour of having more or leſs contributed to an Effect. But if we deſire to judge of it out of Knowledge, we ſhall find the Queſtions of that Nature very much compounded. They may be conſidered in ſeveral Reſpects; and in order to determine them rightly, one muſt attend to the Rule of Compariſons, that is, compare together only Things of the *ſame kind*. I ſhall therefore compare an Attempt with an Attempt, a Danger with a Danger: I ſhall

conſider

conſider how far the Wiſdom of the Scheme has contributed to its Execution; what Efforts that Execution required; and what Dangers it was expoſed to; that I may judge who contributed moſt to the Plan, who expoſed himſelf moſt to execute it, and who made the greateſt Efforts.

Co-ordinate Cauſes all Principal.

XXIII. THE *Equivocation* of the Words *principal Cauſe* has almoſt carried me into a Digreſſion. Sometimes many Cauſes are reciprocally looked upon as principal Cauſes; which happens when they act in concert.

IN ſuch Caſes, though many Cauſes have concurred to the Production of one ſingle Effect, yet the whole Effect is aſcribed to each of them, becauſe each of them has not only contributed to the Production of part of the Effect, but beſides, has been concerned in the whole Effect. Thus when many People run to put out a Fire, one of them ſaves a Beam, another a Door; but beſides, each of them uſes his utmoſt Endeavours to preſerve the Whole. In like manner, when many Incendiaries ſet a Houſe on Fire, each of them is anſwerable for the whole Loſs, as if he was the ſole Cauſe of it.

Total and partial.

XXIV. AT other times Co-ordinate Cauſes act in ſuch a Manner, that each of them is only the Cauſe of part of the Effect. Thus, though many Robbers ſhould meet by chance to plunder a Houſe, each of them would be only obliged to reſtore what he has taken away. I ſpeak of the Obligation of reſtoring, which I diſtinguiſh from deſerving to be puniſhed. Co-ordinate Cauſes in this laſt Senſe are called *Partial*, and the others juſt now mentioned, are called *Total*. But this laſt Word is ſtill very *Equivocal*, and admits of ſeveral Senſes; for, the Conjunction of Partial Cauſes, forms, as it were, one ſingle Whole, which goes alſo by the Name of total Cauſe. Beſides, that Name is beſtowed upon the Cauſe, which is *ſingle abſolutely*, and upon the Cauſe which is the *only one of its Kind*, and of its Order, provided it contributes to the *whole Effect*; and in that Reſpect there may be many total Cauſes of one ſingle Effect, but ſubordinate Cauſes. A Book is a total Production of one Mind; one Hand that writ it, is alſo the total Cauſe of it in a certain Senſe; and ſo is in its kind one ſingle Pen, that was made uſe of. The Influence of each of thoſe Cauſes reached the whole Effect.

XXV

Immediate and Mediate.

XXV. WHEN many Cauſes contribute to one Effect, thoſe are called *immediate*, which Act upon the very Subject in which the Effect is produced, and ſo reach the Effect it ſelf, and touch it. But thoſe Cauſes, the Action whereof does not reach the Effect, but conſiſts only in ſetting other Cauſes to work, are called *Mediate*; and among them, ſome are more *remote* than others.

Diviſion of remote Cauſes.

XXVI. SOMETIMES remote Cauſes afford only to other Cauſes, leſs remote, a Matter to Act, or they facilitate the Occaſions of Acting: Theſe are *preparing* Cauſes. Nay, ſometimes the whole Influence of a Cauſe conſiſts only in removing the Obſtacles, which might hinder the Action of the other Cauſes from producing its Effect. Theſe are called, in the Schools, Cauſes *without which* the Effect does not happen.

Univerſal and Particular Cauſes.

XXVII. WHEN the ſame remote Cauſe has many different Effects, when it does equally Exerciſe its Power upon ſeveral Subjects, and that Power is differently diverſified by the Agents to be found between that remote Cauſe and its Effects; ſuch a Cauſe is called *univerſal*; and thoſe which determine its general Power, are called *particular* Cauſes.

IN order to determine which of thoſe Cauſes has the greateſt Share in the Production of an Effect, one ſhould in the firſt Place know the Nature and Manner of acting of each of thoſe Cauſes, and then obſerve, by comparing them together, the Rules which I have laid down before. But Men are not ſo nice about it. Among many Cauſes, which act jointly, that which affects the Senſes moſt, and by that means is the moſt eaſy to be diſcovered, is commonly more minded, and frequently the only one that is attended to. Thus we are miſtaken about the Cauſes of Diſeaſes incident to the human Body, and of the Diſorders which diſturb the Society and the Body Politick.

Subordination of two Sorts.

XXVIII. WHEN in a Subordination of Cauſes, each of them follows in its Motions the Direction of the principal Cauſe, that Subordination is called *eſſential*. But if ſome of them, by their own Activity, depart from the Direction of the principal Cauſe, and by that Means break the Series of the Motions deſigned to produce an Effect, that Subordination is looked upon as *accidental*; and what is defective in the Effect, is not imputed to the principal Cauſe, if it was

was not in its Power to foreſee the Inconveniencies, whereby its Deſign would be diſordered; or if having foreſeen them, it was not obliged to ſuſpend its Action, and to give over the Production of ſome important Effects, in order to prevent ſome Inconveniencies. Wherefore in ſuch Caſes, what is good in the intended Effect, ought to be of ſuch a Nature as to deſerve that one ſhould overlook the Inconveniency which attends it, and which cannot be avoided without giving over an Effect more valuable and more neceſſary, as a Good, than the Inconveniency is odious, as an Evil. I ſay, it ought to be more proper and more advantageous to procure that intended Good, than to neglect it in order to avoid the Evil with which it is attended. It is better, for inſtance, to attack and ſink Pirates, though ſome innocent Perſons, whom they made Priſoners, will periſh in the Attack, than to give them, under that Pretence, full Liberty to infeſt the Seas, and to encreaſe every Day the Number of unhappy Men.

BUT an Architect is blamed, and anſwerable for the Damage, when the Materials he made uſe of, occaſion the fall, ſplitting or leaning of an Edifice, though otherwiſe raiſed according to all the Rules of Art; becauſe he ought not to mind only the Diſpoſition of the Materials, but alſo their Nature.

IT is ſometimes right, but ſometimes wrong, to judge of a Project by the Event. When nothing happens but what was in the Scheme; when no Part of the Event is owing to happy Circumſtances, which could not be expected; when every Part of the Succeſs is an Effect of the Precautions and Attention of him, who is the principal Cauſe of it; the Event is rightly looked upon as a Proof of his Ability.

BUT when a Man muſt neceſſarily reſolve upon ſomething, and does it by the moſt probable Appearances, for want of an infallible Certainty, which the Nature of Things does not permit him to have; if ſome Circumſtances, which could neither be feared, nor prevented, occaſion the Miſcarriage of his Undertaking, the Event proves nothing againſt him. In ſuch a Caſe, one may rightly ſay: *Omnium rerum conſilium ſapiens, non exitum ſpectat.* A rational Man does not mind ſo much what has happened, as what was deſigned to be done, and the Reaſons for reſolving upon it (*d*).

THAT

(*d*) Nunquam enim temeritas cum ſapientia commiſcetur: nec ad conſilium caſus admittitur. *Cic. pro M. Marcello.*

Hoc

THAT Propenſity of moſt People to judge of a Deſign only by the Event, does Good and Harm in the Society. It makes a Man wary: He will be ſure of the Succeſs, knowing how difficult it is to juſtify a Project, when it miſcarries. But ſome Matters are not capable of an infallible Certainty: And upon thoſe Occaſions, the Fear of being overwhelmed with Reproaches, or Banters, for the ill Succeſs of an Undertaking, makes a Man give over ſome Thoughts, which might have a noble Effect. One muſt have an uncommon Zeal to expoſe one ſelf to the Hazard of being blamed, rather than neglect an Occaſion of doing what will probably have a very good Succeſs (*e*).

Inſtrumental Cauſes.

XXIX. BECAUSE little Care has been taken to beſtow a true Name upon each Cauſe, I have been obliged to ſpend the greateſt Part of this Chapter in clearing the Confuſion brought into this Matter. I muſt go on with that Work. When Cauſes leſs principal have no Activity of their own, and act only as they are directed by the Principal, they are called *inſtrumental Cauſes*. Thus a Pen is an *Inſtrument*, becauſe it writes only by being moved. It appears from thence that *intelligent Cauſes*, which are capable of Liberty and Choice, cannot be called *inſtrumental* Cauſes, but in a figurative Senſe. In this Senſe, a Man, who lays aſide his own Activity, to be altogether governed by others, without any Examination, will be called an *inſtrumental Cauſe*. Wherefore we ought not to take in a literal Senſe what is ſaid of a Murderer, for inſtance, or a Poiſoner, that he was an Inſtrument in the Hands of the firſt Cauſe, to put an End to the Life of an innocent Man; for the firſt Cauſe, infinitely Wiſe, Good, and Holy, has not directed ſuch a wicked Man to execute that horrid Project. When it is ſaid, upon ſuch an Occaſion, that we muſt not mind only the Stone that gave the immediate blow, but go back as far as the Hand which directed it, the meaning of thoſe Words is this: We ought to bear a Misfortune as patiently, as if the

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Hoc plerumque facimus, ut conſilia eventis ponderemus; & cui benè quid proceſſerit, multum illum providiſſe; cui ſecus, nihil ſenſiſſe dicamus, - - - - ut jam nihil eſſe videatur, niſi divinare, ſapientis. *Pro C. Rab. Poſt.*

(*e*) "Thoſe Men (*ſays* Montagne, *Book* II. *Chap.* 34. *ſpeaking* "*of* Alexander *and* Cæſar) had more than a human Confidence in "their Fortune. One of them ſaid, *That Enterprizes were to be exe-* "*cuted, and not debated.*"

the Blow was come immediately from the ſupreme Cauſe. The Reaſon of it is, that nothing happens without the Knowledge of the ſupreme Being; and ſince that Being, though Good, Holy, and averſe to Evil, has thought fit to permit it, we ſhould be certainly in the wrong to murmur about a Thing, which he tolerates with great Patience.

THE ſupreme Being, who is as Wiſe as he is Powerful, who loves Order and Equity infinitely more than the wiſeſt and beſt Men, does perfectly know the Thoughts of all Mankind, and has future Things in his Power. If our Knowledge could attain to the Knowledge of the ſupreme Being, we ſhould ſee that he diſpoſes of all Things for the beſt. And therefore whoever is grieved at what he orders and ſuffers, is wanting to the Reſpect due to him. It is always wrong to loſe our Time, of which we can never be too ſparing, in reflecting upon Events, that are not in our Power. Every Body has within his Cloaths a petty Kingdom, hard to be governed: Wrong Notions and Rebellious Thoughts ariſe in it. We muſt mend, repreſs, fight, and triumph: We muſt be ſenſible ſometimes of the Shamefulneſs of a Defeat, to riſe up again; and ſometimes of the Pleaſure of a Conqueſt, and the Charms of a Victory, to engage a new Battle. Beſides, a Man is ſurrounded with Inferiors, Equals, and Superiors. We owe an Homage to ſome Men: Others pay us a Tribute. We muſt be juſt to all, and uſeful to every Body, if it be poſſible. Thus we are a Compound of Meanneſs and Greatneſs, Knowledge and Ignorance. A wiſe Man is in his own Eyes, what Noveliſts will have their Heroes to be in the Eyes of the World. God orders, directs, and permits: In all thoſe Reſpects I am in the wrong to grow impatient. Wherefore I reſpect what is not in my Power, as if it came from the Hand of God; for he does not prevent it, and has ſome Reaſons not to do it.

IT is alſo evident, that Men make a very ill Uſe of the Word *Inſtrument*, and do not ſufficiently mind the true Notion of it upon a thouſand Occaſions. Though they are guilty, yet they pretend to juſtify themſelves by ſaying they have only acted as Inſtruments, and that if there is any Harm in what they do, the Cauſe which they obey is only anſwerable for it; as if Men were allow'd to renounce their Knowledge and Liberty, to make no Uſe of them, and to ſubject themſelves to the Will of another, without enquiring whether he commands lawful or unlawful Things. 'Tis certainly a horrid Scandal to ſee Chriſtians, that is, Men who call themſelves Diſciples of the GOD of Peace, and Children

of

of the Father of all Nations, ſell themſelves, in a manner, to plunder and to kill, without examining whether the Order for doing ſo be grounded upon Reaſon, or tends only to raviſh what belongs to others, and to deſtroy with Fire and Sword thoſe, who take up Arms in Defence of their Rights againſt unſatiable Uſurpers, and Diſturbers of the Publick Peace (*b*).

HERE we may ſee how little moſt Men agree with themſelves. One would think from their Words, that they adore their Princes; and yet at the leaſt Signal from them, there is no Meanneſs, no Injuſtice, no Cruelty, but what they will be guilty of, without any Scruple, being perſuaded that all thoſe Things will be laid upon the Prince. The Truth is, they love no Body but themſelves, wherein they uſe their Maſters in their own Way; for, the latter pretend to love, and yet love no Body. One would think, they do not look upon other Men to be of their own Kind; for they uſe them like Dogs and Horſes, which they kill by uſing them; and when they die, they are quite forgotten, and others ſupply their Room. Moſt Subjects likewiſe, without any true Love for their Maſters, whom they ſeem to adore, think only of raiſing themſelves. With that Proſpect they flatter and obey with Eagerneſs; and becauſe the readieſt and blindeſt Obedience is generally the moſt acceptable, they perform it; and a mere Effect of an ambitious and unjuſt *Intereſt* is call'd a *Duty*, Fidelity, the Love of one's Country, though in many Caſes, that blind Obedience be directly contrary to the Intereſts of the Prince and Country. Thus Vice is honour'd with the Name of Virtue. Thoſe Inconveniencies might be prevented, if Men, inſtead of being ſatisfied with confuſed Pretences, would govern themſelves by *clear Ideas*, and well defined Notions.

AN ill Uſe is made of Inſtruments, when they are uſed contrary to their natural and lawful Deſtination. Wine is deſigned to rejoice and ſtrengthen: An ill Uſe is made of it, when a Man drinks ſo much, as to grow ſtupid and deſtroy his Health. The lawful Uſe of the Sword conſiſts in defending one's ſelf, and protecting the Innocent againſt their

(*b*) Ex quo pecunia in honore eſſe cœpit, verus rerum honor cecidit; mercatoreſque & venales invicem facti, quærimus non quale ſit quidque, ſed quanti. Ad mercedem pii ſumus, ad mercedem impii. Honeſta, quamdiu aliqua illis ſpes ineſt, ſequimur, in contrarium tranſituri, ſi plus ſcelera promittant. *Sen. Ep.* CXV.

their unjuſt Aggreſſors; an ill Uſe is made of it by taking away a Man's Life, without having a Right to do it.

IT is a Query, whether the Uſe of Inſtruments ought to be laid aſide by reaſon of the ill Uſe that is made of them. It ought to be laid aſide, when the ſame End can be attain'd by other Means, and when the Danger, ariſing from the Abuſe, exceeds the Benefit ariſing from the Uſe. But when Inſtruments are neceſſary for an important Uſe, and the Abuſes may be prevented, what is more uſeful would be preferred to what is leſs uſeful, if the Uſe was laid aſide to avoid an Abuſe. Beſides, one muſt examine whether an Abuſe, being prevented one Way, may not creep in many other Ways; for why ſhould wiſe Men deprive themſelves of ſome comfortable Things, of which they can make a very lawful Uſe, if the Inconveniencies which they would prevent by yielding their Right, are brought in ſtill by other Cauſes?

IF thoſe Rules be attended to, we ſhall be able to determine the following Queſtions: Whether it was lawful to forbid the Reading of the Holy Scripture? Whether Men ought to enjoy the Liberty of a free Examination? Whether it were better for the Clergy to renounce ſome of their Dignities, or part of their great Wealth? or whether it be proper to reſtore them in thoſe Countries, where they have been taken away. But upon theſe Subjects and many others, in order to avoid falling into Error, it is abſolutely neceſſary to have a perfect Knowledge of the Things that are to be compared together; otherwiſe, one might eaſily make a wrong Application of the Rule. An ill Uſe is made of Plays and Satire. The Queſtion is, whether they ought to be ſuppreſſed by reaſon of thoſe accidental Abuſes? Muſt all Vines be pluck'd up? Muſt all beautiful Women hide themſelves? Muſt all Spectacles and publick Entertainments be forbidden?

Diſtinctions leſs accurate.

XXX. BECAUSE in the whole Courſe of our Lives, and in the whole World, we perceive nothing but a continual Viciſſitude of Cauſes and Effects, thoſe Words being ſo common, and apply'd to ſo many different Subjects, and ſo many different Ways of acting, muſt needs have alſo very different Interpretations. Hence ſo many Diſtinctions, ſome of which are juſt and neceſſary, but the others are only grounded upon a wrong Way of viewing Things. Cauſes are diſtinguiſh'd, for inſtance, into *procreating* and *preſerving* Cauſes. We are told, that the former produce ſomething new, and make

ſome Alteration; and that the others do only maintain a Thing in its State. But how can that be a Cauſe, which produces nothing? 'Tis plain, that Diſtinction is not exact. Sometimes the Preſervation of a Thing is aſcribed to an Agent, which has only removed what might have done it ſome harm: But, exactly ſpeaking, that Agent is only the Cauſe of that Removing. At other Times, the Preſervation of a Thing in its State is aſcribed to a Man, who takes Care to prevent all the Accidents that might alter it, becauſe that Intention is look'd upon as an Effect. Laſtly, at other Times, the Cauſe, that is call'd a *preſerving* Cauſe, has really acted upon the Subject it has preſerved; but what it has produced, not being very ſenſible, it is not minded, nor called, upon that Account, a *producing* Cauſe.

THE Diſtinction of Cauſes into *univocal* and *equivocal*, is not much better grounded. We are told that the former are like their Effects, and the latter different from them. I grant that intelligent Cauſes can produce very different Effects from themſelves, ſince they can produce Motions by the Efficacy of their Will, which is not a Motion: But Bodies have no Action, and no Force, but by their Motion; and a Motion never produces but a like Motion. 'Tis true, that when many Cauſes are united to produce a compounded Effect, that Effect, conſider'd in its Totality, will be different from each of its partial Cauſes; but each immediate Effect will always be like its immediate Cauſe, and bear the Character of it. The Action is the acting Cauſe, and the Effect is the Trace of the Action.

WE are convinced by our own Experience, that Thought can produce or determine Motion. We are alſo convinced, that a Motion produces only a Motion, that Figures produce only Figures, as Numbers, being united together, produce only Numbers. And therefore we think contrary to our Knowledge, when we fancy that Thought can ariſe from Extenſion, rather than believe that Thought is capable of modifying and diſpoſing Extenſion.

Axioms. XXXI. THE Notions of Cauſe and Effect are very common and uniform: There are none that Men conceive more frequently, and more eaſily. Thoſe clear and familiar Notions made all Men conclude, that *nothing is done without a Cauſe*; that every Being, every Reality, every State that can exiſt, or not exiſt, every Thing that can be one Way, or another Way, muſt have been determined by ſome Cauſe to be, rather than not to be; to be in a certain manner, rather than in another. What can be,

or

or not be; what can be in a certain manner, or in another; if it was not determined by ſome Cauſe to be, rather than not to be; to be in a certain manner, rather than in another; if nothing had made it, or if nothing had made it ſuch as it is, rather than otherwiſe; its Exiſtence, its Manner of Being, would be an Effect of Nothing.

MEN continually argue upon that Principle; their whole Conduct runs upon that Foundation. When they form a Deſign, they think of proper Means for the Execution of it: When a Thing happens, they ask how it came to paſs. If a Man, driven by a Tempeſt upon an Iſland, where he ſees Buildings, or only regular Grottoes, Trees planted in a Row, ſome mathematical Inſtruments, *&c.* if ſuch a Man ſhould admire the Caprice of Chance in imitating ſuch a Regularity, he would be accounted a Man out of his Senſes by every Body. And therefore it muſt be acknowledged, that a Man falls into a great Extravagance, when reflecting upon the Diſpoſition of the Univerſe, he renounces a Principle which he always made uſe of, and by which he never was deceived. Certainly, nothing but a great Depravation hinders him from being ſenſible of his Folly.

THE ſame Knowledge, which teaches us that nothing is done without a Cauſe, does likewiſe teach us that *no one Thing can be produced of it ſelf*, ſince a Thing muſt already exiſt to give Exiſtence. The *Proportion of the Reality of Effects, with the Reality of their Cauſes*, is grounded upon thoſe ſame Principles; for if there was more Reality and Perfection in the Effect than in the Cauſe, that Reality and Perfection, not proceeding from the Cauſe, in which they are not, would have no Cauſe at all, and would be the Work of Nothing.

AGAIN, from the ſame Principles we judge of Effects by their Cauſes, and of Cauſes by their Effects; becauſe an Effect being the Impreſſion of a Cauſe, it muſt be like its Cauſe. If your Virtue is only an Effect of ſome Fear, or of ſome Trouble in your Mind, it will laſt no longer than your ill Humour; and when it does not proceed from Knowledge, it muſt needs throw you into Extremes, and into Superſtition. If your Zeal for thoſe whom you call your Friends, has no other Principle but your Intereſt, it will laſt and end with that Intereſt.

XXXII. A MOUNTAIN, the Paths whereof being dark and full of Briars, are difficult to be found, and yet, notwithſtanding thoſe Difficulties, are frequented by People, who go up, and come down, *Diſcovery of Cauſes.*

down, is a pretty exact Emblem of Philoſophy, in which a Man aſcends from the Effects to the Cauſes, or deſcends from the Cauſes to the Effects.

MEN are miſtaken in thoſe two Reſpects, which is the Reaſon of ſo many chimerical Syſtems, and vain Projects.

A MAN looks for a Cauſe, and is reſolved to find it out. An Idea offers it ſelf; he takes hold of it. However, it is not the beſt; it is only the moſt familiar to him, and the moſt agreeable to his Prejudices. 'Tis no Matter; he is pleaſed with it for that very Reaſon: He goes no farther.

SOME are contented to imagine a poſſible Cauſe, and then aſcribe to it ſome Phænomena, and ſometimes ſo haſtily, that they only mind thoſe which agree to their Conjecture, or thoſe Circumſtances that may be explain'd by it; they lay aſide every Thing elſe. Thus the Courſe of the heavenly Bodies has been aſcribed to moving Intelligences, and the Formation of organized Bodies to plaſtick Natures, without knowing what they are. It has been rightly ſaid, that it is an eaſy Thing to imagine, but a difficult one to obſerve; becauſe Men being impatient of imagining a Cauſe of the Effects which they obſerve, ſee nothing in thoſe Effects but what favours the Conjecture of which they are fond.

A MAN takes hold of a Conjecture, as a Maſon takes hold of a Stone, to lay it in a Building. One would think he has received a Commiſſion to make the World according to his Ideas. He conceives that a certain Motion could produce certain Effects, and will have it to be ſo. I conceive, that if the fluid Matter, which ſurrounds the Earth, deſcribes all manner of Ways, Circles, or Arches of Circles, having the Center of the Earth for their common Center, thoſe Motions will cauſe the Fall of heavy Bodies; therefore I have found out the true Cauſe of that Fall. But is it not a precarious Suppoſition? What Proof have I of thoſe Motions, ſo different by reaſon of the Difference of their Tendencies, and at the ſame time ſo uniform, becauſe they are all Concentric? What Cauſe can I alledge of their Riſe and Continuation?

WHEN out of Shame of being ſilent, or ſpeaking after others, a Man has contrived an Hypotheſis, he leaves nothing unattempted to defend it againſt very good Arguments; and rather than give it up, he fences it about with Nonſenſe.

IT is one Thing to prove the Truth of one's Conjectures, and another to adjuſt them ſo well, that they cannot be overthrown one by another.

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THE Connexion of *Conſequences*, makes a Man wiſh that the *Principles* be true, and diſpoſes him to believe them; but it does not prove them.

A COMPARISON may ſerve to prove the Poſſibility of a Cauſe, by making it more intelligible; but it does not eſtabliſh the Truth of it.

IN order to find out ſome Cauſe, we ſhould conſider its Effects with great Attention, enquire into and weigh the Circumſtances according to the Maxims laid down above. *Chap.* V. It happens ſometimes that the Cauſe we ſeek with that Method, is diſcover'd by the Senſes themſelves: But when it eſcapes their Penetration, and Conjectures muſt ſupply them, we ought, in the firſt Place, to examine the Poſſibility of the Cauſes of which we have an Idea; and the particular Ideas of which it is compoſed, muſt contain no Inconſiſtency among themſelves, nor with our other Ideas, which are already known to be clear and juſt. Afterwards, we muſt be ſure, by convincing Reaſons, that the Cauſe which appears to us poſſible, does actually exiſt. Laſtly, we muſt enquire whether it produces the Effect aſcribed to it. To that end, the Subject upon which that Effect is produced, ought to be placed in Circumſtances wherein that Cauſe cannot act upon it. It ought to be placed in other Circumſtances, wherein it can act but imperfectly. The other Cauſes, to which that Effect might be owing, muſt be laid aſide; and by thoſe Obſervations we ſhall proceed from Probability to Certainty.

IF an Effect is only owing to a certain Cauſe, it will appear where that Cauſe is to be found; and it will not appear where that Cauſe is not obſerved. For inſtance, ſome have conjectured that the *Stamina* in Flowers ſerve for the purifying of the Juices; but in all Plants the Juices muſt be purify'd: And yet the *Stamina* do not grow upon thoſe Plants that bear Seed, and always grow upon thoſe that bear none.

THE Liquor of *Succinum*, being ſhaken in a Vial, takes a Purple-Colour. It is inferred from thence, that this Colour ariſes neither by an Addition, nor by a Subſtraction of Parts, and is owing to mere Alterations.

'TIS in vain to pretend to have diſcover'd the true Cauſe of an Effect, when that pretended Cauſe leaves us as much in the dark as before. It is a Query, for inſtance, how a Stone continues to move, as ſoon as it comes out of the Hand that throws it. 'Tis the Elaſticity of the Air, ſay ſome, which is the Cauſe of that continued Motion. But

what is that Elaſticity? What is the Cauſe of it? How comes its Motion to continue, and its Activity to be perpetual? A Body of Natural Philoſophy will never ſatisfy the Mind, if it contains other Principles than mechanical Principles, and any other Thing be ſuppoſed in material Beings, beſides Motion, Reſt, Figure, and the Situation of the different Corpuſcles of which they are compoſed. 'Tis in vain to explain ſome Phænomena by the Properties of Salts and Sulphurs, *&c.* for unleſs I have an Idea of thoſe Salts, and of thoſe Sulphurs, whereby I may know how they act, I am ſtill in the dark as to the Cauſes of the Phænomenon. When I am told, and even ſhewn by Experience, that ſuch and ſuch Effects ought to reſult from the Action of Salts, Sulphurs, *&c.* I am inform'd of ſome Effects, but I am not taught how they ariſe. It is in vain to tell me, That acid Salts give the Form and Eſſence to all mix'd Bodies: That they are *the eldeſt Sons of the Sun*; *the Promoters of all Fermentation*; *the true Balſam of Nature*, *which preſerves all Bodies*, *and the beſt and moſt valuable Things in the World.* I am by no Means inſtructed by a Language, which I don't underſtand.

THE more ſimple and evident thoſe Rules are, the more ſhameful a Thing is it to neglect them. It is a Sign of a very contemptible Lightneſs of Mind to take Pride in ſome Conjectures, which an unruly Imagination may eaſily bring forth, and to call them a *Syſtem*, becauſe, if they are ſuppoſed, one may explain to thoſe, who readily grant them, ſome Circumſtances of a Phænomenon. A Man gets a Name at a cheap Rate; he gets himſelf recorded among original Wits, and takes for a juſt Encomium whatever the Politeneſs of Men of Letters makes them ſay about thoſe new Propoſitions, which, like political News, make ſome Noiſe for a Week, and then are altogether forgotten. A Man, being extremely deſirous to get a Name, not only takes hold of every Thing that offers it ſelf, but alſo ſtops there; and is ſo ſincerely miſtaken, that he does not ſcruple to make the Eyes of all other Men the Judges of his Diſcovery. He informs the Publick, out of Charity, that he has diſcover'd a Thermometer, ſought long ago by the Royal Academy of Sciences, free from the Imperfections of other Thermometers, and containing all the Advantages that are only to be found ſeparately in thoſe that have been uſed hitherto. Another deſires his Friends to inform the Publick, forthwith, of a new Diſcovery in Geometry, the Paralogiſm whereof is obvious.

XXXIII.

XXXIII. In the Practice and Conduct of Life, the Diſcovery of the true Cauſes is frequently of the greateſt Importance, becauſe to prevent an ill Effect, or to put a Stop to it, 'tis but taking away its fundamental Cauſe. Becauſe the Events of human Life are generally very much compounded and complicated, Men eaſily fancy they know the whole Cauſe of an Effect, though they only know part of it: Nay, Circumſtances are often looked upon as Cauſes. Intereſt and other Paſſions fix the Mind upon thoſe Things with which it is affected, and hinder it from going farther. Men of a ſhallow Mind dwell upon partial Cauſes, and pretend to ſee every thing; but thoſe who have a greater Extent of Wit, don't ſtop till they come to the Source. When a Man of a ſhallow Wit has a Deſign at Heart, he only ſees his Aim, and does not perceive the Obſtacles that lie in his Way. He runs ſo faſt towards his Aim, that he ſtumbles, and frequently cannot attain to it. *In Practical Affairs.*

THERE is nothing more common among Men, than to aſcribe to their Misfortune what proceeds only from their own Fault. By that means they think they have a Right to be angry with thoſe whom they do not love, or to inveigh againſt I know not what, inſtead of blaming themſelves. A Man does not ſucceed in a Deſign of which he was very fond; whereupon, without enquiring into the Cauſes of his Miſcarriage, he gives the obſcure Name of Misfortune to a Cauſe unknown to him. It frequently happens, that a Man ſcolds at others, for no other Reaſon but becauſe he is not well pleaſed with himſelf: And in general, Men lay their Faults upon others as much as they can. Deaf People complain that others ſpeak too low: Dull Preachers groan by reaſon of the Lukewarmneſs of the Age.

MEN love to make Syſtems, and to raiſe vaſt Edifices upon a ſmall Number of Suppoſitions: That Inclination does frequently move Hiſtorians to vent their own Imaginations as undeniable Facts. Out of ſome Strokes they form a compleat Character; and that Character, if we may believe them, influenced all the Actions of a Man; as if it was not a common Thing among Men to contradict themſelves, to act at a venture, and to become the Sport of Circumſtances (*c*).

(*c*) *Montagne* (Book III. Ch. 9.) *alledges an Example of thoſe Reformations, which do not remove the Evil.* "However, I ſaw "ſome

THE Society is disturbed by many Disorders: A Man undertakes to remove some of them. To that End, he perceives some Causes which contribute to a certain Disorder. A well-meaning Man, or a Man who desires to get a Name, is wonderfully pleased with that Discovery; but, though that particular Cause be removed, it frequently happens that all the other Causes remain still; and the Method that is made use of, is attended with many other Inconveniences that are no less grievous (*d*).

WHEN therefore something is to be mended, one must examine, 1. Whether it be a Disorder, and an Evil. 2. For what Reasons it is a Disorder, and an Evil. 3. One must go back from one Principle to another, as far as the first Cause of that Evil; take a Survey of Men, and consider how they would live, if such a Cause was removed, and had no longer any Influence over them. Afterwards one must enquire, whether the Dispositions of the People would not be still sufficient to revive the same Inconveniency; for Men do frequently make a great Noise about the pretended Remedy of a Symptom, which does not perfectly cure the Evil.

LASTLY,

" some Years ago a Man, for whose Memory I have a great Respect, " who, in the midst of our Evils, when there was neither Law, " nor Justice, nor any Magistrate that performed his Office, no " more than now, published I know not what sorry Reformations " about Cloaths, Cookery, and Pettifogging. They are mere Amuse- " ments to please a People ill used, that they may not think they have been " quite forgotten. Others do the same, when they forbid a People, " given over to all sorts of execrable Vices, to Dance and to Play. " It is not a proper Time for a Man to wash, and make himself " clean, when he is sick of a violent Fever."

(*d*) " Considering the natural Instability of our Manners and Opi- " nions, it appears to me frequently, that good Authors themselves " are in the wrong, to pretend to form a constant and solid Contexture " of Men. They pitch upon an universal Air, and interpret, according " to that Image, all the Actions of a Man; and if they cannot wrest " them sufficiently, they have recourse to Dissimulation. *Augustus* " escaped them; for there is in that Man such an apparent, sudden, " and continual Variety of Actions, during the whole Course of his " Life, that the boldest Judges have not thought fit to meddle with " him. There is nothing in Men I am more apt to disbelieve than " Constancy, and nothing I believe more easily than their Incon- " stancy. In all Antiquity it would be a hard Matter to pick out " twelve Men, who directed their Lives to a certain Aim, which is " the principal End of Wisdom." *Montagne, Book* II. *Chap.* 1.

Laſtly, Though the Remedies ſhould appear efficacious and certain, yet we muſt ſtill examine whether they be lawful and uſeful; for the Remedy of an Evil does frequently occaſion worſe Evils, and more difficult to be cured. Thoſe Enquiries are above a Man of a narrow Mind, who is not laborious, who has no clear Thoughts, who knows not how to be free from Prejudices, and does not judge of Things with all the neceſſary Calmneſs and Attention.

IN like manner, when ſome Good is to be procured; leaſt we ſhould be impoſed upon, and prejudiced by its Advantages (*e*), we muſt in the firſt Place examine whether it be poſſible, and then whether it be uſeful. To that End, we muſt have a clear Notion of the Thing it ſelf, weigh the Efficacy of the Means proper to bring it about, conſider the Power we have over thoſe Means, their Simplicity and Certainty, compare them with the Obſtacles, and compare alſo the Uſefulneſs of the intended Good with the Uſefulneſs of what we part with to obtain it. That Compariſon leads us to examine the Uſefulneſs of the Thing it ſelf; and that Examination muſt run upon three Things: 1. Whether it be Juſt; and why. 2. What Benefit will be reaped from it. 3. What Inconveniencies it will be expoſed to. In each of thoſe Conſiderations we ought to be attentive, and ſet Things before our Eyes, in order to apprehend, whether, ſuppoſing ſuch and ſuch Circumſtances, ſuch and ſuch Conſequences

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(*e*) "An eager and violent Deſire is rather an Obſtacle, than a "Help, to carry on a Deſign: It makes us very uneaſy, with reſpect "to Events that prove ſlow or contrary to our Expectation: It "raiſes in us a Suſpicion towards thoſe with whom we deal. We "never manage well a Thing by which we are poſſeſs'd and governed.

---- *Malè cuncta miniſtrat*
Impetus.

"A Man, who uſes only his Judgment and his Skill, goes on more "chearfully: He diſſembles, he yields, and puts off, as Occaſion re"quires. He miſſes his Aim, without being vexed at it, being ready "for a new Attempt: He acts with Deliberation. A Man, who is "moved by violent and tyrannical Deſires, muſt needs betray a "great Imprudence and Injuſtice. He is hurried on by the Impe"tuoſity of thoſe Deſires: They are raſh Motions, and of little Uſe, "unleſs they be very much ſupported by Fortune." *Montagne, Book* III. *Chap.* 10.

ſequences will take place. A Man, who does not proceed in that cautious Method, will be apt to fall into chimerical Notions, and build Caſtles in the Air.

IF a Man happens to be prepoſſeſs'd with Affection and Deſires, he muſt entreat ſome Perſons, who are able to examine the Eaſineſs and Difficulty of a Project with more Indifference, to enter upon that Examination. A great many Things will offer themſelves to a Man free from Prejudices, which would eſcape a Man who is prepoſſeſs'd.

THE Method which I have propoſed to reaſon about a Project, appears to me eſſential; and one cannot depart from it, without running the Hazard of falling into Error. When a Man is very intent upon the Advantages ariſing from the Succeſs of an Enterprize, he can hardly avoid being prepoſſeſs'd, and inflamed with Deſires at the Sight of ſo many Advantages. He is reſolved to attain his Ends: He only ſees what can be ſerviceable to his Deſign; and all the Obſtacles diſappear, or, at leaſt, he perceives them only at a Diſtance.

NOT only Men of a vehement Temper run too haſtily into an ill-concerted Project, but the calmeſt People are alſo guilty of the ſame Fault. Being uſed to feed themſelves with flattering Notions, as ſoon as they have formed a Deſign, they ſhut their Eyes againſt every Thing that might make them uneaſy, and diſturb the Pleaſure of their Hopes. Nay, thoſe Men never mend, becauſe the Deſire of Quietneſs does not allow them to reflect upon their Faults, and to grow more wary by their Reflections.

IT happens but too often, that ſome Perſons, full of Piety and Zeal, engage too eaſily in Projects, the Execution whereof would require that Men ſhould be new moulded. Thoſe Projects, wonderful in the Theory, occaſion many Diſorders, when a Man is reſolved to execute them.

TIMOROUS People are only affected with Inconveniencies; and bold Men conſider only Advantages, and the Means of obtaining them. Happy is that Man, who indulging neither Fear, nor Raſhneſs, can diſcover every Thing, and compare the Power of the Means with the Force of the Obſtacles, that are to be overcome! It requires Tranquillity without Indolence, and a long Habit of reflecting upon what paſſes in the World, and comparing Events with their Cauſes.

FEW People can rightly judge of Things, without exaggerating the Facility or the Difficulty, according as Deſire or Fear prevails in them. Men are uſed from their early

Years

Years to decide a great many Things which they never examined, and which are wholly or very imperfectly known to them. Thoſe Deciſions proceed from Paſſion. Reaſon has hardly any ſhare in them. According as a Man is bold and daring, or timorous and wary, according as he is inclined or averſe to a Propoſition, he looks out for Arguments to prove or reject it. Thoſe Arguments are not drawn from the Knowledge of the Subject, but from Paſſion. The Reaſonings of moſt People diſcover only the Thing in Favour of which they are prejudiced, without clearing it.

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